Region

Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-83 in Bandar-e Mahshahr

Date & Time: Jan 27, 2020 at 0736 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EP-CPZ
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tehran - Bandar-e Mahshahr
MSN:
53464
YOM:
1994
Flight number:
RV6936
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
136
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
18430
Captain / Total hours on type:
7840.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
300
Copilot / Total hours on type:
124
Circumstances:
On Jan. 27, 2020, at 03:12 UTC Caspian Airlines (CPN) Flight 6936, an MD83, EP-CPZ took off from Mehrabad International Airport and climbed to FL320 as final cruising level. At about 03:45:37 UTC, the aircraft was flying according to the flight plan route on Airway B417 at an assigned FL320. Due to another traffic departing flight, an A320, IRA356 from Abadan Airport (OIAA) to destination Mashhad International Airport (OIMM), the ACC controller issued direct routing to the flight CPN 6936 position GODMO. At 03:49:34 UTC, CPN6936 requested descent clearance, so the flight was cleared to FL100. At 03:52:30 UTC, the pilot called Mahshahr AFISO and reported position 50 nm inbound GODMO and estimated time over GODMO at 03:59 UTC. At 03:52:51 UTC, Mahshahr AFISO reported necessary information as below: "RWY active is 31; wind is now 280/08kts, CAVOK, temperature +06, DP 04 and QNH 1023, expected VOR approach RWY 31 via GODMO 1E ARRIVAL" At 03:53: 33 UTC, the pilot requested RWY 13 and Mahshahr AFISO performed VOR/DME approach RWY 13, via GODMO 1F arrival. At 03:59:39 UTC, the pilot reported, “we are approaching position GODMO in contact with destination Mahshahr.” At 04:00:41UTC, the pilot reported his position “GODMO” to Mahshahr AFISO. At 04:02:46 UTC, the pilot reported leaving of IAF and received landing clearance for RWY13. Finally, at 04:06:11 UTC, the aircraft landed on RWY 13, passed two-thirds of RWY length and ran off the end of runway13 after landing at Mahshahr Airport at 04:06 UTC, Khuzestan province. The accident flight was being operated on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan in a Visual Meteorological Condition (VMC). The main door of the accident aircraft was opened in emergency condition, but the slide skid did not operate automatically. The cabin floor was just too close to the ground (grass surface) due to the impact of the nose and main landing gears strut which were broken after the runway overrun. The evacuation was performed from the main door, and all 136 passengers and 8 crew members disembarked.
Probable cause:
The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were the pilots’ failures below, resulting in a runway overrun:
- Poor decision-making for acceptance of the risk of high-speed landing;
- Un-stabilized approach against the normal flight profile;
- Poor CRM in the cockpit; and
- Poor judgment and not accomplishing go-around while performing an unstabilized approach.

Contributing Factors:
- Loading of 5 tons of extra fuel, which increased the landing distance required.
- Decision to make a landing on RWY 13 with tailwind.
- Inability of the copilot (PM) to take control of the aircraft and proper action to execute goaround.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-8KV in Sabashahr: 176 killed

Date & Time: Jan 8, 2020 at 0618 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UR-PSR
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Tehran - Kiev
MSN:
38124
YOM:
2016
Flight number:
PS752
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
167
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
176
Captain / Total flying hours:
11590
Captain / Total hours on type:
8428.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7633
Copilot / Total hours on type:
3642
Circumstances:
On Wednesday, January 08, 2020, at 00:53, the inbound flight No. 751 of Ukraine International, Boeing 737-800, UR-PSR, en route to Tehran Imam Khomeini INTL. Airport from Kyiv Boryspyl INTL. Airport was cleared for landing, and after four minutes landed on the IKA runway. After disembarking 58 passengers and refueling, the flight crew went on to check into the hotel located at IKA. From 01:16 to 01:38, the aircraft was refueled with 9510 kg (11800 liters) of fuel. Once the total weight of the cargo received from passengers (310 packages weighing 6794 kg) was determined, in order to comply with the maximum takeoff weight allowed for aircraft, 82 packages in 2094 kg in weight, were separated by Airport Service Company, that is, they were not loaded. Initially, 78 packages of the passenger's luggage were not loaded first, then due to the large volume of passengers' hand luggage, the flight attendants passed some of them on to the Airport Service Company personnel to be placed in the aircraft cargo. After that, 4 packages belonging to the passengers were removed from the aft cargo door, where the hand luggage was placed. At 04:35, the flight crew embarked on the aircraft. After checking the aircraft and cabin, boarding was announced at 04:45, and passengers started to board the plane. Based on the available documents, 167 passengers proceeded to the Airport Services Co. counter at the airport terminal, all of whom went on board. Only one of the passengers who received the boarding pass online the night before the flight, due to the delay in arriving in Tehran from another city did not go to the airport in person, and therefore had been removed from the list of passengers provided by the UIA. At 05:13, the pilot made his first radio contact with the IKA's control tower ground unit and requested the initial clearance for flying, which was issued by the controller subsequently. At 05:48, all the aircraft documents required to start the flight operations were filled out, and all the doors were then closed at 05:49. The flight was initially scheduled for 05:15, and based on the flight coordinator's report form, the reason given for its delay was the aircraft being overweight and the decision not to load the passengers' lugga for reducing the aircraft weight. At 05:51 the pilot notified his position at the airport parking, declared his readiness to exit the parking and start up the aircraft. The IKA tower asked him to wait for receiving the clearance since they wanted to make the coordination required with other relevant units. At 05:52, the IKA tower made the necessary coordination with the Mehrabad approach unit, who contacted Tehran ACC asking for clearance. Accordingly, the controller in ACC made coordination on Ukrainian flight clearance with the CMOCC. The clearance was issued by the CMOCC. At 05:54, the Mehrabad approach unit, received the FL260 clearance for the flight AUI752 from ACC, and forwarded it to IKA via the telecommunication system. Flight no. 752 was detached from the A1 Jet Bridge and at about 05:55 started to leave its parking position, NO 116 on the right, by a pushback truck. Following that, at 05:55 the ground controller cleared the AUI752 flight for startup and exiting the parking, which was read back by the pilot. At 06:12, the aircraft took off from the Runway 29 Right of IKA and was delivered to the Mehrabad approach unit. The pilot contacted the approach unit, and announced the IKA 1A radar procedure as SID procedure. Next, the Mehrabad approach identified and cleared the flight to climb to FL260. The controller instructed the pilot to turn to the right after 6,000 feet, and continue straight to PAROT. After it was read back by the pilot, the controller again instructed the pilot to continue to PAROT point once passing the 6000-foot altitude, which was read back by the pilot. From 06:17 onwards, upon the disappearance of the PS752 information from the radarscope, the controller called the captain repeatedly, but received no response. According to the data extracted from the surveillance systems and FDR, the aircraft climbed to an altitude of 8,100 feet; thereafter, the label including the call sign and altitude of aircraft disappeared from the radarscope, yet no radio contact indicating unusual conditions was received from the pilot. FDR recording terminated at 06:14:56. This time corresponds to the termination of Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) and ADS-B information. After the mentioned time, the aircraft was still being detected by the Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR), according to which the aircraft veered right and after approximately three minutes of flying, it disappeared from the PSR at 06:18 too. The aircraft was conducting the flight under the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and the accident occurred around half an hour before the sunset.
Probable cause:
Cause of the Accident:
- The air defense's launching two surface-to-air missiles at the flight PS752, UR-PSR aircraft the detonation of the first missile warhead in proximity of the aircraft caused damage to the aircraft systems and the intensification of damage led the aircraft to crash into the ground and explode instantly.

Other Contributing Factors:
- The mitigating measures and defense layers in risk management proved to be ineffective due to the occurrence of an unanticipated error in threat identifications, and ultimately failed to protect the flight safety against the threats caused by the alertness of defense forces.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 707-3J9C in Fath: 15 killed

Date & Time: Jan 14, 2019 at 0830 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EP-CPP
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Bishkek - Payam
MSN:
21128/917
YOM:
1976
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
16
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
15
Circumstances:
The airplane, owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) was completing a cargo flight from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on behalf of Saha Airlines, and was supposed to land at Payam Airport located southwest of Karaj, carrying a load of meat. On approach, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions and the pilot mistakenly landed on runway 31L at Fath Airport instead of runway 30 at Payam Airport which is located 10 km northwest. After touchdown, control was lost and the airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 31L is 1,140 meters long), overran and crashed in flames into several houses located past the runway end. The aircraft was destroyed by fire as well as few houses. The flight engineer was evacuated while 15 other occupants were killed.

Crash of a Canadair CL-600-2B16 Challenger 604 near Shahr-e-Kord: 11 killed

Date & Time: Mar 11, 2018 at 1840 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
TC-TRB
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Sharjah – Istanbul
MSN:
5494
YOM:
2001
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
11
Captain / Total flying hours:
4880
Captain / Total hours on type:
1600.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1132
Copilot / Total hours on type:
114
Aircraft flight hours:
7935
Aircraft flight cycles:
3807
Circumstances:
A Turkish Challenger 604 corporate jet impacted a mountain near Shahr-e Kurd in Iran, killing all 11 on board. The aircraft departed Sharjah, UAE at 13:11 UTC on a flight to Istanbul, Turkey. The aircraft entered Tehran FIR fifteen minutes later and the Tehran ACC controller cleared the flight to climb to FL360 according to its flight plan. About 14:32, the pilot requested FL380, which was approved. Before reaching that altitude, the left and right airspeeds began to diverge by more than 10 knots. The left (captain's) airspeed indicator showed an increase while the right hand (copilot's) airspeed indicator showed a decrease. A caution aural alert notified the flight crew of the difference. Remarks by the flight crew suggested that an 'EFIS COMP MON' caution message appeared on the EICAS. As the aircraft was climbing, the crew reduced thrust to idle. Approximately 63 seconds later, while approaching FL380, the overspeed aural warning (clacker) began to sound, indicating that the indicated Mach had exceeded M 0.85. Based on the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) of the aircraft, the pilot flying should validate the IAS based on the aircraft flight manual and define the reliable Air Data Computer (ADC) and select the reliable Air Data source. The pilot did not follow this procedure and directly reduced engine power to decrease the IAS after hearing the clacker. The actual airspeed thus reached a stall condition. The copilot tried to begin reading of the 'EFIS COMP MON' abnormal procedure for three times but due to pilot interruption, she could not complete it. Due to decreasing speed, the stall aural warning began to sound, in addition to stick shaker and stick pusher activating repeatedly. The crew then should have referred to another emergency procedure to recover from the stall condition. While the stick pusher acted to pitch down the aircraft to prevent a stall condition, the captain was mistakenly assumed an overspeed situation due to the previous erroneous overspeed warning and pulled on the control column. The aircraft entered a series of pitch and roll oscillations. The autopilot was disengaged by the crew before stall warning, which ended the oscillations. Engine power began to decrease on both sides until both engines flamed out in a stall condition. From that point on FDR data was lost because the electric bus did not continue to receive power from the engine generators. The CVR recording continued for a further approximately 1 minute and 20 seconds on emergency battery power. Stall warnings, stick shaker and stick pusher activations continued until the end of the recording. The aircraft then impacted mountainous terrain. Unstable weather conditions were present along the flight route over Iran, which included moderate up to severe turbulence and icing conditions up to 45000ft. These conditions could have caused ice crystals to block the left-hand pitot tube. It was also reported that the aircraft was parked at Sharjah Airport for three days in dusty weather condition. Initially the pitot covers had not been applied. The formation of dust inside the pitot tube was considered another possibility.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by insufficient operational prerequisites for the management of erratic airspeed indication failure by the cockpit crew. The following contributing factors were identified:
- The aircraft designer/manufacturer provided insufficient technical and operational guidance about airspeed malfunctions that previously occurred.
- Lack of effective CRM.
Final Report:

Crash of an ATR72-212 on Mt Dena: 66 killed

Date & Time: Feb 18, 2018 at 0931 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EP-ATS
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Tehran – Yasuj
MSN:
391
YOM:
1993
Flight number:
EP3704
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
60
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
66
Captain / Total flying hours:
17926
Captain / Total hours on type:
12519.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1880
Copilot / Total hours on type:
197
Aircraft flight hours:
28857
Aircraft flight cycles:
28497
Circumstances:
Iranian ATR72 aircraft registered EP-ATS operated by Iran Aseman Airlines was assigned to perform a domestic scheduled passenger flight from Tehran to Yasuj on 07:55 local time. The aircraft took off from Tehran Mehrabad International Airport (0III) at 04:35 UTC. (08:05 LMT) and the flight was the first flight of the day for aircraft and the crew. The cruise flight was conducted at FL210 on airway W144 and no abnormal situation was reported by the crew and the flight was continued on Tehran ACC frequency till the time the first officer requested latest weather information of the destination by contact to Yasuj tower then requested to leave FL210 to FL170 from Tehran ACC. When the aircraft was descending to FL170 and crew calling YSJ tower the aircraft descending was continued to altitude of 15000 ft. The aircraft was approved to join overhead of the airport and perform “circling NDB approach “to land on RWY 31 at the destination aerodrome. Finally the aircraft collided with a peak lee of DENA Mountains about 8.5 miles at North far from the airport and involved accident on 06:01 UTC. The aircraft was completely destroyed as a result of collision with the mountain at the altitude of approximately 13,300 ft.
Probable cause:
The accident was happened due to many chains of considered causes but the “Human Factor” had main roll for the conclusion of the scenario. The Cockpit Crew action which has caused dangerous conditions for the flight is considered as main cause. Based on provided evidences, the errors of cockpit crew were as follows:
- Continuing to the Yasouj airport for landing against Operation manual of the Company, due to low altitude ceiling of the cloud and related cloud mass. They should divert to alternate airport,
- Descending to unauthorized altitude below minimum of the route and MSA,
- Lack of enough CRM during flight,
- Failure to complete the stall recovery (flap setting, max RPM),
- Inappropriate use of Autopilot after Stall condition,
- Inadequate anticipation for bad weather based on OM (Clouds, Turbulence, and Icing ...),
- Quick action to switch off anti-ice system and AOA,
- Failure to follow the Check lists and standard call out by both pilots.
Contributing Factors:
The contributive factors to this accident include but are not limited to the following:
- The airline was not capable to detect systematic defectives about :
- Effectiveness of crew training about Meteorology, OM, SOP,
- Enough operational supervision on pilot behaviors,
- The lack of SIGMET about Mountain Wave or Severe Mountain wave,
- Unclear procedure for stall recovery in FCOM,
- Lack of warning in aircraft manuals by manufacturer for flight crew awareness about mountain wave.
- Lack of APM System to alert crew about performance degradation.
Other Deficiencies and Short Comes:
In the process of the accident investigation, some detailed deficiencies and short comes were found and should be considered as latent conditions by related authorities:
- AD accomplishment and related monitoring,
- Sanction on aviation industries and effect on Flight safety,
- Non-standard communication between ATC and crew,
- Unclear definition of the Fully Qualified Pilot and qualified copilot in Aircrew regulation.
- Weather forecast (TAF) in the airports based on annex 3 procedure in the Civil Aviation Organization for approving alternative method of compliance for aircraft AD,s
- Search and rescue Coordination with local authorities for aviation accidents,
- Time setting of aircraft flight data recording(FDR) either by technician or pilots.
Final Report:

Crash of a BAe 146-300 in Khark

Date & Time: Jun 19, 2016 at 1335 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EP-MOF
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Ahwaz – Khark
MSN:
E3149
YOM:
1989
Flight number:
IRM4525
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
79
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5494
Captain / Total hours on type:
1270.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
300
Copilot / Total hours on type:
110
Circumstances:
On June 19, 2016, Mahan Air flight IRM 4525 was a scheduled passenger flight which took off from Ahwaz Airport at 1257 LMT (0827 UTC) to destination and landed at Khark Island Airport at 1335 LMT (0905 UTC). After delivery of the flight from BUZ approach to Khark tower, the flight was cleared to land on RWY 31 via visual approach. At 10 NM on final the pilot has asked weather information of the destination so, the captain requested to perform a visual approach for RWY 13. Finally the pilot in command accomplished an un-stabilized approach and landed on the runway after passing long distance of the Runway. Regarding to the length of the runway (7,657 feet) the aircraft overran the end of runway and made runway excursion on runway 13 and came to rest on the unpaved surface after 54 meters past the runway end. The nose landing gear strut has broken and collapsed. The captain instructed the cabin crew to evacuate the aircraft. No unusual occurrences were noticed during departure, en-route and descent.
Probable cause:
The main cause of this accident is wrong behavior of the pilot which descripted as:
- Decision to make a landing on short field RWY 13 with tailwind.
- Un stabilized landing against on normal flight profile
- Weak, obviously, CRM in cockpit.
- Poor judgment and not accomplishing a go around while performing a unstabilized approach.
- Improper calculating of landing speed without focusing on the tailwind component
Contributing factors:
- Anti-skid failures of RH landing gear causing prolong landing distance.
- Instantaneous variable wind condition on aerodrome traffic pattern.
- Late activating of airbrakes and spoilers (especially airbrakes) with tailwind cause to increase the landing roll distance.
Final Report:

Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-83 in Mashhad

Date & Time: Jan 28, 2016 at 1937 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EP-ZAB
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Isfahan – Mashhad
MSN:
49930/1720
YOM:
1990
Flight number:
ZV4010
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
154
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
9224
Captain / Total hours on type:
4341.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
633
Copilot / Total hours on type:
471
Aircraft flight hours:
51446
Aircraft flight cycles:
30255
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Isfahan, the crew initiated the approach to Mashhad Airport by night and poor weather conditions with low visibility due to snow falls. After touchdown on runway 31R, the crew started the braking procedure and activated the reverse thrust systems. The aircraft skidded then veered off runway to th left, lost its both main undercarriage and came to rest 55 metres to the left of the runway, some 1,311 metres from the runway threshold. All 162 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The following findings were identified:
- Loss of control after touchdown due to an abnormal use by the captain of the reverse thrust systems, which caused the aircraft to slid and to become out of control,
- Weather conditions deteriorated with a sudden drop in temperature and a reduced visibility,
- Limited RVR to 811 metres,
- The crew failed to initiate a go-around procedure,
- Overconfidence on part of the captain due to his high experience,
- Poor crew resource management,
- The braking coefficient was low due to an excessive deposit of rubber on the runway surface, combined with a layer of snow that the airport authorities did not consider necessary to clear in due time.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell Grand Commander 690 near Zāhedān: 7 killed

Date & Time: Oct 12, 2014 at 1920 LT
Registration:
1405
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Tehran - Zahedan
MSN:
690-11075
YOM:
1972
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft was flying to Zahedan with a crew of three (two pilots and a flight attendant) and four passengers, among them General Mahmoud Sadeqi, a senior police officer who was travelling to Zahedan to investigate the circumstances of a recent attack that killed four police officers. While approaching Zahedan by night, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the airplane struck the slope of a mountain located in the Sabzpushan Heights, north of the airport. The wreckage was found the following morning. All seven occupants were killed. A day later, Iranian Authorities said the accident was caused by technical flaws, darkness and the pilot’s unfamiliarity with the region.

Crash of a HESA IrAn-140-100 in Tehran: 40 killed

Date & Time: Aug 10, 2014 at 0921 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EP-GPA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Tehran – Tabas
MSN:
90-05
YOM:
2008
Flight number:
SPN5915
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
42
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
40
Captain / Total flying hours:
9478
Captain / Total hours on type:
2000.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
572
Copilot / Total hours on type:
400
Aircraft flight hours:
1405
Aircraft flight cycles:
1058
Circumstances:
On August 10,2014, at 04:52 UTC daylight time, an AN-140-100 aircraft , Iranian registration EP-GPA ( MSN 90-05), operated by Sepahan Airlines flight # 5915, experienced engine number 2 shutdown just about 2 seconds before lift-off and crashed shortly after take-off nearby Mehrabad International Airport (THR), TEHRAN; IR. Of IRAN; the aircraft was on lift off from runway 29L. The airplane was completely destroyed by impact forces and post-crash fire. Fatality incorporates 34 of the 40 passengers; 4 of the 4 flight attendants, and 2 of the 2 flight crewmembers. The 11 passengers received serious injuries, which finally as a result of that accident there are 40 fatalities and 8 passengers recovered from injury. Sepahan Airline was operating under the provisions of CAO.IRI operational requirement for commercial air transport. Before the accident flight the airplane dispatch from Isfahan and arrived at Tehran about 03:30. The dispatcher and PIC perform the load calculation using the aircraft FM performance charts. Because of load limitation for 15° flap position, load sheet change and re-write with 10° flap position and re-calculated MTOM. The aircraft was enrouted to Airport Tabbas Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. Figure 1 below is a map showing the location of the accident and the aircraft flight path. Figure 2 shows THR runway 29L SID and figure 3 show timeline of event in the flight path. According to overview of flight crew performance, it is indicated that the crewmembers were provided with the flight release paperwork, which included weather information, notices to airmen (NOTAM), and the flight plan.
Probable cause:
The accident investigation team determined that the main cause of this accident was combination of:
1. Electronic engine control (SAY-2000) failure simultaneously with engine No: 2 shutdown, just about 2 seconds before aircraft lift-off.
2. AFM Confusing performance chart resulted the pilots relying on performance calculation that, significantly over-estimate the aircraft MTOM.
Contributing Factors to the accident were:
1. Aircraft flight manual unclear procedure, including the procedure for calculating maximum allowable take-off weight, VR and V2 and ambiguity in the climb segment definition and applications.
2. Crew performance, including:
- PIC rotated the aircraft at the speed of about 219 km/h (whereas 224 km/h is the speed recommended by the AFM table 4.2.3),
- The crew failed to perform the manual propeller feathering procedure for the failed engine,
- The PIC's decision to fly with the aircraft, notwithstanding, had about 190 kgf overweight,
- Aircraft fuel was about 500 kg more than required fuel for the accident flight.
3. The appearance of negative thrust from the unfeathered propeller blades at takeoff were not considered during the aircraft certification tests, as it was considered improbable. However, in
the accident flight the negative thrust did appear and affected the flight performance.
Final Report:

Crash of a Fokker 100 in Zahedan

Date & Time: May 10, 2014 at 1300 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EP-ASZ
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Mashhad - Zahedan
MSN:
11421
YOM:
1992
Flight number:
EP853
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
98
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On approach to Zahedan Airport, the crew followed the checklist and configured the aircraft for landing when he realized that the left main gear remained stuck in its wheel well. The crew abandoned the landing manoeuvre and initiated a go-around procedure. During an hour, the crew followed a holding circuit to burn fuel and also to try to lower the left main landing gear but without success. Eventually, the crew was cleared to land on runway 35. After touchdown, the aircraft rolled for about 1,500 metres then veered off runway to the left before coming to rest in a sandy area. All 103 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.