Landing (descent or approach)

After touchdown at Obo Airfield, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran and came to rest in a wooded area. All seven occupants escaped uninjured, the cargo equipment was recovered and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Entebbe to Obo, with a possible intermediate stop in Sudan, carrying an aircraft engine, some fuel drums (Jet A-1) and other logistics intended to the UPDF military offensive, code-named 'Operation Lightning Thunder' that has been hunting Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and its rebel leader Joseph Kony. About 100 members of the US special forces were based at the Obo Airstrip at the time of the accident. The runway 04/22 is about 2,050 feet long (625 meters).

The approach to Colombo-Ratmalana Airport was completed in marginal weather conditions and low visibility. Too low, the aircraft struck the roof of a house and crashed inverted in a wooded area located in Hokandara, less than 10 km from the runway threshold, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. A crew member was seriously injured while four other occupants were killed. The only survivor died from his injuries six days later, on December 18.

The airplane crashed while on approach to runway 14 at Montgomery County Airpark (GAI), Gaithersburg, Maryland. The airplane impacted three houses and the ground about 3/4 mile from the approach end of the runway. A postcrash fire involving the airplane and one of the three houses, which contained three occupants, ensued. The pilot, the two passengers, and the three people in the house died as a result of the accident. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The flight was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. Data from the airplane’s cockpit voice and data recorder (CVDR) indicated that the takeoff about 0945 from Horace Williams Airport, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, and the cruise portion of the flight were uneventful. CVDR data showed that about 15 minutes after takeoff, the passenger in the right cockpit seat made a statement that the airplane was “in the clouds.” A few seconds later, the airplane’s engine anti-ice system and the wing and horizontal stabilizer deice system were manually activated for about 2 minutes before they were manually turned off. About 6 minutes later, a recording from the automated weather observing system (AWOS) at GAI began transmitting over the pilot’s audio channel, containing sufficient information to indicate that conditions were conducive to icing during the approach to GAI. The CVDR recorded no activity or faults during the rest of the flight for either ice protection system, indicating that the pilot did not turn the systems back on. Before the airplane descended through 10,000 ft, in keeping with procedures in the EMB-500 Pilot Operating Handbook, the pilot was expected to perform the Descent checklist items in the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), which the pilot should have had available in the airplane during the flight. Based on the AWOS-reported weather conditions, the pilot should have performed the Descent checklist items that appeared in the Normal Icing Conditions checklist, which included turning on the engine anti-ice and wing and horizontal stabilizer deice systems. That action, in turn, would require the pilot to use landing distance performance data that take into account the deice system’s activation. CVDR data show that, before beginning the descent, the pilot set the landing reference (Vref) speed at 92 knots, indicating that he used performance data for operation with the wing and horizontal stabilizer deice system turned off and an airplane landing weight less than the airplane’s actual weight. Using the appropriate Normal Icing Conditions checklist and accurate airplane weight, the pilot should have flown the approach at 126 knots (a Vref of 121 knots +5 knots) to account for the icing conditions.

After landing at Belize City-Sir Barry Bowen Municipal Airport in marginal weather conditions, the single engine aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its right main gear, plunged into the sea and came to rest in shallow water. All six occupants were rescued and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew was completing a ferry flight from Heraklion to Riyadh with an intermediate stop in Hurghada, Egypt. On final approach to Riyadh-King Khaled Airport, at an altitude of about 600 feet, the left engine lost power and failed, followed 10 seconds later by the right engine. The crew reported his situation to ATC when the aircraft lost height, impacted ground and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest against a pile of rocks. One of the pilot suffered a broken wrist while the second pilot escaped uninjured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The twin engine aircraft departed Bogotá-Guaymaral Airport on a charter flight to Bahía Solano, carrying eight passengers and two pilots. En route, while in cruising altitude, the crew contacted ATC and reported engine trouble. He was then cleared to divert to Mariquita-José Celestino Mutis Airport for an emergency landing. On final approach to runway 19, the aircraft stalled and crashed on hilly and wooded terrain, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 10 occupants were killed.

The aircraft was completing a supply mission from Punta Arenas, carrying a load of various goods and several passengers and crew members. After touchdown at Teniente Rodolfo Marsh-Presidente Eduardo Frei Montalva Airport, the right main gear collapsed, causing the propeller of the engine n°4 to detach. The airplane came to rest on a snow covered runway and all occupants escaped uninjured. The airplane was later parked on the apron and repairs were initiated. Eventually, in early 2017, it was decided to scrap the airplane which was destroyed on site. All debris were placed in a container and later shipped back to Brazil.

The pilots of the very light jet were conducting a positioning flight in instrument meteorological conditions. The flight was cleared by air traffic control for the instrument landing system (ILS) approach; upon being cleared for landing, the tower controller reported to the crew that there was no standing water on the runway. Review of the airplane's flight data recorder (FDR) data revealed that the airplane reached 50 ft above touchdown zone elevation (TDZE) at an indicated airspeed of 118 knots (KIAS). The airplane crossed the runway displaced threshold about 112 KIAS, and it touched down on the runway at 104 KIAS with about a 7-knot tailwind. FDR data revealed that, about 1.6 seconds after touchdown of the main landing gear, the nose landing gear touched down and the pilot's brake pedal input increased, with intermediate oscillations, over a period of 7.5 seconds before reaching full pedal deflection. During this time, the airplane achieved its maximum wheel braking friction coefficient and deceleration. The cockpit voice recorder recorded both pilots express concern the that the airplane was not slowing. About 4 seconds after the airplane reached maximum deceleration, the pilot applied the emergency parking brake (EPB). Upon application of the EPB, the wheel speed dropped to zero and the airplane began to skid, which resulted in reverted-rubber hydroplaning, further decreasing the airplane's stopping performance. The airplane continued past the end of the runway, crossed a service road, and came to rest in a drainage ditch. Postaccident examination of the brake system and data downloaded from the brake control unit indicated that it functioned as commanded during the landing. The airplane was not equipped with thrust reversers or spoilers to aid in deceleration. The operator's standard operating procedures required pilots to conduct a go-around if the airspeed at 50 ft above TDZE exceeded 111 kts. Further, the landing distances published in the airplane flight manual (AFM) are based on the airplane slowing to its reference speed (Vref) of 101 KIAS at 50 ft over the runway threshold. The airplane's speed at that time exceeded Vref, which resulted in an increased runway distance required to stop; however, landing distance calculations performed in accordance with the AFM showed that the airplane should still have been able to stop on the available runway. An airplane performance study also showed that the airplane had adequate distance available on which to stop had the pilot continued to apply maximum braking rather than engage the EPB. The application of the EPB resulted in skidding, which increased the stopping distance. Although the runway was not contaminated with standing water at the time of the accident, the performance study revealed that the maximum wheel braking friction coefficient was significantly less than the values derived from the unfactored wet runway landing distances published in the AFM, and was more consistent with the AFM-provided landing distances for runways contaminated with standing water. Federal Aviation Administration Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 15009 warns operators that, "the advisory data for wet runway landings may not provide a safe stopping margin under all conditions" and advised them to assume "a braking action of medium or fair when computing time-of-arrival landing performance or [increase] the factor applied to the wet runway time-of-arrival landing performance data." It is likely that, based on the landing data in the AFM, the crew expected a faster rate of deceleration upon application of maximum braking; when that rate of deceleration was not achieved, the pilot chose to engage the EPB, which only further degraded the airplane's braking performance.

The commercial pilot was conducting an on-demand cargo charter flight. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot informed the tower controller that he wanted to "come back and land" because he was "having trouble with the left engine." The pilot chose to fly a left traffic pattern and return for landing. No further transmissions were received from the pilot. The accident site was located about 0.50 mile southeast of the runway's displaced threshold. GPS data revealed that, after takeoff, the airplane entered a left turn to a southeasterly course and reached a maximum GPS altitude of 959 ft (about 342 ft above ground level [agl]). The airplane then entered another left turn that appeared to continue until the final data point. The altitude associated with the final data point was 890 ft (about 273 ft agl). The final GPS data point was located about 135 ft northeast of the accident site. Based on GPS data and the prevailing surface winds, the airspeed was about 45 knots during the turn. According to the airplane flight manual, the stall speed in level flight with the wing flaps extended was 59 knots. Postaccident examination and testing of the airframe, engines, and related components did not reveal any preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation; therefore, the nature of any issue related to the left engine could not be determined. Based on the evidence, the pilot failed to maintain adequate airspeed while turning the airplane back toward the airport, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall/spin.

The crew was performing a humanitarian cargo flight from Juba to Panyagor. On final approach, it seems that the crew encountered technical problems, maybe with the undercarriage. The aircraft went out of control and crashed in a huge explosion short of runway and was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. Both pilots were killed while the engineer was seriously injured. The mission was conducted on behalf of the Lutheran World Federation. It was confirmed that ten goats were killed as well.