Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The three engine aircraft departed Abadan for a night flight to Mashhad. Due to poor weather conditions at destination, the crew diverted to Isfahan Airport. The aircraft departed Isfahan Airport at 0535LT bound to Mashhad. While on an ILS approach in thick fog, the aircraft was in a nose high attitude when the base of the empennage struck the runway surface and separated. On impact, the undercarriage were torn off. Out of control, the aircraft slid for few dozen metres, veered off runway and came to rest with both wings partially torn off, bursting into flames. At least 46 occupants were injured while the aircraft was partially destroyed by fire. Vertical visibility was 200 feet at the time of the accident due to fog.

The crew was apparently completing a cargo flight from Florida. Upon landing at Jacmel Airport, the undercarriage collapsed. The twin engine aircraft went out of control, veered off runway and came to rest against trees. Both occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot of the Part 91 business flight filed an instrument-flight-rules (IFR) flight plan with the destination and alternate airports, both of which were below weather minimums. The pilot and
copilot departed from the departure airport in weather minimums that were below the approach minimums for the departure airport. While en route, the destination airport's automated observing system continued to report weather below approach minimums, but the flight crew continued the flight. The flight crew then requested and were cleared for the instrument landing system (ILS) 31 approach and while on that approach were issued visibilities of 1,800 feet runway visual range after changing to tower frequency. During landing, the copilot told the pilot that he was not lined up with the runway. The pilot reportedly said, "those are edge lights," and then realized that he was not properly lined up with the runway. The airplane then touched down beyond a normal touchdown point, about 2,800 feet down the runway, and off the left side of the runway surface. The airplane veered to the left, collapsing the nose landing gear. Both flight crewmembers had previous experience in Part 135 operations, which have more stringent weather requirements than operations conducted under Part 91. Under Part 135, IFR flights to an airport cannot be conducted and an approach cannot begin unless weather minimums are above approach minimums. The accident flight's departure in weather below approach minimums would have precluded a return to the airport had an emergency been encountered by the flight crew, leaving few options and little time to reach a takeoff alternate airport. The company's flight procedures allow for a takeoff to be performed as long as there is a takeoff alternate airport within one hour at normal cruise speed and a minimum takeoff visibility that was based upon the pilot being able to maintain runway alignment during takeoff. The company's procedures did not allow flight crew to depart to an airport that was below minimums but did allow for the flight crew, at their discretion, to
perform a "look-see" approach to approach minimums if the weather was below minimums. The allowance of a "look see" approach essentially negates the procedural risk mitigation afforded by requiring approaches to be conducted only when weather was above approach minimums.

On his first Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach, the pilot initially flew through the localizer course. The pilot then reestablished the airplane on the final approach course, but the airplane’s altitude at the decision height was about 500 feet too high. He executed a missed approach and received radar vectors for another approach. The airplane was flying inbound on the second ILS approach when a witness reported that he saw the airplane about 150 feet above the ground in about a 60-degree nose-low attitude with about an 80-degree right bank angle. The initial ground impact point was about 2,150 feet west of the runway threshold and about 720 feet north (left) of the extended centerline. The cloud tops were about 3,000 feet with light rime or mixed icing. The flap jack screws and flap indicator were found in the 5-degree flap position. The inspection of the airplane revealed no preimpact anomalies to the airframe, engines, or propellers. A radar study performed on the flight indicated that the calibrated airspeed was about 130 knots on the final approach, but subsequently decreased to about 95–100 knots during the 20-second period prior to loss of radar contact. According to the airplane’s flight manual, the wings-level power-off stall speed at the accident aircraft’s weight is about 91 knots. The ILS approach flight profile indicates that 20 degrees of flaps should be used at the glide slope intercept while maintaining 120 knots minimum airspeed. At least 20 degrees of flaps should be maintained until touchdown. The “No Flap” or “5 Degrees Flap Landing” flight profile indicates that the NO FLAP Vref airspeed is 115 knots calibrated airspeed minimum.

The multiengine airplane was at an altitude of 6,000 feet when it experienced a catastrophic right engine failure, approximately 15 minutes after takeoff. The pilot elected to return to his departure airport, which was 30 miles away, instead of diverting to a suitable airport that was located about 10 miles away. The pilot reported that he was not able to maintain altitude and the airplane descended until it struck trees and impacted the ground, approximately 3 miles from the departure airport. The majority of the wreckage was consumed by fire. A 5 1/2 by 6-inch hole was observed in the top right portion of the crankcase. Examination of the right engine revealed that the No. 2 cylinder separated from the crankcase in flight. Two No. 2 cylinder studs were found to have fatigue fractures consistent with insufficient preload on their respective bolts. In addition, a fatigue fracture was observed on a portion of the right side of the crankcase, mostly perpendicular to the threaded bore of the cylinder stud. The rear top 3/8-inch and the front top 1/2-inch cylinder hold-down studs for the No. 2 cylinder exceeded the manufacturer's specified length from the case deck by .085 and .111 inches, respectively. The airplane had been operated for about 50 hours since its most recent annual inspection, which was performed about 8 months prior the accident. The right engine had been operated for about 1,425 hours since it was overhauled, and about 455 hours since the No. 2 cylinder was removed for the replacement of six cylinder studs. It was not clear why the pilot was unable to maintain altitude after the right engine failure; however, the airplane was easily capable of reaching an alternate airport had the pilot elected not to return to his departure airport.

The aircraft had recently been purchased in Germany and was flown to the United Kingdom on 11 December 2009 by the pilot of the accident flight. The new owner, who accompanied him for the flight from Germany, was a private pilot himself and was the passenger in the accident. The aircraft landed at Oxford on the evening of 11 December. The pilot reported to a maintenance organisation that there had been a problem with the brakes after landing and the aircraft was left parked outside a hangar. Minor maintenance was carried out on 20 December 2009 and on 9 January 2010 the aircraft was refuelled, but it was not flown again until the accident flight. On the morning of 15 January 2010 the pilot and his passenger met at Oxford Airport and prepared the aircraft for flight. The plan was to carry out an air test, although its exact nature was not established. The flight was pre‑notified to Royal Air Force (RAF) Brize Norton as an air test with a requested level of FL190. At 1344 hrs the aircraft taxied out to Holding Point C for Runway 19 at Oxford. The pilot reported ‘READY FOR DEPARTURE’ at 1400 hrs and was given a clearance for a right turn after takeoff with a climb initially to FL80. The pilot then requested the latest weather information and the tower controller provided the following information: ‘........TWO THOUSAND METRES IN MIST AND CLOUD IS BROKEN AT 200 FEET.’ At 1403 hrs the takeoff commenced and shortly after liftoff Oxford ATC suggested that the pilot should contact Brize Radar on 124.275 Megahertz (MHz). The pilot made contact with Brize Radar at 1404 hrs, two-way communication was established and the provision of a Deconfliction Service was agreed. On the radar screen the Brize Norton controller observed the ‘Mode C’ (altitude) return increase to around 1,500 ft and then noticed it decrease, seeing returns of 1,300 ft and 900 ft, before the secondary return disappeared. At 1406 hrs the Brize Norton controller contacted Oxford ATC to ask if the aircraft had landed back there and was advised that it had not done so, but that it could be heard overhead. The Brize Norton controller told Oxford ATC that they had a continuing contact, but no Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR). The Oxford controller could still hear an aircraft in the vicinity and agreed with the Brize Norton controller to attempt to make contact. At 1407 hrs Oxford ATC made several calls to the aircraft but there was no reply. The Oxford controller told the Brize Norton controller there was no reply and was informed in return that there was no longer any radar contact either. The Brize Norton controller also attempted to call the aircraft at 1407 hrs but without success. At 1410 hrs the Oxford controller advised the Brize Norton controller that there was smoke visible to the west of the airfield and they would alert both the airport and local emergency services. In the meantime several witnesses saw the aircraft crash into a field to the west of Oxford Airport. A severe fire started soon afterwards and bystanders who arrived at the scene were not able to get close to the aircraft. The local emergency services were notified of the accident by witnesses at 1407 hrs.

The crew was departing Les Eplatures Airport on a training flight to Dole-Tavaux, Jura. During the takeoff roll on runway 24, the pilot-in-command realized that the aircraft' speed did not increase after 88 knots then dropped to 85 knots. He decided to reject the takeoff procedure and initiated an emergency braking procedure. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and collided with concrete blocks and the ILS equipment. All four occupants were injured, two seriously. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft departed Broome on a charter flight to Koolan Island, WA. At about 0645 Western Standard Time1, when the aircraft was at an altitude of about 9,500 feet, the pilot noticed a drop in the engine torque indication with a corresponding drop in the engine oil pressure indication. The pilot increased the power lever setting but the engine torque and oil indications continued to reduce, all other engine indications were normal. During an interview with the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) the pilot stated that he felt a power loss associated with the drop in indicated engine torque. The pilot diverted to the nearest airstrip, which was Beagle Bay, WA. He stated that the low oil pressure warning light illuminated so he shut the engine down and prepared for an emergency landing. The pilot reported that on the final approach to the airstrip he realized that the aircraft was too high and its airspeed was too fast. The aircraft touched down about mid way along the runway and overran the end of the runway by about 200 metres. The aircraft impacted a mound of dirt, coming to rest upside down. The pilot, who was the only occupant sustained minor injuries. Examination of the aircraft by a third party and inspection of the photographs taken of the accident site, revealed that the engine, left main gear and nose gear had separated from the airframe during the accident sequence. There was a significant amount of oil present on the underside of the aircraft, indicating that the oil had leaked from the engine during operation. The
engine was removed from the accident site as an assembly by a third party. The propeller was removed and the engine was shipped to an engine overhaul facility where a disassembly and
examination was conducted under the supervision of the ATSB.

The aircraft departed Nairobi on a humanitarian mission to Moba, carrying 18 passengers and 4 crew members on behalf of the United Nations Organization. After touchdown, the left main gear collapsed. The aircraft veered off runway to the left and came to rest in a marsh field. All 22 occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It appears that the pilot-in-command was distracted during the last segment by pedestrians at the runway threshold and the aircraft landed hard.

During taxi the airplane was observed to run over a tire chock with the left main gear tire. During a turn out of the ramp, the left main gear was observed to run over the nose gear chock that had been removed from the nose gear by the pilot during pre-flight. During the departure roll, the left main gear tire failed and the pilot elected to abort the takeoff attempt. The airplane did not stop on the remaining runway surface and departed the runway overrun area, coming to rest in snow-covered terrain. An examination of the airplane's systems revealed no anomalies.