Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

After landing on wet runway 35 at Houston-Sugar Land Airport, the crew encountered nil braking action. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and came to rest in a ditch. Both occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On final approach to Lucapa in heavy fog, the captain was unable to establish a visual contact with the runway and decided to make a go-around. A second approach was abandoned few minutes later. During a third attempt to land, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the four engine aircraft hit obstacles some 200 metres to the right of the runway, crashed and burst into flames. All 15 occupants were killed.

During the takeoff roll on runway 31 at Abu Dhabi Airport, just before V1, the aircraft started to vibrate and longitudinal control was lost. The captain decided to abandon the takeoff procedure and initiate an emergency braking manoeuvre. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, lost its nose gear and came to a halt few dozen metres further. On impact, the cockpit and both engines were almost destroyed and the left wing broke in two.

Just after liftoff from runway 06, while in initial climb, the crew raised the landing gear and reduced the engine power. The aircraft stalled and sank back on the runway, slid for about 450 metres and came to rest. All 21 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

En route from Campo Grande to Vilhena, while in cruising altitude, the crew received the last weather bulletin about Vilhena with conditions below minimums. The copilot (under line check on this flight) suggested to divert to the alternate airport but the captain/instructor preferred to attempt an approach via Echo 1 and the NDB for runway 03. If visual contact would not be established at decision height, the crew would divert to the alternate airport. Then the copilot set the decision height at 2,500 feet which was wrong as the correct decision height was fixed at 2,560 feet. Nor the copilot nor the captain realized this mistake prior to start the descent to Vilhena Airport. On approach, the copilot was told by captain to monitor the horizon. He focused his attention on the horizon and failed to monitor the altimer. On his side, the captain elected to establish a visual contact with the ground and the runway light but is was later confirmed that the city of Vilhena suffered a general blackout. On final, the aircraft descended below MDA then struck trees and crashed less than one km from the runway threshold, bursting into flames. All 16 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was destroyed by fire.

While approaching Ardabil Airport in poor weather conditions, the aircraft struck the ground few km short of runway. All four crew members were killed. They were completing a humanitarian flight from Tehran.

The flight was on a coupled instrument landing system (ILS) approach with 1/2 mile visibility in snow showers. Three successive fixes on the localizer are defined by distance measuring equipment (DME) paired with the ILS; prior to the ILS DME commissioning 6 months before the accident, the DME fixes were defined by a VORTAC 4.7 nautical miles past the ILS DME. The aircraft was 800 feet high at the first fix and 1,500 feet high at the second, but approximately on altitude 4.7 nautical miles past the first and second fixes, respectively. It passed the outer marker 900 feet high and captured the glide slope from above about 1.8 nautical miles from the threshold, 500 feet above decision height (DH) and 700 feet above touchdown. The aircraft was on glide slope for 28 seconds, during which time its speed decayed to stall speed; it then dropped below glide slope and crashed 1.3 nautical miles short of the threshold. The pilot's FLT DIR DME-1/ DME-2 switch, which control the DME display on the pilot's horizontal situation indicator (HSI), was found set to DME-2; the NAV-2 radio was set to the VORTAC frequency. Up to 800 feet may be required for stall recovery.

Shortly after liftoff, while in initial climb, the twin engine aircraft stalled and crashed near the runway end. The pilot was injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

The pilot-in-command stated he was cleared for an ILS approach. He had to use spoilers to intercept the glideslope. The landing was extended at the outer marker as the airspeed was slowed through 200 knots. As the airspeed decreased the spoilers were retracted and the flaps were extended to 20-degrees. The airplane was drifting to the right and flaps were lowered to 40-degrees as the drift was corrected. The airplane floated and touched down long. The spoilers, and brakes were applied as well as full reverse. There was no braking due to hydroplaning. Examination of the crash site revealed the airplane went off the end of the runway, skidded through 200 feet of sod, vaulted off a 25 foot embankment, skidded across a road, and collided with a ditch.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Kaduna-New Kaduna Airport. On final approach, the pilot-in-command lost control of the airplane that nosed down and crashed in a field located 3 km short of runway. All three crew members were killed.