Jamestown-Chautauqua County

The airplane departed Dunkirk-Chautauqua County Airport, State of New York, on a ferry flight to Fort-Lauderdale-Executive Airport, carrying a crew of two. After he reached the altitude of 10,000 feet, the crew reported technical problems with the onboard electric system and elected to divert to Jamestown-Chautauqua County Airport. On final approach to runway 25, at an airspeed of 157 knots and with a rate of descent of 1,000 feet per minute, the airplane impacted the ground at runway threshold and went out of control. It caught fire, veered off runway to the left and came to rest in a grassy area, bursting into flames. Both crew members were rescued with various injuries. The airplane was totally destroyed by fire.

The co-pilot was performing a nighttime approach and landing to runway 25. No runway condition reports were received by the flight crew while airborne, and a NOTAM was in effect, stating, “thin loose snow over patchy thin ice.” After landing, the co-pilot called out that the airplane was sliding and the wheel brakes were ineffective. The captain took the controls, activated the air brakes, and instructed the co-pilot to deploy the drag chute. The crew could not stop the airplane in the remaining runway distance and the airplane overran the runway by approximately 100 feet. After departing the runway end, the landing gear contacted a snow berm that was the result of earlier plowing. The captain turned the airplane around and taxied to the ramp. Subsequent inspection of the airplane revealed a fractured nose gear strut and buckling of the fuselage. The spring-loaded drag chute extractor cap activated, but the parachute remained in its tail cone container. Both flight crewmembers reported that the runway was icy at the time of the accident and braking action was “nil.” The airport manager reported that when the airplane landed, no airport staff were on duty and had not been for several hours. He also reported that when the airport staff left for the evening, the runway conditions were adequate. The runway had been plowed and sanded approximately 20 hours prior to the accident, sanded two more times during the day, and no measurable precipitation was recorded within that time frame. The reason that the drag chute failed to deploy was not determined.

During the initial climb, a "throbbing or surging" sound was heard as the airplane departed in gusting wind conditions with a 600-foot ceiling and 1/2 mile visibility in snow. Moments later the airplane came "straight down" and impacted the ground. During examination of the wreckage, it was discovered that that the fuel selector switch for the right engine had been in the "X-FEED" position during the accident. Examination of documents discovered in the wreckage revealed, three documents pertaining to operation of an Aerostar. These documents consisted of two airplane flight manuals (AFMs) from two different manufacturers, and a checklist. Examination of the first of the AFMs revealed, that it had the name of both the pilot and the operator on the cover of the document. Further examination revealed that it had been published 4 years prior to the manufacture of the accident airplane, and contained information for a Ted Smith Aerostar Model 601P, which the operator had previously owned. This document contained no warnings regarding the use of the crossfeed system during takeoff. Examination of the second of the two AFMs found in the wreckage revealed that it was the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved AFM for the accident airplane. Unlike the first AFM, the second AFM advised that the fuel selector "X-FEED" position should be used in "level coordinated flight only." It also advised that each engine fuel selector "must be in the ON position for takeoff, climb, descent, approach, and landing." It also warned that, if the airplane was not in a level coordinated flight attitude, "engine power interruptions may occur on one or both engines" when "X-FEED" is selected "due to unporting of the respective engine's fuel supply intake port." Review of the checklist contained in the FAA approved AFM for the Piper Aircraft Model 601P under "STARTING ENGINES," required a check of the crossfeed system prior to engine start by selecting each fuel selector to "ON," then selecting "X-FEED," and after verifying valve actuation and annunciator light illumination, returning the fuel selector to "ON." Additionally, under "BEFORE TAKEOFF" It also required that the fuel selectors be checked in the "ON" position, and that the "X-FEED" annunciator light was out, prior to takeoff. Examination of the pilot's checklist revealed that, it consisted of multiple pages inserted into plastic protective sleeves and included both typed, and hand written information. A review of the section titled "BEFORE TAKEOFF" revealed that the checklist item "Fuel Selectors - ON Position," which was listed in the AFM, had been omitted.