Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The airplane was engaged in the exercise 'ECCAragon2019' organized by the Aerial Evacuation Unit of the Air Force and was carrying six passengers and a crew of four on behalf of the 35th Aerial Unit based at Getafe AFB. Upon touchdown on runway 27 (850 meters long), the airplane bounced twice then landed firmly. It veered to the right and struck the concrete taxiway passing to the north apron. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the airplane overran, struck trees and came to rest in a wooded area. All 10 occupants were slightly injured and evacuated.

The twin engine airplane departed Sorocaba-Estadual Bertram Luiz Leupolz Airport at 2300LT on a flight to Palmas, Tocantins, carrying three passengers and a crew of two. Few minutes after takeoff, the crew encountered technical difficulties and was cleared to divert to Campinas-Viracopos Airport. On final, he realized he could not make it so he attempted an emergency landing in a prairie located about 6 km short of runway 15 threshold. The wreckage was found less than a km from the Jardim Bassoli condominium and all five occupants, slightly injured, were evacuated. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

At 1357 hrs the airplane had taken off from Cannes-Mandelieu Airport, France, to a private flight to Egelsbach Airfield, Germany. On board were the pilot and two passengers. According to the flight plan cruise flight was planned for Flight Level (FL)260. At 1519:03 hrs the pilot established contact with Frankfurt Radar, and informed the controller that the airplane was in descent to FL60 towards reporting point UBENO. The radar recordings show that the airplane was flying towards 335° and transmitted the transponder code 4065. The radar controller issued the descent clearance to 4,000 ft AMSL and conveyed a QNH of 1,020 hPa. At 1519:25 hrs the controller addressed the pilot: “[…] proceed direct DELTA, runway zero eight in use.” The pilot acknowledged the clearance. At 1520:20 hrs the controller instructed the pilot to descend to 3,500 ft AMSL. After the pilot had acknowledged the controller’s question, the change of flight rules from IFR to VFR was conducted at 1521 hrs about 16 NM south of Egelsbach Airfield. At the time, the airplane was at about 5,000 ft AMSL with a ground speed of approximately 240 kt. At 1522:34 hrs, the airplane was at 3,500 ft AMSL and about 14 NM from the airfield, the pilot established radio contact with Egelsbach Information with the words: “[…] inbound DELTA, descending VFR.” The Flugleiter (A person required by German regulation at uncontrolled aerodromes to provide aerodrome information service to pilots) answered: “Hello […] runway zero eight, QNH one zero two zero, squawk four four four one.” The pilot acknowledged the landing direction and the QNH. The communicated transponder code was not acknowledged, and did not change during the remainder of the flight, according to the radar recording. At 1524:34 hrs the Flugleiter gave the pilot the hint: “[…] the maximum altitude in this area is one thousand five hundred feet.” The pilot answered: “Roger, continue descent […].” At this time, altitude was still about 2,000 ft AMSL. According to the radar recording, at 1524:45 hrs the airplane turned right in northern direction toward the DELTA approach path to runway 08 of Egelsbach Airfield. Altitude was about 1,900 ft AMSL, and ground speed 170 kt. At 1526:30 hrs, at about the Tank- und Rastanlage Gräfenhausen (resting facility) at the Bundesautobahn A5 (motorway), it began to turn right up to north-eastern direction. At 1526:44 hrs the Flugleiter addressed the pilot: “[…] do you have the field in sight?” The pilot responded: “Ah, not yet […].” At the time, the airplane was about 1,000 m south-west of threshold 08 at the western outskirts of Erzhausen flying a northeastern heading. The Flugleiter added: “I suggest to reduce, you are now in right base.” After the pilot had answered with “Roger”, the Flugleiter added: “You are number one to land. The wind is zero four zero, one zero knots.” At 1527:04 hrs, the airplane was about 300 m south of threshold 08 flying a northeastern heading, the radio message“[…] approach” of the pilot was recorded. From then on the airplane began to turn left. At 1527:11 hrs, the airplane crossed runway 08 with a ground speed of about 100 kt at very low altitude with northern heading. At 1527:24 hrs the pilot said: “[…] may I the […] make an orbit?” The Flugleiter answered: “Yes, do it to your left-hand side and do not overfly the highway westbound.” At 1527:31 hrs, the last radar target was recorded at approximately 600 m north-west of threshold 08 indicating an altitude of about 425 ft AMSL. About 100 m south-west of it the airplane crashed to the ground and caught fire. All three occupants suffered fatal injuries. At the time of the accident, three persons were in the Tower of the airfield. The Flugleiter, as tower controller, his replacement, and the apron controller. They observed that the airplane flew directly towards the tower coming from the DELTA approach in descent with north-eastern heading, i.e. diagonal to the landing direction. In this phase the landing gear extended. Two witnesses, who were at the airport close to the tower, stated that they had seen the airplane during the left-hand turn. They estimated the bank angle during the turn with 30-45°. The two occupants of a Piper PA-28, which had been on approach to runway 08, stated that they had become aware of the other airplane, before changing from downwind leg to final approach. They also stated that during the turn the airplane went into a dive and impacted the ground after about a half turn. Approximately 330 m north-east of the accident site, persons had been walking in a forest. One of them recorded a video. This recording was made available for investigation purposes. The video shows the shadow of the airplane moving west immediately prior to the accident. Consistent engine sounds and, 8 seconds after the shadow passed, the crash of the airplane can be heard. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire and all three occupants were killed, among them Natalia Fileva, co-owner of the Russian Operator S7 Airlines.

Earlier in the afternoon the pilot was an uninvited guest at a private function that was held at the Matsieng Flying Club facility at Matsieng Aerodrome. In a statement, the Matsieng Flying Club reported that it was rumored that the pilot was involved in a domestic dispute earlier in the afternoon. At 2015LT the aircraft approached Matsieng Aerodrome from the direction of Sir Seretse Khama Airport and made a number of low level fly passes from different directions past the Club facilities next to the Air Traffic Control tower. An immediate evacuation of the club premises was ordered. The final extreme low level run by the aircraft along runway 36 resulted in an impact with the Matsieng Flying Club facility at ground level. The Club facility and Matsieng ATC tower was destroyed on impact. The post impact fire destroyed 13 parked vehicles. The emergency services of the Kgatleng District Council were on the scene within minutes to attend to the post-impact fire and distress. These response actions are to be commended. It is believed that the pilot had no permission to fly the aircraft involved. Sole on board, he was killed.

The two commercial pilots were conducting a personal, cross-country flight. A video surveillance camera at the airport captured their airplane’s approach. Review of the video revealed that, as the airplane approached the approach end of the landing runway, it began to climb, rolled left, became inverted, and then impacted terrain. The left thrust reverser (T/R) was found open and unlatched at the accident site. An asymmetric deployment of the left T/R would have resulted in a left roll/yaw. The lack of an airworthy and operable cockpit voice recorder, which was required for the flight, precluded identifying which pilot was performing pilot flying duties, as well as other crew actions and background noises, that would have facilitated the investigation. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that it was not equipped, nor was required to be equipped, with a nose landing gear (NLG) ground contact switch intended to preclude inflight operation of the thrust reverser (T/R). The left T/R door was found unlatched and open, and the right T/R door was found closed and latched. Further, electrical testing of the T/R left and right stow microswitches within the cockpit throttle quadrant revealed that the left stow microswitch did not operate within design specifications. Disassembly of the left and right stow microswitches revealed evidence of arc wear due to aging. Based on this information, it is likely that the airplane’s lack of an NLG ground contact switch and the age-related failure of the stow microswitches resulted in an asymmetric T/R deployment while on approach and a subsequent loss of airplane control. Also, there were additional T/R system components that were found to unairworthy that would have affected the control of the T/R system. Operational testing of the T/R system could not be performed due to the damage the airplane incurred during the accident. Toxicology testing results of the pilot’s specimens indicated that the pilot had taken diazepam, which is considered impairing at certain levels. However, the detected amounts of both diazepam and its metabolite nordiazepam were at subtherapeutic levels, and given the long half-life of these compounds, it appears that the medication was taken several days before the accident; therefore, it is unlikely that the pilot was impaired at the time of the accident and thus that his use of diazepam was a not factor in the accident.

The aircraft departed Rosario-Islas Malvinas Airport at 1900LT on a charter flight to Buenos Aires, carrying two passengers and two pilots. On approach to Buenos Aires-Aeroparque-Jorge Newbury Airport by night, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity, heavy rain falls and strong winds. The aircraft landed 200 metres past the runway 13 threshold and the crew stated the braking procedure. After a course of about 500 metres, the aircraft deviated to the left and veered off runway. It rolled on a grassy area then contacted the concrete taxiway, causing both main landing gear to be torn off. The aircraft came to rest 860 metres from the runway threshold and was damaged beyond repair. All four occupants evacuated safely.

The first instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 1 appeared to be proceeding normally until the first officer (the pilot flying) transitioned from instrument references inside the flight deck to outside references. During a postaccident interview, the first officer stated that he expected to see the runway at that time but instead saw “white on white” and a structure with an antenna that was part of the runway environment but not the runway itself. The captain (the pilot monitoring) stated that she saw a tower and called for a go-around. (Both flight crewmembers were most likely seeing the automated weather observing system wind sensor pole, which was located about 325 ft to the right of the runway 1 centerline and about 870 ft beyond the runway threshold, and the damage to the lightning arrester at the top of the wind sensor pole was likely due to contact with the accident airplane as it flew over the pole.) According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), after the go-around, the first officer asked the captain if she saw the runway lights during the approach. The captain responded that she saw the lights but that “it’s really white down there that’s the problem.” Airport personnel stated that snow plowing operations on the runway had finished about 10 minutes before the first approach. The CVR recorded the flight crew’s discussion about turning on the pilot-controlled runway lights and sounds similar to microphone clicks before and after the discussion. However, the PQI maintenance foreman stated that, after the first approach, the runway lights were not on. Thus, the investigation could not determine, based on the available evidence, whether the flight crew had turned on the runway lights during the first approach. The captain thought that the airplane had drifted off course when the first officer transitioned from flight instruments to the outside, so she instructed the first officer to remain on the instruments during the second approach until the decision altitude (200 ft above ground level [agl]). The second approach proceeded normally with no problems capturing or maintaining the localizer and glideslope. During this approach, the captain asked airport maintenance personnel to ensure that the runway lighting was on, and the PQI maintenance foreman replied that the lights were on “bright”(the high-intensity setting). Thus, the flight crew had a means to identify the runway surface even with the reported snow cover at the time. As the airplane approached the decision altitude, the captain instructed the first officer to disconnect the autopilot, which he did. About nine seconds later, the airplane reached the decision altitude, and the captain called, “runway in sight twelve o’clock.” This callout was followed by the first officer’s statement, “I’m stayin’ on the flight director ‘cause I don’t see it yet.” A few seconds later, while the airplane was below 100 ft agl, the captain and the first officer expressed confusion, stating “what the [expletive]” and “I don’t know what I'm see in’,” respectively, but neither called for a go-around. The airplane subsequently impacted the snow-covered grassy area between runway 1 and a parallel taxiway. During a postaccident interview, the first officer stated that, when he transitioned from flight instruments to the outside during the second approach, he again saw “white on white” as well as blowing snow and that the airplane touched down before he could determine what he was seeing. The maintenance foreman estimated that, at the time of the accident, the runway had about 1/8 inch of snow with about 20% to 25% of the runway visible.

The airplane departed Baku-Bina Airport on a charter flight to Moscow, carrying three passengers and three crew members. Following an uneventful flight, the crew was cleared for an approach to Moscow-Sheremetyevo Airport runway 24C. The aircraft landed at a speed of 150 knots some 250 metres past the runway threshold. After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure and activated the thrust reversers. After a course of several hundred metres, the aircraft deviated to the left, made an almost 180 turn and veered off runway to the left. While contacting soft ground, the right main gear was torn off and the aircraft came to rest in a snow covered area. All six occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was complering a survey mission on behalf of the US Ministry of Defense. For unknown reasons, the four engine airplane landed hard at Pyongtaek-Desiderio AAF (Camp Humphreys), causing the right main gear to collapse. The right wing fell on the ground and the aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The left main gear collapsed after the airplane landed on a gravel airstrip located somewhere in Somalia. There were no injuries among the occupants and the airplane was damaged beyond repair.