Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The certificated airline transport pilot was departing on a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The purpose of the flight was to deliver a load of wooden roofing shakes to a friend's remote lodge. Witnesses reported that just after takeoff, as the airplane climbed to about 200 to 300 feet above the ground, the airplane abruptly pitched up about 70 degrees, and drifted to the right. The airplane continued to turn to the right as the nose of the airplane lowered momentarily. As the airplane flew very slowly the landing gear was extended. The nose of the airplane pitched up again, the right wing dropped, and the airplane descended. One witness described the descent as: "The wings rocked back and forth as it descended, like a card in the wind, with the nose of the airplane slightly higher." The airplane impacted shallow water in an area of tidal mud flats. A postaccident investigation revealed that the estimated gross weight of the airplane at takeoff was 11,500.8 pounds, 1,400.8 pounds in excess of the airplane's maximum takeoff gross weight. The airplane's center of gravity could not be calculated due to the fact that the exact location/station of the cargo could not be determined. Examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical anomalies.

On approach to Cafunfo Airport, the encountered strong crosswinds. On short final, the aircraft was too low and struck the ground short of runway threshold. On impact, the undercarriage were torn off. The aircraft slid on its belly for few dozen metres then lost its empennage and left wing before coming to rest. All 15 occupants escaped uninjured.

The MU-300 on-demand passenger charter flight sustained substantial damage during a landing overrun on a snow/ice contaminated runway. The captain, who was also the company chief pilot and check airman, was the flying pilot, and the first officer was the non flying pilot. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. Area weather reporting stations reported the presence of freezing rain and snow for a time period beginning several hours before the accident. The captain did not obtain the destination airport weather observation until the flight was approximately 30 nautical miles from the airport. The flight received radar vectors for a instrument landing system approach to runway 30 (5,401 feet by 100 feet, grooved asphalt). The company's training manual states the MU-300's intermediate and final approach speeds as 140 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) and Vref, respectively. Vref was reported by the flight crew as 106 KIAS. During the approach, the tower controller (LC) gave the option for the flight to circle to land or continue straight in to runway 30. LC advised that the winds were from 050-070 degrees at 10 knots gusting to 20 knots, and runway braking action was reported as fair to poor by a snow plow. Radar data indicates that the airplane had a ground speed in excess of 200 knots between the final approach fix and runway threshold and a full-scale localizer deviation 5.5 nm from the localizer antenna. The company did not have stabilized approach criteria establishing when a missed approach or go-around is to be executed. The captain stated that he was unaware that there was 0.7 percent downslope on runway 30. The company provided a page from their airport directory which did not indicate a slope present for runway 30. The publisher of the airport directory provided a page valid at the time of the accident showing a 0.7 percent runway slope. Runway slope is used in the determination of runway performance for transport category aircraft such as the MU-300. The airplane operating manual states that MU-300 landing performance on ice or snow covered runways has not been determined. The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder with a remote cockpit erasure control. Readout of the cockpit voice recorder indicated a repetitive thumping noise consistent with manual erasure. No notices to airman pertaining to runway conditions were issued by the airport prior to the accident.

The pilot was flying a three leg IFR cross-country, and was on an ILS approach in IMC weather conditions for his final stop. Radar data indicated that the pilot had crossed the final approach fix inbound and was approximately 3 nm from the runway threshold when he transmitted that he had "lost an engine." Radar data indicates that the airplane turned left approximately 180 degrees, and radar contact was lost. A witness said "the airplane appeared to gain a slight amount of altitude before banking sharply to the left and nose diving into the ground just over the crest of the hill." Postimpact fuel consumption calculations suggest that there should have been 50 to 60 gallons of fuel onboard at the time of the accident. Displaced rubber O-ring seals on two Rulon seals in the left fuel valve and hydraulic pressure/deflection tests performed on an exemplar fuel valve suggest that the fuel selector valve was in the auxiliary position at the time of impact. The airplane's Owner's Manual states: "The fuel selector valve handles should be turned to LEFT MAIN for the left engine and RIGHT MAIN for the right engine, during takeoff, landing, and all emergency operations." No preimpact engine or airframe anomalies, which might have affected the airplane's performance, were identified.

After touchdown on runway 16 at Belo Horizonte-Tancredo Neves-Confins Airport, the three engine aircraft went out of control, veered off runway at high speed, lost its undercarriage and came to rest. All three crew members evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and fire, when it impacted the ground about 3.7 miles from the destination airport. The airplane had been cleared for an ILS approach to the airport. No anomalies were found during the on-scene examination of the airframe, engine or gyroscopic flight instruments that could be associated with a pre-existing condition. The minimum descent altitude for the approach is 243 feet above ground level. The inbound course for the instrument approach is 298 degrees magnetic. The radar data shows that the airplane headed in a northerly direction prior to commencing a left turn onto the inbound course of the instrument approach. The last radar return, was received prior to the airplane reaching the locator outer marker for the approach. Altitude returns show the airplane descending from a pressure altitude of 4,000 feet to a pressure altitude of 2,800 feet. The 2,800-foot return was the final return received. The wreckage path was distributed on a magnetic heading of approximately 145 degrees. The weather reporting station located at the destination airport recorded a 100 foot overcast ceiling with 1 statute mile of visibility about 20 minutes prior to the accident. The current weather was available to the pilot via the Automated Weather Observing System at the destination airport. No communications were received from the airplane after controllers authorized the pilot to change to the destination airport's advisory frequency.

A US Army Pilatus UV-20A collided in midair with a Cessna 182C during parachute jumping operations. The collision occurred about 4,800 feet mean sea level (msl) (2,800 feet above ground level (agl)) on the northeast side of runway 12 abeam the approach end. Both aircraft had made multiple flights taking jumpers aloft prior to the accident. The Pilatus departed runway 12 about 5 minutes prior to the Cessna's departure on the same runway. The drop zone was on the airport west of the intersections of runways 12 and 03. The Pilatus departed to the south and began a climb to the jump altitude of 5,500 feet msl, which was 3,500 feet agl. The pilot began the jump run on the southwest side of the runway paralleling it on a heading of about 300 degrees and when he was 1 to 2 minutes from the drop zone broadcast the intent to drop jumpers. The first jumper stated that it normally took him between 1 minute and 1 minute 15 seconds to reach the ground. As he neared the ground he observed everyone running toward the crash site. The Cessna pilot had four jumpers on board and said that his usual practice is to plan his climb so that the jump altitude (5,000 to 5,500 feet msl) is reached about the same time that the aircraft arrives over the jump zone. He departed runway 12 and made a wide sweeping right turn around the airport to set up for the jump. As the Pilatus neared the jump zone the Cessna was greater than 1,000 feet lower and west of the Pilatus climbing on a northerly heading. The Cessna pilot planned to make a right turn to parallel the left side of runway 12, and then turn right toward the drop zone. The jumpers in the Cessna looked out of the right side, and watched the Golden Knights exit their airplane. The jumpers said that their altimeters read 2,500 feet agl. The Cessna pilot turned to a heading of 120 degrees along the left side of the approach end of runway 12. He heard the Pilatus pilot say on Common Traffic Advisory Frequency that the Pilatus was downwind for runway 12. Based on witness observations, at this point the Pilatus was in a descending turn heading generally opposite to the downwind heading on the northeast side of the runway. Everyone in the Cessna heard a loud bang, the Cessna pilot felt something hit him in the head, and the airplane pitched down and lost several hundred feet of altitude. He noticed a blur of yellow and white out of his left window. The lead jumper decided that they should exit, and they all jumped. The Cessna pilot decided that the airplane was controllable, and landed safely. Both civilian and military witnesses on the ground heard the Pilatus pilot call downwind for runway 12. About 10 seconds later they heard intense transmissions over the loud speaker, and looked up and observed the Pilatus in a nearly vertical, nose down slow spiral. There was an open gash in the top of the Cessna's cabin on the left side near the wing root. The green lens and its gold attachment fitting from the Pilatus were on the floor behind the pilot's seat.

A group of five technicians/engineers of the company was preparing the aircraft to be transferred to a hangar for maintenance. After engine startup, the power was reduced to idle after someone inadvertently pulled out the circuit breaker. The aircraft jumped the chocks and started to roll. Since the engine's power was in idle, the brakes and the nosewheel steering system were inoperative. The crew elected to reduce power on the left engine but mistakenly increased the power on the right engine by 90%. This caused the aircraft to rotate 80° when control was lost. The airplane rolled through a perimeter wall, causing the nose gear to collapse. All five occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was on a scheduled courier flight from St. John=s, Newfoundland and Labrador, to Goose Bay. The aircraft touched down at 0456 Atlantic standard time and, during the landing roll on the snow-covered runway, the aircraft started to veer to the right. The captain's attempt to regain directional control by the use of full-left rudder and reverse on the engines was unsuccessful. The aircraft continued to track to the right of the centreline, departed the runway, and struck a hard-packed snow bank. There were no injuries to the two crew members. The aircraft was substantially damaged.

On final approach to Mozdok AFB, the crew encountered bad weather conditions with heavy snow falls when the aircraft struck the ground and crashed 450 metres short of runway. There were no casualties but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.