Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

Collision with an elk during the takeoff roll. Factors include dark night VFR conditions.

Poor approach configuration on part of the crew who landed the aircraft 750 metres past the runway threshold, reducing the landing distance available. The following contributing factors were identified:
- The crew completed an unstabilized approach,
- Poor approach planning,
- Limited visibility due to the night and poor weather conditions,
- The braking action was low because the runway surface was wet,
- The crew failed to initiate a go-around procedure.

Failure of the left engine during initial climb for unknown reasons.

Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
1. The crew did not complete the before-landing checks, ignored aural warnings, and did not lower the landing gear, which resulted in a gear-up landing.
Findings as to risk:
1. The aircraft was not equipped with a GPWS, which could have prevented this accident.
2. The before-landing checklist in use did not reflect the AFM requirement that the speed brakes should be retracted prior to 50 feet.

The pilot's inadvertent flight into mountain wave weather conditions while IMC, resulting in a loss of aircraft control.

The pilot reported that he had completed a daily inspection of the aircraft earlier in the morning. That inspection included assessing the fuel quantity on board the aircraft and completing a fuel drain and water check. Both of these checks did not reveal any problem with the fuel. The pilot estimated that there was approximately 185 litres of fuel on board the aircraft, 90 litres in the right tank and 95 litres in the left tank. The aircraft had last been refuelled the day previously from drum stock. The aircraft had completed two flights since that refuelling with no problems being reported. The engineers that recovered the aircraft reported that there was approximately 30 litres of fuel in the left tank and approximately 100 litres of fuel in the right tank. The C207 aircraft has a fuel selector in the cockpit that allows the pilot to supply fuel to the engine from either the right tank or the left tank, but not from both tanks simultaneously. The pilot reported that he conducted the flight with the fuel selector switched to the left tank. He also reported that he did not move the selector during the flight and only moved it to the right tank as part of his trouble checks when the engine failed. The pilot reported that he did not complete flight or fuel plans for the flight, but operated on previous knowledge from other flights. A post occurrence analysis of the weather indicated that the winds at 7000 feet were as forecast. Post flight analysis of the flight revealed that the aircraft would have required 57 litres of fuel to complete the flight, which included allowances for taxi and climb. The engine was sent by the owner to an engine overhaul facility for testing. The ATSB did not attend the testing of the engine. The engine was fitted to the test cell in the condition as removed from the aircraft. The engine was started and test run in accordance with the engine manufacturer's overhaul manual. The engine ran normally and all temperature and pressure limits were within normal ranges. The investigation was unable to determine why the engine failed to operate normally in the latter stages of the flight.

Engine failure for unknown reasons.

The initial cause of the accident is the crew’s acceptance of the approach clearance although they were not prepared to it, namely the absence of preparation of a go-around. It led the crew to perform a series of improvised actions that ended in the prohibited override of the primary stop on the power levers and leading to an irreversible loss of control.
Contributory factors can be listed as follows:
1. A lack of preparation for the landing, initiated by unnecessary occupations resulting from an obtained RVR value, which was below their company approved minima, created a disorganisation in the cockpit, leading to uncoordinated actions by each crewmember.
2. Some procedures as laid down in the operations manual were not followed at some stage of the approach. All this did not directly cause the accident, but created an environment whereby individual actions were initiated to make a landing possible.
3. Routine and the will to arrive at destination may have put the crew in a psychological state of mind, which could have been the origin of the deviations from standard procedures as noticed.
4. The priority in the approach sequence given to the crew by ATC, which facilitated the traffic handling for the controller who was not aware of the operational consequences.
5. The low reliability of the installed secondary stop safety device that was favoured by the non-application of service bulletin ABSC SB Fo50-32-4. Also the mode of distribution of the safety information (Fokker Aircraft B.V. – Service letter 137) to the operator as well as the operator’s internal distribution to the crews, that did not guarantee that the crews were aware of the potential loss of secondary stop on propeller pitch control.
6. Latent shortcomings in the Authority and the organisational structure of the operator, in combination with poor application of SOPs by the crew.

Poor flight preparation on part of the crew who failed to follow the pre taxi and the pre takeoff checklist. The aircraft was unable to gain sufficient speed and height after takeoff because the propeller lever was not in the correct position.