Landing (descent or approach)

The airline transport pilot was conducting a business flight with six passengers on board. Radar data showed that, after crossing the final approach fix for an instrument approach at the destination airport, the airplane descended below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 2,480 ft mean sea level (msl); dark night, instrument meteorological conditions existed at that time. Subsequently, when the airplane was about 2 miles from the airport and about 2,070 ft msl, the airplane impacted a utility pole, which was 10 ft above ground level (agl). After impacting the pole, the pilot executed a missed approach, and about 40 minutes later, he landed the airplane without further incident at another airport. On-scene examination showed that the impact had scattered debris from the separated utility pole for about 200 ft into a snow-covered field. Examination of the airplane revealed that the impact resulted in substantial damage to the nose structure, lower and upper fuselage, and horizontal stabilizer. Further examinations of the airplane, including its static system, both altimeters, both vertical speed indicators, and the radar altimeter system revealed no evidence of preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot reported that he thought he had leveled the airplane at an altitude above the MDA and that at no time during the descent and approach did the airplane's radar altimeter sound an alert indicating that the airplane was below 400 ft agl radar altitude. He also reported that he never saw the terrain, any obstructions, nor the runway lights or airport environment. Despite the pilot's statement, given the radar data and the impact evidence, it is apparent that he descended the airplane below the MDA, which resulted in the subsequent impact with the utility pole. It could not be determined why the radar altimeter did not alert the pilot that the airplane was only 10 ft above the ground. The pilot's second-class medical certificate, which had been issued more than 20 months before the accident, had expired. The medical certificate limitation section in the expired certificate stated, "Not valid for night flying or by color signal control." There is no evidence that these restrictions contributed to the accident.

The instrument-rated private pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight in the multiengine airplane under instrument flight rules (IFR). As the flight neared its destination, the controller issued clearance for a GPS approach, and, shortly thereafter, the pilot informed the controller that he needed to review the approach procedure before continuing the approach. The controller acknowledged, and, after the pilot reported that he was ready to proceed with the approach, the controller again issued clearance for the GPS approach. Radar data showed that, during the approach, the airplane tracked a course that was offset about 0.5 miles right of the final approach course until it was about 1 mile from the runway threshold. The airplane then turned left towards the threshold and descended to an altitude of about 145 ft above ground level over the runway threshold before the pilot performed a missed approach. It is likely that the pilot performed the missed approach because he was unable to align the airplane with the runway before it crossed the threshold. The controller provided radar vectors for the airplane to return to the approach course and cleared the airplane a third time for the GPS approach to the runway. Radar data showed that the airplane was established on the final approach course as it passed the initial approach fix; however, before it reached the final approach fix, its airspeed slowed to about 111 knots, and it began a left turn with a 25 degree bank angle. About 18 seconds later, while still in the turn, the airplane slowed to 108 knots and began descending rapidly. The airplane's rate of descent exceeded 10,000 feet per minute, and it impacted the ground about 9 miles from the destination airport. Examination of the accident site showed that the airplane was severely fragmented and fire damaged with debris scattered for about 450 feet. Postaccident examination of the wreckage did not reveal evidence of any preimpact failures; however, damage to the left engine indicated that it was not producing power at the time of the accident. The severity of impact and fire damage to the airplane and engine precluded determination of the reason for the loss of left engine power. Weather conditions present at the time of the accident were conducive to super cooled liquid water droplets, and the airplane likely encountered moderate or greater icing conditions. Several pilot reports (PIREPs) for moderate, light, trace, and negative icing were reported to air traffic control but were not distributed publicly into the national airspace system, and there was no airmen's meteorological information (AIRMET) issued for icing. However, the pilot received standard and abbreviated weather briefings for the flight, and his most recent weather briefing included three PIREPs for icing conditions in the area of the accident site. Given the weather information provided, the pilot should have known icing conditions were possible. Even so, the public distribution of additional PIREPs would have likely increased the weather situational awareness by the pilot, weather forecasters, and air traffic controllers. The airplane was equipped with deicing and anti-icing systems that included wing and empennage deice boots and engine inlet heaters. Due to impact damage to the cockpit, the positions of the switches for the ice protection systems at the time of the accident could not be determined. Although the airplane's airspeed of 108 knots when the steep descent began was above its published stall speed of 77 knots, both bank angle and ice accretion would have increased the stall speed. In addition, the published minimum control airspeed was 93 knots. It is likely that, after the airplane passed the initial approach fix, the left engine lost power, the airplane's airspeed began to decay, and the asymmetric thrust resulted in a left turn. As the airspeed continued to decay, it decreased below either stall speed or minimum control airspeed, and the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent.

The pilot and two passengers were planning to fly from Rand Airport to Lanseria International Airport (FALA) in the early hours of the morning with the intention to clear customs. It was still dark and the weather forecast thunderstorms with rain for most areas of Gauteng. Rand Tower requested clearance from FAOR approach before departure. The aircraft took off from Runway 29 following the clearance given and proceeded in a westerly direction. At 6500 feet above mean sea level (AMSL), Rand handed the aircraft over to Approach for further clearances. Reported visibility at FALA was 600m and the cloud base was 600 feet AGL. The pilot then requested a VHF Omnidirectional range (VOR) Z approach for Runway 07. He started the approach at 8000 feet and approximately 14nm from LIV. At 12nm and established on Radial 245 Approach handed him over to FALA. Once in contact with FALA the pilot was advised of the heading to turn to at missed approach point (MAP). At MAP the pilot did not have the runway in sight and advised tower that they were going around. They turned left 360° and climbed to 8000 feet as instructed by FALA. FALA handed them back to Approach for repositioning for Radial 245. Approach advised the aircraft that visibility at Wonderboom was better but the pilot said if not successful they would route to Polokwane. At 12nm the aircraft was handed over to FALA. During the descent, the pilot started repeating messages more than twice. Close to MAP the pilot indicated that he had the field in sight. FALA gave them landing clearance. Soon after, the pilot said he did not have it in sight. When FALA instructed him to go around and route Polokwane, the pilot came back on frequency indicating that the aircraft was in distress. After that, the tower heard a loud bang accompanied by black smoke from behind a hangar.

Following an uneventful flight from Moscow-Domodedovo Airport, the crew was cleared to land on runway 01 at Kulob Airport. In heavy snow falls, the aircraft landed 230 metres past the runway threshold at a speed of 255 km/h. After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure when, after a course of 520 metres, the right main gear contacted a snow berm. Simultaneously, both engines impacted a snow berm (up to 95 cm high) and stopped due to the high quantity of snow ingested. The aircraft veered to the right, lost its nose gear and came to rest in snow, 20 metres to the right of the runway and 1,190 metres from its threshold. All 192 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Upon landing on runway 07 at Ilulissat (BGJN) in gusting crosswind conditions above the aircraft and the operator limited maximum crosswind components, the left main landing gear collapsed. The aircraft skidded off the left side of the runway in a nose right position and into the safety zone. The aircraft continued an increasingly sideways skid in a nose right position, skidded down a steep snow-covered slope and impacted a rocky area approximately 10 meters below the runway elevation. One passenger and one crew member suffered minor injuries. The aircraft was destroyed. The accident occurred in dark night and under visual meteorological conditions (VMC).

Following an uneventful flight from Leipzig, the crew started the descent to Paris-Roissy-CDG Airport runway 27R. At an altitude of 400 feet on approach, the automatic pilot system was deactivated. At an altitude of 200 feet, the decision height, the crew decided to continue the approach as the runway was in sight and the aircraft was stable. During the last segment, at a height of 50 feet, power levers were reduced to flight idle and the aircraft went into a nose up attitude (maximum value of 11°). Both main gears touched down at a speed of 120 knots but the aircraft bounced twice and went into a pitch down attitude, causing the nose gear to land first during the third touchdown. On impact, the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft slid for dozen yards before coming to rest. All 19 occupants were evacuated safely and the aircraft was later considered as damaged beyond repair.

The commercial pilot, who was the pilot flying (PF), and the airplane transport pilot, who was the pilot not flying (PNF), were conducting an aeromedical positioning flight. The pilots reported that, during a night approach, they visually identified the airport, activated the runway lighting system, and then canceled the instrument flight plan for a visual approach. The PNF reported that, after turning onto the final approach, the flaps were fully lowered and that the airplane was in a “wings level, stabilized approach.” The PF reported that he was initially using the vertical approach slope indicator (VASI) for guidance but that the airplane drifted below the glidepath during the approach, and he did not correct back to the glidepath. On short final, the pilots verified that the landing gear were in the down-and-locked position by noting the illumination of the three green landing gear indicator lights, and the airspeed indicator indicated 110 knots. Both pilots reported that the landing was “firm” and that it was followed by a loud bang and the subsequent failure of all three landing gear. The airplane slid on its belly for about 825 ft down the runway before coming to rest. Both pilots evacuated the airplane, which was subsequently consumed by a postaccident fire. Both pilots reported that the airplane was operating normally with no discrepancies noted. Postaccident examination of the wreckage at the accident site revealed that the airplane impacted the runway about 100 ft short of its displaced threshold. Broken components of the landing gear were located along the debris field, which extended about 565 ft beyond the initial impact point. It is likely that the PF's failure to correct and maintain the VASI glidepath after allowing the airplane to descend below the glidepath and the touchdown at a high descent rate resulted in a hard landing and the subsequent failure of all three landing gear.

Following an uneventful flight from Brisbane, the crew completed the approach and landing at Honiara-Henderson Airport. After touchdown on runway 24, the right main gear collapsed and punctured the right wing. The aircraft veered slightly to the right and came to a halt on the runway. All three occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On approach to Moscow-Domodedovo Airport, the crew encountered poor visibility due to marginal weather conditions. Rather than initiating a go-around procedure, the crew continued the descent when the aircraft crash landed to the right of runway 14R, in an area between the runway and the boundary fence. All 28 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

When flying in the Ethiopian Airspace, the crew informed ATC about engine problems and was cleared to divert to Addis Ababa-Bole Airport for an emergency landing. On approach, the twin engine aircraft crashed in an open field located in Legedadi, about 20 km northeast of the airport. Both pilots were seriously injured and the aircraft was destroyed.