Memphis

On July 26, 2002, about 0537 eastern daylight time, Federal Express flight 1478, a Boeing 727-232F, N497FE, struck trees on short final approach and crashed short of runway 9 at the Tallahassee Regional Airport (TLH), Tallahassee, Florida. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a scheduled cargo flight from Memphis International Airport, in Memphis, Tennessee, to TLH. The captain, first officer, and flight engineer were seriously injured, and the airplane was destroyed by impact and resulting fire. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

The MU-300 on-demand passenger charter flight sustained substantial damage during a landing overrun on a snow/ice contaminated runway. The captain, who was also the company chief pilot and check airman, was the flying pilot, and the first officer was the non flying pilot. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. Area weather reporting stations reported the presence of freezing rain and snow for a time period beginning several hours before the accident. The captain did not obtain the destination airport weather observation until the flight was approximately 30 nautical miles from the airport. The flight received radar vectors for a instrument landing system approach to runway 30 (5,401 feet by 100 feet, grooved asphalt). The company's training manual states the MU-300's intermediate and final approach speeds as 140 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) and Vref, respectively. Vref was reported by the flight crew as 106 KIAS. During the approach, the tower controller (LC) gave the option for the flight to circle to land or continue straight in to runway 30. LC advised that the winds were from 050-070 degrees at 10 knots gusting to 20 knots, and runway braking action was reported as fair to poor by a snow plow. Radar data indicates that the airplane had a ground speed in excess of 200 knots between the final approach fix and runway threshold and a full-scale localizer deviation 5.5 nm from the localizer antenna. The company did not have stabilized approach criteria establishing when a missed approach or go-around is to be executed. The captain stated that he was unaware that there was 0.7 percent downslope on runway 30. The company provided a page from their airport directory which did not indicate a slope present for runway 30. The publisher of the airport directory provided a page valid at the time of the accident showing a 0.7 percent runway slope. Runway slope is used in the determination of runway performance for transport category aircraft such as the MU-300. The airplane operating manual states that MU-300 landing performance on ice or snow covered runways has not been determined. The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder with a remote cockpit erasure control. Readout of the cockpit voice recorder indicated a repetitive thumping noise consistent with manual erasure. No notices to airman pertaining to runway conditions were issued by the airport prior to the accident.

The airplane was dispatched as a cargo flight to pick up a load of 118 boxes of automotive seatbelts. After refueling and loading the cargo on board, the flight crew taxied to runway 22 for a no-flap takeoff, which called for a V1 speed of 141 knots. The first officer was the flying pilot for this leg of the flight. The crew reported that the initial takeoff roll from the 11,009 foot runway was normal. At approximately 120 knots, the flight crew reported hearing a loud bang followed by a vibration. The captain called for the first officer to abort the takeoff. The captain later stated that he believed he saw the #2 engine "roll back." The flight crew reported that the brakes were not effective in slowing the airplane. A witness stated that the airplane was going west on the runway at a high rate of speed when it "went up to two feet, then came back down." Another witness stated that he saw the airplane "exit off the end of the runway" and after about "seventy-five to one hundred feet, the front wheels lifted off the ground about ten feet." The airplane overran the departure end of the runway, went through the airport's chain link perimeter fence, across a 4-lane highway, collided with 3 vehicles on the roadway, and went through a second chain link fence, before coming to rest. The airplane came to rest on its belly, 2,010 feet from the departure threshold of runway 22. The investigation revealed that the flight crew was provided an inaccurate weight for the cargo, and the airplane was found to be 942 pounds over the maximum takeoff weight at the time of the accident. The density altitude was calculated to be 5,614 feet at the time of the accident. Both crewmembers were current and properly certified; however, the captain had upgraded to his present position two months prior to the accident, and the first officer had accumulated a total of 123.8 hours in the Falcon 20 at the time of the accident. Both engines were operated in a test cell and performed within limits. About 90% of the right outboard main landing gear tire's retread was found on the runway approximately 7,200 feet from where the aircraft had commenced its takeoff roll. The operator stated that since the aircraft was over maximum gross weight, the long taxi to the runway could have resulted in the brakes and tires heating more than normal.

The flight was in radio contact with air traffic controllers at the FAA Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC), and was level at 9,000 feet, when the pilot checked in on frequency. The last radio contact with the flight was at 0447. At 0520, radar contact was lost. The airplane impacted in rough terrain, at a steep angle of impact. Two other company pilots flying in trail of the accident aircraft said, they had radio contact with the pilot of N840FE about 5 minutes before the accident. They said he sounded fine and did not say anything about any problems. Radar data showing the flight's ground speed indicated that at 0512, the ground speed was 158 knots (182 mph). The ground speed then decreased to 153 (176 mph), 143 (165 mph), 138 (159 mph), and 132 (152 mph), until at 0519:40, when the ground speed of the flight was 125 knots (144 mph). After the radar read out at 0519:40, the next radar hit was coast (no information), and then the flight disappeared from the radar scope. The airplane's heading and altitude did not change during the decrease in ground speed. According to the NTSB Radar Data Study, calculated flight parameters indicated the airplane "...experienced a slow reduction of airspeed in the final 8 minutes of flight at altitude, and then abruptly exhibited a sharp nose down pitch attitude with a rapid increase in airspeed." About the time of the reduction in airspeed, pitch angle began to slowly increase also. When radar contact was lost, the calculated airspeed had reduced to less then 102 knots [118 mph], and calculated body angle of attack [AOA] had increased to 8.8 degrees. A large reduction in pitch angle, angle of attack, and flight path angle as the airspeed increases after peak AOA was reached. Examination of the engine Power Analyzer and Recorder (PAR) revealed that no exceedences were in progress at the time power was removed from the PAR. It was determined that no caution timing events were in progress. The PAR computer appeared to be operating correctly until power was removed at impact. Examination of the airplane's autopilot were not conclusive due to impact damage. Determination of whether the autopilot was engaged or not engaged at the time of the accident could not be determined. The NTSB Meteorological Factual Report revealed that at 0515, about 7 minutes before the flight was lost on radar, the radiative temperature in an area centered at Clarksville (4 kilometer resolution data), showed that the Mean Radiative Temperature was -6.26 degrees C (21F). The Minimum Radiative Temperature was -6.66 degrees C (19F). The Maximum Radiative Temperature was -6.06 degrees C (21F). According to the Archive Level II Doppler weather radar tape for a beginning sweep time of 0508:10, showed that N840FE had tracked into a weather echo from 0510:34, to 0516:28. The Doppler Weather Radar data, revealed that N840FE, had entered a weak weather echo about the same time that the airspeed of the airplane started to decrease, at an altitude of about 9,000 feet, and the airplane was in the weak weather echo for a few minutes. Based on the weather data, it was determined that in-flight airplane icing conditions were encountered by N840FE. Cessna Aircraft Company Airworthiness Directive (AD) 96-09-15; Amendment 39-9591; Docket No. 96-CE-05-AD, applicable to this airplane and complied with by the company, on December 12, 1996, stated: "...to minimize the potential hazards associated with operating the airplane in severe icing conditions by providing more clearly defined procedures and limitations associated with such conditions... operators must initiate action to notify and ensure that flight crewmembers are apprised of this change...revise the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) by incorporating the following into the Limitation Section of the AFM. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM...." The airplane was equipped with leading edge deicing boots on the wings, elevators, struts, and had a cargo pod deicing capability. Lights were installed to illuminate the leading edge of the wings, to aid the pilot in detecting ice on the leading edges of the wings during night operations. The airplane was not equipped with an ice detection device.

The PIC stated he was established on an instrument approach when the left engine fuel pressure dropped to zero and the engine quit. He moved the fuel selector to the right rear fuel tank and the engine started. He continued the approach for about 2 miles when the right engine quit followed by the left engine. He made a forced landing to a sandbar. Examination of the airplane revealed the fuel tanks were not ruptured and the fuel tanks were empty.

The airplane was at FL 330 when the flightcrew determined that there was smoke in the cabin cargo compartment. An emergency was declared and the flight diverted to Newburgh/Stewart International Airport and landed. The airplane was destroyed by fire after landing. The fire had burned for about 4 hours after after smoke was first detected. Investigation revealed that the deepest and most severe heat and fire damage occurred in and around container 06R, which contained a DNA synthesizer containing flammable liquids. More of 06R's structure was consumed than of any other container, and it was the only container that exhibited severe floor damage. Further, 06R was the only container to exhibit heat damage on its bottom surface, and the area below container 06R showed the most extensive evidence of scorching of the composite flooring material. However, there was insufficient reliable evidence to reach a conclusion as to where the fire originated. The presence of flammable chemicals in the DNA synthesizer was wholly unintended and unknown to the preparer of the package and shipper. The captain did not adequately manage his crew resources when he failed to call for checklists or to monitor and facilitate the accomplishment of required checklist items. The Department of Transportation hazardous materials regulations do not adequately address the need for hazardous materials information on file at a carrier to be quickly retrievable in a format useful to emergency responders.

The pilot contacted approach control and was given the weather as sky partly obscured, ceiling 100 feet, visibility 1/16 mile with fog, wind calm. The pilot then requested a surveillance radar approach to runway 14, to be followed by a surveillance approach to runway 32, in the event of a missed approach from runway 14. The published approach minimums were 1-1/4 mile visibility, ceiling 460 feet msl (438 feet agl). The radar control observed an altitude readout that was below the published minimums and advised the pilot to execute a missed approach. No response was received from the pilot. The aircraft was found floating in the bay approximately 2 miles from the end of the runway. Another pilot (based at the same facility) stated that the two pilots had, on numerous occasions, attempted the approach at times when the weather was reported to be less than that required for the approach. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Eleven minutes after departure the pilot reported smoke and a right engine problem, then said 'going down'. Right wing and engine assemblies separated in flight. Fire damage vicinity of right engine left turbocharger; tailpipe assembly had separated. Heavy smoke and heat damage between right wing forward and aft wing spars. Tailpipe had failed in fatigue near flange where attached to turbocharger exhaust port. Evidence of non-uniformly seated gasket between flanges. Also, right engine lower left engine mount deteriorated; significant portion of rubber missing. Piper sb #818 (ad87-07-09) accomplished 5/21/88; requires removal and inspection of exhaust system for cracks and reinstallation with new flange gaskets.

After conducting ground training all day, the instructor/director of operations and his trainee flew an EMB-110P1 to Memphis to exchange airplanes. Ground fog had started to form prior to departure. After exchanging airplanes, they made the return flight to Columbia. They obtained radar vectors to the final approach course for the SDF at Columbia. The thick fog resulted in a missed approach. During the missed approach, the runway was visible from above and the crew indicated that they would try for a VFR approach and landing. The airplane collided with trees 2,350 feet from the runway in a wings level attitude. The tops of the trees were broken 41 feet above the runway threshold altitude. The trainee had been without rest for at least 30 hours prior to the accident. One pilot was killed while the second was seriously injured.

The airplane had made one approach, followed by a missed approach during a dark night with low ceilings and low visibility. During the next approach the airplane was high on the glide slope and touched down fast and long. The airplane hit the terrain 300 feet past the end of the runway, hit a second time 115 feet further down, then flew into the ils localizer. Part of the left wing burned. There were no indications of an attempted go-around.