Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

Shortly after takeoff from Moroni-Prince Saïd Ibrahim-Hahaya Airport, while climbing, the pilot encountered an unexpected situation and apparently attempted an emergency landing when the twin engine airplane struck the ground past the runway end and came to rest inverted. All 11 occupants were evacuated, a passenger and the pilot were injured. The aircraft was partially destroyed by a post crash fire.

While approaching class B airspace, the airline transport pilot was in communication with a controller who later stated that the pilot's speech was slurred, and the controller repeatedly asked if the oxygen system on the airplane was working properly. As the airplane approached a nearby airport, about 85 miles from his destination airport, the pilot stated he had the airport in sight and repeatedly requested a visual approach. The controller instructed the pilot to continue his flight to his destination, in a southwest direction. As the controller attempted to maintain communications, the pilot dropped off radar shortly after passing the nearby airport and subsequently landed at the nearby airport, which was not his destination airport. According to a surveillance video and impact marks on the runway, the airplane landed hard about halfway down the runway and slid to a stop on the left side of the runway. The airplane fuselage and wings were mostly consumed by postimpact fire. After authorities arrived onsite, the pilot was arrested for operating an aircraft under the influence of alcohol. The pilot was found to have a blood alcohol level of .288, which likely contributed to the pilot landing at the incorrect airport and his subsequent loss of airplane control during landing.

The purpose of the flight was to drop eight parachutists from flight level 130 (an altitude of 13,000 feet, approximately 4,000 metres). The load sheet that the pilot received did not contain any information about the individual weights of the parachutists or the total mass of the load. The pilot could thus not, with any help from the load sheet, check or make his own calculation of mass and balance before the flight. The aeroplane was approaching the airport and, at 14:05 hrs, the pilot requested permission to drop the parachutists slightly higher because of clouds. The airspeed was decreasing in conjunction with the aeroplane’s approach to the airport. Just over a kilometre from the airport where the jump point was located, the aeroplane suddenly changed direction to the left and began descending rapidly in almost the opposite direction. The aeroplane then travelled just under one kilometre at the same time as it descended 1,500 metres, which is a dive angle of over 45 degrees. The aeroplane broke up in the air as both the airspeed and the g-forces exceeded the permitted values for the aeroplane. From an altitude of 2,000 metres, the aeroplane fell almost vertically with a descent velocity of around 60 m/s. The fact that no one was able to get out and save themselves using their parachute was probably due to the g-forces and the rotations that occurred. All those on board remained in the aeroplane and died immediately upon impact.

The commercial pilot was conducting a visual flight rules scheduled passenger flight with five passengers. During the return leg to the company’s base airport, the pilot requested, and was given clearance to, a short gravel runway of 1,858 ft that terminated at parallel cross-runways and had inbound airplanes. The wind was reported as variable at 3 knots, and the outside air temperature was 88°F which was 25° warmer than usual. The pilot stated that he conducted a steeper than normal approach and performed a normal 30° flap landing flare; however, the airplane floated halfway down the runway. He initiated a go-around by advancing the throttle to takeoff power and retracting the flaps to 20° as the main landing gear briefly touched down. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data indicated that the airplane arrived 0.1 mile from the runway threshold at 149 ft above ground level (agl) and 110 knots of ground speed, which was 32 knots faster than the short field landing approach speed listed in the pilot operating handbook. A witness in the air traffic control tower (the ground controller) stated that the airplane “bled off a lot of airspeed,” during the landing attempt and climbed out in a very flat profile. The tower local controller stated that after liftoff, the airplane’s right wing dropped and the airplane appeared to be turning right into conflicting landing traffic, so he twice instructed the airplane to “left turn out immediately.” The pilot stated that he attempted to comply with the tower controller’s instruction, but when he applied left aileron, the airplane appeared to stall, rolled rapidly right, and descended in a right-wing-low attitude. It subsequently impacted the surface between runways. A postimpact fire ensued, and the pilot helped the passengers egress. The airplane was destroyed by postimpact fire. Given the evidence, it is likely that the pilot decided to land on the short runway to expedite the arrival and did not perform an appropriate short field landing approach, which resulted in excessive airspeed and altitude over the runway threshold, a long landing flare, rapid deceleration, and a self-initiated go-around from a slow airspeed. Had the pilot initiated the go-around as he approached the runway with indications of an unstable visual approach, the airspeed would have been well above stall speed, which would have allowed for the desired positive climb out on runway heading. The pilot likely attempted to comply with the tower local controller’s urgent commands to turn while the airplane was near the limit of performance (the temperature was about 25 degrees warmer than average, which would have resulted in a higher density altitude than the pilot was accustomed to and degraded aircraft and engine performance). The pilot’s maneuvering resulted in the exceedance of the critical angle-of-attack of the high wing (right wing) during the left turn, and an aerodynamic stall.

On 01.07.2019, B737-800 aircraft was involved in an accident (runway excursion) at Mumbai airport while landing in moderate to heavy rain. The aircraft was under the command of an ATPL holder (PF) with a CPL holder as First Officer (PM). There were 160 passengers and 7 crew members on board. There was no injury to any of the passengers or crew members. The aircraft suffered substantial damage. The subject flight was fifth of the day for the aircraft and second for the flight crew. The flight crew had earlier operated Mumbai-Jaipur sector and the incident flight was from Jaipur to Mumbai. There were no technical issues reported by the flight crew either during Mumbai Jaipur sector or on the return leg (Jaipur- Mumbai) till descent into Mumbai. The pilots had carried out briefing amongst themselves for the approach including the weather and Go Around actions, if required. The aircraft commenced descent into Mumbai in the late evening hours. As per the reported weather at the time of approach visibility was 2100 metres in rain making it dark. Reported winds were 090/12 Knots. Runway was wet and the trend provided was ³temporary reduction in visibility to 1500 metres with thunder/ showers of rain´. During descend at approximately 7000' Pressure Altitude, the crew observed an indication for IAS disagree, indicating a discrepancy of airspeed between the instrument sources for the flight crew. Although this indication was momentary, the 'Non-Normal Checklist' was carried out. The indication discrepancy did not recur for the remainder of the flight. The aircraft was radar vectored for an ILS approach for Runway 27 at Mumbai. The approach was stabilized by 3800' Pressure Altitude with landing gear down, flaps 30 and auto brake selected at 3. The autopilot was engaged throughout the descent phase and during approach, the second autopilot was also coupled for the ILS approach. At 100', the autopilot and the auto-throttle were disengaged by the PF. The flare manoeuvre consumed approximately 5807' of the runway length prior to the aircraft touchdown with 3881' of runway remaining. After touchdown, the speed brakes deployed automatically and maximum reverse thrust and wheel brakes were applied. The aircraft exited the paved surface at 65 Knots and came to rest at a distance of 615' beyond the end of the runway. Once the aircraft came to rest, the flight crew advised cabin crew to be at their stations. The pilots were unable to contact ATC through VHF communication. The PF contacted his airline personnel using mobile phone and informed that the aircraft had overrun the runway and requested for step ladders. The ATC activated fire services and the runway was closed for operation. The Cabin crew carried out check on the passengers in the cabin. The fire services reached the aircraft location and verbal communication was established with the flight crew once the cockpit window was opened. Two Fire Services personnel boarded the aircraft from the L1 door using a fire ladder. An assessment of the aircraft structure and occupants was made and the fire services personnel informed the cabin crew that deplaning was to be carried out using fire ladders. There were no injuries during evacuation or otherwise.

The pilot, co-pilot, and eight passengers departed on a cross-country flight in the twin-engine airplane. One witness located on the ramp at the airport reported that the airplane sounded underpowered immediately after takeoff “like it was at a reduced power setting.” Another witness stated that the airplane sounded like it did not have sufficient power to takeoff. A third witness described the rotation as “steep,” and other witnesses reported thinking that the airplane was performing aerobatics. Digital video from multiple cameras both on and off the airport showed the airplane roll to its left before reaching a maximum altitude of 100 ft above ground level; it then descended and impacted an airport hangar in an inverted attitude about 17 seconds after takeoff and an explosion immediately followed. After breaching a closed roll-up garage door, the airplane came to rest on its right side outside of the hangar and was immediately involved in a postimpact fire. Sound spectrum analysis of data from the airplane’s cockpit voice recorder (CVR) estimated that the propeller speeds were at takeoff power (1,714 to 1,728 rpm) at liftoff. About 7 seconds later, the propeller speeds diverged, with the left propeller speed decreasing to about 1,688 rpm and the right propeller speed decreasing to 1,707 rpm. Based on the airplane’s estimated calibrated airspeed of about 110 knots and the propeller rpm when the speeds diverged, the estimated thrust in the left engine decreased to near 0 while the right engine continued operating at slightly less than maximum takeoff power. Analysis of available data estimated that, 2 seconds after the propeller speed deviation, the airplane’s sideslip angle was nearly 20°. During the first 5 seconds after the propeller speed deviation, the airplane’s roll rate was about 5° per second to the left; its roll rate then rapidly increased to more than 60° per second before the airplane rolled inverted. Witness marks on the left engine and propeller, the reduction in propeller speed, and the airplane’s roll to the left suggest that the airplane most likely experienced a loss of thrust in the left engine shortly after takeoff. The airplane manufacturer’s engine-out procedure during takeoff instructed that the landing gear should be retracted once a positive rate of climb is established, and the propeller of the inoperative engine should be feathered. Right rudder should also be applied to balance the yawing moment imparted by a thrust reduction in the left engine. Examination of the wreckage found both main landing gear in a position consistent with being extended and the left propeller was unfeathered. The condition of the wreckage precluded determining whether the autofeather system was armed or activated during the accident flight. Thus, the pilot failed to properly configure the airplane once the left engine thrust was reduced. Calculations based on the airplane’s sideslip angle shortly after the propeller speed deviation determined that the thrust asymmetry alone was insufficient to produce the sideslip angle. Based on an evaluation of thrust estimates provided by the propeller manufacturer and performance data provided by the airplane manufacturer, it is likely that the pilot applied left rudder, the opposite input needed to maintain lateral control, before applying right rudder seconds later. However, by then, the airplane’s roll rate was increasing too rapidly, and its altitude was too low to recover. The data support that it would have been possible to maintain directional and lateral control of the airplane after the thrust reduction in the left engine if the pilot had commanded right rudder initially rather than left rudder. The pilot’s confused reaction to the airplane’s performance shortly after takeoff supports the possibility that he was startled by the stall warning that followed the propeller speed divergence, which may have prompted his initial, improper rudder input. In addition, the NTSB’s investigation estimated that rotation occurred before the airplane had attained Vr (rotation speed), which decreased the margin to the minimum controllable airspeed and likely lessened the amount of time available for the pilot to properly react to the reduction in thrust and maintain airplane control. Although the airplane was slightly over its maximum takeoff weight at departure, its rate of climb was near what would be expected at maximum weight in the weather conditions on the day of the accident (even with the extended landing gear adding drag); therefore, the weight exceedance likely was not a factor in the accident. Engine and propeller examinations and functional evaluations of the engine and propeller controls found no condition that would have prevented normal operation; evidence of operation in both engines at impact was found. Absent evidence of an engine malfunction, the investigation considered whether the left engine’s thrust reduction was caused by other means, such as uncommanded throttle movement due to an insufficient friction setting of the airplane’s power lever friction locks. Given the lack of callouts for checklists on the CVR and the pilot’s consistently reported history of not using checklists, it is possible that he did not check or adjust the setting of the power lever friction locks before the accident flight, which led to uncommanded movement of the throttle. Although the co-pilot reportedly had flown with the pilot many times previously and was familiar with the B-300, he was not type rated in the airplane and was not allowed by the pilot to operate the flight controls when passengers were on board. Therefore, the co-pilot may not have checked or adjusted the friction setting before the flight’s departure. Although the investigation considered inadequate friction setting the most likely cause of the thrust reduction in the left engine, other circumstances, such as a malfunction within the throttle control system, could also result in loss of engine thrust. However, heavy fire and impact damage to the throttle control system components, including the power quadrant and cockpit control lever friction components, precluded determining the position of the throttle levers at the time of the loss of thrust or the friction setting during the accident flight. Thus, the reason for the reduction in thrust could not be determined definitively. In addition to a lack of callouts for checklists on the CVR, the pilots did not discuss any emergency procedures. As a result, they did not have a shared understanding of how to respond to the emergency of losing thrust in an engine during takeoff. Although the co-pilot verbally identified the loss of the left engine in response to the pilot’s confused reaction to the airplane’s performance shortly after takeoff, it is likely the co-pilot did not initiate any corrective flight control inputs, possibly due to the pilot’s established practice of being the sole operator of flight controls when passengers were on board. The investigation considered whether fatigue from inadequately treated obstructive sleep apnea contributed to the pilot’s response to the emergency; however, the extent of any fatigue could not be determined from the available evidence. In addition, no evidence indicates that the pilot’s medical conditions or their treatment were factors in the accident. In summary, the available evidence indicates that the pilot improperly responded to the loss of thrust in the left engine by initially commanding a left rudder input and did not retract the landing gear or feather the left propeller, which was not consistent with the airplane manufacturer’s engine out procedure during takeoff. It would have been possible to maintain directional and lateral control of the airplane after the thrust reduction in the left engine if right rudder had been commanded initially rather than left rudder. It is possible that the pilot’s reported habit of not using checklists resulted in his not checking or adjusting the power lever friction locks as specified in the airplane manufacturer’s checklists. However, fire and impact damage precluded determining the position of the power levers or friction setting during the flight.

After touchdown on runway 18/36 at Canaima Airport, the twin engine airplane went out of control, veered off runway and came to rest in the bush, bursting into flames. All occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was partially destroyed by fire. It was reported that a tire burst upon landing.

On a flight from Ulan-Ude to Nizhneangarsk, while descending to an altitude of 3,050 metres about 30 km from the destination airport, the crew contacted ATC and reported the failure of the left engine. The approach was continued to runway 22. After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure when the airplane deviated to the right then veered off runway. It rolled in a grassy area, cwent through the perimeter fence and eventually impacted the building of a sewage treatment plant located 380 metres to the right of the runway centerline. The captain and the flight engineer were killed and the copilot was seriously injured. 10 other occupants were injured. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

On June 21, 2019, about 1822 Hawaii-Aleutian standard time, a Beech King Air 65-A90 airplane, N256TA, impacted terrain after takeoff from Dillingham Airfield (HDH), Mokuleia, Hawaii. The pilot and 10 passengers were fatally injured, and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was owned by N80896 LLC and was operated by Oahu Parachute Center (OPC) LLC under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a local parachute jump (skydiving) flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. OPC had scheduled five parachute jump flights on the day of the accident and referred to the third through fifth flights of the day as “sunset” flights because they occurred during the late afternoon and early evening. The accident occurred during the fourth flight. The accident pilot was the pilot-in-command (PIC) for each of the OPC flights that departed on the day of the accident. The pilot and 8 of the 10 passengers initially boarded the airplane. These eight passengers comprised three OPC tandem parachute instructors, three passenger parachutists, and two OPC parachutists performing camera operator functions. The pilot began to taxi the airplane from OPC’s location on the airport. According to a witness (an OPC tandem instructor who was not aboard the accident flight), the two other passengers—solo parachutists who had been on the previous skydiving flight and were late additions to the accident flight—“ran out to the airplane and were loaded up at the last minute.” The pilot taxied the airplane to runway 8 about 1820, and the airplane departed about 1822. According to multiple witnesses, after the airplane lifted off, it banked to the left, rolled inverted, and descended to the ground. One witness stated that, before impact, the airplane appeared to be intact and that there were no unusual noises or smoke coming from the airplane. A security camera video showed that the airplane was inverted in a 45° nose-down attitude at the time of impact. The airplane impacted a grass and dirt area about 630 ft northeast of the departure end of the runway, and a postcrash fire ensued. The airplane was not equipped, and was not required to be equipped, with a cockpit voice recorder or a flight data recorder. The accident flight was not detected by radar at the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Hawaii Control Facility, which was the air traffic control (ATC) facility with jurisdiction of the airspace over HDH. The FAA found no audio communications between the accident airplane and ATC on the day of the accident.

During a cross-country flight, the pilot initiated a descent to his intended destination. During the descent, the pilot informed air traffic control (ATC) that he could not retard power on the right engine. Later in the descent, the pilot decided to shut down the right engine. The pilot communicated his desire to land at the nearest airport to ATC, and ATC provided the pilot with the clearance to divert. Radar data showed the airplane in a steady descent toward the airport. When the airplane was at an altitude of about 2,500 ft mean sea level, the pilot contacted ATC and stated that he was trying to get the airplane under control; radar data showed the airplane in a 360° right turn at the time. The pilot contacted ATC again and stated that he was going to land on a highway. No further transmissions were received from the pilot. After the right turn, the airplane continued in a descent through 1,300 ft mean sea level, at which point radar contact was lost. A witness saw the airplane and stated that the airplane was low and slow but appeared to be in stable flight with both propellers spinning. She did not see any smoke coming from the airplane. She saw the airplane flying northeast to southwest when it suddenly descended nose first into the ground. The airplane impacted a gravel road adjacent to a 100-fttall grain silo about 1 mile from the highway and about 3.3 miles from the airport.