DeLand

The owner of the airplane had purchased the airplane with the intent to resell it after repairs had been made. As part of that process, a mechanic hired by the owner had assessed the airplane’s condition, proposed the necessary repairs to the airplane’s owner, and had identified a pilot who would, once the repairs and required inspection annual inspection had been completed, fly the airplane from where it was located to where the owner resided. While the mechanic had identified a potential pilot for the relocation flight, he had not yet completed the repairs to the airplane, nor had he completed the necessary logbook entries that would have returned the airplane to service. The pilot-rated passenger onboard the airplane for the accident flight, was the pilot who had been identified by the mechanic for the relocation flight. Review of the pilot-rated passenger’s flight experience revealed that he did not possess the necessary pilot certificate rating, nor did he have the flight experience necessary to act as pilot-in-command of the complex, highperformance, pressurized, multi-engine airplane. Additionally, the owner of the airplane had not given the pilot-rated-passenger, or anyone else, permission to fly the airplane. The reason for, and the circumstances under which the pilot-rated passenger and the commercial pilot (who did hold a multi-engine rating) were flying the airplane on the accident flight could not be definitively determined, although because another passenger was onboard the airplane, it is most likely that the accident flight was personal in nature. Given the commercial pilot’s previous flight experience, it is also likely that he was acting as pilot-in-command for the flight. One witness said that he heard the airplane’s engines backfiring as it flew overhead, while another witness located about 1 mile from the accident site heard the accident airplane flying overhead. The second witness said that both engines were running, but they seemed to be running at idle and that the flaps and landing gear were retracted. The witness saw the airplane roll to the left three times before descending below the tree line. As the airplane descended toward the ground, the witness heard the engines make “two pop” sounds. The airplane impacted a wooded area about 4 miles from the departure airport, and the wreckage path through the trees was only about 75-feet long. While the witnesses described the airplane’s engines backfiring or popping before the accident, the postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Additionally, examination of both propeller blades showed evidence of low rotational energy at impact, and that neither propeller had been feathered in flight. Given the witness statement describing the airplane “rolling three times” before it descended from view toward the ground, it is most likely that the pilot lost control of the airplane and while maneuvering. It is also likely that the pilot’s lack of any documented previous training or flight experience in the accident airplane make and model contributed to his inability to maintain control of the airplane. Toxicology testing was performed on the pilot’s chest cavity blood. The results identified 6.7 ng/ml of delta-9-tetrahydracannabinol (THC, the active compound in marijuana) as well as 2.6 ng/ml of its active metabolite, 11-hydroxy-THC and 41.3 ng/ml of its inactive metabolite delta9-carboxy-THC. Because the measured THC levels were from cavity blood, it was not possible to determine when the pilot last used marijuana or whether he was impaired by it at the time of the flight. As a result, it could not be determined whether effects from the pilot’s use of marijuana contributed to the accident circumstances.

The airline transport certificated pilot with 10 skydiving passengers began a takeoff in a tailwheel-equipped and turboprop powered airplane on a CFR Part 91 skydiving flight. As the airplane started its climb, the pitch angle of the nose of the airplane increased until the airplane appeared to stall about 50 to 100 feet agl. It descended and impacted the runway in a left wing, nose low attitude. Several FAA inspectors responded to the accident site and documented the accident scene and the airplane systems. The inspectors reported that flight control continuity was established, and they noted that the stabilizer appeared to be in a nose up trim position. Measurement of the stabilizer trim position equated to a 56.5 percent nose up trim condition. The airplane's horizontal stabilizer trim system is electrical. An electric trim indicator, and a trim warning light were installed in the upper left portion of the instrument panel. The light will illuminate if "full-up" trim is set, and the engine is producing over 80 percent power. A placard stating, "Set Correct Trim for Takeoff," was installed on the lower instrument panel in front of the pilot position. The airplane's flight manual contains a "Before Takeoff" warning, which states, in part: "Warning - An extreme out-of-trim stabilizer can, in combination with loading, flaps position and power influence, result in an uncontrollable aircraft after the aircraft leaves the ground." In addition, a caution states, in part: "Caution - Failure to set correct trim settings will result in large control forces and/or unrequested pitching/yawing." Pilot actions listed in the "Before Takeoff" checklist include stabilizer trim settings. The airplane contained seat belts for all passengers, but the pilot's shoulder harness was not used, as it was folded and tie-wrapped near its upper attach point.

During an NDB approach in instrument conditions with the landing gear extended, the fire warning light for the right engine illuminated. The right engine was shut down and a missed approach was initiated; however, the landing gear would not retract and the aircraft would not maintain altitude. As it descended into the top of an overcast at an altitude of about 600 feet, the pilots tried to restart the engine, but to no avail. Subsequently, the aircraft descended below the clouds at an altitude of about 150 feet to 170 feet. As the instructor (cfi) landed the aircraft in an open field, the nose gear encountered soft dirt and the aircraft nosed over. An exam revealed that an electrical power jumper wire between 2 bus bars had become chafed and shorted. The left and right isolation circuit breakers and the bus tie circuit breaker were found in the tripped (open) position. This resulted in a false fire warning light and prevented the landing gear from being retracted.

The aircraft was observed to be flying slowly, then roll steeply to the left and dive into an unoccupied house from about 300 feet shortly after takeoff. The pilot had considerable flight time but he had not flown this model, except for a 35 minutes checkout that morning. The checkout consisted of 3 takeoffs and landings. The pilot's friend, a rated pilot without a multi engine rating, sat in the right cockpit seat and had logged flight time in the pilot's other twin aircraft. A witness stated the pilot looked pale and appeared troubled just before the flight. The autopsy of the pilot revealed the left main coronary artery was blocked except for a 'pinhole' opening. The doctor stated the condition could have caused a seizure but could not say whether it had any bearing on this accident. No evidence could be found to indicate any preimpact malfunction or failure with the airframe, propellers, or engines. The aircraft was estimated to be 134 pounds over gross weight. All five occupants were killed.