Greenland

The following factors were identified:
- A non-optimum CRM on final approach to runway 07 led to flight crew target fixation and a mental blocking of an appropriate decision on going around.
- A non-stabilized approach in crosswind conditions above the aircraft and the operator’s crosswind limitations combined with the actual crosswind landing technique and the power levers retarded below flight idle in flight resulted in an accelerated rate of descent leading to a hard landing, with side load on the left main landing gear at touchdown.
- The left main landing gear structural fuse pin sheared as a result of lateral and vertical overload stress.
- Cycling the power levers between ground and flight range prevented an appropriate deceleration of the aircraft and prolonged the landing roll.
- The combination of applying full left rudder and no decisive use of reverse thrust on the side with the unaffected main landing gear made it impossible for the flight crew to maintain directional control.

Findings:
- The licenses and qualifications held by the flight crew, flight and duty times, the documented technical status of the aircraft and the aircraft mass and balance had no influence on the sequence of events
- The flight crew planned the flight from BGKK to BGGH with the destination alternate BGSF
- The latest BGGH TAF before departure from BGKK indicated marginal weather conditions (strong winds, low visibility and low cloud base) for a successful approach and landing at BGGH
- The forecasted weather conditions at the expected approach time at BGGH were below preplanning minima (use of two destination alternate aerodromes)
- The actual weather conditions at BGGH and enroute weather briefings were equivalent to the forecasted weather conditions
- With reference to the operator’s aerodrome and procedure briefing and the latest reported wind conditions from Nuuk AFIS before landing, a landing was prohibited
- Strong winds and moderate to severe orographic turbulence from the surrounding mountainous terrain increased the flight crew load
- On approach, the flight crew had difficulties of maintaining stabilized approach parameters
- The flight crew most likely suffered from task saturation and information overload
- No flight crew call outs on divergence from the operator’s stabilized approach policy were made
- An optimum crew resource management was not present
- Important low altitude stabilized approach parameters like airspeed, bank angle and runway alignment were not sufficiently corrected
- The flight crew was solely focused on landing and task saturation mentally blocked a decision of going around
- A divergence from the operator’s stabilized approach policy caused an unstabilized approach and a hard landing leading to an excess load of the right MLG at touchdown
- The right MLG fuse pin sheared as a result of overload
Factors:
- A divergence from the operator’s stabilized approach policy caused an unstabilized approach and a hard landing leading to an excess load of the right MLG at touchdown
- The right MLG fuse pin sheared as a result of stress
Summary:
Adverse wind and turbulence conditions at BGGH led to flight crew task saturation on final approach and a breakdown of optimum cockpit resource management (CRM) resulting in a divergence from the operator’s stabilized approach policy.
The divergence from the operator’s stabilized approach policy caused an unstabilized approach and a hard landing leading to an excess load of the right MLG at touchdown. According to its design, the right MLG fuse pin sheared as a result of stress.

After the flight was airborne from BIKF, the flight was restricted by ATC to cruise at FL200 instead of FL280. The lower flight altitude and the power setting used resulted in a reduction of the final reserve to approximately zero minutes. At that time the commander was not concerned about the final reserve because the flight to BGBW was only a two hours flight and as the aircraft before take-off from BIKF had fuel for more than three hours and 40 minutes of flight. During the approach to BGBW the flight never came below the clouds and was in IMC during the entire final approach. The most likely cause was that the aircraft was not following the NDB DME 07 approach procedure descent profile. Consequently the commander did not get visual contact during the approach and he had to make a missed approach. During the diversion to the alternate aerodrome, BGSF the flight was altitude restricted by ATC to FL190. One engine was intentionally stopped during the diversion to BGSF. The consequence was a reduction of the aircraft range. A shallow descent was initiated approximately 57 minutes before ETA over BGSF. The shallow descent profile did consume more fuel than a steeper descent profile. The commander decided to make a precautionary landing in the terrain. The aircraft was destroyed during the landing attempt on the rugged and bumpy surface of the icecap.