Kangerlussuaq (Søndre Strømfjord)

The following factors were identified:
- A non-optimum CRM on final approach to runway 07 led to flight crew target fixation and a mental blocking of an appropriate decision on going around.
- A non-stabilized approach in crosswind conditions above the aircraft and the operator’s crosswind limitations combined with the actual crosswind landing technique and the power levers retarded below flight idle in flight resulted in an accelerated rate of descent leading to a hard landing, with side load on the left main landing gear at touchdown.
- The left main landing gear structural fuse pin sheared as a result of lateral and vertical overload stress.
- Cycling the power levers between ground and flight range prevented an appropriate deceleration of the aircraft and prolonged the landing roll.
- The combination of applying full left rudder and no decisive use of reverse thrust on the side with the unaffected main landing gear made it impossible for the flight crew to maintain directional control.

After the flight was airborne from BIKF, the flight was restricted by ATC to cruise at FL200 instead of FL280. The lower flight altitude and the power setting used resulted in a reduction of the final reserve to approximately zero minutes. At that time the commander was not concerned about the final reserve because the flight to BGBW was only a two hours flight and as the aircraft before take-off from BIKF had fuel for more than three hours and 40 minutes of flight. During the approach to BGBW the flight never came below the clouds and was in IMC during the entire final approach. The most likely cause was that the aircraft was not following the NDB DME 07 approach procedure descent profile. Consequently the commander did not get visual contact during the approach and he had to make a missed approach. During the diversion to the alternate aerodrome, BGSF the flight was altitude restricted by ATC to FL190. One engine was intentionally stopped during the diversion to BGSF. The consequence was a reduction of the aircraft range. A shallow descent was initiated approximately 57 minutes before ETA over BGSF. The shallow descent profile did consume more fuel than a steeper descent profile. The commander decided to make a precautionary landing in the terrain. The aircraft was destroyed during the landing attempt on the rugged and bumpy surface of the icecap.

Investigation revealed that the crew were very inexperienced (a captain with less than 100 hours in command). The were probably affected by an optical illusion. The first 3,000 feet of runway 11 has an upslope of 1.51%; it rises 59 feet from the threshold. At touchdown, the last two-thirds of the runway disappears, giving the impression of a very short runway.

An in-flight fire, initiated and sustained by a severe fuel leak. The fuel leak was caused by the locking of a carburetor drain plug to unscrew.