Memphis

On October 4, 2023, about 23:47 eastern daylight time, Federal Express (FedEx) flight 1376, a Boeing 757-236, experienced a failure with its left hydraulic system shortly after takeoff from Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport-Lovell Field (CHA), Chattanooga, Tennessee. The airplane turned back to CHA, and, while preparing to land, the landing gear failed to extend normally. The landing gear also failed to extend using the alternate extend system. The flight crew declared an emergency and the airplane sustained substantial damage during the emergency landing. The two flight crew members and the jump seat occupant aboard the airplane were not injured. The flight was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a non-scheduled domestic cargo flight from CHA to Memphis International Airport (MEM), Memphis, Tennessee. The flight crew reported that the airplane had no maintenance issues before the flight and that the push-back, engine start, and taxi were all uneventful. The captain was the pilot flying, and the first officer was the pilot monitoring. Digital flight data recorder (DFDR) data showed that the airplane departed CHA about 22:24. According to the flight crew, after rotation and confirmation of a positive rate of climb, the first officer (FO) raised the landing gear control lever to retract the landing gear. DFDR data showed that both the main gear and the nose gear retracted to their up and locked position. About 1 minute later, the flap handle was positioned in its up (flaps 0) position. The flight crew reported that immediately thereafter, a “TE FLAP DISAGREE” message was displayed on the engine indication and crew alerting system (EICAS), along with an associated master caution light, a “TRAILING EDGE” discrete light, and the aural alert caution beeper. Per the captain's direction, the FO began accomplishing the “TE FLAP DISAGREE” checklist in the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). The FO was able to retract the flaps to their up position via alternate means in accordance with the appropriate checklist contained in the QRH. While completing this checklist, the flight crew received an “L HYD SYS PRESS” EICAS message at 22:24:33 at an altitude of about 1978 ft above ground level (agl). The status page showed that the left hydraulic system fluid quantity was near zero and that the system was not pressurized. The captain directed the FO to run the QRH checklist for “L HYD SYS PRESS”. The flight crew decided to return to CHA. Upon positioning the landing gear control lever to its down position to extend the gear for landing, the flight crew received a gear unsafe indication via illumination of the amber “GEAR” disagreement light and a “GEAR DISAGREE” message on the EICAS. Also, the lack of illumination of the three green landing gear indicator lights indicated that the gear was not down and locked. The FO then conducted the “Alternate Gear Extension” procedure embedded in the L HYD SYS PRESS checklist, which was unsuccessful. After multiple attempts to lower the landing gear, the flight crew declared an emergency. The flight crewmembers asked Chattanooga approach if they could conduct a low approach over the runway so that tower personnel could visually confirm the position of the landing gear. The airplane descended to about 150 ft agl and flew the length of the runway, which was followed by a go-around. Approach control relayed confirmation that the landing gear was not in the down position. Subsequently, the flight crew completed the deferred items on the “GEAR UNSAFE” QRH checklist and the airplane was cleared to land on runway 20. The flight crewmembers reported that during the initial touchdown, the airplane bounced slightly but they were able to maintain directional control and the runway’s centerline. The flight crew was unable to stop the airplane and it slid off the departure end of runway 20 and impacted localizer antennas before coming to rest about 830 ft beyond the end of the runway. After the airplane came to a complete stop, the flight crew performed the “EVACUATION” checklist, and the jump seat occupant attempted to open the left-hand door (L1). The door rotated halfway open and then became bound, and the slide did not deploy. The jump seat occupant then attempted to open the right-hand door (R1), but it became lodged on the packing of the raft/slide. The jump seat occupant subsequently forced the door open, and the slide deployed. The flight crew and the jump seat occupant then egressed the airplane via the R1 door/slide. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the left main landing gear door actuator retract port hose was leaking hydraulic fluid. The hose was removed and retained by the NTSB for further investigation. The examination also found a discontinuity in the wiring of the landing gear alternate extension system. The section of that wire was retained for further examination. The following NTSB specialists were assigned to investigate the accident: systems, survival factors, cockpit voice recorder (CVR), and DFDR. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Express, The Boeing Company, Safran Evacuation Systems, and the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) are parties to the investigation. The DFDR and the CVR were removed from the airplane and shipped to the NTSB’s Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC, for download of the data. The DFDR was downloaded, and a review of the preliminary data indicates that the left hydraulic system began losing pressure shortly after takeoff.

Following an uneventful flight from Memphis at FL260, the pilot initiated the descent to Yoakum Airport, Texas. On final approach to runway 31, the single engine airplane went out of control and crashed in an open field located about one mile southeast of the airfield. A passenger was able to get out from the cabin and was slightly injured while all four other occupants were killed.

According to the pilot, during the landing roll, the airplane "began to drift sharply to the left." The pilot reported that, although there were no wind gusts reported, he felt as though a wind gust was pushing the airplane to the left. He attempted to maintain directional control with rudder pedal application, and he applied full right aileron. The airplane continued to drift to the left, and the pilot attempted to abort the landing by applying full throttle and 25° of flaps. He reported that the airplane continued to drift to the left and that he was not able to achieve sufficient airspeed to rotate. The airplane exited the runway, the pilot pulled the throttle to idle, and he applied the brakes to avoid obstacles. However, the airplane impacted the runway and taxiway signage and came to rest in a drainage culvert. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings. The published METAR for the accident airport reported that the wind was from 290° at 15 knots, and wind gusts exceeded 22 knots 1 hour before and 1 hour after the accident. The pilot landed the airplane on runway 20. The maximum demonstrated crosswind component for the airplane was 17 knots. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

On October 28, 2016, about 1751 eastern daylight time, FedEx Express (FedEx) flight 910, a McDonnell Douglas MD-10-10F, N370FE, experienced a left main landing gear (MLG) collapse after landing on runway 10L at Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport (KFLL), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and the left wing subsequently caught fire. The airplane came to rest off the left side of the runway. The two flight crew members evacuated the airplane. The captain reported a minor cut and abrasions from the evacuation, and the first officer was not injured. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The cargo flight was operating on an instrument flight plan under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 121 and originated at Memphis International Airport (KMEM), Memphis, Tennessee. The first officer was the pilot flying, and the captain was the pilot monitoring. Both flight crew members stated in post accident interviews that the departure from MEM and the en route portion of the flight were normal. About 1745, air traffic control (ATC) cleared the flight for final approach to the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 10L at KFLL. Recorder data indicate that the first officer set the flaps at 35º about 1746 when the airplane was 3,000 ft above ground level (agl). The first officer disconnected the autopilot about 1749 when the airplane was 1,000 ft agl. Both flight crew members reported that the approach was stable at 500 ft agl. At 200 ft agl, the first officer began making airspeed corrections to compensate for the crosswind. About 1750, the first officer disconnected the autothrottles, as briefed, when the airplane was at 100 ft agl. At 50 ft agl, the first officer initiated the flare. The left MLG touched down about 1750:31 in the touchdown zone and left of the runway centerline. The first officer deployed the spoilers at 1750:34, and the nose gear touched down 3 seconds later. The thrust reversers were deployed at 1750:40. According to cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data, the captain instructed the first officer to begin braking about 1750:39 (the airplane was not equipped with autobrakes). FDR data indicate an increase in brake pedal position angle and increase in longitudinal deceleration (indicating braking) about 1750:41. In post accident interviews, the flight crew members reported hearing a "bang" as the first officer applied the brakes, and the airplane yawed to the left. About this time, the CVR recorded the sound of multiple thuds, consistent with the sound of a gear collapse. About 1750:48, the captain stated, "I have the airplane," and the first officer replied, "you got the airplane." The captain applied full right rudder without effect while the first officer continued braking. About 1750:53, the captain instructed the first officer to call and inform the tower about the emergency. An airport video of the landing showed that the No. 1 engine was initially supporting the airplane after the left MLG collapse when a fire began near the left-wing tip. The airplane eventually stopped off the left side of runway 10L, about 30º to 40º off the runway heading. About 1751, the flight crew began executing the evacuation checklist. The pilots reported that, as they were about to evacuate, they heard an explosion. The airport video showed a fireball erupted at the No. 1 engine. The captain attempted to discharge a fire bottle in the No. 1 engine, but it didn't discharge. They evacuated the airplane through the right cockpit window.

The commercial pilot reported that he had completed several uneventful flights in the multiengine airplane earlier on the day of the accident. He subsequently took off for a return flight to his home airport. He reported that the en route portion of the flight was uneventful, and on final approach for the traffic pattern for landing, all instruments were indicating normal. He stated that the airplane landed "firmly," that the right wing dropped, and that the right engine propeller blades contacted the runway. He pulled back on the yoke, and the airplane became airborne again momentarily before settling back on the runway. The right main landing gear (MLG) collapsed, and the airplane then veered off the right side of the runway and struck a runway sign and weather antenna. Witness reports corroborated the pilot's report. Postaccident examination revealed that the right MLG actuator was fractured and that the landing gear was inside the wheel well, which likely resulted from the hard landing. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. Based on the pilot and witness statements and the wreckage examination, it is likely that the pilot improperly flared the airplane, which resulted in the hard landing and the collapse of the MLG.

On June 25, 2014, about 0750 central daylight time, a Raytheon Aircraft Company C90A, N800MK, was substantially damaged following a runway excursion during an attempted go-around at Houston, Mississippi (M44). The commercial-rated pilot, co-pilot, and two passengers were not injured, while one passenger received minor injuries. The airplane was
operated by BECS, LLC under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. Day, visual meteorological conditions prevailed for corporate flight that originated at Memphis, Tennessee (MEM). According to the pilot, who was seated in the left, cockpit seat, he was at the controls and was performing a visual approach to runway 21. Just prior to touchdown, while at 90 knots and with approach flaps extended, the right wing "rose severely and tried to put the airplane into a severe left bank." He recalled that the co-pilot called "wind shear" and "go around." As he applied power, the airplane rolled left again, so he retarded the throttles and allowed the airplane to settle into the grass on the left side of runway 21. The airplane struck a ditch, spun around, and came to rest in the grass, upright. A post-crash fire ensued in the left engine area. The pilot and passengers exited the airplane using the main entry door. The pilot reported no mechanical anomalies with the airplane prior to the accident. The co-pilot reported the following. As they turned onto final, he noticed that the wind "picked up" a little by the wind sock. The final approach was stable, and as the pilot began to flare, he noticed the vertical speed indicator "pegged out." The airplane encountered an unexpected wind shear just above the runway. He called out for a go around. The pilot was doing everything he could to maintain control of the airplane. It was a "jarring" effect when they hit the shear. It felt like the wind was trying to lift the tail and cartwheel them over. He felt that the pilot did a good job of keeping the airplane from flipping over. In his 30,000-plus hours flying airplanes, he has never experienced anything quite like what they experienced with this shear. He has instructed on the King Air and does not feel that the pilot could have done anything different to avoid the accident.

The approach and landing were stabilized and within specified limits. Recorded data indicates that the loads experienced by the landing gear at touchdown were within the certification limits for an intact landing gear without any pre-existing cracks or flaws. The weather and runway conditions did not affect the landing. The application of braking by the accident crew, and the overall effect of the carbon brake modification did not initiate or contribute to the landing gear fracture. Post-accident modifications to the MD-10 carbon brake system were implemented due to investigative findings for the purposes of braking effectiveness and reliability. Post accident emergency response by the flight crew and ARFF was timely and correct. The left main landing gear (LMLG) outer cylinder on the accident airplane had been operated about 8 ½ years since its last overhaul where stray nickel plating likely was introduced in the air filler valve hole. Nickel plating is a permissible procedure for maintaining the tolerances of the inner diameter of the outer gear cylinder, however the plating is not allowed in the air filler valve bore hole. Literature and test research revealed that a nickel plating thickness of 0.008" results in a stress factor increase of 35%. At some point in the life of the LMLG, there was a load event that compressively yielded the material in the vicinity of the air filler valve hole causing a residual tension stress. During normal operations the stress levels in the air filler valve hole were likely within the design envelope, but the addition of the residual stress and the stress intensity factor due to the nickel increased these to a level high enough to initiate and grow a fatigue crack on each side of the air filler valve hole. The stresses at the air filler valve hole were examined via development of a Finite Element Model (FEM) which was validated with data gathered from an instrumented in-service FedEx MD-10 airplane. The in-service data and FEM showed that for all of the conditions, the stress in the air filler valve hole was much higher than anticipated in the design of the outer cylinder. Fatigue analysis of the in service findings and using the nickel plating factor resulted in a significantly reduced fatigue life of the gear cylinder compared with the certification limits. During the accident landing the spring back loads on the LMLG were sufficient to produce a stress level in the air filler valve hole that exceeded the residual strength of the material with the fatigue cracks present.

On August 13, 2004, about 0049 eastern daylight time, Air Tahoma, Inc., flight 185, a Convair 580, N586P, crashed about 1 mile south of Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport (CVG), Covington, Kentucky, while on approach to runway 36R. The first officer was killed, and the captain received minor injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 as a cargo flight for DHL Express from Memphis International Airport (MEM), Memphis, Tennessee, to CVG. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The flight crew was scheduled to fly the accident airplane on a roundtrip sequence from MEM to CVG. Flight 185 departed MEM about 2329. The first officer was the flying pilot, and the captain performed the non flying pilot duties. During postaccident interviews, the captain stated that the takeoff and climb portions of the flight were normal. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript, at 0017:49, the captain stated that he was just going to “balance out the fuel here.” The first officer acknowledged. From 0026:30 to 0027:08, the CVR recorded the captain discussing the airplane’s weight and balance with the first officer. Specifically, the captain stated, “couldn’t figure out why on the landing I was out and I was okay on the takeoff.” The captain added, “the momentum is one six six seven and I…put one zero six seven and I couldn’t work it.” He then stated, “so…we were okay all along.” At 0030:40, the first officer stated, “weird.” At 0032:31, the captain stated, “okay just let me finish this [the weight and balance paperwork] off and…I’m happy,” and, about 2 minutes later, he stated, “okay, back with you here.” At 0037:08, the captain contacted Cincinnati Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) and reported an altitude of 11,000 feet mean sea level. About 1 minute later, the first officer stated, “something’s messed up with this thing,” and, at 0039:07, he asked “why is this thing?” At 0041:21, the first officer stated that the control wheel felt “funny.” He added, “feels like I need a lot of force. it is pushing to the right for some reason. I don’t know why…I don’t know what’s going on.” The first officer then repeated twice that it felt like he needed “a lot of force.” The CVR did not record the captain responding to any of these comments. At 0043:53, when the airplane was at an altitude of about 4,000 feet, the captain reported to Cincinnati TRACON that he had the runway in sight. The approach controller cleared flight 185 for a visual approach to runway 36R and added, “keep your speed up.” The captain acknowledged the clearance and the instruction. The first officer then stated, “what in the world is going on with this plane? sucker is acting so funny.” The captain replied, “we’ll do a full control check on the ground.” At 0044:43, the approach controller again told the captain to “keep your speed up” and instructed him to contact the CVG Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT). At 0045:11, the captain contacted the CVG ATCT and requested clearance to land on runway 36R, and the local control west controller issued the landing clearance. Flight data recorder (FDR) data indicated that, shortly afterward, the airplane passed through about 3,200 feet, and its airspeed began to decrease from about 240 knots indicated airspeed. At 0045:37, when the airplane was at an altitude of about 3,000 feet, the captain started the in-range checklist, stating, “bypass is down. hydraulic pressure. quantity checks. AC [alternating current] pump is on. green light. fuel panel. boost pumps on.” About 0046, the first officer stated, “I’m telling you, what is wrong with this plane? it is really funny. I got something all messed up here.” The captain replied, “yeah.” The first officer then asked, “can you feel it? it’s like swinging back and forth.” The captain replied, “we’ve got an imbalance on this…crossfeed I left open.” The first officer responded, “oh, is that what it is?” A few seconds later, the first officer stated, “we’re gonna flame out.” The captain responded, “I got the crossfeed open. just keep power on.” At 0046:45, the CVR recorded a sound similar to decreasing engine rpm. Immediately thereafter, the first officer stated, “we’re losing power.” At 0046:52, the first officer stated, “we’ve lost both of them. did we?” The captain responded, “nope.” FDR data showed that, about 1 second later, a momentary electrical power interruption occurred when the airplane was at an altitude of about 2,400 feet. At 0046:55, the CVR stopped recording. Airplane performance calculations indicated that, shortly after the power interruption, the airplane’s descent rate was about 900 feet per minute (fpm). According to air traffic control (ATC) transcripts, at 0047:12, the captain reported to the CVG ATCT that the airplane was “having engine problems.” The local control west controller asked, “you’re having engine problems?” The captain replied, “affirmative.” At 0047:28, the controller asked the captain if he needed emergency equipment, and the captain replied, “negative.’” This was the last transmission received by ATC from the accident flight crew. The FDR continued recording until about 0049. The wreckage was located about 1.2 miles short of runway 36R.

On December 18, 2003, about 1226 central standard time, Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) flight 647, a Boeing MD-10-10F (MD-10), N364FE, crashed while landing at Memphis International Airport (MEM), Memphis, Tennessee. The right main landing gear collapsed after touchdown on runway 36R, and the airplane veered off the right side of the runway. After the gear collapsed, a fire developed on the right side of the airplane. Of the two flight crewmembers and five non revenue FedEx pilots on board the airplane, the first officer and one non revenue pilot received minor injuries during the evacuation. The post crash fire destroyed the airplaneís right wing and portions of the right side of the fuselage. Flight 647 departed from Metropolitan Oakland International Airport (OAK), Oakland, California, about 0832 (0632 Pacific standard time) and was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

Following maintenance at Memphis Airport facilities, a crew of two technicians was ferrying the aircraft from the hangar to the main terminal. While approaching the C2 gate, the aircraft could not be stopped in time and collided with the jet bridge. Both occupants escaped with minor injuries while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.