Riyadh-King Khaled

The crew was completing a ferry flight from Heraklion to Riyadh with an intermediate stop in Hurghada, Egypt. On final approach to Riyadh-King Khaled Airport, at an altitude of about 600 feet, the left engine lost power and failed, followed 10 seconds later by the right engine. The crew reported his situation to ATC when the aircraft lost height, impacted ground and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest against a pile of rocks. One of the pilot suffered a broken wrist while the second pilot escaped uninjured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On 27 February 2011, at approximately 12:12:20 UTC, a mechanic working on McKinnon G-21G, registration mark N221AG, called the operational telephone line of Al Ain International Airport tower and informed the Aerodrome Controller (ADC) that the Aircraft would depart that evening. The Aerodrome Controller requested the estimated time of departure (ETD) and the mechanic stated that the departure would not be before 1400 outbound to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The ADC asked if the flight crew were still planning to perform a test flight before departure to the planned destination. The mechanic answered that they have not flown the Aircraft for a while and they want to stay in the pattern to make sure everything is “okay” prior to departure on the cleared route. The ADC advised that they could expect a clearance to operate in the circuit until they were ready to depart. The mechanic advised that there would be no need land, they only wished to stay in the circuit and to go straight from there towards the cleared route. The ADC asked the mechanic about the Aircraft type, the mechanic answered that it is Grumman Goose equipped with turbine engines and it would be heading back to the United States for an autopilot installation and annual inspection and “everything”. The mechanic commented to the ADC that the Aircraft was unique in the world with the modifications that it had. At 13:53:15, the ADC contacted the mechanic and requested an ETD update. The mechanic advised that there would be a further one-hour delay due to waiting for fuel. A witness, who is an instructor at the flight academy where the Aircraft was parked, stated that he had formed the impression that the maintenance personnel “…looked stressed out and they were obviously behind schedule and were trying to depart as soon as possible for the test flight so everything would go as planned and they could depart to Riyadh the same evening”. At approximately 14:10, the Aircraft was pushed out of the hangar, and the two mechanics moved luggage from inside the hangar and loaded it onboard the Aircraft. The mechanics also loaded a bladder extra fuel tank onboard and placed it in the cabin next to the main passenger door. At 14:17, the Aircraft was fueled with 1,898 liters of Jet-A1 which was 563 liters less than the 650 USG (2,461 liters) requested by the crew. At approximately 15:00, and after performing exterior checks, the male, 28 year old pilot in command (PIC), and another male, 61 years old pilot boarded the Aircraft and occupied the cockpit left and right seats, respectively. The two mechanics occupied the two first row passenger seats. The PIC and the other pilot were seen by hangar personnel using torchlights while following checklists and completing some paperwork. At 15:44:48, the PIC contacted the Airport Ground Movement Controller (GMC) on the 129.15 MHz radio frequency in order to check the functionality of the two Aircraft radios. Both checks were satisfactory as advised by the GMC. Thereafter, and while the Aircraft was still on the hangar ramp, the PIC informed the GMC that he was ready to copy the IFR clearance to Riyadh. The GMC queried if the Aircraft was going to perform local circuits and then pick up the IFR flight plan to the destination. The PIC replied that he would like to make one circuit in the pattern, if available, then to [perform] low approach and from there he (the PIC) would be able to accept the clearance to destination. The GMC acknowledged the PIC’s request and advised him to expect a left closed circuit not above two thousand feet and to standby for a clearance. The PIC read back this information correctly. At 15:48:58, the GMC gave engine start clearance and, at 15:50:46, the PIC reported engine start and requested taxi clearance at 15:52:16. The GMC cleared the Aircraft to taxi to the holding point of Runway (RWY) 19. The GMC advised, again, to expect a left hand (LH) closed circuit not above two thousand feet VFR and to request IFR clearance from the tower once airborne. The GMC instructed the squawk as 3776, which was also read back correctly. At 15:55:13, the PIC requested a three-minute delay on the ramp. The GMC acknowledged and instructed the crew to contact the tower once the Aircraft was ready to taxi. At 15:56:03, the PIC called the GMC and requested taxi clearance; he was recleared to the holding point of RWY 19. At 15:57:53, the GMC advised that, after completion of the closed circuit, route to the destination via the ROVOS flight planned route on departure RWY 19 and to make a right turn and maintain 6,000 ft. The PIC read back the instructions correctly. At 16:02:38, and while the Aircraft was at the holding point of RWY 19, the PIC contacted the ADC on 119.85 MHz to report ready-for-departure for a closed circuit. The ADC instructed to hold position then he asked the PIC if he was going to perform only one closed circuit. The PIC replied that it was “only one circuit, then [perform] a low approach and from there capture the IFR to Riyadh.” At 16:03:56, the ADC instructed the PIC “to line up and wait” RWY 19 which, at that time, was occupied by a landing aircraft that vacated the runway at 16:05:23. At 16:05:37, the Aircraft was cleared for takeoff. The ADC advised the surface wind as 180°/07 kts and requested the crew to report left downwind which was acknowledged by the PIC correctly. The Aircraft completed the takeoff acceleration roll, lifted off and continued initial climb normally. When the Aircraft reached 300 to 400 ft AGL at approximately the midpoint of RWY 19, it turned to the left while the calibrated airspeed (CAS) was approximately 130 kts. The Aircraft continued turning left with increasing rate and losing height. At approximately 16:07:11, the Aircraft impacted the ground of Taxiway ‘F’, between Taxiway ‘K’ and ‘L’ with a slight nose down attitude and a slight left roll. After the impact, the Aircraft continued until it came to rest after approximately 32 m (105 ft) from the initial impact point. There was no attempt by the PIC to declare an emergency. The Aircraft was destroyed due to the impact forces and subsequent fire. All the occupants were fatally injured.

After landing at Madinah-Mohammad Bin Abdulaziz Airport runway 17, the crew completed the braking procedure and vacated via taxiway B. For unknown reasons, the aircraft departed the concrete zone and entered a sandy area, causing the left main gear to dug in and both left engines n°1 and 2 to struck the ground. All 277 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airplane operated on Flight LH8460, a scheduled cargo service operating from Frankfurt (FRA) to Riyadh (RUH). It carried 80 tons of cargo. The accident flight departed Frankfurt about 05:16 local time (03:16 UTC), 2.5 hours later than originally scheduled due to minor maintenance issues. The accident flight was the first time the captain and first officer had flown together. The captain decided that the first officer, who had been employed with Lufthansa Cargo for 7 months and had not flown into Riyadh before, would fly the leg because he believed it would be an easy leg appropriate for the first officer. Cruise flight and approach to Riyadh were uneventful. The first officer indicated that he completed the approach briefing about 25 minutes before landing, calculating that he would use a flap setting of 35°, target 72 percent N1 rpm on final approach, expect a pitch attitude of about 4.5° on final approach, and commence the flare about 40 feet above ground level (agl). The flight was radar vectored to the instrument landing system of runway 33L, and the first officer flew the approach with a planned Vref of 158 knots. Convective conditions prevailed, with a temperature of 39°C and winds at 15 to 25 knots on a heading closely aligned with the landing runway. The aircraft was centered on the glide slope and localizer during the approach, until 25 seconds before touchdown when it dipped by half a dot below the glide slope. During that period, the indicated airspeed oscillated between 160 and 170 kt, centered about 166 kt. The ground speed was 164 kt until 20 sec. prior to touchdown, when it began to increase and reached 176 kt at touchdown. The flare was initiated by the first officer between 1.7 and 2.0 sec. before touchdown, that is: 23 to 31 feet above the runway. The main gear touchdown took place at 945 ft from the runway threshold at a descent rate of -13 ft/sec. (780 ft/min) resulting in a normal load factor of 2.1g. The aircraft bounced with the main gear reaching a maximum height of 4ft above the runway with the spoilers deployed to 30 degrees following main-wheel spin up. During this bounce, the captain who was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) pushed on the control column resulting in an unloading of the aircraft. The aircraft touched down a second time in a flat pitch attitude with both the main gear and nose gear contacting the runway, at a descent rate of -11 ft/sec. (660 ft/min), achieving a load factor of 3.0g. Just prior to this second touchdown, both pilots pulled on the control column, which combined with the rebound of the nose gear from the runway, resulted in a 14° pitch angle during the second bounce. Additionally, the spoilers reached their full extension of 60° following the compression of the nose gear strut during the second touchdown. During this second bounce, the main gear reached a height of 12 ft above the runway. Early in this second bounce, the captain pushed the control column to its forward limit and the elevators responded accordingly. Prior to the third and final touchdown, both pilots pulled back on the control column at slightly different times. Although the elevators responded accordingly and started to reduce the nose-down pitch rate, the aircraft was still pitching down at the third touchdown. During this third touchdown, the aircraft contacted the runway at a descent rate of -17 ft/sec (1020 ft/min), thus achieving a load factor of 4.4g. At this point, the aft fuselage ruptured behind the wing trailing edge. Two fuel lines were severed and fuel spilled within the left hand wheel well. A fire ignited and travelled to the upper cargo area. The captain attempted to maintain control of the aircraft within the runway boundaries. Not knowing about the aft fuselage being ruptured and dragging on the runway, the captain deployed the engine thrust reversers, but only the no. 1 and the no. 3 engines responded. The captain maintained directional control of the aircraft as best he could and requested the First Officer to declare a Mayday. The aircraft then went towards the left side of the runway as the captain attempted, without success, to maintain the aircraft on the runway. As the aircraft departed the runway, the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft came to a full stop 8800 ft from the threshold of the runway and 300 ft left from the runway centerline. The fuel to the engines was cut off and both pilots evacuated the aircraft by using the slide at the Left One (L1) door. The mid portion of the aircraft was on fire.

A Saudi Arabian Airlines MD-90 was substantially damaged during a runway excursion accident Riyadh (RUH). The seven crew members escaped unhurt. The airplane operated on a repositioning flight from Jeddah. During the flight, the captain discussed the use of manual spoilers during landing with the first officer. He further stated that; as he "had only around 400 hours in the aircraft" as a captain, he wanted to "see the effect' of landing with manual spoilers. He further explained that the flight provided an opportunity to "do it manually" (use manual spoilers) as it was a repositioning flight and, the weather and dry runway conditions were ideal. As such, he discussed the procedure with the first officer and elected to land with the auto ground spoiler system unarmed. The flight was uneventful. During the approach to Riyadh the Landing Checklist was completed, which included the arming of the auto ground spoiler system for landing. After the Landing Checklist was completed, the captain disarmed the auto ground spoiler system with the intention of applying manual ground spoilers after landing. The auto braking system was also not armed prior to landing. The final approach and touchdown to runway 15 Left at Riyadh were uneventful. The touchdown airspeed was 135 knots calibrated air speed (CAS). On touchdown, the captain manually extended the spoiler/speed brake lever, but did not latch it in the fully extended (EXT) position (fully aft and latched upwards). The captain then removed his right hand from the speed brake lever in order to deploy the thrust reversers. The first officer noted the movement of the spoiler/speed brake lever and called "Spoilers Deployed". Since the spoiler/speed brake lever was not fully pulled aft and latched upwards, the lever automatically returned to the forward retracted (RET) position. This movement of the spoiler/speed brake lever was not noticed by the captain and the first officer. In response, the ground spoilers re-stowed before being fully deployed and, a speed brake/flap configuration (SPD BRK/FLP CONFIG) Level 1 Amber Alert occurred. This alert occurred as the aircraft was not yet fully weight on wheels (WOW) and the aircraft still sensed a flight condition with speed brakes deployed and flaps extended beyond six degrees. Six seconds after touchdown on the right main landing gear, the nose gear touched down and the aircraft transferred to a ground condition (WOW on nose gear and main wheel spin up). The SPD BRK/FLP CONFIG alert extinguished when the nose gear oleo actuated ground shift on landing. After touchdown, the aircraft banked to the right and began to drift right of the runway centerline. In response, he applied left rudder, deployed the thrust reversers and applied left aileron. But this did not have any noticeable effect. The captain saw the approaching G4 taxiway exit and in an attempt to keep the aircraft from leaving the runway surface beyond the G4 taxiway exit, he decided to direct the aircraft towards the taxiway. He then applied a right rudder input which caused the aircraft to commence a rapid sweeping turn to the right towards the G4 taxiway exit. The aircraft left the runway at high speed, traversed the full width of the G4 taxiway, and exited the surface at its southern edge. The aircraft then entered a sand section and travelled the distance infield between the edge of the G4 taxiway and the adjacent section of taxiway GOLF. The left main landing gear collapsed during this time. The aircraft came to rest on taxiway GOLF. There was no post impact fire.

The crew was completing a local training mission at Riyadh-King Khaled Airport on behalf of the 16th squadron. On final approach, the aircraft stalled and crashed in a huge explosion few hundred meters short of runway. The aircraft was destroyed and all eight occupants were killed.

About 2108LT, the airplane departed Riyadh Airport en route to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Six minutes and 54 seconds after takeoff, while climbing to FL350, visual and aural warnings indicated smoke in the aft cargo compartment C-3. Climbing through FL220, a return to Riyadh was initiated. About two minutes later smoke was noted in the aft of the cabin, and passengers were panicking. At 18:25:26 the no. 2 engine throttle was stuck. The flight landed at about 2136LT and then taxied clear of the runway and came to a stop on an adjacent taxiway. While parked on the taxiway, the aircraft was destroyed by the fire and the three hundred and one persons on board the flight were killed.
Survival aspects:
The accident was survivable. The first door was opened about 23 min after all engines had been shutdown. The first rescue attempt was conducted at L-1 door. Most witness statements agree in content but differ slightly in the time factor element. A witness who participated in the first two efforts to open the doors stated that he was aboard fire truck n°4 was it was positioned near the left rear portion of the aircraft. He observed thick white smoke flowing from the bottom rear fuselage. At that time the aircraft engines were still running. A few seconds later, he observed smoke near the top of the fuselage, forward of the n°2 engine inlet. According to him, this smoke was followed almost immediately by flames in the same area. As the driver of n°4 started applying agent via the monitor, the witness dismounted and moved toward exit L-1. His route was outboard of n°1 engine which he thought was still running. On approaching L-1, he observed the fire chief and other people attempting to reach the L-1 emergency handle via a ladder which was placed on top of fire truck n°6. While fire personnel steadied the ladder, he climbed up and pulled the emergency handle. He was not certain if the door moved or not. An additional effort was attempted while he held onto and rode the monitor. While on the monitor, he pushed on the door to no avail. Most of :he group then moved to R-2 where another ladder had been positioned by other firemen. A firemen then climbed the ladder, operated the handle and the door opened in the emergency mode. The cabin was observed to be full of smoke and no life was observed nor were any human sounds heard. R-2 door was opened at 1905, 26 min after the aircraft came to a stop and 23 min after the shutdown of all engines. Shortly after (about 3 min) R-2 was opened, flames were seen progressing forward from the rear section of the cabin.