Landing (descent or approach)

On 19 January 2014, a PA-31-350 Piper Chieftain, registered PK-IWT, was being operated by PT. Intan Angkasa Air Service, on positioning flight from Sentani Airport, Jayapura with intended destination of Juanda Airport, Surabaya for aircraft maintenance. The positioning flight was planned to transit at Dumatubun Airport Langgur of Tual, Maluku and Haluoleo Airport, Kendari at South East Sulawesi for refuelling. On the first sector, the aircraft departed Sentani Airport at 2351 UTC (0851 WIT) and estimated arrival at Langgur was 0320 UTC. On board on this flight was one pilot, two company engineers and one ground staff. At 0240 UTC the pilot contacted to the Langgur FISO, reported that the aircraft position was 85 Nm to Langgur Airport at altitude 10,000 feet and requested weather information. Langgur FISO acknowledged and informed that the weather was rain and thunderstorm and the runway in used was 09. When the aircraft passing 5,000 feet, the pilot contacted the Langgur FISO and reported that the aircraft position was 50 Nm from langgur and informed the estimated time of arrival was 0320 UTC. The Langgur FISO acknowledged and advised the pilot to contact when the aircraft was at long final runway 09. At 0318 UTC, the pilot contacted Langgur FISO, reported the position was 25 Nm to Langgur at altitude of 2,500 feet and requested to use runway 27. The Langgur FISO advised the pilot to contact on final runway 27. At 0325 UTC, Langgur FISO contacted the pilot with no reply. At 0340 UTC, Langgur FISO received information from local people that the aircraft had crashed. The aircraft was found at approximately 1.6 Nm north east of Langgur Airport at coordinate 5° 38’ 30.40” S; 132° 45’ 21.57” E. All occupants fatally injured and the aircraft destroyed by impact force and post impact fire. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and post impact fire, several parts of the remaining wreckage such as cockpit could not be examined due to the level of damage. The aircraft was not equipped with flight recorders and the communication between ATC and the pilot was not recorded. No eye witness saw the aircraft prior to impact. Information available for the investigation was limited. The analysis utilizes available information mainly on the wreckage information including the information of the wings, engines and propellers.

The aircraft departed Managua on a cargo flight to Saltillo with an intermediate stop in Tapachula, carrying two passengers and two pilots on behalf of DHL. During a night approach to Saltillo Airport, the crew was cleared to land on runway 17. One minute later, he initiated a go-around and decided to divert to Monterrey Airport which was the alternate. Due to a poor flight preparation, the crew was unaware that Monterrey Airport was closed to traffic that night. So few minutes later, the crew returned to Saltillo and was again cleared to land on runway 17. At that time, weather conditions were marginal with a limited visibility due to fog. Following an ILS CAT I approach, the pilot-in-command descended below the MDA and continued the approach despite he did not establish any visual contact with the runway and its equipment. The aircraft landed hard to the right of the runway and on the last third of the runway. After landing, the aircraft rolled for few dozen metres, lost its nose gear and came to rest against an embankment. All four occupants were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On Friday, 10 January 2014, the airplane had flown from Trier to Shoreham, where it landed at 1456 UTC. Two pilots and two passengers were on board the aircraft. Over the weekend, the passengers wanted to participate in a hunt. On the afternoon of 11 January 2014 the PIC told the service provider, tasked by the aircraft owner with the flight planning, to prepone the scheduled return flight on Sunday, 12 January 2014, from 1400 UTC to 1015 UTC. In the ATC flight plan Trier-Föhren Airfield was the destination aerodrome and Luxembourg Airport the alternate aerodrome. According to the flight plan the change of flight rules from IFR to VFR was to occur at reporting point PITES. The handling agent at Shoreham Airport stated that the PIC and the co-pilot had arrived on Sunday at 0850 UTC. The airport made the recordings of a video camera for apron surveillance available to the BFU. These recordings show that the airplane was refuelled in the presence of the pilots. The two passengers arrived at 0936 UTC and about 11 minutes later the aircraft taxied from the apron. At 1000 UTC, the airplane took off from runway 20. At 1138:25 hrs, the co-pilot established contact with Langen Radar. At that time the airplane was in Flight Level (FL) 170. At 1142:51 hrs, after the airplane had descended to FL140, the controller issued the descent clearance to FL70. Approximately one minute later the controller said: "… proceed direct destination again and descend altitude five thousand feet … Spangdahlem QNH one zero two five." The pilot in command acknowledged the clearance. At 1145:23 hrs the PIC said: "… standing by for cancelling IFR." The controller answered: "... roger, IFR is cancelled at one zero two five, your position is one five miles northwest of your destination airfield, squawk VFR, approved to leave." According to radar data, the airplane was approximately in FL90 and continued to fly with a southern heading. At 1147:26 hrs, about 5 NM east of the omnidirectional radio beacon Nattenheim (VOR NTM), the altitude was 4,900 ft AMSL. According to the radar data at 1148:10 hrs the airplane had reached 3,500 ft AMSL. The flight path continued east until 1149 hrs when, in the area of the city of Wittlich in an altitude of 3,500 ft AMSL, the airplane turned right. The ground speed was approximately 180 kt. In the course of the right turn until 1150:30 hrs, the altitude decreased further to about 2,800 ft AMSL and the ground speed to about 160 kt. At 1151:10 hrs the aircraft turned left maintaining altitude until it had reached a southern heading. From 1151:30 hrs on it continued to descend. At the time the airplane was approximately 6.7 NM from the runway threshold and about 0.5 NM north of the extended runway centre line. Approximately 15 seconds later it reached the extended runway centre line of runway 22 while it turned right into the final approach direction. It was in about 2,300 ft AMSL and approximately 5.7 NM from the runway. From 1152:20 hrs on, at approximately 4.6 NM from the threshold, the aircraft began to leave the extended runway centre line to the south. At that time, altitude was approximately 1,600 ft AMSL and ground speed about 160 kt. The last radar target was recorded at 1152:40 hrs with an altitude indication of approximately 1,300 ft AMSL and a ground speed of about 140 kt. The attention of several witnesses, located about 600 m north-east and south-east, respectively, of the accident site in the valley of the river Salm, was drawn to the airplane by engine noise. They congruently stated that the aircraft had come from the direction of the town Esch and flown in low altitude, below the fog or cloud cover, toward the south-west. One of the witnesses estimated the altitude was 15 to 20 m above the trees bordering the river Salm, approximately the same height as the open wire located in the area. According to congruent witnesses’ statements, the engine thrust was increased and the airplane pulled up shortly before reaching a wooded escarpment rising by about 60 m, banked left and disappeared in the fog. Immediately afterwards fire had become visible and impact noises had been heard. The airplane impacted the ground in an inverted position. The occupants suffered fatal injuries and the aircraft was destroyed. The Flugleiter (A person required by German regulation at uncontrolled aerodromes to provide aerodrome information service to pilots) at Trier-Fohren Airfield stated, that on the morning of the accident day, at about 1010 hrs, he had received a phone call from the PIC. During the call the arrival of the airplane had been announced for 1230 hrs. The Flugleiter had informed the PIC about the severe fog prevailing at the airfield. He had also told him that, if at all, he expected visibility would increase after 1330 or 1400 hrs. After the phone conversation the Flugleiter assumed, that the airplane would fly to another airport. According to statements by the PIC’s wife, she had talked with her husband on the landline and then witnessed the PIC’s phone conversation on his mobile phone with the passenger, where he was asked to prepone the return flight to late morning. An unexpected appointment of the passengers was named as reason for the wish. During a phone conversation prior to departure her husband had explained that he had talked with Trier Airfield and learned that fog was prevailing there and one would fly either to Hahn or Luxembourg. The son of the passengers stated at the police that on the morning of the day of the accident his father had called him. He had told him that the airplane would probably land at Frankfurt-Hahn Airport. He stated that for his parents there was no deadline pressure. He said, that for him it is “völlig unvorstellbar (entirely inconceivable)” that his father would pressure the pilot to fly to Trier. In the past deviation to another airport had often been the case. It had never been a problem.

On 05.01.2014, Air India Ltd. Airbus A-320-231 aircraft was scheduled to operate flight AI-889 (Delhi – Guwahati – Imphal) and return flight, AI-890 (Imphal – Guwahati – Delhi). Air India dispatch section at Delhi, which has received the roster of flight crew for the flights, had prepared the operational and ATC flight plans by using FWz flight planning software and taking into account the weight & weather (forecast winds). Same set of flight crew and cabin crew was rostered to operate the four sectors mentioned above. The flight was under Command of an ATPL holder with another ATPL holder as First Officer (FO) and 04 Cabin Crew members. The Commander was CAT III qualified and the FO was CAT I qualified. The FWz plan was prepared for VT-ESL, but later on the aircraft was changed to VT-ESH. As per the pilot in command as both the aircraft have bogie gear type of landing gear and the performance factor is also same for these aircraft, he had accepted the FWz plan of VT-ESL. As per the manager flight dispatch on duty, only first leg i.e. Delhi Guwahati was dispatched. Required fuel figures were informed to the engineering & commercial departments. Pilots were briefed with folders which in addition to flight plans contained current NOTAMs and meteorological information. The relevant information in these documents was highlighted for briefing to the flight crew. For the remaining sectors which were self briefing sectors flight plan and NOTAMs were given to the flight crew. As per the pre flight briefing register, both the crew members have visited the flight dispatch section for briefing and at around 10:40 hrs. IST have signed the dispatch register. The sectors Delhi – Guwahati – Imphal – Guwahati were as per schedule and were uneventful. As per the flight sector report, the transit time at Guwahati prior to Guwahati-Delhi sector was 50 minutes. The aircraft landed at Guwahati from Imphal at 11:15 hrs. UTC and 12.7 tons of fuel was uplifted. The filed alternates for the sector were Lucknow and Jaipur in that order. METARs of Delhi, Lucknow and Jaipur were provided at Guwahati. There was no specific briefing. Flight crew has taken the weather updates of destination and alternates before departure from Guwahati. Lucknow visibility at that time was 2000 meters with temperature and dew point of 18°C & 13°C respectively. The weather at Delhi (11:05 UTC) was RVR as 500 meters for runway 29, general visibility of 150 meters, with both temperature and dew point of 12°C. A speci was issued at 1130 UTC for Jaipur with winds 04 kts. visibility 3000m and haze. There was no significant clouding (NSC), temperature (T) 18°C & dew point (Dp) 13°C, QNH 1013. Pre flight walk around inspection was carried out by the crew at Guwahati and the aircraft was released by an Aircraft Maintenance Engineer which was accepted by the Pilot-in-command. There was no snag or technical problem with the aircraft. There was no component or system released under Minimum Equipment List (MEL). For its last leg, the aircraft departed Guwahati for Delhi at 1205 UTC with 173 passengers on board. The fuel requirement from Guwahati to Delhi with 179 persons on board was 12.2 tonnes. As per the commander of flight, additional 500 kgs of fuel was taken (total on board was 12.7 tonnes) considering the time of arrival in Delhi was that of traffic congestion and because of weather in Delhi. As per the Operational Flight Plan (OFP), there was 10 minutes of arrival delay at the destination. The aircraft was flown on managed speeds. Initially the flight was cleared by ATC for a lower level and was later on cleared to fly at cruising level of 340. The fuel was checked visually on the Flight Management System (FMS) and Fuel Page which was further cross checked with the OFP planned figures by the crew on way points but was not recorded on the Operational Flight Plan. As per the crew, the fuel consumed was marginally higher than planned. The time taken to reach the way points was also noted, which was almost the same as planned figures were. Enroute, there was no briefing about traffic congestion over Delhi by any of the ground stations of AAI. The crew, on reaching overhead Lucknow, has taken Lucknow weather and when the aircraft was in range of ATIS Delhi, Delhi ATIS weather was also copied. The aircraft was not equipped with Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) but was provided with HF/VHF system. As per the flight crew no flight following was provided either by flight dispatch or the IOCC of Air India. Weather updates were not seeked by the crew from the flight dispatch nor were any updates provided by Flight dispatch to the aircraft during the flight except when crew had asked Delhi dispatch about Jaipur visibility before finally making the decision to divert to Jaipur. Flight crew did not seek any update of Delhi or Jaipur weather till the time the aircraft came in contact with Delhi ATC. While in contact with Delhi ATC, the flight was advised to join hold as Delhi visibility Runway 28 RVR had dropped to the lower end of CAT I operations at this point runway 29 was below minima. AI 890 was number 12 in sequence and continued to remain in the holding pattern for the next 20-25 minutes. During this period there was no attempt on the part of flight crew to seek Lucknow weather. Air India Flight dispatch has also not given any advice to the flight about Jaipur or Lucknow weather. The weather (visibility / RVR) reported on Runway 29 was below CAT I conditions so runway was not available for this flight at that moment as the First Officer was only Cat I qualified. As per commander of the flight, they did 03 holds each of 1.5 minutes leg and flew headings 360° and 180° before intercepting the localizer Runway 28 at 35 miles. RVR runway 28 also dropped below Cat. I minimas, therefore the crew discontinued approach and climbed to 8000 feet on runway heading before going on heading 180. As per the Commander, though the 1st planned diversion alternate was Lucknow which had visibility of 2000 m i.e. above minima, but change of diversion to Jaipur was made as after missed approach they were closer to Jaipur and they had inquired about the visibility from Dispatch for Jaipur, which was provided as 2000 m. At this stage the crew did not check complete weather of Jaipur. Minimum diversion fuel to Jaipur was 2.9 tonnes as per FWz CFP. AI-890 commenced diversion to Jaipur with ―Fuel on Board‖ of 3.1 tonnes. As per the Station Manager of Air India at Jaipur Airport, he received a call from their Executive Director, Northern Region at around 2040 hrs. IST on 05.01.2014 that due to Delhi weather, AI 890 had diverted to Jaipur. He then conveyed the same to the airport office and the concerned engineer. The aircraft came in contact with Jaipur for the first time when it was at 68 DME from Jaipur. At that time the crew came to know of the complete weather of Jaipur from ATIS as visibility of 900 m, Dew Point as 13°C, temperature as 13°C, and RVR of 1000m. At 60 miles and passing flight level 138, the crew intimated Jaipur that the aircraft is descending for flight level 100 as cleared by Delhi control, which was acknowledged by Jaipur ATC. The aircraft again informed Jaipur ATC its position at 55 miles, 50 miles and 42 miles from Jaipur which were also acknowledged by Jaipur ATC. During these contacts, weather of Jaipur was neither asked by the crew nor provided by the ATC. When the aircraft was at flight level 83, the crew asked ATC Jaipur to confirm that they can carry out ILS approach for runway 27 via 10 DME arc. While confirming the requested approach, Jaipur ATC has informed all the stations about the weather at that moment as visibility 400 m and RVR 1000 m. When the aircraft was at 30 miles from Jaipur, Jaipur ATC passed weather as visibility 400 m, RVR 1000 m and trend visibility becoming 350 m. The crew was asked to come overhead by Jaipur ATC. At 28 DME from Jaipur, the aircraft was maintaining 6000 feet and on request was cleared by Jaipur ATC to descend to 5000 feet. When the aircraft was at 25 DME, from Jaipur, ATC advised that the weather was deteriorating rapidly and visibility was 400 meters. The crew however intimated the ATC that they were committed to land at Jaipur due fuel. As per the crew the fuel on board at that point of time was 2.6 tonnes (approx.) and approach was commenced for Jaipur with a visibility of 500 m with trend reducing. The aircraft was no. 2 in approach at Jaipur and was cleared for VORDME arc ILS approach runway 27 at 25 nm. Crew had, as per them, checked Ahmedabad distance as 291 nm, with a fuel calculation of 2.7 tonnes and as sufficient fuel was not available for Ahmedabad so did not consider diverting to Ahmedabad at that moment. Crew has also stated that Udaipur watch hours were not available with them, Jodhpur is an Air Force field with restrictions and Delhi was packed so they continued approach to Jaipur knowing that visibility / RVR was rapidly deteriorating. Due to reducing visibility, Jaipur ATC asked all the aircraft inbound for Jaipur to come over head and join JJP hold. The crew of the subject flight asked for the weather which was provided as visibility 400 m & RVR 1000 m though RVR deteriorating to 550 m. The flight from the ―Arrival Route‖ flew the VORDME arc for ILS runway 27. The ATC had transmitted the RVR as 200 m and visibility as 50 m with trend reducing. Another scheduled flight ahead of AI-890 carried out a missed approach and diverted to Ahmedabad. When the aircraft was above MDA (1480 feet AGL), ATC reported RVR 50 m and cleared the aircraft to land subject to minima. Both the flight crew maintained that they had seen the runway lights. ILS approach was performed with dual AP until 200ft RALT. After descending below MDA on auto pilot, the commander disconnected the auto pilot. Captain performed the final approach manually. The aircraft deviated to the left of the runway centre line and touched down on soft ground (in kutcha) on the LH side of the runway. During touchdown and landing roll, the visibility was zero and crew were unable to see any of the reference cues. The crew had heard rumbling sound during landing roll. As per the commander, he did the manual landing as he was not sure if he could do auto-land on a ground facility which is CAT I certified airfield in actual zero visibility. The aircraft continued to roll/ skid on the unpaved surface and during this period the left wing impacted trees causing damage to the left wing. Thereafter aircraft turned right and entered the runway finally coming to a halt on the LH side of runway. There was no fire. ATC Jaipur informed the Airport Manager of the Airline at Jaipur that their flight AI-890 had blocked the runway and also requested them to send equipments / manpower to attend the aircraft and get the aircraft removed. The Station AME of the airline alongwith the Asst Officer (Comm.), who was at the tarmac were instructed by the Station Manager to move to the aircraft. As per the AME, the visibility was almost nil and they could not move without the help of ‗Follow Me‘ Jeep. The ATC was informed to arrange the jeep to escort the personnel upto the aircraft. The AME after reaching the aircraft observed that the no. 1 main wheel of the aircraft had decapped/ damaged and the port side wing was damaged. The fuel remaining on board was 2400 kgs. The disembarkation of passengers was carried out on the runway itself and passengers were sent to the terminal building. Since the aircraft was not in a position to be either taxied or towed to the parking bay, the baggage of passengers was offloaded at the runway itself and sent to the terminal. One passenger suffered minor bruise on the knuckle of his right hand middle finger. He was attended to by the cabin crew in the aircraft and also by the doctor at the airport. Medical check-up of all the crew members including breathanalyser (BA) test was done by the medical officer, M.I. room Jaipur airport. The BA test was negative for all the crew members with a reading of 00.00. Since the aircraft was obstructing the runway, the airport was shut down for any further flight operations till the runway could be cleared. A NOTAM was issued to this effect. The aircraft was towed the next day to parking bay no.5 at terminal-1 by 1200 hrs and was later repositioned on a non-operational remote bay.

The airplane, with two flight crewmembers and a pilot-rated passenger on board, was on a cross-country flight. The departure and en route portions of the flight were uneventful. As the flight neared its destination, a high-altitude, terrain-limited airport, air traffic control (ATC) provided vectors to the localizer/distance measuring equipment (LOC/DME)-E approach to runway 15. About 1210, the local controller informed the flight crew that the wind was from 290º at 19 knots (kts) with gusts to 25 kts. About 1211, the flight crew reported that they were executing a missed approach and then requested vectors for a second approach. ATC vectored the airplane for a second LOC/DME-E approach to runway 15. About 1221, the local controller informed the flight crew that the wind was from 330° at 16 kts and the 1-minute average wind was from 320° at 14 kts gusting to 25 kts. The initial part of the airplane's second approach was as-expected for descent angle, flap setting, and spoilers. During the final minute of flight, the engines were advanced and retarded five times, and the airplane's airspeed varied between 135 kts and 150 kts. The final portion of the approach to the runway was not consistent with a stabilized approach. The airplane stayed nose down during its final descent and initial contact with the runway. The vertical acceleration and pitch parameters were consistent with the airplane pitch oscillating above the runway for a number of seconds before a hard runway contact, a gain in altitude, and a final impact into the runway at about 6 g. The weather at the time of the accident was near or in exceedance of the airplane's maximum tailwind and crosswind components for landing, as published in the airplane flight manual. Given the location of the airplane over the runway when the approach became unstabilized and terrain limitations of ASE, performance calculations were completed to determine if the airplane could successfully perform a go-around. Assuming the crew had control of the airplane, and that the engines were advanced to the appropriate climb setting, anti-ice was off, and tailwinds were less than a sustained 25 kts, the airplane had the capability to complete a go-around, clearing the local obstacles along that path.Both flight crewmembers had recently completed simulator training for a type rating in the CL600 airplane. The captain reported that he had a total of 12 to 14 hours of total flight time in the airplane type, including the time he trained in the simulator. The copilot would have had close to the same hours as the captain given that they attended flight training together. Neither flight crew member would have met the minimum flight time requirement of 25 hours to act as pilot-in-command under Part 135. The accident flight was conducted under Part 91, and therefore, the 25 hours requirement did not apply to this portion of their trip. Nevertheless, the additional flight time would have increased the crew's familiarity with the airplane and its limitation and likely improved their decision-making during the unstabilized approach. Further, the captain stated that he asked the passenger, an experienced CL-600-rated pilot. to accompany them on the trip to provide guidance during the approach to the destination airport. However, because the CL-600-rated pilot was in the jumpseat position and unable to reach the aircraft controls, he was unable to act as a qualified pilot-in-command.

The pilot departed Puerto Montt at 0900LT on a positioning flight to Port Raúl Marín Balmaceda to pick up five passengers. On approach, the pilot decided to complete a loss pass to evaluate the landing conditions and the wind component. Shortly later, the aircraft landed on its belly and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest in a grassy area. The pilot was uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The four engine aircraft departed Novosibirsk-Yeltsovka Airport on a cargo flight to Irkutsk, carrying three mechanics, six crew members and a load consisting of 1,5 tons of spare parts for the Irkut Group (Sukhoi, Beriev) based in Irkutsk. On approach to Irkust-2 Airport, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions with mist and limited visibility due to the night. On short final, the aircraft deviated to the right and descended too low until it impacted military vehicles and crashed onto several barracks of the 109th Arsenal of the Russian Army, coming to rest 770 metres short of runway 14 and about 90 metres to the right of its extended centerline. The aircraft was destroyed and all nine occupants were killed. There were no victims on the ground.

The crew departed Viña del Mar-Torquemada Airport on a positioning flight to Santiago de Chile. Shortly after takeoff, the crew encountered technical problems and elected to return. On approach, both engines failed and on short final by night, the aircraft stalled and crashed 450 metres short of runway 05. Both pilots escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The twin engine aircraft was performing a flight from Abbotsford to Tofino with two people on board (a father aged 51 and his son aged 25). On approach to Tofino Airport, on Vancouver Island, the aircraft impacted ground and crashed on Vargas Island, off Tofino. The burnt wreckage was found the following day and both occupants were killed.

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Jeddah, the crew completed the approach and landing procedures on runway 04 at Abuja-Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport. During the landing roll, the aircraft overran the displaced threshold then veered to the right and veered off runway. While contacting a grassy area, the aircraft collided with several parked excavator equipment and trucks. The aircraft came to a halt and was severely damaged to both wings and engines. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.