Landing (descent or approach)

The aircraft departed Windhoek on a special flight to the disused Airfield of Omega (ex airbase), carrying six crew members and various equipment in order to collect the bodies of all 33 people who have been killed in the crash of the LAM Embraer ERJ-190AR C9-EMC that occurred in the Bwabwata National Park the previous day. The aircraft landed too far down the airstrip that was overgrown by grass and bushes. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and collided with trees, causing severe damages to the wings (the right wing was partially torn off). All six occupants escaped unhurt while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Hulk still in situ in FEB2014 and may be disassembled and trucked back to Windhoek.

The scheduled commuter flight departed 40 minutes late for a two-stop flight. During the first leg of the night visual flight rules (VFR) flight, weather at the first destination airport deteriorated, so the pilot diverted to the second destination airport. The pilot requested and received a special VFR clearance from an air route traffic controller into the diversion airport area. Review of automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data transmitted by the airplane showed that, after the clearance was issued, the airplane's track changed and proceeded in a direct line to the diversion airport. Postaccident examination of the pilot's radio showed that his audio panel was selected to the air route traffic control (ARTCC) frequency rather than the destination airport frequency; therefore, although the pilot attempted to activate the pilot-controlled lighting at the destination airport, as heard on the ARTCC frequency, it did not activate. Further, witnesses on the ground at St. Mary's reported that the airport lighting system was not activated when they saw the accident airplane fly over, and then proceed away from the airport. Witnesses in the area described the weather at the airport as deteriorating with fog and ice. About 1 mile from the runway, the airplane began to descend, followed by a descending right turn and controlled flight into terrain. The pilot appeared to be in control of the airplane up to the point of the right descending turn. Given the lack of runway lighting, the restricted visibility due to fog, and the witness statements, the pilot likely lost situational awareness of the airplane's geographic position, which led to his subsequent controlled flight into terrain. After the airplane proceeded away from the airport, the witnesses attempted to contact the pilot by radio. When the pilot did not respond, they accessed the company's flight tracking software and noted that the airplane's last reported position was in the area of the airplane's observed flightpath. They proceeded to search the area where they believed the airplane was located and found the airplane about 1 hour later. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. About 3/4 inch of ice was noted on the nonprotected surfaces of the empennage. However, ice formation on the airplane's inflatable leading edge de-ice boots was consistent with normal operation of the de-ice system, and structural icing likely was not a factor in the accident. According to the company's General Operations Manual (GOM), operational control was held by the flight coordinator for the accident flight, and the flight coordinator and pilot-in-command (PIC) were jointly responsible for preflight planning, flight delay, and release of the flight, which included the risk assessment process. The flight coordinator assigned the flight a risk level of 2 (on a scale of 1 to 4) due to instrument meteorological and night conditions and contaminated runways at both of the destination airports. The first flight coordinator assigned another flight coordinator to create the manifest, which listed eight passengers and a risk assessment level of 2. According to company risk assessment and operational control procedures, a risk level of 2 required a discussion between the PIC and flight coordinator about the risks involved. However, the flight coordinators did not discuss with the pilot the risks and weather conditions associated with the flight. Neither of the flight coordinators working the flight had received company training on the risk assessment program. At the time of the accident, no signoff was required for flight coordinators or pilots on the risk assessment form, and the form was not integrated into the company manuals. A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) surveillance activities revealed that aviation safety inspectors had performed numerous operational control inspections and repeatedly noted deficiencies within the company's training, risk management, and operational control procedures. Enforcement Information System records indicated that FAA inspectors observed multiple incidences of the operator's noncompliance related to flight operations and that they opened investigations; however, the investigations were closed after only administrative action had been taken. Therefore, although FAA inspectors were providing surveillance and noting discrepancies within the company's procedures and processes, the FAA did not hold the operator sufficiently accountable for correcting the types of operational deficiencies evident in this accident, such as the operator's failure to comply with its operations specifications, operations training manual, and GOM and applicable federal regulations.

On 25 November 2013, a Cessna Aircraft Company C208B Grand Caravan, registered P2-SAH and operated by Tropicair, departed Kamusi, Western Province, for Purari River, Gulf Province, at 0312 UTC on a charter flight under the instrument flight rules (IFR). There were 10 persons on board; one pilot and nine passengers . Earlier in the day, the aircraft had departed Port Moresby for Kamusi from where it flew to Hivaro and back to Kamusi before the accident flight. SAH was due to continue from Purari River to Vailala and Port Moresby. The pilot reported that the takeoff and climb from Kamusi were normal and he levelled off at 9,000 ft and completed the top-of-climb checklist. Between Kamusi and Purari River the terrain is mostly flat and forest covered, with areas of swampland and slow-moving tidal rivers. Habitation is very sparse with occasional small villages along the rivers. The pilot recalled that the weather was generally good in the area with a cloud base of 3,000 ft and good visibility between build-ups. The pilot reported that approximately 2 minutes into the cruise there was a loud ‘pop’ sound followed by a complete loss of engine power. After configuring the aircraft for best glide speed at 95 kts, the pilot turned the aircraft right towards the coast and rivers to the south, and completed the Phase-1 memory recall items for engine failure in flight. He was assisted by the passenger in the right pilot seat who switched on the Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) and at 0332 broadcast MAYDAY due engine failure on the area frequency. Checking the database in the on-board Global Positioning System (GPS), the pilot found the airstrip at Kibeni on the eastern side of the Palbuna River. The pilot, assisted by the passenger next to him, tried unsuccessfully to restart the engine using the procedure in the aircraft’s Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). The passenger continued to give position reports and to communicate with other aircraft. At about 3,000 ft AMSL the pilot asked for radio silence on the area frequency so he could concentrate on the approach to Kibeni airstrip, flying a left hand circuit to land in a south westerly direction. He selected full flaps during the final stages of the approach, which arrested the aircraft’s rate of descent, but the higher than normal speed of the aircraft during the approach and landing flare caused it to float and touch down half way along the airstrip. The disused 430 metre long Kibeni airstrip was overgrown with grass and weeds. It was about 60 ft above the river and 120 ft above mean sea level, with trees and other vegetation on the slope down to the river. The aircraft bounced three times and, because the aircraft’s speed had not decayed sufficiently to stop in the available length, the pilot elected to pull back on the control column in order to clear the trees that were growing on the slope between the airstrip and the river. The aircraft became airborne, impacting the crown of a coconut palm (that was almost level with the airstrip) as it passed over the trees. The pilot banked the aircraft hard left in an attempt to land/ditch along the river and avoid trees on the opposite bank. He then pushed forward on the control column to avoid stalling the aircraft and levelled the wings before the aircraft impacted the water. The aircraft came to rest inverted with the cockpit and forward cabin submerged and immediately filled with water. After a short delay while he gained his bearings under water, the pilot was able to undo his harness and open the left cockpit door. He swam to the rear of the aircraft, opened the right rear cabin door, and helped the surviving passengers to safety on the river bank. He made several attempts to reach those still inside the aircraft. When he had determined there was nothing further he could do to reach them, he administered first aid to the survivors with materials from the aircraft’s first aid kit. After approximately 20 minutes, villagers arrived in a canoe and transported the pilot and surviving passengers to Kibeni village across the river. About 90 minutes after the accident, rescuers airlifted the survivors by helicopter to Kopi, located 44 km north east of Kibeni.

On final approach to Kazan from Domodedovo in marginal weather conditions, crew was forced to make a go around as the aircraft was not correctly aligned with the runway centerline. While climbing to a height of 700 meters, the aircraft went out of control, nosed down and hit the ground. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 50 occupants were killed. MAK reported in a first statement that the crew did not follow the standard approach profile and the approach was unstable. TOGA mode was selected, autopilot deactivated and flaps raised from 30 to 15 degrees. As gear were retracted, the aircraft pitched up to about 25 degrees nose up and the indicated airspeed decreased from 150 to 125 knots. Crew countered the nose up by control inputs and the climb was stopped. Aircraft reached a maximum height of 2,300 feet and began to rapidly descend until it impacted the ground with a near vertical angle of 75 degrees at a speed of 242 knots, some 20 seconds after reaching the height of 2,300 feet. The crash was no survivable.

Flight from Sioux Lookout was uneventful till the final descent to Red Lake completed by night and in light snow with a ceiling at 2,000 feet and visibility 8 SM. On final approach to runway 26, crew reported south of the airport and declared an emergency. Shortly after this mayday message, aircraft hit power cables and crashed in flames in a dense wooded area located 800 meters south of the airport. Two passengers seating in the rear were seriously injured while all five other occupants including both pilots were killed.

Radar and air traffic control communications indicated that the Mitsubishi MU-2B-25 was operating normally and flew a nominal flightpath from takeoff through the beginning of the approach until the airplane overshot the extended centerline of the landing runway, tracking to the east and left of course by about 0.2 nautical mile then briefly tracking back toward the centerline. The airplane then entered a 360-degree turn to the left, east of the centerline and at an altitude far below what would be expected for a nominal flightpath and intentional maneuvering flight given the airplane's distance from the airport, which was about 5 miles. As the airplane was in its sustained left turn tracking away from the airport, the controller queried the pilot, who stated that he had a "control problem" and subsequently stated he had a "left engine shutdown." This was the last communication received from the pilot. Witnesses saw the airplane spiral toward the ground and disappear from view. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the landing gear was in the extended position, the flaps were extended 20 degrees, and the left engine propeller blades were in the feathered position. Examination of the left engine showed the fuel shutoff valve was in the closed position, consistent with the engine being in an inoperative condition. As examined, the airplane was not configured in accordance with the airplane flight manual engine shutdown and single-engine landing procedures, which state that the airplane should remain in a clean configuration with flaps set to 5 degrees at the beginning of the final approach descent and the landing gear retracted until landing is assured. Thermal damage to the cockpit instrumentation precluded determining the preimpact position of fuel control and engine switches. The investigation found that the airplane was properly certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with federal regulations and that the recovered airplane components showed no evidence of any preimpact structural, engine, or system failures. The investigation also determined that the pilot was properly certificated and qualified in accordance with applicable federal regulations, including Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) No. 108, which is required for MU-2B pilots and adequate for the operation of MU-2B series airplanes. The pilot had recently completed the SFAR No. 108 training in Kansas and was returning to Tulsa. At the time of the accident, he had about 12 hours total time in the airplane make and model, and the flight was the first time he operated the airplane as a solo pilot. The investigation found no evidence indicating any preexisting medical or behavioral conditions that might have adversely affected the pilot's performance on the day of the accident. Based on aircraft performance calculations, the airplane should have been flyable in a one engine-inoperative condition; the day visual meteorological conditions at the time of the accident do not support a loss of control due to spatial disorientation. Therefore, the available evidence indicates that the pilot did not appropriately manage a one-engine-inoperative condition, leading to a loss of control from which he did not recover. The airplane was not equipped, and was not required to be equipped, with any type of crash resistant recorder. Although radar data and air traffic control voice communications were available during the investigation to determine the airplane's altitude and flight path and estimate its motions (pitch, bank, yaw attitudes), the exact movements and trim state of the airplane are unknown, and other details of the airplane's performance (such as power settings) can only be estimated. In addition, because the airplane was not equipped with any type of recording device, the pilot's control and system inputs and other actions are unknown. The lack of available data significantly increased the difficulty of determining the specific causes that led to this accident, and it was not possible to determine the reasons for the left engine shutdown or evaluate the pilot's recognition of and response to an engine problem. Recorded video images from the accident flight would possibly have shown where the pilot's attention was directed during the reported problems, his interaction with the airplane controls and systems, and the status of many cockpit switches and instruments. Recorded flight data would have provided information about the engines' operating parameters and the airplane's motions. Previous NTSB recommendations have addressed the need for recording information on airplane types such as the one involved in this accident. Recorders can help investigators identify safety issues that might otherwise be undetectable, which is critical to the prevention of future accidents.

Following an uneventful flight from Trinidad, the crew started the descent to Riberalta Airport in poor weather conditions with a visibility reduced to 3 km due to rain falls. After touchdown on wet runway 14, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, collided with obstacles and came to rest upside down, bursting into flames, some 300 metres short of runway 32 threshold. Ten people were rescued while eight passengers were killed. The aircraft was totally destroyed. The exact circumstances of the accident remains unclear.

As the airplane was descending toward its destination airport, the pilot reported to an air traffic controller en route that he needed to change his destination to a closer airport because the airplane was low on fuel. The controller advised him to land at an airport that was 4 miles away. Shortly after, the pilot contacted the alternate airport’s air traffic control tower (ATCT) and reported that he was low on fuel. The tower controller cleared the airplane to land, and, about 30 seconds later, the pilot advised that he was not going to make it to the airport. The airplane subsequently impacted a field 3.25 miles southeast of the airport. One witness reported hearing the engine sputter, and another witness reported that the engine “did not sound right.” Forty-foot power lines crossed the field 311 feet from the point of impact. It is likely that the pilot was attempting to avoid the power lines during the forced landing and that the airplane then experienced an inadvertent stall and an uncontrolled collision with terrain. About 1 quart of fuel was observed in each fuel tank. No evidence of fuel spillage was found on the ground; no fuel stains were observed on the undersides of the wing panels, wing trailing edges, or engine nacelles; and no fuel smell was observed at the accident site. However, the fuel totalizer showed that 123 gallons of fuel was remaining. Magnification of the annunciator panel light bulbs revealed that the left and right low fuel pressure annunciator lights were illuminated at the time of impact. An examination of the airframe and engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. About 1 month before the accident, the pilot had instructed the fixed-base operator at Camden, Arkansas, to put 25 gallons of fuel in each wing tank; however, it is unknown how much fuel was already onboard the airplane. Although the fuel totalizer showed that the airplane had 123 gallons of fuel remaining at the time of the crash, information in the fuel totalizer is based on pilot inputs, and it is likely the pilot did not update the fuel totalizer properly before the accident flight. The pilot was likely relying on the fuel totalizer instead of the fuel gauges for fuel information, and he likely reported his low fuel situation to the ATCT after the annunciator lights illuminated.

Following an illegal flight from Yerbogachon (Irkutsk region), the crew started a night approach to Tayozhny (Boguchany district of the Krasnoyarsk region) Airfield. In poor visibility due to the night, the crew was unable to establish a visual contact with the abandoned airstrip. Two approaches were abandoned. During a third attempt, the single engine airplane impacted trees and crashed in a wooded area located 35 metres short of runway, bursting into flames. Both pilots were killed and both passengers were seriously injured.

The aircraft was performing a charter flight from Manila to Balesin, carrying tourists en route to the Balesin Island Club. The approach and landing were completed in poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls. After landing, the four engine aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its nose gear and came to rest in the Lamon Bay, few dozen metres offshore. All 75 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.