Crash of a Hawker 800XP in Ibadan

Date & Time: Nov 3, 2023 at 2018 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5N-AMM
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Abuja - Ibadan
MSN:
258286
YOM:
1995
Flight number:
IB500
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3864
Captain / Total hours on type:
335.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2030
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1730
Aircraft flight hours:
10492
Aircraft flight cycles:
7195
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Abuja-Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport at 1941LT on a charter flight (IB500) to Ibadan, carrying seven passengers and three crew members. At 2013LT, the crew was cleared to land on runway 22 and continued the approach. On short final, the airplane impacted the first row of approach lights on the approach path, then touched down first with the right main landing gear, about 220 metres short of the threshold of the runway, and in the grass verge, followed shortly by the left main and nose landing gears respectively. The aircraft continued towards the paved area of the runway, impacting several other rows of approach lights along its path. A total of six impact points were observed. Subsequently, the aircraft entered the paved area and veered right of the centerline, runway 22. At about 156 metres from the threshold, the aircraft crossed the right runway shoulder and continued into the grass verge for a distance of about 184 metres before coming to a stop, partially impeded by vegetation. Number one tyre was found deflated and the nose landing gear collapsed. All 10 occupants disembarked safely.
The below preliminary report was quickly published by NSIB.
Final Report:

Crash of a Dornier DO228-212 in Kaduna: 7 killed

Date & Time: Aug 29, 2015 at 0647 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
NAF030
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Kaduna – Abuja
MSN:
8219
YOM:
1993
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from the Kaduna Military Airfield, while climbing, the aircraft went out of control and crashed into a house located in the Ribadu Cantonment, bursting into flames. All seven occupants (two pilots, two engineers and three passengers) were killed.

Crash of a Hawker 800XP in Port Harcourt

Date & Time: Jun 8, 2015 at 1916 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N497AG
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Abuja – Port Harcourt
MSN:
258439
YOM:
1999
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4180
Captain / Total hours on type:
2752.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
16744
Copilot / Total hours on type:
147
Aircraft flight hours:
8447
Aircraft flight cycles:
6831
Circumstances:
On 11th June, 2015, at about 18:25 h, an HS-125-800XP aircraft with nationality and registration marks N497AG, operated by SWAT Technology Limited departed Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport, Abuja (DNAA) for Port Harcourt International Airport (DNPO) as a charter flight on an Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) flight plan. There were five persons on board inclusive of three flight crew and two passengers. The Captain was the Pilot Flying while the Co-pilot was the Pilot Monitoring. At 18:48 h, N497AG established contact with Lagos and Port Harcourt Air Traffic Control (ATC) units cruising at Flight Level (FL) 280. At 18:55 h, the aircraft was released by Lagos to continue with Port Harcourt. Port Harcourt cleared N497AG for descent to FL210. At 19:13 h, the crew reported field in sight at 6 nautical miles to touch down to the Tower Controller (TC). TC then cleared the aircraft to land with caution “runway surface wet”. The crew experienced light rain at about 1.3 nautical miles to touch down with runway lights ON for the ILS approach. At about 1,000 ft after the extension of landing gears, the PM remarked ‘Okay...I got a little rain on the windshield’ and the PF responded, ‘We don’t have wipers sir... (Laugh) Na wa o (Na wa o – local parlance, - pidgin, for expression of surprise). From the CVR, at Decision Height, the PM called out ‘minimums’ while the PF called back ‘landing’ as his intention. The PM reported that the runway edge lights were visible on the left side. On the right side, it was missing to a large extent and only appeared for about a quarter of the way from the runway 03 end. The PM observed that the aircraft was slightly to the left of the “centreline” and pointed out “right, right, more right.” The PM further stated that at 50 ft, the PF retarded power and turned to the left. At 40 ft, the PM cautioned the PF to ‘keep light in sight don’t go to the left’. At 20 ft, the PM again said, ‘keep on the right’. PF replied, ‘Are you sure that’s not the centre line?’. At 19:16 h, the aircraft touched down with left main wheel in the grass and the right main wheel on the runway but was steered back onto the runway. The PF stated, “...but just on touchdown the right-hand lights were out, and in a bid to line up with the lights we veered off the runway to the left”. The nose wheel landing gear collapsed, and the aircraft stopped on the runway. The engines were shut down and all persons on board disembarked without any injury. From the CVR recordings, the PF told the PM that he mistook the brightly illuminated left runway edge lights for the runway centreline and apologized for the error of judgement for which the PM responded ‘I told you’. The aircraft was towed out of the runway and parked at GAT Apron at 21:50 h. The accident occurred at night in light rain.
Probable cause:
The accident was the consequence of a black hole effect disorientation causing low-level manoeuvre into grass verge.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- Most of the runway 21 right edge lights were unserviceable at landing time.
- Inadequate Crew Resource Management during approach.
Final Report:

Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-83 in Lagos: 159 killed

Date & Time: Jun 3, 2012 at 1545 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5N-RAM
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Abuja - Lagos
MSN:
53019/1783
YOM:
1990
Flight number:
DAV992
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
147
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
159
Captain / Total flying hours:
18116
Captain / Total hours on type:
7466.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1143
Copilot / Total hours on type:
808
Aircraft flight hours:
60850
Aircraft flight cycles:
35220
Circumstances:
On 3rd June, 2012 at about 1545:00hrs, 5N-RAM, a Boeing MD-83, a domestic scheduled commercial flight, operated by Dana Airlines (Nig.) Limited as flight 0992 (DANACO 0992), crashed into a densely populated area of Iju-Ishaga, a suburb of Lagos, following engine number 1 loss of power seventeen minutes into the flight and engine number 2 loss of power while on final approach to Murtala Muhammed Airport Lagos, Nigeria. Visual Meteorological Conditions prevailed at the time and the airplane was on an instrument flight plan. All 153 persons onboard the airplane, including the six crew were fatally injured. There were also six confirmed ground fatalities. The airplane was destroyed. There was post impact fire. The flight originated at Abuja (ABV) and the destination was Lagos (LOS). The airplane was on the fourth flight segment of the day, consisting of two round-trips between Lagos and Abuja. The accident occurred during the return leg of the second trip. DANACO 0992 was on final approach to runway 18R at LOS when the crew declared a Mayday call “Dual Engine Failure – negative response from the throttles.” According to records, the flight arrived ABV as Dana Air flight 0993 at about 1350:00hrs and routine turn-around activities were carried out. DANACO 0992 initiated engine start up at 1436:00hrs. Abuja Control Tower cleared the aircraft to taxi to the holding point of runway 04. En-route ATC clearance was passed on to DANACO 0992 on approaching holding point of runway 04. According to the ATC ground recorder transcript, the aircraft was cleared to line-up on runway 04 and wait, but the crew requested for some time before lining-up. DANACO 0992 was airborne at 1458:00hrs after reporting a fuel endurance of 3 hours 30 minutes. The aircraft made contact with Lagos Area Control Centre at 1518:00hrs and reported 1545:00hrs as the estimated time of arrival at LOS at cruising altitude of 26,000 ft. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) retained about 30 minutes 53 seconds of the flight and started recording at 1513:44hrs by which time the Captain and First Officer (F/O) were in a discussion of a non-normal condition regarding the correlation between the engine throttle setting and an engine power indication. However, they did not voice concerns then that the condition would affect the continuation of the flight. The flight crew continued to monitor the condition and became increasingly concerned as the flight transitioned through the initial descent from cruise altitude at 1522:00hrs and the subsequent approach phase. DANACO 0992 reported passing 18,100ft and 7,700ft, at 1530:00hrs and 1540:00hrs respectively. After receiving radar vectors in heading and altitude from the Controller, the aircraft was issued the final heading to intercept the final approach course for runway 18R. According to CVR transcript, at 1527:30hrs the F/O advised the Captain to use runway 18R for landing and the request was made at 1531:49hrs and subsequently approved by the Radar Controller. The crew accordingly changed the decision height to correspond with runway 18R. At 1531:12hrs, the crew confirmed that there was no throttle response on the left engine and subsequently the Captain took over control as Pilot Flying (PF) at 1531:27hrs. The flight was however continued towards Lagos with no declaration of any distress message. With the confirmation of throttle response on the right engine, the engine anti-ice, ignition and bleed-air were all switched off. At 1532:05hrs, the crew observed the loss of thrust in No.1 Engine of the aircraft. During the period between 1537:00hrs and 1541:00hrs, the flight crew engaged in prelanding tasks including deployment of the slats, and extension of the flaps and landing gears. At 1541:46hrs the First Officer inquired, "both engines coming up?" and the Captain replied “negative” at 1541:48hrs. The flight crew subsequently discussed and agreed to declare an emergency. At 1542:10hrs, DANACO 0992 radioed an emergency distress call indicating "dual engine failure . . . negative response from throttle." At 1542:35hrs, the flight crew lowered the flaps further and continued with the approach and discussed landing alternatively on runway 18L. At 1542:45hrs, the Captain reported the runway in sight and instructed the F/O to retract the flaps and four seconds later to retract the landing gears. At 1543:27hrs, the Captain informed the F/O, "we just lost everything, we lost an engine. I lost both engines". During the next 25 seconds until the end of the CVR recording, the flight crew attempted to recover engine power without reference to any Checklist. The airplane crashed into a densely populated residential area about 5.8 miles north of LOS. The airplane wreckage was approximately on the extended centreline of runway 18R, with the main wreckage concentrated at N 06o 40.310’ E 003o 18.837' coordinates, with elevation of 177ft. During the impact sequence, the airplane struck an uncompleted building, two trees and three other buildings. The wreckage was confined in a small area, with the separated tail section and engines located at the beginning of the debris trail. The airplane was mostly consumed by post crash fire. The tail section, both engines and portions of both wings representing only about 15% of the airplane, were recovered from the accident site for further examination.
Probable cause:
Probable Causal Factors:
1. Engine number 1 lost power seventeen minutes into the flight, and thereafter on final approach, Engine number 2 lost power and failed to respond to throttle movement on demand for increased power to sustain the aircraft in its flight configuration.
2. The inappropriate omission of the use of the Checklist, and the crew’s inability to appreciate the severity of the power-related problem, and their subsequent failure to land at the nearest suitable airfield.
3. Lack of situation awareness, inappropriate decision making, and poor airmanship.

Tear down of the engines showed that the no.1 engine was overhauled in the U.S in August 2011 and was not in compliance with Service Bulletin SB 6452. Both engines had primary and secondary fuel manifold assemblies fractured, cracked, bent, twisted or pinched which led to fuel leaks, fuel discharge to bypass duct, loss of engine thrust and obvious failure of engine responding to
throttle movement. This condition was similar to the no.1 engine of a different Dana Air MD-80, 5N-SAI, that was involved in an incident in October 2013 when the aircraft returned to the departure airport with the engine not responding th throttle movements. This engine also was not in compliance with Service Bulletin SB 6452. This bulletin was issued in 2003 and called for the installation of new secondary fuel manifold assemblies, incorporating tubes fabricated from new material which has a fatigue life that was approximately 2 times greater than the previous tube material.
Final Report:

Crash of an Aeritalia G.222 in Port Harcourt

Date & Time: Mar 12, 2010
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
NAF950
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Abuja - Port Harcourt
MSN:
4070
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
47
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
After landing at Port Harcourt Airport, the aircraft skidded then veered off runway and came to rest. All 52 occupants were rescued, among them 10 were slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair. All passengers were members of the intervention group taking part to a disaster response operation.

Crash of a Dornier DO228-212 in Vande Ikya: 13 killed

Date & Time: Sep 17, 2006
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
NAF033
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Abuja - Obudu
MSN:
8229
YOM:
1994
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
15
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
13
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Abuja on a flight to Obudu, carrying 15 passengers and a crew of three. The pilots started the descent in poor weather conditions when the aircraft impacted hilly terrain near Vande Ikya, about 29 km northwest of Obudu. Five occupants were injured while 13 others were killed, among them several high ranking officers who were flying to Obudu to proceed to an inspection of the military equipments. At the time of the accident, the visibility was poor due to low ceiling.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain after the crew initiated the descent prematurely, causing the aircraft to descend below the minimum prescribed altitude.

Crash of a Douglas DC-9-32 in Port Harcourt: 108 killed

Date & Time: Dec 10, 2005 at 1408 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5N-BFD
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Abuja - Port Harcourt
MSN:
47562
YOM:
1972
Flight number:
SO1145
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
103
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
108
Captain / Total flying hours:
10050
Captain / Total hours on type:
1900.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
920
Copilot / Total hours on type:
670
Aircraft flight hours:
51051
Aircraft flight cycles:
60238
Circumstances:
The aircraft with call sign OSL 1 145 which departed Abuja at 1225 hrs UTC (1.25 pm local time) with endurance of 2 hours 40 minutes was on a scheduled passenger flight enroute Port Harcourt with 110 Persons on Board (103 Passengers and 7 Crew) and the flight continued normally. At 1241 hours UTC, the aircraft cruising at FL240 (24,000ft) Above Sea Level (ASL) got in contact with Port Harcourt Approach Control. The Approach control gave the OSL 1145 in - bound clearance to expect no delay on ILS Approach to runway 21, QNH of 1008 and temperature of 33° C. At about 1242 hours UTC (1.42pm local), the Approach controller passed the 1230 hours UTC weather report to the aircraft as follows: Wind - 260° /02kts Visibility - 12km Weather - Nil Cloud - BKN 420m, few CB (N-SE) at 690m QNH - 1008HPA Temperature - 33° C. About 1250 hours UTC (1.50 pm local), the aircraft, which was 90 nautical miles to the station, contacted Approach Control for initial descent clearance and was cleared down to FL 160. The aircraft continued its descent until about 1300 hours UTC (2.00 pm local) when the crew asked Approach Control whether it was raining over the station to which the controller reported negative rain but scattered CB and the crew acknowledged. At 1304 hours UTC, the crew reported established on the glide and the localizer at 8 nautical miles to touch down. Then the Approach controller informed the aircraft of precipitation approaching the station from the direction of runway 21 and passed the aircraft to Tower for landing instructions. At 1305 hours UTC, the aircraft contacted Tower and reported established on glide and localizer at 6 nautical miles to touch down. The controller then cleared the airplane to land on runway 21 but to exercise caution as the runway surface was slightly wet and the pilot acknowledged. At about 1308 hours UTC, the aircraft made impact with the grass strip between runway 21 and taxiway i.e. 70m to the left of the runway edge, and 540m from the runway 21 threshold. At about 60m from the first impact, the aircraft tail section impacted heavily with a concrete drainage culvert. The airplane then disintegrated and caught fire along its path spanning over 790m. The cockpit section and the forward fuselage were found at about 330m from the rest of the wreckage further down on the taxiway creating a total wreckage trail of 1 120m. Fire and rescue operations were carried out after which 7 survivors and 103 bodies were recovered. Five of the survivors died later in the hospital. The accident occurred in `Instrument Meteorological Conditions' (IMC) during the day.
Probable cause:
The probable cause of the accident was the crew's decision to continue the approach beyond the Decision Altitude without having the runway and/or airport in sight.
The contributory factors were:
- The crew's delayed decision to carry out a missed approach and the application of improper procedure while executing the go-around.
- The aircraft encountered adverse weather conditions with the ingredients of wind shear activity on approach.
- The reducing visibility in thunderstorm and rain as at the time the aircraft came in to land was also a contributory factor to the accident. And the fact the airfield lightings were not on may also have impaired the pilot from sighting the runway.
- Another contributory factor was the fact that the aircraft had an impact with the exposed drainage concrete culvert which led to its disintegration and subsequent tire outbreak.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 200 Super King Air in Kaduna: 2 killed

Date & Time: Nov 28, 2005 at 1038 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N73MW
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Farnborough - Paris - Oued Isara - Kaduna - Abuja
MSN:
BB-22
YOM:
1975
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
The crew took delivery of the aircraft in Farnborough and was supposed to transfer it in Abuja following fuel stop in Paris-Le Bourget, Oued Isara and Kaduna. Shortly after takeoff from Kaduna Airport runway 05, while in initial climb, one of the engine caught fire. The pilot-in-command lost control of the airplane that stalled and crashed, bursting into flames. Both occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Engine fire/failure for unknown reasons.

Crash of a Boeing 737-2L9 in Lisa: 117 killed

Date & Time: Oct 22, 2005 at 2040 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5N-BFN
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Abidjan – Accra – Lagos – Abuja
MSN:
22734
YOM:
1981
Flight number:
BLV210
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
111
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
117
Captain / Total flying hours:
13429
Captain / Total hours on type:
153.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
762
Copilot / Total hours on type:
451
Aircraft flight hours:
55772
Aircraft flight cycles:
36266
Circumstances:
The accident was reported to erstwhile Accident Investigation and Prevention Bureau (AIPB) now Accident Investigation Bureau (AIB) on Saturday 22nd of October, 2005. The site of the wreckage was located on the 23rd of October, 2005 and investigation began the same day. On October 22, 2005, at 2040 hrs, Bellview Airlines (BLV) Flight 210, a Boeing B737-200, 5N-BFN, crashed while climbing to cruise altitude shortly after take-off from Murtala Muhammed Airport, Lagos (LOS). The flight was operating under the provisions of the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) Air Navigation Regulations (ANRs) as a scheduled domestic passenger flight from LOS to Abuja International Airport (ABV). The flight departed LOS for ABV at 2035 hrs, with 2 pilots, 1 licensed engineer, 3 flight attendants, and 111 passengers on board. The airplane entered a descent and impacted open terrain at Lisa Village, Ogun State. All 117 persons were killed and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and fire. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed. The airplane was operated on an Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) plan. The accident occurred on the final leg of a one-day round trip from Abuja to Abidjan with intermediate stops at Lagos and Accra for both the outbound and inbound segments. The trip through the second stop at Accra (the fourth leg) was reported without incident. On the fifth leg, during the taxi for takeoff at Accra, the pilot and the engineer discussed the low pressure reading of 650 psi in the brake accumulator system according to the pilot that flew the aircraft from Accra to Lagos. Normal accumulator brake pressure is 1000 psi. The captain continued the flight to the destination, LOS, without incident, where the discrepancy was logged. The engineer briefed the maintenance crew about the low pressure reading. The crew consisted of two Licensed Aircraft Engineers (LAEs) and the outbound engineer for Flight 210. LAEs and engineer on riding coverage worked together to troubleshoot the brake system, which included verifying the pressure reading with the pressure gauge from another Boeing 737 (5N-BFM) in the fleet. It was determined that the source of the low pressure was due to a faulty brake accumulator. On checking the Minimum Equipment List (MEL), the maintenance engineers decided that the aircraft could be released for operation with the fault. Before Flight 210 departed, the captain discussed en-route weather with another pilot who had just completed a flight from Port Harcourt to Lagos. The other pilot informed the accident captain of a squall line in the vicinity of Benin. The accident captain indicated that he experienced the same weather condition on his previous flight from Abuja to Lagos. The chronology of the flight was determined from the transcript of the recorded radio communications between Air Traffic Control and Flight 210 and post accident interviews of air traffic personnel. According to the transcript, the pilot of Flight 210 contacted the tower at 1917:02 UTC and requested for startup and clearance was given. The controller gave him the temperature and QNH, which were 27 degrees Centigrade and 1010 millibars respectively. At 1924:08 UTC, the Pilot requested and got approval for taxi to Runway 18L. At 1927 UTC, the tower requested for Persons on Board (POB), endurance and registration. In response, the pilot indicated the number of persons on board as 114 minus 6 crew, fuel endurance as 3 hours and 50 minutes and registration 5N-BFN. The tower acknowledged the information and issued the route clearance via Airway UR778, Flight Level 250, with a right turn-out on course. The pilot read back the clearance and the controller acknowledged and instructed the pilot to report when ready for takeoff. At 1927:55 UTC, the pilot requested “can we have a left turn out please?” and soon afterwards his request was granted by the controller. At 1928:08 UTC, the tower cleared BLV 210 as follows: "BLV 210 RUNWAY HEADING 3500FT LEFT TURN ON COURSE" At 1928;12 UTC, BLV 210 replied "3500FT LEFT TURN ON COURSE 210". 1928:47 UTC, the pilot reported ready for takeoff, and after given the wind condition as 270 degrees at 7 knots the controller cleared Flight 210 for departure at 1928:50 UTC. The pilot acknowledged the clearance, and at 1929:14 UTC requested “And correction, Bellview 210, please we will take a right turn out. We just had a sweep around the weather and right turn out will be okay for us.” The controller responded “right turn after departure, right turn on course” and the pilot acknowledged. According to the transcript, at 1931:52 UTC, the controller reported Flight 210 as airborne and instructed the pilot to contact LOS Approach Control. During the post-crash interview, the controller indicated he saw the airplane turn right, but was unable to determine its attitude due to darkness. He indicated the airplane sounded and appeared normal. At 1932:22 UTC, the pilot made initial contact with Approach Control and reported “Approach, Bellview 210 is with you on a right turn coming out of 1600 (feet)”. The Approach Control replied “report again passing one three zero.” The pilot acknowledged at 1932:35 UTC, and that was the last known transmission from the flight. According to the transcript, the controller attempted to regain contact with the flight at 19:43:46 UTC. Repeated attempts were unsuccessful. Emergency alert was then sent out to relevant agencies including the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) for search and rescue operations to commence. The airplane struck the ground on flat terrain in a relatively open and wooded area, 14NM north of the airport (6˚ 48’ 43” N and 3˚ 18’ 19” E).
Probable cause:
The AIB, after an extensive investigation, could not identify conclusive evidence to explain the cause of the accident involving Bellview Flight 210. The investigation considered several factors that could explain the accident. They include the PIC training of the Captain before taking Command on the B737 aircraft which was inadequate, the cumulative flight hours of the pilot in the days before the accident which was indicative of excessive workload that could lead to fatigue. Furthermore, the investigation revealed that the airplane had technical defects. The airplane should not have been dispatched for either the accident flight or earlier flights. The absence of forensic evidence prevented the determination of the captain’s medical condition at the time of the accident. The missing flight recorders to reconstruct the flight also precluded the determination of his performance during the flight. Due to lack of evidence, the investigation could not determine the effect, if any, of the atmospheric disturbances on the airplane or the flight crew’s ability to maintain continued flight. The operator could not maintain the continuing airworthiness of its aircraft, in ensuring compliance of its flight and maintenance personnel with the regulatory requirements. The Civil Aviation Authority’s safety oversight of the operator’s procedures and operations was inadequate.
Final Report:

Crash of an Embraer EMB-110P1A Bandeirante in Kaduna

Date & Time: Mar 17, 2000 at 1047 LT
Operator:
Registration:
5N-AXM
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Abuja - Jos
MSN:
110-446
YOM:
1984
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8733
Captain / Total hours on type:
1008.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3100
Copilot / Total hours on type:
200
Aircraft flight hours:
10926
Circumstances:
On the day of the accident, the aircraft was engaged in a charter operation for the Central Bank of Nigeria. The first segment of the flight (Lagos - Abuja) was flown by the Commander. The aircraft departed Lagos about 0630 hours UTC and initially at cruise, the crew had a momentary problem setting power on the starboard engine after which the flight continued normally to Abuja. The aircraft which departed Abuja for Jos at 0900 hours UTC had 6 souls on board, 5 hours endurance with the first officer at the controls. At FL 90 and about 30NM from Abuja, the crew again had problems with the cruise power setting on the starboard engine. The torque remained at 1400. The crew retarded the right power lever to the minimum with the aim of achieving a cruise setting of 1300 but the gear warning came on. The Commander at this stage took over the controls from the first officer. At 0923 hours UTC, the aircraft contacted Kaduna Tower that it would be diverting to Kaduna as against its scheduled destination giving its flight level as 90 at a distance of 61 miles and estimating TMA at 24 miles, 'KC' at 41 miles, 6 souls on board and 5 hours endurance at departure. The tower then gave the aircraft an inbound clearance to 'KC' locator maintaining FL 90 and to expect no delay for a locator approach runway 05. Weather report at 0900 hours UTC was also passed to the aircraft as wind 090/05 knots, QNH 1014 and temperature 30°c. At 0928 hours UTC the airplane at about 42 miles, speed between 150-160 kts, requested descent and was cleared to 4,500H, QNH 1014. At about 0935 hours UTC, the pilots contacted tower that they would make a single engine approach because they were having problems controlling power on the starboard engine and it would be shut down. The tower in response, asked whether they would need fire coverage on landing to which the pilots affirmed. The commander then reviewed the single engine approach with the first officer estimating 4,500 ft at 8NM. Approaching 4,500 ft at 11 NM, the crew initiated right engine shut down after which the speed was decayed from 150 to 140 kts. At 0946 hours UTC, the pilot reported 6nm final and field in sight while the tower requested hire to report 4 miles final. Shortly, the controller reported having the aircraft in sight and subsequently cleared it to land on runway 05 giving wind as north easterly 06 knots. Descending at 500ft/min, the commander requested for 25% of flap when the first officer selected full flap. Shortly, the speed started decaying and bleeding faster. When the aircraft was at 2,700 ft high, the speed had already decayed to between 100 - 110 kts. The crew applied full power on the port engine to arrest the speed decay but to no avail . The pilot was trying to correct the descent rate, speed decay and the asymmetry when the stall warning came on. At this juncture, all effort by the controller to establish further contact with the airplane proved abortive. Suddenly, the controller observed a gust of dust in the atmosphere which gave him an indication that the aircraft had crashed. The aircraft crashed into the new VOR/DME site being constructed about 1175m from the threshold of runway 05. Time of accident was 0947 hours UTC.
Probable cause:
The probable cause of this accident was the poor handling by the crew of the one-engine inoperative approach.
The following findings were identified:
- The aircraft was properly registered and certified in accordance with the Civil Aviation Regulations of Nigeria.
- The commander of the aircraft was certified and qualified to take the flight while the first officer did not have a licence on board on the clay of the accident. The licence had expired and yet to he renewed.
- The proficiency check attended by the GWW was Without some critical manoeuvres such as simulated single engine approach and stalls.
- The aircraft on departure from Abuja was to land at Jos but diverted to Kaduna.
- The crew informed Kaduna Control Tower that they were doing to make a single engine (port) approach since they were having problems controlling power of the starboard engine.
- The pilots did not adhere to the laid down procedures for a one-engine inoperative approach.
- Crew coordination was practically lacking in this flight.
- The Control Tower lost contact with the aircraft at about 4NM to the airfield.
- The Landing Configuration of the aircraft was full flaps, gear up with power only on the poet engine.
- The starboard engine propeller was not feathered.
- The aircraft crashed into the new VOR/DME site being constructed about Urn from the threshold of runway 05.
- The final resting position of the aircraft was about 68m from the first point of impact and almost turning 180° from its initial direction (flight path).
- There was power on the port engine as there was severe flexural damage to the propeller blades (tips chip off).
Final Report: