Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The aircraft, a Fokker F27-500, registration G-ECAT, departed Dublin at 16.05 hrs (local time) for the 4th leg of a Public Service Obligation (PSO) rotation between Sligo in the North West of Ireland and Dublin. The aircraft had earlier departed Sligo for Dublin at 10.00 hrs, returned to Sligo at 12.30 hrs and departed once again for Dublin on time at 14.30 hrs. The Operator held the PSO contract to provide regular air service between Sligo and Dublin and also between Donegal (EIDL) and Dublin. The accident flight was delayed for 10 minutes as the flight to Donegal had been cancelled due to strong crosswinds at Donegal and arrangements had been made to fly these passengers to Sligo and bus them onwards to Donegal. The en-route segment of this flight was uneventful. At 16.22 hrs G-ECAT called Sligo on Tower frequency 122.10 Mhz and requested the latest weather conditions for Sligo. The Tower Controller transmitted the 16.30 hrs actual for Sligo, as presented at Section 1.7 Meteorological Information. At 16.50 hrs, the aircraft was handed over from Shannon Control to Sligo Tower, descending to 3,500 ft to the SLG beacon for NDB/DME approach to RWY 11. Sligo Tower then transmitted the Donegal weather, as presented at Section 1.7 Meteorological Information. At 16.53 hrs, the aircraft called overhead the SLG beacon and was cleared by Sligo Tower for the approach. At 17.00 hrs, G-ECAT reported at the Final Approach Fix (FAF) and was cleared to land by the Tower, giving a wind of 120 degrees 15 kt, gusting 29 kt. At 17.01 hrs, just prior to landing, G-ECAT was given a wind check of 120 degrees 15 kt, gusting 31 kt. At 17.02 hrs the aircraft made an initial touchdown at approximately the mid-point of the runway and appeared to a number of witnesses not to immediately decelerate. The aircraft continued down the runway until it departed the paved surface at the right hand side of the threshold of RWY 29. On seeing the aircraft pass the apron taxiway/runway intersection at an abnormally high speed, the Tower Controller immediately sounded the crash alarm. The aircraft continued on through a prepared run-off area at the end of the runway, for a further 50 metres, before coming to rest (17.02:30 hrs) with the main wheels embedded in boulders that formed part of an embankment leading down to the sea. The main wheels were approximately one metre short of where the boulders fall away into the sea. The nose wheel, cockpit and forward section of the fuselage cleared the top of the boulder embankment and the aircraft tilted approximately 15-20 degrees nose down onto the outgoing tide. Full tide was due at 04.00 hrs the following day at a depth of 3.9 meters. The Tower Controller immediately contacted the Shannon ATC Station Manager advising of the runway excursion and called 999 to request Gardaí, Fire Brigade and Ambulance assistance.

The approach and landing at Monterrey-General Mariano Escobido Airport were completed by night and poor weather conditions with limited visibility due to heavy rain falls and mist. At the time of the accident, runway 29 threshold was displaced by 900 metres, reducing the landing distance available from 3,000 metres to 2,100 metres due to construction works. Following a wrong approach configuration, the aircraft landed too far down a wet runway and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest 60 metres further with the right partially torn off. 11 passengers were injured while 79 other occupants were unhurt.

The pilot of the twin turbo-prop airplane lost control of the aircraft during the initial takeoff climb phase while in instrument meteorological conditions. An instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the planned 169-nautical mile cross-country flight. The aircraft impacted terrain approximately 1.7 miles northwest of the departure airport. The 2,893-hour instrument rated private pilot, who had accumulated over 765 flight hours in the same make and model, had been cleared to his destination "as filed," and told to maintain 7,000 feet, and to expect 17,000 feet in 10 minutes. After becoming airborne, the flight was cleared for a left turn. The tower controller then cleared the flight to contact air route traffic control center. The pilot did not acknowledge the frequency change; however, he did establish radio contact with center on 133.1, and reported "climbing through 4,900 feet for assigned 7,000." The weather reported at the time of flight was winds from 010 degrees at 15 knots with 700 feet overcast and 3 miles visibility in mist. The radar controller observed the aircraft climbing through 5,500 feet and subsequently observed the airplane starting a descent. No distress calls were received from the flight. Signatures at the initial point of impact were consistent with a nose-low ground impact in a slight right bank. A post-impact fire consumed the airplane. No discrepancies or anomalies were found at the accident site that could have prevented normal operation of the airplane.

On October 25, 2002, about 1022 central daylight time, a Raytheon (Beechcraft) King Air A100, N41BE, operated by Aviation Charter, Inc., crashed while the flight crew was attempting to execute the VOR approach to runway 27 at Eveleth-Virginia Municipal Airport, Eveleth, Minnesota. The crash site was located about 1.8 nautical miles southeast of the approach end of runway 27. The two pilots and six passengers were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as an on-demand passenger charter flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Among those on board were Paul Wellstone, Senator of Minnesota, his wife Sheila and one of his three children Marcia.

The airplane was equipped with two experimental Engine AIR Power Systems TSIVD-427, 500-horsepower, liquid-cooled, turbocharged, V8 engines. During previous flights, the right engine lost boost then overboosted intermittently, and attempted repairs were unsuccessful. The pilot elected to fly the airplane to its home base for further troubleshooting. During cruise flight, the pilot reported an engine was surging, declared an emergency, and received vectors toward the airport. The airplane collided into a field beside the airport runway and caught fire. The airplane had a total of 8 to 10 hours of flight time at the time of the accident. Records revealed that two days after the airplane's first test flight, the pilot flew the airplane from Melbourne, Florida, to an airport 336 nm miles away, then flew it to Canada to display it at a fly-in.The FAA operating limitations for the airplane restricted its operation to flight test only, which was proposed to consist of 100 flight hours, since the installation of the modified engines. No single-engine performance data was available for this airplane. Examination of the engines and accessories revealed extensive fire and impact damage. Continuity of the crankshaft, valves, rods, and pistons was established for the right engine by manually rotating the propeller reduction control unit.

The aircraft departed Moscow-Domodedovo Airport on a positioning flight Bishkek-Manas Airport where cargo should be loaded. The water ballast tanks were not filled, causing the centre of gravity to be outside the allowed limits. After passing the outer marker on approach to runway 26, a 15-second period of oscillations started with changes in bank angle and heading (between 245° and 255°). The plane passed over the runway threshold at a height of 30 metres and at a speed of 293 km/h. At this point the altitude should have been 15 metres. At a height of 20 metres, at a speed of 297 km/h, the thrust reversers of the n°1 and 4 engines were deployed. This was contrary to regulations, which stipulate that thrust reversers may only be deployed at the leveling-off altitude of 5-8 metres. The nose then rose to a 7° pitch angle. This was caused by the activation of the thrust reversers and the centre of gravity which was too far aft. The pitch-up could not be countered by a 13° nose down elevator application. The plane finally touched down on the maingear wheels 1395 metres down the 4,200 metres long runway. The flight engineer, without telling the pilot in command, shut down the n°2 and 3 engines. With an elevator-down deflection of 10-11° and the stabilizer at -3,3° the crew were still not able to get the nose gear on the ground. After retracting the thrust reversers and with the elevator deflected in a 21° nose-down attitude, the nose pitched down from +7° to -2,5° in 2-3 seconds. The stabilizer was then trimmed from -3,3° to +9° which caused the pitch angle to increase again. The Ilyushin ran off the left side of the runway 3,001 metres past the runway threshold. The plane continued until colliding with a concrete obstruction. The aircraft caught fire and burned out almost completely.

The airplane crashed into rising terrain after departure from an uncontrolled public airport. The runway used by the pilot is 4,600 feet long and has a 1.8 percent upward gradient. The density altitude was 4,937 feet msl, and a slight quartering tailwind existed at the time. The pilot held in position, powered up the engines, and started his departure. The airplane was observed using most of the runway length before rotation and then it assumed a higher than normal pitch attitude in the initial climb. Witnesses watched the airplane turn left following the route of a canyon and into rising terrain. The reciprocal runway departs towards decreasing elevations. In the area of the crash, two witnesses reported the airplane was at a low altitude, nose high, and wallowing just before it descended into a drainage area 0.69 miles from the runway. Post accident examination of the engines revealed worn camshaft lobes and tappets, which would negatively affect the ability of the engines to produce full rated power. One engine exhibited severe rust on the entire crankshaft. The accident site was located in a canyon, and the wreckage and ground scars was confined to an area about the diameter of the wing span. Major portions of the airframe and most of the engine accessories were consumed by a post accident fire. Examination of the wreckage established that all major components of the airframe and powerplants were at the site.

Following maintenance at Memphis Airport facilities, a crew of two technicians was ferrying the aircraft from the hangar to the main terminal. While approaching the C2 gate, the aircraft could not be stopped in time and collided with the jet bridge. Both occupants escaped with minor injuries while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot/owner initiated a VFR approach and landing in a Cessna 525A, to a 3,009-foot long runway with a tailwind of about 7 knots. The touchdown was 642 feet past the approach end of the runway. Vref was calculated to be 108 kts; however, data from the EGPWS showed the ground speed was about 137 kts, 9 seconds before touchdown, and at touchdown, the speed was estimated to be about 130 kts. After touchdown, the pilot selected ground flaps, which moved the flaps from 35 degrees to 60 degrees, the spoilers auto-deployed, and the speed brakes were extended. The pilot said that after applying the brakes, he felt the brakes pedals pulsing, and did not think the airplane was slowing. He released the brakes for a few seconds and then reapplied them. Again, he felt the pulsing in the pedals, but the airplane was not slowing as he expected. He released the brakes, reset the flaps to takeoff, and applied power to abort the landing when he was about halfway down the runway. The airplane departed the end of the runway and traveled for about 300 feet. Skid marks revealed the initial touchdown was most like made with brakes applied, and no locked wheel crossover protection. Additional skid marks revealed the airplane became airborne after touchdown, and in the next 750 ft, touched down 3 more times, each subsequent touchdown occurring without the full weight of the airplane on the wheels. Tire marks on the last half of the runway were consistent with brakes applied and anti-skid operative. Using the approved flight manual standards, the airplane would have required 3,155 feet to stop. This was predicated on crossing the threshold at 50 feet, at Vref, and included a ground roll of 1,895 feet. However, the pilot touched down at 642 feet from the threshold, which left sufficient runway for stopping. Using the pilot's touchdown point of 642 feet, the airplane was capable of stopping on the runway with a Vref as high as 120 kts. The approach was unstabilized with 4 aural warnings, including 2 sink rate warnings on final approach, the last of which occurred with a descent rate of over 1,700 fpm down, 19 seconds prior to touchdown, and about 400 feet above the ground. The last airborne GPS position was about 2,000 ft from runway touchdown. This would have required a flight path angle of about 3.8 degrees to achieve the reported touchdown position.

The approach to Santa Cruz do Sul Airport was completed in poor weather conditions with rain falls. After touchdown on runway 26, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and eventually collided with an embankment located 50 metres further and came to rest. The captain was seriously injured and the copilot was killed, all three other occupants escaped with minor injuries. The aircraft was destroyed. Runway 26 at Santa Cruz do Sul is 4,000 feet and it was determined that the aircraft landed some 400 metres past the runway threshold at an excessive speed.