Takeoff (climb)

The twin engine aircraft was returning to Mombasa with a scheduled stop in Musiara to pickup 15 additional passengers. On departure from Kichwa Tembo, there were four passengers and two pilots on board. During the takeoff roll from runway 08, the aircraft hit a bump half way down the runway and bounced. The aircraft hit a second bump shortly later and as the crew heard the stall alarm, he decided to reject takeoff. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, lost its nose gear and came to rest 300 metres further. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew stated that the preflight examination, takeoff checks, takeoff roll, and rotation from runway 26 were "normal." However, once airborne, and with the landing gear down and the flaps at 20 degrees, the airplane began a roll to the right. The captain used differential thrust and rudder to keep the airplane from rolling over, and as he kept adjusting both. He noted that as the airspeed increased, the airplane tended to roll more; as the airspeed decreased, the roll would decrease. The captain also recalled thinking that the airplane might have had an asymmetrical flap misconfiguration. Both pilots stated that there were no lights or warnings. As the airplane continued a right turn, runway 13 came into view. The captain completed a landing to the right of that runway, landing long and in the grass with a 9-knot, left quartering tailwind. The airplane then paralleled the runway and ran into an airport perimeter fence beyond the runway's end. The cockpit voice recorder revealed that the crew initially used challenge and reply checklists and that after completing the takeoff checklist, engine power increased. About 7 seconds after the first officer called "V1," the captain stated an expletive, and the first officer announced "positive rate." During the next 50 seconds, the captain repeated numerous expletives, an automated voice issued numerous "bank angle" warnings, and the first officer asked what he could do, to which the captain later told him to declare an emergency. There were no calls by either pilot for an emergency checklist nor were there callouts of any emergency memory items. Each of the airplane's wings incorporated four hydraulically-actuated spoiler segments. The outboard segment, the roll control spoiler, normally extends in conjunction with its wing aileron after the aileron has traveled more than about 3 degrees, and extends up to 50 degrees at full control wheel rotation. When the airplane was subsequently examined in a hangar, hydraulic power was applied to the airplane via a ground hydraulic power unit, and the right roll spoiler elevated to 7.9 degrees above the flush wing level. Multiple left/right midrange turns of the yoke, with the hydraulic ground power unit both on and off, resulted in the roll spoiler being extended normally, but still returning to a resting position of 7.8 to 7.9 degrees above the flush position. When the yoke was turned full right and left, whether the aileron boost was on or off, both wings' roll spoilers extended to their full positions per specifications; however, once the full deflection testing was completed, the right roll spoiler returned to 6.1 degrees above the flush position. A final yoke turn resulted in the roll spoiler being elevated to 5.5 degrees. The right wing roll spoiler actuator was subsequently examined at the airplane manufacturer, and the roll spoiler was found to jam. The roll spoiler actuator was disassembled, but no specific reason(s) for the jamming were found. The roll spoiler parts were also examined and no indications of why the actuator may have jammed were found. According to the flight manual, if any of the spoiler segments should float, moving the spoiler hold down switch to "Spoiler Hold Down" locks all spoiler panels down. The roll control spoilers may then be used in the roll mode by turning on the auxiliary hydraulic pump. Also, an "Aileron/Spoiler Disconnect" T-handle is available to release the tie between the ailerons and the roll control spoilers in the event of a jam in either system. When used, the pilot's yoke controls only the ailerons, and the copilot's yoke controls only the roll control spoilers. Although the jamming of the right spoiler initiated the event, the crew's proper application of emergency procedures should have negated the adverse effects. Memory items for an uncommanded roll include moving the spoiler hold-down switch to the "on" position, which was not done; the spoiler hold-down switch was found in the "off" position. (The captain thought that he may have had an asymmetrical flap configuration; however, if an asymmetry had been the initiating event, the flap system would have been automatically disabled and the flap segments would have been mechanically locked in their positions.) The aileron/spoiler disconnect T-handle was found pulled up, which the crew indicated had occurred when the first officer's shoe hit it as he evacuated the airplane. While pulling the aileron/spoiler disconnect T-handle would have been appropriate for a different emergency procedure to release the tie between the ailerons and the roll control spoilers in the event of a jam in either system, it would have actually hindered the captain's attempts to control the airplane in this case because it would have disconnected the left roll spoiler from the captain's yoke, making it more difficult to counter the effects of the displaced right roll spoiler. Although the crew indicated that the t-handle was pulled during the first officer's exit of the airplane, its position, safety cover, and means of activation make this unlikely. In addition, precertification testing of the airplane showed that even with the right roll spoiler fully deployed, as long as the pilot had the use of the left roll spoiler in conjunction with that aileron, the airplane should have been easily controlled.

Although the pilot filed an instrument flight rules flight plan through the Direct User Access Terminal System (DUATS), no evidence of a weather briefing was found. The flight departed in visual meteorological conditions and entered instrument meteorological conditions while climbing through 12,800 feet. The air traffic controller advised the pilot of moderate rime icing from 15,000 feet through 17,000 feet, with light rime ice at 14,000 feet. The controller asked the pilot to advise him if the icing worsened, and the pilot responded that he would let them know and that it was no problem for him. The controller informed the pilot that he was coordinating for a higher altitude. The pilot confirmed that, while at 16,800 feet, "…light icing has been present for a little while and a higher altitude would be great." About 15 seconds later, the pilot stated that he was getting a little rattle and requested a higher altitude as soon as possible. About 25 seconds after that, the flight was cleared to flight level 200, and the pilot acknowledged. About one minute later, the airplane reached a peak altitude of 17,800 feet before turning sharply to the left and entering a descent. While descending through 17,400 feet, the pilot stated, "and N731CA's declaring…" No subsequent transmissions were received from the flight. The airplane impacted the paved surfaces and a wooded median on an interstate highway. A postaccident fire resulted. The outboard section of the right wing and several sections of the empennage, including the horizontal stabilizer, elevator, and rudder, were found about 1/4 mile southwest of the fuselage, in a residential area. Witnesses reported seeing pieces of the airplane separating during flight and the airplane in a rapid descent. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the outboard section of the right wing separated in flight, at a relatively low altitude, and then struck and severed portions of the empennage. There was no evidence of a preexisting mechanical anomaly that would have precluded normal operation of the airframe or engine. An examination of weather information revealed that numerous pilots reported icing conditions in the general area before and after the accident. At least three flight crews considered the icing "severe." Although severe icing was not forecasted, an Airmen's Meteorological Information (AIRMET) advisory included moderate icing at altitudes at which the accident pilot was flying. The pilot operating handbook warned that the airplane was not certificated for flight in severe icing conditions and that, if encountered, the pilot must exit severe icing immediately by changing altitude or routing. Although the pilot was coordinating for a higher altitude with the air traffic controller at the time of the icing encounter, it is likely that he either did not know the severity of the icing or he was reluctant to exercise his command authority in order to immediately exit the icing conditions.

The single engine aircraft was leased by the Uganda Peoples Defence Force Air Wing to carry a group of four Officer to Nzara, South Sudan. Shortly after takeoff from Arua Airport, the aircraft encountered difficulties to gain altitude, hit a tree and crashed in an open field located near the village of Mingoro, bursting into flames. All seven occupants evacuated with minor injuries and the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

On December 10, 2011, BE-65-80QA (Queen Air) with Registry RP-C824 took off from RWY 13, Manila Domestic Airport on/or about 0610 UTC (1410H) southbound for San Jose, Mindoro. There were three (3) persons on board, the PIC and two (2) other persons; one was seated at the right-hand cockpit seat and the other one at the passenger seat. After airborne, the ATC gave instructions to the pilot o turn right and report five (5) miles out. After performing the right turn, the pilot requested for a reland which was duly acknowledged but the ATC with instructions to cross behind traffic on short final Rwy 06 (a perpendicular international runway) and to confirm if experiencing difficulty. However, there was no more response from the pilot. From a level flight southward at about 200 feet AGL, three (3) loud sputtering/burst sounds coming from the aircraft were heard (by people on the ground) then the aircraft was observed making a left turn that progressed into a steep bank and roll-over on a dive. After about one complete roll on a dive the aircraft hit ground at point of impact (Coordinates 14.48848 N 121.025811 E), a confined area beside a creek surrounded by shaties where several people were in a huddle. Upon impact, the aircraft exploded and fire immediately spread to surrounding shanties and a nearby elementary school building. The aircraft was almost burned into ashes and several shanties were severely burned by post-crash fire. A total of thirteen (13) persons were fatality injured composed of: the 3 aircraft occupants who died due to non survivable impact and charred by post-crash fire, and ten (10) other persons on the ground, all residents at vicinity of impact point, incurred non-fatal injuries and were rushed to a nearby hospital for medical treatment. About 20 houses near the impact point were completely burnt and the adjacent Elementary School building was severely affected by fire.

Shortly after the airplane lifted off, the tower controller informed the pilot that a plume of smoke was visible behind the airplane. No communications were received from the pilot after he acknowledged the takeoff clearance. Witnesses reported that white smoke appeared to be trailing from the area of the left engine during takeoff. The witnesses subsequently observed flames at the inboard side of the left engine. The airplane began a left turn. As the airplane continued the turn, the flames and trail of white smoke were no longer visible. When the airplane reached a southerly heading, the nose dropped abruptly, and the airplane descended to the ground. Witnesses stated that they heard an increase in engine sound before impact. A postimpact fire ensued. The accident site was located about 3/4 mile from the airport. A postaccident examination determined that the left engine fuel selector and fuel valve were in the OFF position, consistent with the pilot shutting down that engine after takeoff. However, the left engine propeller was not feathered. Extensive damage to the right engine propeller assembly was consistent with that engine producing power at the time of impact. The landing gear and wing flaps were extended at the time of impact. Teardown examinations of both engines did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a loss of engine power. The left engine oil cap was observed to be unsecured at the accident site; however, postaccident comparison of the left and right engine oil caps revealed disproportionate distortion of the left oil cap, likely due to the postimpact fire. As a result, no determination was made regarding the security of left engine oil cap before the accident. Emergency procedures outlined in the pilot’s operating handbook (POH) noted that when securing an engine, the propeller should be feathered. Performance data provided in the POH for single-engine operations were predicated on the propeller of the inoperative engine being feathered, and the wing flaps and landing gear retracted. Thus, the pilot did not follow the emergency procedures outlined in the POH for single-engine operation.

During the takeoff roll at Huambo-Albano Machado Airport, the crew decided to reject takeoff for unknown reasons. The aircraft veered off runway and came to rest. All 10 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was destroyed when it impacted terrain in the Superstition Mountains near Apache Junction, Arizona. The commercial pilot and the five passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Ponderosa Aviation, Inc. (PAI) and operated by PAI under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a personal flight. Night visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The airplane had departed Falcon Field (FFZ), Mesa, Arizona, about 1825 and was destined for Safford Regional Airport (SAD), Safford, Arizona. PAI’s director of maintenance (DOM) and the director of operations (DO), who were co owners of PAI along with the president, conducted a personal flight from SAD to FFZ. The DO flew the leg from SAD to FFZ under visual flight rules (VFR) in night VMC. After arriving at FFZ and in preparation for the flight back to SAD, the DOM moved to the left front seat to act as the pilot flying. The airplane departed FFZ about 12 minutes after it arrived. According to a witness, engine start and taxi-out appeared normal. Review of the recorded communications between the pilot and the FFZ tower air traffic controllers revealed that when the pilot requested taxi clearance, he advised the ground controller that he was planning an "eastbound departure." The flight was cleared for takeoff on runway 4R, and the pilot was instructed to maintain runway heading until advised, due to an inbound aircraft. About 90 seconds later, when the airplane was about 1.1 miles from the departure end of the runway, the tower local controller issued a "right turn approved" advisory to the flight, which the pilot acknowledged. Radar data revealed that the airplane flew the runway heading for about 1.5 miles then began a right turn toward SAD and climbed through an altitude of about 2,600 feet mean sea level (msl). About 1828, after it momentarily climbed to an altitude of 4,700 feet, the airplane descended to an altitude of 4,500 feet, where it remained and tracked in an essentially straight line until it impacted the mountain. The last radar return was received at 1830:56 and was approximately coincident with the impact location. The impact location was near the top of a steep mountain that projected to over 5,000 feet msl. Witnesses reported seeing a fireball, and law enforcement helicopters were dispatched.

Forty seconds after its take off from Ecuvillens Airport runway 28, while flying at a speed of 120 knots, the aircraft slightly turned to the right without gaining sufficient altitude. Then, its altitude fluctuated and it descended and climbed again. Suddenly, the aircraft hit tree tops, lost some wing's and empennage elements while all engine cowlings separated. The fuel tanks were spoiled and the aircraft caught fire. It overflew the wooded area for a distance of 120 metres then impacted a powerline before crashing in an open field located 275 metres after the initial impact, bursting into flames. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot departed on a scheduled commuter flight at night from an unlit, rough and uneven snow-covered runway with five passengers and baggage. During the takeoff roll, the airplane bounced twice and became airborne, but it failed to climb. As the airplane neared the departure end of the runway, it began to veer to the left, and the pilot applied full right aileron, but the airplane continued to the left as it passed over the runway threshold. The airplane subsequently settled into an area of snow and tundra-covered terrain about 100 yards south of the runway threshold and nosed over. Official sunset on the day of the accident was 48 minutes before the accident, and the end of civil twilight was one minute before the accident. The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Airport/Facility Directory, Alaska Supplement listing for the airport, includes the following notation: "Airport Remarks - Unattended. Night operations prohibited, except rotary wing aircraft. Runway condition not monitored, recommend visual inspection prior to using. Safety areas eroded and soft. Windsock unreliable." A postaccident examination of the airplane and engine revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Given the lack of mechanical deficiencies with the airplane's engine or flight controls, it is likely the pilot failed to maintain control during the takeoff roll and initial climb after takeoff.