Crash of a Beechcraft 60 Duke in Mexia: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 3, 2002 at 1350 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N7272D
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Mexia - DuPage
MSN:
P-124
YOM:
1970
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
25600
Aircraft flight hours:
4363
Circumstances:
The pilot arrived at Mexia-Limestone County Airport (TX06), Mexia, Texas, sometime before 1100. Once onboard the airplane, a witness, and an acquaintance of the pilot, closed and locked the airplane's cabin door for the pilot, and walked away from the airplane. He also reported that after the engines to the airplane were started, the airplane stayed on the ramp and idled for 10 to 15 minutes. No one saw the pilot taxi to the runway, but he taxied to the north end of Runway 18 for a downwind takeoff to the south. Examination of the accident site found the wreckage oriented along a path consistent with an extended centerline of runway 18. The airplane was found along a fence line approximately 1/4 mile from the departure end of Runway 18. The airplane's track was along a 183-degree bearing, and there was a large burn area prior to and around the debris zone along the wreckage path. Examination of the cockpit revealed a 9/16-inch hex-head bolt inserted in the control lock pinhole for the control column. Under normal procedures Cockpit Check in the Duke 60 Airplane Flight Manual, for Preflight Inspection the first item listed is: 1. "Control Locks - REMOVE and STOW". In addition, under normal procedures Before Starting checklist in the Duke 60 Airplane Flight Manual, the fourth item to check is listed as: 4. "Flight Controls - FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT and PROPER RESPONSE"
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to remove the control lock before the flight and his failure to follow the checklist.
Final Report:

Ground accident of a Douglas DC-8-62F in Singapore

Date & Time: Feb 28, 2002 at 0044 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N1808E
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
46105/494
YOM:
1969
Flight number:
APWP6L
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5000
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4300
Circumstances:
On 28 February 2002, Arrow Air flight APWP6L touched down on Runway 02L at Singapore Changi Airport at 0029 hours. The weather and visibility conditions were good (visibility in excess of 10 km). Arrow Air flight APWP6L was assigned to park at Bay 117, a remote aircraft parking bay. After APWP6L had landed, the runway controller at Changi Tower instructed the aircraft to taxi towards Bay 117. The aircraft exited the runway via rapid exit Taxiway W4. The ground movement planner at Changi Tower selected the taxiway centre line lights to guide the aircraft from Taxiway W4 onto Taxiway NC1, Taxiway WA and to Bay C7 (Bay 117 is the second parking bay after Bay C7). Due to airside construction works, there was no taxiway centre line lighting guidance on the short segment of taxi route from Taxiway WA from abeam Bay C7 to the adjacent parking Bays 117 and 118. There was a NOTAM in force that stipulated that during hours of darkness, aircraft could only be towed in to Bays 117 and 118. On reaching Bay C7, the flight crew of APWP6L did not stop but continued taxiing past Bay C7 onto a diverted portion of Taxiway WA. The taxiway centre line lights for this diverted portion of Taxiway WA were not switched on by ATC as it was not the intended route for the aircraft. At about 0037 hours, flight APWP6L called Changi Tower to indicate its position near Bay 106. Realising that flight APWP6L had missed its allocated parking position, the ground movement planner at Changi Tower routed the aircraft back to Bay 117 via Taxiways WA, SC, WP, V8 and Taxiway WA. Flight APWP6L followed the return route until it was abeam Bay 117 on the straight section of the diverted portion of Taxiway WA, just before Taxiway VY. At that location, the pilot saw the ground marshaller at Bay 117 on the aircraft’s right side. Instead of continuing to follow the assigned taxi route, the aircraft turned right. In doing so, it left the WA taxiway centre line and went onto a grass area between Taxiway WA and the parking apron. The nose gear of the aircraft went across an open drain of about 1.4 m wide and 0.8 m deep within the grass area. The aircraft came to a halt when its main landing gears went into the drain at about 0044 hours. All three crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The following findings were identified:
- The accident took place at night in clear weather.
- The flight crew members were properly licensed, qualified, medically fit, and in compliance with flight and duty time regulations.
- The flight crew had the latest revision of the Jeppesen charts showing the layout of Singapore Changi Airport, including the yellow supplementary chart showing the area near Bay 117 in greater detail.
- The flight crew was not familiar with the Terminal 1 West Apron area where Bay 117 was located.
- The flight crew was aware of the NOTAM tow-in requirement at Bay 117 during hours of darkness.
- The Apron Control duty supervisor was aware of the requirement for aircraft to be towed into Bay 117. He did not coordinate with ATC and the ground handler on towing arrangements as there was no towing procedure established for aircraft assigned to Bay 117 or 118.
- The runway controller was not aware of the requirement for aircraft to be towed into Bay 117. He instructed flight APWP6L to follow the green lights to Bay 117 in accordance with standard ATC procedures.
- The flight crew did not stop at Bay C7 to ask for instructions or guidance to get to Bay 117.
- After missing Bay 117 initially, the flight crew continued taxiing in search of the bay on their own.
- On the subsequent return towards Terminal 1 West Apron, after sighting Bay 117 and the marshaller on the right of the aircraft, the flight crew deviated from the Taxiway WA centre line marking and green centre line lights and turned the aircraft to the right directly towards Bay 117.
- The flight crew did not see a turn signal from the marshaller but believed they saw the marshaller waving a “move ahead” signal.
- The flight crew did not notice on the Jeppesen charts that there was a turf island separating Taxiway WA from the parking apron where Bay 117 was located.
- The flight crew turned right from the straight section of the diverted portion of Taxiway WA to head directly towards Bay 117 even though there was no turn signal from the marshaller, no instruction to turn from ATC and no aircraft parking bay guidance marking on the ground to indicate to the flight crew to turn right.
- The landing lights of the aircraft were turned on.
- As taxiway centre line lights were provided along Taxiway WA, according to ICAO Annex 14, there was no requirement for taxiway edge lights to be provided. However, where there is a large unmarked paved area adjacent to a taxiway, the provision of taxiway edge lights or reflective markers (in addition to taxiway centre line lights) would provide an additional cue to pilots to stay within the taxiway. This may help to prevent pilots inadvertently straying off the taxiway.
- There were no edge lights or markers to show the grass area between Taxiway WA and the parking apron where Bay 117 was located. There is no requirement in ICAO Annex 14 for edge lights or markers to show the presence of grass areas adjacent to taxiways.
- The drain located within the grass area between the diverted portion of Taxiway WA and the parking apron was outside the taxiway strip. According to ICAO Annex 14, drains located outside a taxiway strip are not required to be covered.
- The airworthiness of the aircraft was not a factor in this accident.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-26 in Heglig

Date & Time: Feb 27, 2002 at 0915 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ST-MGL
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Khartoum - Heglig
MSN:
97 09
YOM:
1980
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
12
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft was completing a charter flight from Khartoum to Heglig on behalf of an oil company, carrying 12 passengers and four crew members. On final approach in good weather conditions, the aircraft was too low and struck the ground short of runway 34 threshold. The aircraft bounced then landed hard, causing the undercarriage to be torn off. The aircraft slid on its belly, veered off runway and came to rest in bushes. Al 16 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Wind was gusting to 23 knots at the time of the accident.

Crash of an Ilyushin II-76MD in Mashhad

Date & Time: Feb 24, 2002
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
15-2281
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Mashhad - Tehran
MSN:
0073475236
YOM:
1987
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
222
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Few minutes after takeoff from Mashhad Airport, while flying at FL230 about 80 km from his departure point, the crew encountered technical problems when the autopilot system disengaged and the engine n°4 caught fire. The crew elected to extinguish the fire but without success and was cleared to return to Mashhad for an emergency landing. The fire spread to the right wing and the engine n°4 detached. Nevertheless, the crew was able to land safely at Mashhad Airport 24 minutes later and stopped the airplane on the runway. All 230 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was partially destroyed after the right wing broke off and fell on the ground.
Probable cause:
Fire on engine n°4 for unknown reasons.

Crash of an Antonov AN-26 at Lakhta AFB: 17 killed

Date & Time: Feb 21, 2002 at 2045 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
07 red
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Safonovo - Lakhta
MSN:
ZR726001
YOM:
1975
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
12
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
17
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Safonovo NAS (Severomorsk), the crew started a night descent to Lakhta AFB. Weather conditions were poor with low clouds at 120 metres, a visibility of 1,500 metres and snow squalls. On final, at a distance of 2,700 metres from the runway threshold, the aircraft was 30 metres below the glide. Once the crew reached the decision altitude, he decided to continue despite he did not establish any visual contact with the ground. At a speed of 220-240 km/h and at a height of 16 metres, the right wing collided with trees. The aircraft descended and crashed in a snow covered field located 1,725 metres short of runway and 52 metres to the left of the extended centerline. Three people, among them a pilot, survived, while 17 other occupants were killed. The aircraft was totally destroyed.
Probable cause:
The crew's decision to continue the approach after the decision height without any visual contact with the ground until the aircraft collided with trees and impacted terrain. The crew failed to follow the published procedures and to initiate a go-around manoeuvre.

Crash of a Cessna 421B Golden Eagle II in Libourne: 3 killed

Date & Time: Feb 19, 2002 at 1815 LT
Operator:
Registration:
F-GHUY
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Libourne – Toussus-le-Noble
MSN:
421B-0417
YOM:
1973
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
1761
Copilot / Total flying hours:
552
Circumstances:
After takeoff from runway 22 at Libourne-Les Artigues-de-Lussac Airport, while initial climb, the twin engine aircraft made a first slight turn to the right then a turn to the left in a strong left bank configuration. It went out of control and crashed in a wooded area located 2 km from the runway end, bursting into flames. All three occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The accident was due to the loss of control of the aircraft during the initial climb phase, which may be linked to a power asymmetry between the two engines. He was not possible to determine the origin of this asymmetry, nor its effective contribution to the accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a Canadair CL-44D4-2 in Mbuji-Mayi

Date & Time: Feb 17, 2002
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
9Q-CTS
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Mbuji-Mayi – Kinshasa
MSN:
25
YOM:
1961
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
20
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Mbuji-Mayi Airport, while climbing, the engine n°1 caught fire. The flight engineer elected to extinguish the fire but without success. The aircraft lost height then rolled to the left to an angle of 85°. The crew extended the flaps to 45° to maintain a rate of descent of 700 feet per minute but due to an asymmetric flap condition, the rate of descent increased to 1,500 feet per minute. After the aircraft rolled to the left to an angle of 110°, at a speed of 98 knots, the captain attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crash landed in a prairie. All 23 occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

Crash of a Harbin Yunsunji Y-12 II in Sam Neua

Date & Time: Feb 14, 2002 at 1200 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RDPL-34118
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sam Neua - Vientiane
MSN:
0043
YOM:
1991
Flight number:
QV702
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
13
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Just after liftoff, while climbing to a height of about two metres, the twin engine aircraft encountered downdraft. It struck the runway surface, went out of control and veered off runway. It then collided with a fence and came to rest on a road located 17 metres below. All 15 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, the wind was blowing at 8 knots but apparently changed rapidly and became stronger shortly after rotation.

Crash of a Gulfstream GV in West Palm Beach

Date & Time: Feb 14, 2002 at 0649 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N777TY
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
West Palm Beach - Teterboro
MSN:
508
YOM:
1996
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
13280
Captain / Total hours on type:
1227.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
18477
Copilot / Total hours on type:
450
Aircraft flight hours:
1945
Circumstances:
After a normal taxi and takeoff, the airplane's landing gear would not retract after liftoff. After unsuccessfully attempting to raise the landing gear manually, the flight crew elected to return to the airport. During the landing flare, the ground spoilers deployed when the throttles were brought to idle. The airplane descended rapidly and landed hard, and the right main landing gear collapsed. The investigation determined that a mechanic had wedged wooden sticks into the airplane's weight-on-wheels (WOW) switches to force them into the ground mode while the airplane was on jacks during maintenance. The mechanic said that he used the sticks to disable the WOW switches to gain access to the maintenance data acquisition unit, which was necessary to troubleshoot an overspeed alert discrepancy. After the maintenance was performed, the sticks were not removed, and the airplane was returned to service. No notation about the disabled WOW switches was entered in the work logs. Postaccident ground testing of the accident airplane's cockpit crew alerting system and examination of flight data recorder (FDR) data determined that the system was functioning properly and that it produced a blue WOW fault message, an amber WOW fault message, and a red GND SPOILER warning message when the accident flight conditions were recreated. The messages produced were consistent with FDR and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) information. Ground spoilers will deploy when the throttles are brought to idle if the spoilers are armed and the WOW switches are in the ground mode. The G-V Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) cautions flight crews not to move thrust reverser levers and to switch the GND SPOILER armed to off following an amber WOW FAULT message. A red GND SPOILER message calls for the flight crew to disarm the ground spoilers and pull the circuit breakers to make sure the spoilers are not rearmed inadvertently. Based on CVR information, there was no indication that the flight crew followed checklist procedures contained in the G-V's QRH that referenced WOW faults or GND SPOILER faults. Preflight checklist procedures also called for the flight crew to conduct a visual inspection of the WOW switches.
Probable cause:
The flight crew's failure to follow preflight inspection/checklist procedures, which resulted in their failure to detect wooden sticks in the landing gear weight-on-wheel switches and their failure in flight to respond to crew alert messages to disarm the ground spoilers, which deployed when the crew moved the throttles to idle during the landing flare, causing the airplane to land hard. Contributing to the accident was maintenance personnel's failure to remove the sticks from the weight-on-wheels switches after maintenance was completed.
Final Report:

Ground accident of a BAe 125-400B in Lanseria

Date & Time: Feb 12, 2002 at 0800 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ZS-JBA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Lanseria – Blantyre
MSN:
25259
YOM:
1971
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7881
Captain / Total hours on type:
64.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
13500
Copilot / Total hours on type:
18
Circumstances:
The aircraft was parked on the international departures apron at FALA, ready for a flight from FALA to Blantyre. The pilot assumed that the engineer had pressurised the hydraulic accumulator and therefore did not inspect it himself. When the passengers arrived, the pilot got in the aircraft and began the internal pre-start checks. The co-pilot removed the chocks after boarding the passengers, closed the door and then started to brief the passengers. At that moment the pilot noticed that the aircraft was rolling forward. Attempts to stop the aircraft were unsuccessful, the aircraft rolled forward, narrowly missed a hangar and a parked Bell Long-ranger helicopter next to the hangar, crossed the taxiway and finally stopped when entering a ditch between the taxiway and the runway. The pilot was the holder of a valid transport pilot’s licence and had the type endorsed in his licence. The operation of the hydraulic system was found to be satisfactory. The hand pump was used to pressurise the system after which the brakes could be applied successfully.
Probable cause:
The hydraulic system was not pressurised during the pre-flight inspection of the aircraft. The chocks were therefore removed without adequate hydraulic system pressure available.
Final Report: