Crash of a Dassault Falcon 20C in Jamestown

Date & Time: Dec 21, 2008 at 0100 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N165TW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tulsa – Jamestown
MSN:
65
YOM:
1966
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3028
Captain / Total hours on type:
1160.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2086
Copilot / Total hours on type:
80
Aircraft flight hours:
16360
Circumstances:
The co-pilot was performing a nighttime approach and landing to runway 25. No runway condition reports were received by the flight crew while airborne, and a NOTAM was in effect, stating, “thin loose snow over patchy thin ice.” After landing, the co-pilot called out that the airplane was sliding and the wheel brakes were ineffective. The captain took the controls, activated the air brakes, and instructed the co-pilot to deploy the drag chute. The crew could not stop the airplane in the remaining runway distance and the airplane overran the runway by approximately 100 feet. After departing the runway end, the landing gear contacted a snow berm that was the result of earlier plowing. The captain turned the airplane around and taxied to the ramp. Subsequent inspection of the airplane revealed a fractured nose gear strut and buckling of the fuselage. The spring-loaded drag chute extractor cap activated, but the parachute remained in its tail cone container. Both flight crewmembers reported that the runway was icy at the time of the accident and braking action was “nil.” The airport manager reported that when the airplane landed, no airport staff were on duty and had not been for several hours. He also reported that when the airport staff left for the evening, the runway conditions were adequate. The runway had been plowed and sanded approximately 20 hours prior to the accident, sanded two more times during the day, and no measurable precipitation was recorded within that time frame. The reason that the drag chute failed to deploy was not determined.
Probable cause:
The inability to stop the airplane on the remaining runway because of icy runway conditions. A factor was the failure of the drag chute to properly deploy.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-524 in Denver

Date & Time: Dec 20, 2008 at 1818 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N18611
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Denver - Houston
MSN:
27324/2621
YOM:
1994
Flight number:
CO1404
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
110
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
13100
Captain / Total hours on type:
6300.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
8000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1500
Aircraft flight hours:
40541
Aircraft flight cycles:
21511
Circumstances:
On December 20, 2008, about 1818 mountain standard time, Continental Airlines flight 1404, a Boeing 737-500, N18611, departed the left side of runway 34R during takeoff from Denver International Airport (DEN), Denver, Colorado. A postcrash fire ensued. The captain and 5 of the 110 passengers were seriously injured; the first officer, 2 cabin crewmembers, and 38 passengers received minor injuries; and 1 cabin crewmember and 67 passengers (3 of whom were lap-held children) were uninjured. The airplane was substantially damaged. The scheduled, domestic passenger flight, operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, was departing DEN and was destined for George Bush Intercontinental Airport, Houston, Texas. At the time of the accident, visual meteorological conditions prevailed, with strong and gusty winds out of the west. The flight operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.
Probable cause:
The captain’s cessation of right rudder input, which was needed to maintain directional control of the airplane, about 4 seconds before the excursion, when the airplane encountered a strong and gusty crosswind that exceeded the captain’s training and experience.
Contributing to the accident were the following factors:
1) an air traffic control system that did not require or facilitate the dissemination of key, available wind information to the air traffic controllers and pilots; and
2) inadequate crosswind training in the airline industry due to deficient simulator wind gust modeling.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31T-500 Cheyenne I in Buenos Aires: 2 killed

Date & Time: Dec 18, 2008 at 0619 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
LV-MYX
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Buenos Aires – Victoria
MSN:
31-7904045
YOM:
1979
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
13109
Captain / Total hours on type:
31.00
Circumstances:
Shortly after a night takeoff from runway 05 at Buenos Aires-San Fernando Airport, the pilot initiated a left turn at low altitude when the twin engine aircraft collided with two poles and two parked trucks then crashed on the ground, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed and both occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
A loss of power on the left engine shortly after takeoff for undetermined reasons.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- A probable inadequate compliance with emergency procedures,
- Probable little and discontinuous flight activity on the aircraft type during the year 2008,
- Low turn.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 402B in Madison

Date & Time: Dec 16, 2008 at 2252 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N4504B
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Appleton - Milwaukee
MSN:
402B-1370
YOM:
1978
Flight number:
FRG1531
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2069
Captain / Total hours on type:
274.00
Aircraft flight hours:
12805
Circumstances:
The on-demand cargo flight departed for the destination airport and was delayed en route due to repetitive destination airport closures. The closures were the result of snow-contaminated runways. The pilot then diverted to an alternate airport due to concerns about remaining fuel reserves. The airplane experienced a loss of engine power during an instrument approach at the alternate airport and impacted the ground about 200 yards short of the landing runway. A postaccident inspection of the airplane revealed no usable fuel on board.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s improper fuel management, which resulted in a loss of engine power during an instrument landing due to fuel exhaustion.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-46-350P Malibu Mirage in Bad Vöslau: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 14, 2008 at 1204 LT
Registration:
N403HP
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Shoreham – Bad Vöslau
MSN:
46-36312
YOM:
2000
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The pilot departed Shoreham on a flight to Hungary with an intermediate stop in Bad Vöslau near Vienna, to pick up a passenger before continuing to Hungary. On approach to Bad Vöslau Airport, the pilot encountered poor visibility due to fog when the aircraft impacted trees and crashed in a wooded area near the airfield. The pilot, sole onboard, was killed.

Crash of a Dornier DO228-202 in Cambridge Bay

Date & Time: Dec 13, 2008 at 0143 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FYEV
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Resolute Bay - Cambridge Bay
MSN:
8133
YOM:
1987
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
12
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
13400
Captain / Total hours on type:
802.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
850
Copilot / Total hours on type:
470
Circumstances:
The Summit Air Charters Dornier 228-202 was on a charter flight from Resolute Bay to Cambridge Bay, Nunavut, under instrument flight rules. While on final approach to Runway 31 True, the aircraft collided with the ground approximately 1.5 nautical miles from the threshold at 0143 mountain standard time. Of the 2 pilots and 12 passengers on board, 2 persons received serious injuries. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The emergency locator transmitter activated, and the crew notified the Cambridge Bay Airport radio operator of the accident via the aircraft radio. Local ground search efforts found the aircraft within 30 minutes, and all occupants were removed from the site within two hours.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. An abbreviated visual approach was conducted at night in instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in the flight crew’s inability to obtain sufficient visual reference to judge their height above the ground.
2. The flight crew did not monitor pressure altimeter readings or reference the minimum altitude requirements in relation to aircraft position on the approach, resulting in controlled flight into terrain.
3. The pilots had not received training and performance checks for the installed global positioning system (GPS) equipment, and were not fully competent in its use. The attempts at adjusting the settings likely distracted the pilots from maintaining the required track and ground clearance during the final approach.
Findings as to Risk:
1. The precision approach path indicator systems (PAPI) at Cambridge Bay had not been inspected in accordance with the Airport Safety Program Manual. Although calibration of the equipment did not have a bearing on this occurrence, there was an increased risk of aircraft misalignment from the proper glide path, especially during night and reduced visibility conditions.
2. The flight crew’s cross-check of barometric altimeter performance was not sufficient to detect which instrument was inaccurate. As a result, reference was made to a defective altimeter, which increased the risk of controlled flight into terrain.
3. Operators’ maintenance organizations normally do not have access to the troubleshooting information contained in Component Maintenance Instruction Manuals for the Intercontinental Dynamics Corporation altimeters. Therefore, aircraft could be dispatched with damaged instruments with the potential for developing a loss of calibration during flight.
4. The flight was conducted during a period in which the crew’s circadian rhythm cycle could result in cognitive and physical performance degradation unless recognized and managed.
Final Report:

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-60 Marquise in Millington

Date & Time: Dec 9, 2008 at 1058 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N452MA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Millington - Millington
MSN:
1533
YOM:
1981
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5311
Captain / Total hours on type:
662.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6094
Circumstances:
According to the pilot, after he took off for a nearby airport he raised the landing gear but did not raise the 20-degree flaps per the “after takeoff” checklist. Shortly thereafter, when the airplane was at an altitude of about 2,400 feet, and in "heavy rain," the pilot noticed that the right engine was losing power. He subsequently feathered the propeller as engine power reduced to 40 percent, but still did not raise the flaps. Weather, recorded shortly before the accident, included scattered clouds at 500 feet, and a broken cloud layer at 1,200 feet, and the pilot advised air traffic control (ATC) that he would fly an ILS (instrument landing system) approach if he could maintain altitude. After maneuvering, and advising ATC that he could not maintain altitude, the pilot descended the airplane to a right base leg where, about 1/4 nautical mile from the runway, it was approximately 300 feet above the terrain. The pilot completed the landing, with the airplane touching down about 6,200 feet down the 8,000-foot runway, heading about 20 degrees to the left. The airplane veered off the left side of the runway and subsequently went through an airport fence. The left engine was running at “high speed” when fire fighters responded to the scene. The right engine propeller was observed in the feathered position at the scene, and after subsequent examinations, the right engine was successfully run in a test cell with no noticeable loss of power. There was no determination as to why the right engine lost power in flight, although rain ingestion is a possibility. Airplane performance calculations indicated that with the landing gear up, a proper single-engine power setting and airspeed, and flaps raised, the airplane should have been able to climb about 650 feet per minute. Even with flaps at 20 degrees, it should have been able to climb at 350 feet per minute. In either case, unless the airplane was not properly configured, there was no reason why it should not have been able to maintain the altitudes needed to position it for a stabilized approach.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s improper configuration of the airplane following an engine shutdown, which resulted in a low-altitude, unstabilized approach. Contributing to the accident was a loss of engine power for undetermined reasons.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-46-310P Malibu in León

Date & Time: Dec 1, 2008 at 2000 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N9095K
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Mexico City – Cali
MSN:
46-08023
YOM:
1986
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The single engine aircraft was completing a flight from Mexico City to Cali, carrying five passengers and one pilot on behalf of the Cristina Adventista Congregation. While approaching León-Fanor Urroz Airport, the aircraft crashed by a wooded area. All six occupants were seriously injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

Crash of a Falcon 900EX EASy in Brindisi

Date & Time: Nov 28, 2008 at 1900 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
I-FLYI
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Athens - Rome
MSN:
204
YOM:
2008
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
100
Circumstances:
The aircraft was on its way from Athens-Elefterios Venizelos Airport to Rome with 3 passengers and 3 crew members on board. While at cruising level over the Adriatic Sea, the crew informed ATC about burn smell on board (possible smoke), declared an emergency and elected to divert to Brindisi-Papola Casale Airport. Upon arrival at Brindisi, weather conditions were poor with rain showers and strong crosswinds. In the meantime, the runway 14/32 (3,330 meters long) was closed to traffic due to works in progress. After landing on runway 23, the aircraft skidded, veered off runway and lost its right main gear before coming to rest. Three occupants were evacuated to local hospital with minor injuries while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair due to severe damages to the right wing and the right part of the fuselage. Brand new, it was delivered this year and completed 100 flying hours only.

Crash of a BAe 3112 Jetstream 31 in Fort Smith

Date & Time: Nov 27, 2008 at 1515 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FNAY
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Hay River - Fort Smith
MSN:
768
YOM:
1987
Flight number:
PLR734
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The Northwestern Air BAe Jetstream 31 was operating as PLR734 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight from Hay River to Fort Smith, Northwest Territories. After conducting an IFR approach to Runway 11, PLR734 executed a missed approach and flew a full procedure approach for Runway 29. At approximately 0.2 nautical miles from the threshold, the crew sighted the approach strobe lights and continued for a landing. Prior to touchdown, the aircraft entered an aerodynamic stall and landed hard on the runway at 1515 mountain standard time. The aircraft remained on the runway despite the left main landing gear collapsing. The two flight crew members and three passengers were uninjured and evacuated the aircraft through the left main cabin door. There was no post-impact fire.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. Though icing conditions were encountered, the airframe de-icing boots were not cycled nor was the Vref speed increased to offset the effects of aircraft icing.
2. An abrupt change in aircraft configuration, which included a reduction in power to flight idle and the addition of 35° flap, caused the aircraft’s speed to rapidly decrease.
3. The aircraft entered an aerodynamic stall due to the decreased performance caused by the icing. There was insufficient altitude to recover the aircraft prior to impact with the runway.
Finding as to Risk:
1. The company had not incorporated the British Aerospace Notice to Aircrew into its standard operating procedures (SOP) at the time of the occurrence. Therefore, crews were still required to make configuration changes late in the approach sequence, increasing the risk of an unstabilised approach.
Final Report: