Anderson-Darlington Field

On final approach to Anderson-Darlington Field Airport, the pilot initiated a go-around procedure, probably because his altitude was too high. Control was lost and the single engine airplane crashed in an open field located three miles from the airfield, bursting into flames. All four occupants were killed.

The MU-300 on-demand passenger charter flight sustained substantial damage during a landing overrun on a snow/ice contaminated runway. The captain, who was also the company chief pilot and check airman, was the flying pilot, and the first officer was the non flying pilot. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. Area weather reporting stations reported the presence of freezing rain and snow for a time period beginning several hours before the accident. The captain did not obtain the destination airport weather observation until the flight was approximately 30 nautical miles from the airport. The flight received radar vectors for a instrument landing system approach to runway 30 (5,401 feet by 100 feet, grooved asphalt). The company's training manual states the MU-300's intermediate and final approach speeds as 140 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) and Vref, respectively. Vref was reported by the flight crew as 106 KIAS. During the approach, the tower controller (LC) gave the option for the flight to circle to land or continue straight in to runway 30. LC advised that the winds were from 050-070 degrees at 10 knots gusting to 20 knots, and runway braking action was reported as fair to poor by a snow plow. Radar data indicates that the airplane had a ground speed in excess of 200 knots between the final approach fix and runway threshold and a full-scale localizer deviation 5.5 nm from the localizer antenna. The company did not have stabilized approach criteria establishing when a missed approach or go-around is to be executed. The captain stated that he was unaware that there was 0.7 percent downslope on runway 30. The company provided a page from their airport directory which did not indicate a slope present for runway 30. The publisher of the airport directory provided a page valid at the time of the accident showing a 0.7 percent runway slope. Runway slope is used in the determination of runway performance for transport category aircraft such as the MU-300. The airplane operating manual states that MU-300 landing performance on ice or snow covered runways has not been determined. The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder with a remote cockpit erasure control. Readout of the cockpit voice recorder indicated a repetitive thumping noise consistent with manual erasure. No notices to airman pertaining to runway conditions were issued by the airport prior to the accident.

The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and fire, when it impacted the ground about 3.7 miles from the destination airport. The airplane had been cleared for an ILS approach to the airport. No anomalies were found during the on-scene examination of the airframe, engine or gyroscopic flight instruments that could be associated with a pre-existing condition. The minimum descent altitude for the approach is 243 feet above ground level. The inbound course for the instrument approach is 298 degrees magnetic. The radar data shows that the airplane headed in a northerly direction prior to commencing a left turn onto the inbound course of the instrument approach. The last radar return, was received prior to the airplane reaching the locator outer marker for the approach. Altitude returns show the airplane descending from a pressure altitude of 4,000 feet to a pressure altitude of 2,800 feet. The 2,800-foot return was the final return received. The wreckage path was distributed on a magnetic heading of approximately 145 degrees. The weather reporting station located at the destination airport recorded a 100 foot overcast ceiling with 1 statute mile of visibility about 20 minutes prior to the accident. The current weather was available to the pilot via the Automated Weather Observing System at the destination airport. No communications were received from the airplane after controllers authorized the pilot to change to the destination airport's advisory frequency.