IAI 1124 Westwind

The aircraft departed Goiânia-Nacional de Aviação Airport Runway 14 at 1012LT on a local test flight with three crew members on board. After reaching FL340, several tests were completed then the crew made a high speed descent before landing on runway 32. After touchdown and a course of about 700 metres, the airplane veered off runway to the right, collided with a concrete wall, lost its nose gear and came to rest near the perimeter fence. All three occupants evacuated safely.

On the 5th July, 2021 at approximately 3:45PM, EDT (1945UTC), an Israeli Aircraft Industries, (IAI) Westwind 1124A aircraft, United States registration N790JR, crashed a short distance from the end of runway 32 at the Treasure Cay International Airport (MYAT), Treasure Cay, Abaco, Bahamas. The aircraft plowed through airport lighting equipment at the end of the runway, hitting and breaking several trees along its path. A trail of aviation fuel and pieces of the aircraft and avionics equipment from the flight deck, were left behind before the aircraft finally hit a small mound (hill), spinning, hitting several additional trees, breaking apart and bursting into flames. The aircraft came to rest at coordinates 26°45’21.50”N, 77°24’7.26”W, approximately 2,000 feet (.33 miles) from the end of runway 32. As this airport did not have a fire truck or crash and rescue personnel stationed on site, assistance with fire services were requested from the town. Two firetrucks from the township responded, however, due to the location of the crash, and no access road available, the trucks were unable to reach the crash site and assist in extinguishing the blaze. The fire continued unimpeded, dampened only by the intermittent downpour of rain, which did not aid in extinguishing the blaze, but rather, only limited the spread of the fire to surrounding bushes. The raging fire totally destroyed the aircraft and much of the control surfaces and components in the direct area of the blaze. On July 6, a team of investigators from the AAIA and CAA-B were dispatched to the scene. Upon arrival of the investigation team, surrounding brush and trees, as well as some parts and components of the aircraft were still burning. Initial assessments pointed to a possible failure of the aircraft to climb and perform as required. Runway 14/32 is 7,001 x 150 feet with an asphalt surface and based on the distance the aircraft traveled from the end of the runway to its final resting place, the signature marking on trees and airport lighting fixtures struck by the aircraft, in addition to the ground scars, along with pieces of the aircraft beyond the runway, up to the final resting place of the aircraft, it appears the aircraft was approximately 2 to 5 feet about the surface and not developing any lift or climb performance, while developing full power over the ground, striking trees and brush along its path. Investigations uncovered the private flight with a crew of two (2), proposed a flight time departure of 2:10PM EDT from the Treasure Cay International Airport (MYAT), with a planned destination of Nassau, Bahamas (MYNN) and an arrival time of 2:33PM EDT, according to flight plan retrieved from Flightaware.com. The flight plan did not specify whether the flight would be operated under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) or Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). According to witness statements taken at Treasure Cay, witnesses recalled two pilots entering the ramp after 3 pm. Witnesses also stated that one of the persons onboard advised customs that they will be departing for Marsh Harbor for fuel in the aircraft (N790JR).

An IAI Westwind II 1124A type of aircraft with registry number RP-C5880, was destroyed following a runway excursion while taking-off at RWY 06, Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), Manila Philippines. All eight (8) occupants (six (6) Filipino, one (1) Canadian and one (1) American citizen are fatally injured. The aircraft is being operated by Lionair Inc. and was bound for Haneda, Japan on a medical evacuation flight. While the aircraft was on take-off roll before reaching taxiway R2, sparks were noted at the runway, it continued until the aircraft came to complete stop and engulfed by fire. Chunks of rubber and metal debris were present on the runway. Scrape marks coming from the right hand (RH) wheel hub were also visible. Tire marks followed by scrape marks on the runway coming from the LH tire and wheel hub were also seen after taxiway H1 intersection. Large portion of the remaining LH tire was recovered from the grassy portion near taxiway H1. After exiting from the asphalted portion of runway safety area, the aircraft initially run over two (2) runway edge lights then impacted into a concrete electric junction box and came to a complete stop at the runway secondary fence. The aircraft settled almost 172 meters away from the end of RWY 06, in an upright position at 14°30'53.50"N; 121°1'48.48"E and heading of 170 degrees. The flight was on Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) condition. A Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) of NAIA RWY 06/24 closure for aircraft operation was declared at 2000H and opened for operation at 0420H, March 30, 2020.

The two commercial pilots were conducting a personal, cross-country flight. A video surveillance camera at the airport captured their airplane’s approach. Review of the video revealed that, as the airplane approached the approach end of the landing runway, it began to climb, rolled left, became inverted, and then impacted terrain. The left thrust reverser (T/R) was found open and unlatched at the accident site. An asymmetric deployment of the left T/R would have resulted in a left roll/yaw. The lack of an airworthy and operable cockpit voice recorder, which was required for the flight, precluded identifying which pilot was performing pilot flying duties, as well as other crew actions and background noises, that would have facilitated the investigation. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that it was not equipped, nor was required to be equipped, with a nose landing gear (NLG) ground contact switch intended to preclude inflight operation of the thrust reverser (T/R). The left T/R door was found unlatched and open, and the right T/R door was found closed and latched. Further, electrical testing of the T/R left and right stow microswitches within the cockpit throttle quadrant revealed that the left stow microswitch did not operate within design specifications. Disassembly of the left and right stow microswitches revealed evidence of arc wear due to aging. Based on this information, it is likely that the airplane’s lack of an NLG ground contact switch and the age-related failure of the stow microswitches resulted in an asymmetric T/R deployment while on approach and a subsequent loss of airplane control. Also, there were additional T/R system components that were found to unairworthy that would have affected the control of the T/R system. Operational testing of the T/R system could not be performed due to the damage the airplane incurred during the accident. Toxicology testing results of the pilot’s specimens indicated that the pilot had taken diazepam, which is considered impairing at certain levels. However, the detected amounts of both diazepam and its metabolite nordiazepam were at subtherapeutic levels, and given the long half-life of these compounds, it appears that the medication was taken several days before the accident; therefore, it is unlikely that the pilot was impaired at the time of the accident and thus that his use of diazepam was a not factor in the accident.

A pilot proficiency examiner (PPE) was using the airplane to conduct a pilot-in-command (PIC) proficiency check for two company pilots. Before the accident flight, one of the two company pilots on board received a PIC proficiency check, which terminated with a full-stop landing and reverse thrust application; no discrepancies with either thrust reverser were discussed by either flight crewmember. The pilot being examined then left the cockpit, and the accident pilot positioned himself in the left front seat while the PPE remained in the right front seat. The flight crew then taxied to the approach end of the runway to begin another flight. Data from the enhanced ground proximity system (EGPWS) revealed that, the flight began the takeoff roll with the flaps retracted, the thrust reversers armed, and both engines stabilized at 96 percent N2. About 2 seconds later, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the "V1" call while on the airplane was on the runway; acoustic analysis indicated that the N2 speed of one engine, likely the right, decreased; the N2 speed of the other engine remained constant. This decrease in N2 speed was consistent with the PPE retarding right engine thrust to flight idle with the intent of simulating an engine failure. The takeoff continued, and, while the airplane was in a wings-level climb at an airspeed of 148 knots about 18 ft radar altitude, the CVR recorded the pilot command that the landing gear be retracted. The landing gear remained extended, and, about 1 second after the command to retract the landing gear, or about 3 seconds after becoming airborne, while about 33 ft above the runway and at the highest recorded airspeed of 149 knots, the CVR recorded the beginning of a rattling sound, which was consistent with the deployment of the right thrust reverser, and it continued to the end of the recording. About 1.5 seconds after the rattling sound began, the CVR recorded the PPE asking, "…what happened," which indicates that the deployment was likely not annunciated in the cockpit. The right engine N2 speed continued to gradually decrease, and the airplane rolled slightly left, back to a wings-level position. The airplane continued climbing with the landing gear extended as pitch changes continued to occur. During this time, the flight crew exchanged comments about their lack of understanding about what was occurring. While flying 10 knots above V2 speed with the left engine N2 speed remaining steady and the right engine N2 speed decreasing at a slightly greater rate than previously, the airplane began a right roll with a corresponding steady decrease in airspeed from about 144 knots. About 9 seconds after the original call to retract the landing gear, the CVR recorded the PPE requesting that the landing gear be retracted, which occurred 1 second later. The airplane then continued in the right turn with the airspeed steadily decreasing, and about 11 seconds after the PPE asked "…what happened", the EGPWS sounded a bank angle alert. At that time, the airplane was in a right roll of about 30 degrees, and the airspeed was about 132 knots. The right roll continued to a maximum value of about 39 degrees, which was the last valid bank angle value recorded. The airplane impacted the ground off the right side of the runway in a nose- and right-winglow attitude. The landing gear and flaps were retracted, and there was no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the flight controls for roll, pitch, and yaw; nor was there any evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction of either engine. A definitive reason for the deployment of the right thrust reverser could not be determined. No previous instances of inadvertent in-flight thrust reverser deployment were documented by the operator of the accident airplane or by the airframe manufacturer for the accident airplane make and model. Certification flight testing of an airplane with the same thrust reverser system determined that the airplane remained controllable with the right thrust reverser deployed and throttle retarder system functioning. The flight testing also included application of a momentary, peak burst of right engine thrust, again with no controllability issues noted. It was also noted that with the installed throttle retarder system, in the event of inadvertent thrust reverser deployment, that the engine's thrust should have been reduced to idle within 4 to 8 seconds. Acoustic analysis of the accident flight indicated that the lowest recorded N2 rpm value was about 84 percent and that the reduction in rpm occurred over a period of about 8.5 seconds, after the right thrust reverser deployed. No determination could be made as to why the throttle retarder system did not reduce the right engine thrust to flight idle as designed. Additionally, no determination could be made as to why the flight crew was not able to maintain directional control of the airplane following deployment of the right thrust reverser. Although the PPE had severe coronary artery disease, which placed him at risk for an acute coronary event that would cause symptoms like chest pain, shortness of breath, or sudden unconsciousness, the CVR recorded no evidence of impairment. Neither the heart disease nor the medications he was taking to treat it would have impaired his judgement or physical functioning. Therefore, it is unlikely any medical condition or substance contributed to the PPE's actions. Additionally, there was no evidence that any medical condition would have impaired judgement or physical functioning of the pilot being examined.