Zone

Ground fire of an Airbus A330-343 in Beijing

Date & Time: Aug 27, 2019 at 1648 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
B-5958
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Beijing - Tokyo
MSN:
1587
YOM:
2014
Flight number:
CA183
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
14
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
147
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
19007
Aircraft flight cycles:
4596
Circumstances:
The airplane was parked at gate 530 (Terminal 3) at Beijing Capital and being prepared for flight CA183 to Tokyo-Haneda. 14 crew members were on board as well as 147 passengers when an abnormal sound was heard coming from the L2 door connected to the jetbridge. The cargo smoke alarm came on in the cockpit while smoke spread in the cabin. The pilot declared an emergency and decision was taken to evacuate all 161 occupants and no one was injured while the aircraft was partially destroyed by fire. The origin of the fire is still under investigation.

Crash of a Boeing 777-2H6ER in the Indian Ocean: 239 killed

Date & Time: Mar 8, 2014 at 0130 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
9M-MRO
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Kuala Lumpur – Beijing
MSN:
28420/404
YOM:
2002
Flight number:
MH370
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
12
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
227
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
239
Captain / Total flying hours:
18423
Captain / Total hours on type:
8559.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2813
Copilot / Total hours on type:
39
Aircraft flight hours:
53471
Aircraft flight cycles:
7526
Circumstances:
The Boeing 777-2H6ER took off from Kuala Lumpur Airport runway 32R at 0041LT bound for Beijing. Some 40 minutes later, while reaching FL350 over the Gulf of Thailand, radar contact was lost. At this time, the position of the aircraft was estimated 90 NM northeast of Kota Bharu, some 2 km from the IGARI waypoint. More than 4 days after the 'accident', no trace of the aircraft has been found. On the fifth day of operation, several countries were involved in the SAR operations, in the Gulf of Thailand, west of China Sea and on the Malacca Strait as well. All operations are performed in coordination with China, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia and Philippines. No distress call or any kind of message was sent by the crew. The last ACARS message was received at 0107LT and did not contain any error, failure or technical problems. At 0119LT was recorded the last radio transmission with the crew saying "All right, good night". At 0121LT, the transponder was switched off and the last radar contact was recorded at 0130LT. Several hypothesis are open and no trace of the aircraft nor the occupant have been found up to March 18, 2014. It is now understood the aircraft may flew several hours after it disappeared from radar screens, flying on an opposite direction from the prescribed flight plan, most probably to the south over the Indian Ocean. No such situation was ever noted by the B3A, so it is now capital to find both CVR & DFDR to explain the exact circumstances of this tragic event. Considering the actual situation, all scenarios are possible and all hypothesis are still open. On Mar 24, 2014, the Malaysian Prime Minister announced that according to new computations by the British AAIB based on new satellite data, there is no reasonable doubt that flight MH370 ended in the South Indian Ocean some 2,600 km west of Perth. Given the situation, the Malaysian Authorities believe that there is no chance to find any survivors among the 239 occupants.

***************************

According to the testimony of 6 Swiss Citizens making a cruise between Perth and Singapore via Jakarta, the following evidences were spotted on March 12 while approaching the Sunda Strait:
1430LT - latitude 6° S, longitude 105° E, speed 17,7 knots:
life jacket, food trays, papers, pieces of polystyrene, wallets,
1500LT:
a huge white piece of 6 meters long to 2,5 meters wide with other debris,
1530LT:
two masts one meter long with small flags on top, red and blue,
2030LT - latitude 5° S, longitude 107° E, speed 20,2 knots.

This testimony was submitted by these 6 Swiss Citizens to the Chinese and Australian Authorities.

On April 21, 2016, it was confirmed that this testimony was recorded by the Swiss Police and transmitted to the Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB), the State authority of the Swiss Confederation which has a mandate to investigate accidents and dangerous incidents involving trains, aircraft, inland navigation ships, and seagoing vessels. The link to the STSB is http://www.sust.admin.ch/en/index.html.

***************************

On July 29, 2015, a flaperon was found on a beach of the French Island of La Réunion, in the Indian Ocean. It was quickly confirmed by the French Authorities (BEA) that the debris was part of the Malaysian B777. Other debris have been found since, in Mozambique and South Africa.

On May 12, 2016, Australia's TSB reported that the part has been identified to be a "the decorative laminate as an interior panel from the main cabin. The location of a piano hinge on the part surface was consistent with a work-table support leg, utilised on the exterior of the MAB Door R1 (forward, right hand) closet panel". The ATSB reported that they were not able to identify any feature on the debris unique to MH-370, however, there is no record that such a laminate is being used by any other Boeing 777 customer.

***************************

On September 15, 2016, the experts from the Australian Transportation Safety Bureau (ATSB) have completed their examination of the large piece of debris discovered on the island of Pemba, off the coast of Tanzania, on June 20, 2016. Based on thorough examination and analysis, ATSB with the concurrence of the MH370 Safety Investigation Team have identified the following:
- Several part numbers, along with physical appearance, dimensions, and construction confirmed the piece to be an inboard section of a Boeing 777 outboard flap.
- A date stamp associated with one of the part numbers indicated manufacture on January 23, 2002, which was consistent with the May 31, 2002 delivery date for MH370,
- In addition to the Boeing part number, all identification stamps had a second 'OL' number that were unique identifiers relating to part construction,
- The Italian part manufacturer has confirmed that all numbers located on the said part relates to the same serial number outboard flap that was shipped to Boeing as line number 404,
- The manufacturer also confirmed that aircraft line number 404 was delivered to Malaysian Airlines and registered as 9M-MRO (MH370)

As such, the experts have concluded that the debris, an outboard flap originated from the aircraft 9M-MRO, also known as flight MH370. Further examination of the debris will continue, in hopes that further evidence may be uncovered which may provide new insight into the circumstances surrounding flight MH370.
Probable cause:
Due to lack of evidences the exact cause of the accident could not be determined.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 777-236ER in London

Date & Time: Jan 17, 2008 at 1242 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-YMMM
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Beijing - London
MSN:
30314/342
YOM:
2001
Flight number:
BA038
Region:
Crew on board:
16
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
136
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
12700
Captain / Total hours on type:
8450.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
9000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
7000
Aircraft flight hours:
28675
Aircraft flight cycles:
3957
Circumstances:
G-YMMM was on a scheduled return flight from Beijing, China, to London (Heathrow) with a flight crew consisting of a commander and two co-pilots; the additional co-pilot enabled the crew to take in-flight rest. There had been no reported defects with G-YMMM during the outboard flight from London (Heathrow) to Beijing, China. The flight plan for the return sector, produced by the aircraft’s operator, required an initial climb to 10,400 m (FL341) with a descent to 9,600 m (FL315) because of predicted ‘Extreme Cold’ at POLHO (a waypoint that lies on the border between China and Mongolia). Having checked the flight plan and the weather in more detail the crew agreed on a total fuel load for the flight of 79,000 kg. The startup, taxi, takeoff at 0209 hrs and the departure were all uneventful. During the climb, Air Traffic Control (ATC) requested that G-YMMM climb to an initial cruise altitude of 10,600 m (FL348). The crew accepted this altitude and, due to the predicted low temperatures, briefed that they would monitor the fuel temperature en route. The initial climb to altitude was completed using the autopilot set in the Vertical Navigation (VNAV) mode. Approximately 350 nm north of Moscow the aircraft climbed to FL380; this step climb was carried out using the Vertical Speed (VS) mode of the autoflight system. Another climb was then carried out whilst the aircraft was over Sweden, this time to FL400, and again this was completed in VS mode. During the flight the crew monitored the fuel temperature displayed on the Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) and noted that the minimum indicated fuel temperature en route was -34˚C. At no time did the low fuel temperature warning annunciate. The flight continued uneventfully until the later stages of the approach into Heathrow. The commander was flying at this time and during the descent, from FL400, the aircraft entered the hold at Lambourne at FL110; it remained in the hold for approximately five minutes, during which it descended to FL90. The aircraft was radar vectored for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to Runway 27L at Heathrow and subsequently stabilised on the ILS with the autopilot and autothrottle engaged. At 1,000 ft aal, and 83 seconds before touchdown, the aircraft was fully configured for the landing, with the landing gear down and flap 30 selected. At approximately 800 ft aal the co-pilot took control of the aircraft, in accordance with the briefed procedure. The landing was to be under manual control and the co-pilot intended to disconnect the autopilot at 600 ft aal. Shortly after the co-pilot had assumed control, the autothrottles commanded an increase in thrust from both engines. The engines initially responded but, at a height of about 720 ft, 57 seconds before touchdown, the thrust of the right engine reduced. Some seven seconds later, the thrust reduced on the left engine to a similar level. The engines did not shut down and both engines continued to produce thrust above flight idle, but less than the commanded thrust. At this time, and 48 seconds before touchdown, the co-pilot noted that the thrust lever positions had begun to ‘split’. On passing 500 ft agl there was an automatic call of the Radio Altimeter height, at this time Heathrow Tower gave the aircraft a landing clearance, which the crew acknowledged. Some 34 seconds before touchdown, at 430 ft agl, the commander announced that the approach was stable, to which the co-pilot responded “just”. Seven seconds later, the co-pilot noticed that the airspeed was reducing below the expected approach speed of 135 kt. On the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) the flight crew were heard to comment that the engines were at idle power and they attempted to identify what was causing the loss of thrust. The engines failed to respond to further demands for increased thrust from the autothrottle and manual movement of the thrust levers to fully forward. The airspeed reduced as the autopilot attempted to maintain the ILS glide slope. When the airspeed reached 115 kt the ‘airspeed low’ warning was annunciated, along with a master caution aural warning. The airspeed stabilised for a short period, so in an attempt to reduce drag the commander retracted the flaps from flap 30 to flap 25. In addition, he moved what he believed to be an engine starter/ignition switch on the overhead panel. The airspeed continued to reduce and by 200 ft it had decreased to about 108 kt. Ten seconds before touchdown the stick shaker operated, indicating that the aircraft was nearing a stall and in response the co-pilot pushed the control column forward. This caused the autopilot to disconnect as well as reducing the aircraft’s nose-high pitch attitude. In the last few seconds before impact, the commander attempted to start the APU and on realising that a crash was imminent he transmitted a ‘MAYDAY’ call. As the aircraft approached the ground the co-pilot pulled back on the control column, but the aircraft struck the ground in the grass undershoot for 27L approximately 330 m short of the paved runway surface and 110 m inside the airfield perimeter fence. During the impact and short round roll the nose landing gear (NLG) and both the main landing gears (MLG) collapsed. The right MLG separated from the aircraft but the left MLG remained attached. The aircraft came to rest on the paved surface in the undershoot area of Runway 27L. The commander attempted to initiate an evacuation by making an evacuation call, which he believed was on the cabin Passenger Announcement (PA) system but which he inadvertently transmitted on the Heathrow Tower frequency. During this period the co-pilot started the actions from his evacuation checklist. Heathrow Tower advised the commander that his call had been on the tower frequency so the commander repeated the evacuation call over the aircraft’s PA system before completing his evacuation checklist. The flight crew then left the flight deck and exited the aircraft via the escape slides at Doors 1L and 1R. The cabin crew supervised the emergency evacuation of the cabin and all occupants left the aircraft via the slides, all of which operated correctly. One passenger was seriously injured, having suffered a broken leg, as a result of detached items from the right MLG penetrating the fuselage. Heathrow Tower initiated their accident plan, with a crash message sent at 1242:22 hrs and fire crews were on scene 1 minute and 43 seconds later. The evacuation was completed shortly after the arrival of the fire vehicles. After the aircraft came to rest there was a significant fuel leak from the engines and an oxygen leak from the disrupted passenger oxygen bottles, but there was no fire. Fuel continued to leak from the engine fuel pipes until the spar valves were manually closed.
Probable cause:
Whilst on approach to London (Heathrow) from Beijing, China, at 720 feet agl, the right engine of G-YMMM ceased responding to autothrottle commands for increased power and instead the power reduced to 1.03 Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR). Seven seconds later the left engine power reduced to 1.02 EPR. This reduction led to a loss of airspeed and the aircraft touching down some 330 m short of the paved surface of Runway 27L at London Heathrow. The investigation identified that the reduction in thrust was due to restricted fuel flow to both engines. It was determined that this restriction occurred on the right engine at its FOHE. For the left engine, the investigation concluded that the restriction most likely occurred at its FOHE. However, due to limitations in available recorded data, it was not possible totally to eliminate the possibility of a restriction elsewhere in the fuel system, although the testing and data mining activity carried out for this investigation suggested that this was very unlikely. Further, the likelihood of a separate restriction mechanism occurring within seven seconds of that for the right engine was determined to be very low.
The investigation identified the following probable causal factors that led to the fuel flow restrictions:
1) Accreted ice from within the fuel system released, causing a restriction to the engine fuel flow at the face of the FOHE, on both of the engines.
2) Ice had formed within the fuel system, from water that occurred naturally in the fuel, whilst the aircraft operated with low fuel flows over a long period and the localised fuel temperatures were in an area described as the ‘sticky range’.
3) The FOHE, although compliant with the applicable certification requirements, was shown to be susceptible to restriction when presented with soft ice in a high concentration, with a fuel temperature that is below -10°C and a fuel flow above flight idle.
4) Certification requirements, with which the aircraft and engine fuel systems had to comply, did not take account of this phenomenon as the risk was unrecognised at that time.
Final Report:

Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-82 off Dalian: 112 killed

Date & Time: May 7, 2002 at 2132 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
B-2138
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Beijing - Dalian
MSN:
49522
YOM:
1990
Flight number:
CJ6136
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
103
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
112
Aircraft flight hours:
26000
Aircraft flight cycles:
16000
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Beijing, the crew started the descent to Dalian Airport. While flying over the east side of the Korean Gulf, the crew contacted ATC and declared an emergency, reporting fire on board and smoke spreading in the cabin. Shortly later, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the sea about 20 km from the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 112 occupants were killed. The CVR was found on May 13 and FDR on May 18.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the in-flight fire was the consequence of an act of sabotage. A passenger contracted seven life insurances from different companies for a total amount of 170,000 US$ and was able to board at Beijing-Capital Airport with a bottle filled with gasoline that he ignited during flight.

Crash of a Boeing 767-2J6ER in Busan: 129 killed

Date & Time: Apr 15, 2002 at 1121 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
B-2552
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Beijing - Busan
MSN:
23308
YOM:
1985
Flight number:
CA129
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
11
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
155
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
129
Captain / Total flying hours:
6497
Captain / Total hours on type:
6287.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5295
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1215
Aircraft flight hours:
39541
Aircraft flight cycles:
14308
Circumstances:
On April 15, 2002, about 11:21:17, Air China flight 129, a Boeing 767-200ER, operated by Air China International (Air China hereinafter), en route from Beijing, China to Busan, Korea, crashed during a circling approach, on Mt. Dotdae located 4.6 km north of runway 18R threshold at Busan/Gimhae International Airport (Gimhae airport hereinafter), at an elevation of 204 meters. The flight was a regularly scheduled international passenger service flight operating under instrument flight rules (IFR) within Korean airspace, according to the provisions of the Korean Aviation Act and Convention on International Civil Aviation. One captain, one first officer and one second officer, eight flight attendants, and 155 passengers were on board at the time of the accident. The aircraft was completely destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. Of the 166 persons on board, 37 persons including the captain and two flight attendants survived, while the remaining 129 occupants including two copilots were killed.
Probable cause:
3.1 Findings Related to Probable Causes:
1. The flight crew of flight 129 performed the circling approach, not being aware of the weather minima of widebody aircraft (B767-200) for landing, and in the approach briefing, did not include the missed approach, etc., among the items specified in Air China’s operations and training manuals.
2. The flight crew exercised poor crew resource management and lost situational awareness during the circling approach to runway 18R, which led them to fly outside of the circling approach area, delaying the base turn, contrary to the captain’s intention to make a timely base turn.
3. The flight crew did not execute a missed approach when they lost sight of the runway during the circling approach to runway 18R, which led them to strike high terrain (mountain) near the airport.
4. When the first officer advised the captain to execute a missed approach about 5 seconds before impact, the captain did not react, nor did the first officer initiate the missed approach himself.
Final Report:

Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-82 in Ürümqi: 12 killed

Date & Time: Nov 13, 1993 at 1456 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
B-2141
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Shenyang – Beijing – Ürümqi
MSN:
49849
YOM:
1990
Flight number:
UJ6901
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
92
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
12
Circumstances:
The approach to Ürümqi-Diwopu was completed in limited visibility due to foggy conditions. On short final, the aircraft descended below the glide and struck a concrete wall located 3 km short of runway 25. It gain height and collided with power lines before crashing in a field, bursting into flames. Twelve occupants were killed, among them four crew members. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.
Probable cause:
The automatic pilot system disconnect on final approach for unknown reasons, causing the aircraft to adopt a rate of descent of 800 feet per minute until the aircraft struck a concrete wall and crashed.

Crash of a BAe 146-300 in Yinchuan: 55 killed

Date & Time: Jul 23, 1993 at 1441 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
B-2716
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Yinchuan - Beijing
MSN:
E3215
YOM:
1992
Flight number:
WH2119
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
108
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
55
Circumstances:
During the takeoff roll on runway 36 at Yinchuan Airport, at Vr speed, the pilot-in-command pull up the control column to rotate but the aircraft failed to respond. Following a lack of crew coordination and inappropriate decisions, the crew failed to abort the takeoff procedure. After a long roll, the nose gear lifted off but the aircraft entered a high nose attitude, causing the tail to struck the runway surface. The aircraft then overran runway 36, collided with various obstacles and eventually crashed in a lake. 58 occupants were injured while 55 others were killed, among them one crew member. Weather conditions were good with OAT +27° C and an excellent visibility. Runway 36 is 2,160 metres long.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the accident was the consequence of a wrong takeoff configuration on part of the crew. For unknown reasons, both leading edge and trailing edge flaps were not properly deployed for the takeoff procedure. Due to lack of coordination, the crew failed to proceed to cross checks prior to departure and failed to realize that the aircraft was not properly configured for takeoff. Nevertheless, it was not established if the flaps warning sounded or not prior to the accident.

Crash of an Ilyushin II-18D in Chongqing: 108 killed

Date & Time: Jan 18, 1988 at 2217 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
B-222
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Beijing - Chongqing
MSN:
187 0099 01
YOM:
1967
Flight number:
SZ4146
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
98
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
108
Circumstances:
At 2150LT, while approaching Chongqing-Baishiyi Airport, the n°4 engine failed. Seven minutes later, it caught fire and later detached. Aware that he would not reach the airport, the captain decided to attempt an emergency landing when the airplane struck power cables and crashed on a hill located 5,7 km short of runway, bursting into flames. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 108 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the n°4 engine right starter generator became so hot that the feathering oil tube was burnt. The oil tube burst upon feathering of the prop and the engine caught fire.