West Palm Beach

The airline transport pilot reported that, before landing following an uneventful flight, he extended the wing flaps to the approach position and extended the landing gear; the gear indicator lights showed "3 green." After touchdown, he heard noises, and the airplane started to sink. After the airplane came to a stop on the right side of the runway, he noticed that the landing gear handle was up. The pilot stated to the copilot, "How did the gear handle get up?" then placed the handle to the down position and the flight crew exited the airplane. The copilot reported that he was acting as an observer during the flight and that he also saw three green landing gear down-and-locked indicator lights before landing. The airframe sustained substantial damage from contact with the runway. All three landing gear were found in a partially-extended position. Skid marks from all three tires were observed on the runway leading up to the main wreckage. Both propeller assemblies were damaged due to contact with the runway. The pressure vessel was compromised from contact with a propeller blade. The nose landing gear actuator was forced up, into the nose gear well and penetrated the upper nose skin. Examination of the landing gear components did not reveal evidence of a preexisting mechanical malfunction or malfunction. The skid marks leading to the wreckage and the partially-extended gear were inconsistent with the pilot's account that the gear handle was up after the airplane came to rest and was then lowered. The gear handle consisted of an electrical switch that required it to be pulled out of a detent before placing it up or down. There was no mechanical linkage between the gear handle and the landing gear, as the gear were driven by an electric motor. It is likely that the pilot realized that the gear were not extended just before touchdown and then tried to lower the gear, resulting in a touchdown with the gear only partially extended. The pilot reported that he had experienced several interruptions to his sleep the night before the accident. He also reported that he flew 7 legs on the day of the accident for a total of 5.2 hours, only eating a banana for breakfast during this time period. It is likely that the pilot's fatigue contributed to his failure to ensure that the landing gear were down and locked before landing.

On approach to West Palm Beach Airport, the crew encountered technical problems with the undercarriage that could not be lowered. The crew decided to return to his base in Fort Lauderdale. On final, the crew was again unable to lower the gear so the decision was taken to complete a wheels-up landing. The airplane landed on its belly on runway 08 then slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. The occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On December 20, 2007 at approximately 1630EST, N954PA a Cessna 208B Caravan aircraft, owned and operated by Agape Flight Inc [United States FAR Part 91 Operator] enroute from Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic to West Palm Beach, Florida incurred sudden engine stoppage. At the time N954PA was flying at 12,000 ft. The aircraft was diverted to the nearest airport but was unable to glide the required distance and landed 30 nautical miles (NM) West North West (WNW) of Chub Cay. There were 2 crew members on board the aircraft. No injuries were reported by the crew. The aircraft is submerged in approximately eighteen to twenty feet of water, with the aircraft tail being visible at low tide. Both crews were qualified in accordance with the United States Code of Federal Regulations.

The airplane, flown by an airline transport pilot, departed in day visual meteorological conditions for an 18-nautical mile flight from the home base airport to another airport where the pilot planned to conduct a practice instrument approach. The pilot contacted approach control and requested a practice ILS approach. The controller instructed the pilot to proceed northwest bound and maintain 2,500 feet msl. Radar indicated the airplane tracked a northerly heading instead of a northwesterly heading as instructed. The airplane continued on a northerly heading until 1113:48 when it was about 5 miles southwest of the destination airport at 1,900 feet msl with a ground speed of 172 knots. At this point, the controller instructed the pilot to turn southbound and remain clear of Class C airspace. Radar coverage for the next 50 seconds was intermittent. At 1114:29, radar picked up the airplane about 4 miles southwest of the destination airport at 1,800 feet msl, a ground speed of 106 knots, and a heading of 101 degrees. The airplane continued heading east-southeast for about 30 seconds and its ground speed continued to decay. At 1114:58, it entered an abrupt descent, going from 1700 feet to 200 feet in 15 seconds. The last radar return was recorded at 1115:13 and showed the airplane at 200 feet msl, a ground speed of 64 knots, and a heading of 093 degrees. Several witnesses observed the airplane descend in a "flat spin" and impact a shallow canal in a residential area. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane impacted the canal in a nearly flat and level attitude. No evidence of any pre-impact mechanical discrepancies with the airframe or engines was found that would have prevented normal operation. Testing of the electronic engine controls revealed that both units were functional, but under some conditions would trip to manual mode. Further investigation determined that the units tripping to manual mode was due to an electrical overstress that failed the same thermistor within each unit. The reason for the electrical overstress or when it occurred could not be determined; however, it is probable it occurred at impact when the units were submerged in water. Even if the units tripped to manual mode in flight, this would only result in the loss of the torque and temperature limiting and propeller synchrophaser systems, meaning the pilot would have to manually adjust the power levers as required to maintain the proper torque and exhaust gas temperature. Post accident toxicology testing of the pilot's blood revealed chlorpheniramine, an over-the-counter sedating antihistamine, at more than ten times higher than the level expected with a typical maximum over-the-counter dose. It is probable that the pilot's performance and judgment were substantially impaired by his very high blood level of chlorpheniramine.

The pilot reported visually checking the main fuel tanks during his preflight inspection of the airplane and later reported there was enough fuel for the intended flight which would be less than 1 hour, plus a 45-minute reserve amount of fuel. He estimated the fuel level in the main fuel tanks was 2-3 inches from the top. He also reported that before the accident flight he had never flown the accident make and model airplane, and that he had not had any flight training in the airplane. The passengers were boarded, the flight departed and climbed to between 4,500 and 6,500 feet msl. He leaned the mixture during cruise, and the flight continued. He began descending when the flight was 12 miles from the destination airport, and he performed the pre landing checks when the flight was 3 miles from the destination airport. The flight entered left downwind where he lowered the landing gear and turned on the fuel pumps. When abeam the landing point he reduced power, lowered the flaps 10 degrees, and turned onto base leg. During the base leg while rolling out of the turn and flying at 600 feet, "the right engine suddenly came to a stop...." He banked to the left to maintain zero sideslip, pushed the mixture, propeller, and throttle controls full forward, and identified the right engine had failed. He reportedly pulled the right propeller control to the feather position but during the postaccident investigation, the right propeller blades were not in the feather position and there was no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the propeller. The pilot further reported that while pulling the right propeller control to the feather position, the airplane, "began to yaw right and simultaneously bank right...." He moved the left throttle control to idle, and they were on the ground in a span of 6 seconds from the time the right engine quit. No fuel leakage was noted at the scene, and no fuel contamination was noted in a nearby pond. Additionally, only residual fuel was noted in the fuel lines in each engine compartment. A total of 4.0 and 1.5 gallons of fuel were drained from the left and right auxiliary fuel tanks, respectively. No evidence of preimpact flight control failure or malfunction was noted. Neither propeller was at or near the feather range at the time of impact. Both engines were removed from the airplane, placed on a test stand with a "club" propeller, and both engines were noted to operate normally during the engine run. Examination of the right seat in the third row of the airplane revealed the seat frame was bent down on the left side, and all seat feet were in position but distorted; no fracture of the seat feet were noted. Examination of the seat of the passenger who sustained minor injuries (left seat in the third row) revealed the seatpan was compressed down, and the lapbelt was unbuckled. The inboard arm rest was bent inward, and the outboard arm rest was bent outward. The seat frame indicated displacement to the left. The seat back was twisted counter clockwise, and the left forward seat foot was in place. The seat and attach structure was certificated for a maximum forward g loading of 9 g's, and a maximum sideward g loading of 1.5 g's. This does not include a 1.33 margin of safety factor. The seat and attach structure was tested to ultimate loads in a combined forward, sideward, and upward directions in accordance with CAR 3.390-2. The same loads were also applied in a downward direction by itself. The empennage was separated just aft of the aft pressure bulkhead but remained secured by flight control cables. According to personnel from the airplane manufacturer, the tested load (150 percent limit) for the empennage in negative shear translates to 14.0 g loading. Based on Cessna Engineering rough calculations, they believe the empennage is capable of sustaining an additional 30 percent beyond what it was tested to, or an estimated 18.2 g's in negative shear loading.

After a normal taxi and takeoff, the airplane's landing gear would not retract after liftoff. After unsuccessfully attempting to raise the landing gear manually, the flight crew elected to return to the airport. During the landing flare, the ground spoilers deployed when the throttles were brought to idle. The airplane descended rapidly and landed hard, and the right main landing gear collapsed. The investigation determined that a mechanic had wedged wooden sticks into the airplane's weight-on-wheels (WOW) switches to force them into the ground mode while the airplane was on jacks during maintenance. The mechanic said that he used the sticks to disable the WOW switches to gain access to the maintenance data acquisition unit, which was necessary to troubleshoot an overspeed alert discrepancy. After the maintenance was performed, the sticks were not removed, and the airplane was returned to service. No notation about the disabled WOW switches was entered in the work logs. Postaccident ground testing of the accident airplane's cockpit crew alerting system and examination of flight data recorder (FDR) data determined that the system was functioning properly and that it produced a blue WOW fault message, an amber WOW fault message, and a red GND SPOILER warning message when the accident flight conditions were recreated. The messages produced were consistent with FDR and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) information. Ground spoilers will deploy when the throttles are brought to idle if the spoilers are armed and the WOW switches are in the ground mode. The G-V Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) cautions flight crews not to move thrust reverser levers and to switch the GND SPOILER armed to off following an amber WOW FAULT message. A red GND SPOILER message calls for the flight crew to disarm the ground spoilers and pull the circuit breakers to make sure the spoilers are not rearmed inadvertently. Based on CVR information, there was no indication that the flight crew followed checklist procedures contained in the G-V's QRH that referenced WOW faults or GND SPOILER faults. Preflight checklist procedures also called for the flight crew to conduct a visual inspection of the WOW switches.

At 0314, the pilot reported to the Air Traffic Control (ATC) Tower that he wanted to divert from his destination to land at a closer airport, and was cleared for a visual approach. At 0325, the pilot issued a "Mayday." On final approach the airplane struck a building and wires about 1/2 mile short of the runway. Witnesses that saw the airplane just before impact said that the airplane was low, there was no in-flight fire, and the engine sounds "...appeared to be a fluttering sound as if air [was] passing through the propeller." The pilot had filed for a cruise altitude of 15,000 feet, with a time en route of 5 hours, and fuel on board 6 hours. Weight and balance calculations showed that the pilot was operating about 722 pounds above the maximum gross weight for the takeoff, climb, and maximum cruise power settings. The Pilot Operating Handbook calculations showed that most of the fuel would have been used during the flight. The engine and propeller examinations revealed that both engines were not producing power at impact (windmilling). There were no discrepancies found with the engines or propellers. Examination of the propellers revealed that they were not in the feather position and they were not in beta/reverse position. Line personnel at the departure airport confirmed that all the tanks were topped off (282 gallons added). It took the flight 32 minutes to reach a cruise altitude of 15,000 feet, which calculated to about 293.3 pounds (1 gallon of Jet "A" equals 6.7 pounds), and a flight time of 4.9 hours from takeoff to impact. Sample calculations indicated that the fuel burn rate would have caused the airplane to use 2,649.3 pounds of Jet "A" turbine fuel during the flight. The flight departed with all tanks full 384 gallons usable (2,572.8 pounds), which calculates to insufficient fuel for the completion of the flight. Two gallons of fuel was drained from the right nacelle tank at the crash site, and there was no evidence of in-flight leakage. The sample calculations do not consider performance degradation for operating the airplane above the maximum allowable gross weight, which would cause the fuel consumption to go up because more power was required for the overweight conditions. The pilot's flight plan was for economy cruise, plus the airplane was over gross weight at takeoff, and there are no performance charts for that condition. So, the performance was even poorer than shown on the maximum power chart for climb and cruise. Calculations of the maximum allowable fuel that could be on board the aircraft showed that only 1851 pounds of turbine fuel could be carried to start the flight at the maximum allowable weight, or about 3.2 hours of flight. The en route winds aloft at the airplane's altitude indicated a slight tailwind for half the flight and a headwind of about 15 knots for the remainder of the flight.

The airplane touched down about 1/3 beyond the approach end of Runway 28, a 5,000 footlong, asphalt runway. The PIC stated, 'as usual,' he applied 'light' braking and attempted to actuated the airplane's thrust reverser (TR) system; however, the TR handles could not be moved beyond the 'Deploy-Reverse-Idle' position. After the PIC cycled the levers two or three times, he began to apply maximum braking. A passenger in the airplane stated he looked out of the cockpit window, saw the end of the runway, and the airplane seemed like it was still moving 'pretty fast.' As the airplane approached the end of the runway, he could see smoke, which he believed was coming from the airplane's tires. He then sensed the airplane was falling. The co-pilot stated he had no memory at all of the accident flight. Review of the CVR revealed the co-pilot said that the airplane was 'Vref plus about twenty,' when the airplane was 100 feet over the runway threshold. The PIC could not recall the airplane's touchdown speed, however, he stated that it seemed like the airplane was still traveling 50 to 60 knots when it departed the end of the runway. A pair of parallel tire marks were observed 3,200 feet beyond the approach end of the runway. The tire marks extended past the end of the runway and onto a 106 foot-long grass area. The airplane came to rest on a plateau about 90 feet below the runway elevation. Examination of the airplane, including the optional TR system did not reveal any pre-impact malfunctions. The airplane's estimated landing distance was calculated to be about 3,100 feet. The PIC reported about 4,700 hours of total flight experience, of which, 107 hours were in make and model. The PIC stated he had never performed a landing in the accident airplane without using the TR system. Winds reported at the time of the accident were from 290 degrees at 15 knots, with 21 knot gusts.

According to the passengers, they departed about 30 or 40 minutes late because of the late arrival of the airplane. When the pilot arrived, he 'seemed to...be in a hurry...there was no safety instructions or any attempt to show us or the kids the operation of the door.' After takeoff, the flight climbed to an altitude of 6,700 feet. The pilot attempted to make radio contact with an unknown station, was unsuccessful in making radio contact, and according to a passenger, 'seemed agitated.' The passengers noticed that the left alternator light was illuminated, and questioned the pilot. The pilot told the passengers, '...it's nothing it always comes on.' About 15 minutes after departure, the flight descended to 3,000 feet and the pilot attempted to make radio contact with someone again. The flight continued at 3,000 feet until the pilot saw a ship in the ocean. He descended to around 1,000 feet over the ship, and was still working with the radio. The flight continued onto the coast. The passengers told EMS personnel that the airplane made an 'abrupt' left turn to line up with the runway, and when the airplane touched down, they felt the right side of the aircraft collapse. After touchdown on runway 27L, the airplane's right main landing gear collapsed, then the left gear collapsed. The airplane slid off the right side of the runway and struck RVR (runway visual range) equipment. According to the pilot's statement he, '...made [a] normal approach to runway 27 left. All system indicated normal. Upon touchdown and roll out all was ok for 3-4 hundred feet- [right] gear collapsed...unable to hold aircraft on runway...nose hit RVR antenna swinging aircraft more right to catch right wing and remove tip tank. Left gear collapsed as aircraft came to rest.' According to the FAA Inspector's statement, it was his opinion, on the day of the accident the aircraft was 'over gross weight on departure from Marsh Harbor...the pilot was experiencing radio problems... and I [FAA Inspector] believe he was flustered and annoyed...in the pattern he made an abrupt left turn to lineup with [runway] 27, and when he touched down on the runway the right gear immediately collapsed due to [side] overload.' In addition, both landing gear trunnions, where the retract mechanisms attached, were broken as if 'overloaded.'

On July 10, 1995, about 1430 eastern daylight time, an Aero Commander 500, N89M, registered to Candy Yellow Apple, Inc., leased to and operated by Palm Beach Aviation, experienced separation of a propeller blade during the ground roll to takeoff from the Treasure Cay Airport, Treasure Cay, Bahamas. The nonscheduled, international, passenger flight was operating under 14 CFR Part 135. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and a VFR flight plan was filed for the flight. The airplane was substantially damaged and the airline transport- rated pilot and five passengers were not injured. One passenger was fatally injured. The flight was originating at the time of the accident.