Takeoff (climb)

Shortly after takeoff from El Zorrillo Airport, while in initial climb, an engine failed. The crew attempted a forced landing in an open field located near the airport when the aircraft crashed. All seven occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

During the takeoff roll on runway 34, the right engine failed. The captain rejected takeoff and initiated an emergency braking procedure. Unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 34 is 1,767 metres long), the aircraft overran when the right main gear hit a pot hole, causing the right wing to be torn off. The aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest in a pasture. Two passengers were injured while 37 other occupants escaped unhurt. The aircraft was destroyed.

Witnesses observed the airplane depart the airport to the north and make an abrupt right turn at an altitude of about 150 feet. One witness, who was also a pilot, described the wings as “shimmying,” appearing as if the airplane stalled before it banked to the right in a nose-down attitude. The airplane crashed and was nearly consumed during the postcrash fire. A postaccident examination was conducted with no preimpact mechanical anomalies noted. Records indicate that the pilot built the airplane from a kit about 6 years before the accident. The pilot and airplane logbooks were not located during the investigation; therefore, the maintenance history for the airplane, and the pilot’s recent (and total) flight experience could not be determined. Postaccident toxicological testing revealed metabolites of the drug diazepam (Valium) in the pilot’s blood and urine. Valium is a prescription benzodiazepine classed as a central nervous system depressant and tranquilizer, used as a sleep aid and to inhibit anxiety. The amount noted in the pilot’s blood suggested he took the drug 12 to 24 hours before the accident, and, as a result, it would not have affected his performance.

On 01.04.2012 the the UTAir Air Division 1 crew (based at Surgut AP) was conducting a scheduled passenger flight UTA-119 on the АТR 72-201 VP-BYZ A/C from Surgut to Tyumen. The landing at Tyumen (Roschino) AP was performed at 17:41 (23:41 local time). Descending for landing at Roschino (Tyumen) AD was conducted in extended cloudiness with icing conditions. According to the FDR records, the flight crew used the aircraft ice protection system. At the time of flight UTA-119 landing at Roschino (Tyumen) AD the weather was as follows: surface wind 090°-7 m/s, visibility 1600 m, showers of moderate snow with rain, significant cumulonimbus (5-7 oct.) clouds, fractonimbus, cloud base at 140 m, temperature + 0.2°C, dew point + 0.2°C, QFE 735 mmhg (980 hPa), friction coefficient 0.6; moderate icing at cloud layer from 140 m to 4800 m. Forecast for landing: tempo visibility 500 m, showers of heavy snow with rain, vertical visibility 90 m. Weather at Roschino (Tyumen) AD at day time on 01.04.2012 and at night from 01.04.2012 to 02.04.2012 was formed by the cyclone trough forward part with the widespread precipitation area associated with warm front. A passage of the warm front through Roschino (Tyumen) AD was expected in the period from 20:00 to 21:00, with a temperature of 0°C and relative humidity 100% precipitations were fallen from the cumulonimbus and fractonimbus clouds in form of showers of snow with rain. Visibility in precipitations was 1200–1600 m with individual charges of heavy wet snow with visibility 600–700 m and vertical visibility 100 m. Precipitation was followed by east wind 9–10 m/s, direction 90–110°, with individual gusts up to 13–14 m/s. This direction of wind remained till 21:00. After the passage of front through the region of Roschino (Tyumen) AD, at 21:05 the surface wind changed its direction to the west 250° – 260° with gradual increase of wind speed from 2–4 m/s to 7–10 m/s. Precipitation in the form of showers of moderate snow with rain at Roschino (Tyumen) AD went on till 22:00, 01.04.2012. From 22:00, 01.04.2012 to 01:00, 02.04.2012 precipitation turned into showers of slight snow with rain with a temperature of 0°C and relative humidity 100%. According to the observations of weather stations situated at a distance of about 200– 250 km from Roschino (Tyumen) AD and affected by the cyclone on 01.04.2012 as well as on 02.04.2012 storm detecting information was sent to the Roschino (Tyumen) AD AMC about glaze-ice accretion of wet snow. After the landing the A/C was placed at stand 3 heading to the air terminal (MH 30°). According to the flight shift work schedule, the crew left for rest to the Liner Hotel at Roschino AP and had a rest till 23:30 (05:30 local time). After having their rest, the crew members arrived to the AP and started the preflight preparation for the UTA120 scheduled passenger flight from Tyumen to Surgut with visiting AMC where at 00:15 they got weather briefing and documentation. The Nizhnevartovsk AD had been appointed as the alternate AP. At the end of the weather briefing the PIC received Form АВ-11 No.1 and put his signature at the sheet of the "Log of flight crews’ weather briefings at Tyumen-Roschino AMC" indicating the flight number and the A/C number. The weather forecast and actual weather at the departure AD, destination AD and alternate AD as well as their technical conditions did not imply any hazard for the flight operation. At 00:20 the crew passed a medical examination at the AP pre-start medical station and was cleared for the flight. According to the intra-airport radio conversation, around the same time the PIC made his decision to fly. After the medical examination, the F/O visited the aeronautical information office and received a navigator’s briefcase and flight plan; which is recorded in pertinent logbooks. Further, the crew continued the preflight preparation in the briefing room. According to the load documents there were 39 passengers, 133 kg of cargo, 143 kg of passengers’ luggage, and 1 kg of mail registered for the UTA120 flight. The fuel on board was 2000 kg, the A/C TOW was 18730 kg, the A/C weight balance was 30.72% mean aerodynamic chord. The TOW and weight balance were inside the AFM (FCOM) limitations. According to an avionics technician's statements the crew arrived to the A/C around 00:30. By the external observation video camera records it can be seen that the PIC performed the preflight inspection very briefly. He lingered for a few minutes by the right engine then moved along the fuselage sides, then stopped by the left main gear, and finally went into the cockpit. The after-inspection FTLB entry made by the PIC was: "LC PERFORMED BY CDR", the PIC also put the time of inspection which was 00:40 and quantity of fuel 2000 kg. There were no remarks made against the A/C condition in the FTLB. By the records of the external observation video camera, it can be seen that at 01:13 the boarding had been completed and the entrance door was closed. So, the A/C had been remaining at the AD under the influence of precipitations in the form of rain and wet snow with ambient temperature around zero degrees Celsius and wind velocity more than 10 m/s for more than 7 hours. There was no de/anti-icing treatment performed for the A/C before the flight. At 01:20 the flight crew performed the engine start, and after that passed through the Before Taxi checklist. At 01:24:46 the flight crew obtained clearance for holding position. At 01:32:08 after clearance for lineup position the flight crew reported: “Lining up”. At 01:32:58 the A/C started taking off. The takeoff was performed with flaps extended at 15°. The A/C lift-off occurred at 01:33:28 with a speed of around ≈127 kt. At 01:33:56 at height 600 ft2 and speed of 135 kt the A/P was engaged. At 01:34:00 at height 640 ft and speed of 139 kt the flaps retraction was started. At 01:34:08 after the retraction had been completed, at 690 ft and at a speed of 150 kt uncommanded development of right bank started. At 01:34:10 the A/P was disengaged. The bank angle reached around 40° to the right within 3 s and after that was counteracted by ailerons and rudder deflection. Further, the A/C banked to the left, which the flight crew was not able to compensate with full deflection of ailerons to the right. The A/C collision into terrain occurred at 01:34:35 with a pitch down angle ≈11°, left bank angle ≈55° and vertical rate of descent over 20 m/s. The ASL elevation of the accident area is about ≈110 m. The accident resulted in the A/C full destruction and partial damage by the ground fire. From the 43 persons onboard 4 crew members and 29 passengers were killed. Others sustained serious injuries.

A witness reported that the airplane veered left during the takeoff roll and headed toward a large ditch that surrounded the runway. It appeared that the pilot did not attempt to stop the airplane or abort the takeoff. The airplane continued toward the ditch, and, upon reaching the ditch's edge, the airplane rotated and reached an altitude of about 50 feet. The airplane's left wing collided with trees. The airplane rolled left and then right before stalling and crashing. The pilot stated that the airplane seemed to pull left on takeoff, possibly due to a right quartering tailwind, and that he did not realize where he was positioned on the runway. Examination of the airplane and engine did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

The airplane, operated by Fresh Air, Inc., crashed into a lagoon about 1 mile east of the departure end of runway 10 at Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport (SJU), San Juan, Puerto Rico. The two pilots died, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces. The airplane was operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1251 as a cargo flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, and a visual flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight had departed from runway 10 at SJU destined for Princess Juliana International Airport, St. Maarten. Shortly after takeoff, the first officer declared an emergency, and then the captain requested a left turn back to SJU and asked the local air traffic controllers if they could see smoke coming from the airplane (the two tower controllers noted in postaccident interviews that they did not see more smoke than usual coming from the airplane). The controllers cleared the flight to land on runway 28, but as the airplane began to align with the runway, it crashed into a nearby lagoon (Laguna La Torrecilla). Radar data shows that the airplane was heading south at an altitude of about 520 ft when it began a descending turn to the right to line up with runway 28. The airplane continued to bank to the right until radar contact was lost. The estimated airspeed at this point was only 88 knots, 9 knots below the published stall speed for level flight and close to the 87-knot air minimum control speed. However, minimum control speeds increase substantially for a turn into the inoperative engine as the accident crew did in the final seconds of the flight. As a result, the airplane was operating close to both stall and controllability limits when radar contact was lost. Pilots flying multiengine aircraft are generally trained to shut down the engine experiencing a problem and feather that propeller; thus, the flight crew likely intended to shut down the right engine by bringing the mixture control lever to the IDLE CUTOFF position and feathering the right propeller, as called out in the Engine Fire In Flight Checklist. This would have left the flight crew with the left engine operative to return to the airport. However, postaccident examinations revealed that the left propeller was found feathered at impact, with the left engine settings consistent with the engine at takeoff or climb setting. The right engine settings were generally consistent with the engine being shut down; however, the right propeller’s pitch was consistent with a high rotation/takeoff power setting. The accident airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder or a cockpit voice recorder (nor was it required to be so equipped); hence, the investigation was unable to determine at what point in the accident sequence the flight crew shut down the right engine and at what point they feathered the left propeller, or why they would have done so. Post accident examination of the airplane revealed fire and thermal damage to the airframe on the airplane’s right wing rear spar, nacelle aft of the power section, and in the vicinity of the junction between the augmentor assemblies and the exhaust muffler assembly. While the investigation was unable to determine the exact location of the ignition source, it appears to have been aft of the engine in the vicinity of the junction between the augmentor assemblies and exhaust muffler assembly. The investigation identified no indication of a fire in the engine proper and no mechanical failures that would have prevented the normal operation of either engine.

The pilot was performing a positioning flight from Manaus-Aeroclube de Flores Airport to the international Airport of Manaus-Eduardo Gomes. Shortly after takeoff from runway 11 which is 860 metres long, the single engine aircraft failed to gain sufficient altitude. It collided with an electric pole, stalled and crashed in a wooded area. The pilot, sole occupant, was killed.

During the takeoff roll from runway 27 at Brooksville-Hernando County Airport, control was lost. The aircraft veered off runway and came to rest. All three crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew started the takeoff procedure from runway 09 at Craiova Airport in a visibility of 500 metres due to freezing fog. During the course, the aircraft deviated to the right, causing the right engine to struck a snow berm (one meter high). The right propeller was torn off then aircraft rolled for few metres before coming to rest in snow. All 55 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On the day of the accident, a mechanic taxied the airplane onto the runway and performed a full power check of both engines, exercised both propellers, and checked each magneto drop with no discrepancies reported. Following the engine run, the mechanic taxied the airplane to the fuel ramp where the fuselage fuel tank was filled; after fueling, the fuselage tank had 41.5 gallons of usable fuel. The mechanic then taxied the airplane to the ramp where the engines were secured and the fuel selector switches were placed to the off position. The mechanic reported that, at that time, the left fuel tank had 4 to 5 gallons of fuel, while the right fuel tank had about 2 to 3 gallons of fuel; the unusable fuel amount for each wing tank is 3 gallons. The pilot taxied the airplane to the approach end of runway 18 and was heard to apply takeoff power. A pilot-rated witness noted that, at the point of rotation, the airplane pitched up fairly quickly to about 20 degrees and rolled left to about 10 to 15 degrees of bank. The airplane continued rolling left to an inverted position and impacted the ground in a 40 degree nose-low attitude. A postcrash fire consumed most of the cockpit, cabin, both wings, and aft fuselage, including the vertical stabilizer, rudder, and fuselage fuel tank. Postaccident inspection of the flight controls, which were extensively damaged by impact and fire, revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Although the flap actuators were noted to be asymmetrically extended and no witness marks were noted to confirm the flap position, a restrictor is located at each cylinder’s downline port by design to prevent a rapid asymmetric condition. Therefore, it is likely that the flap actuators changed positions following impact and loss of hydraulic system pressure and did not contribute to the left roll that preceded the accident. Examination of the engines and propellers revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. Postaccident examination of the fuselage fuel sump revealed the left fuel selector was in the crossfeed position, while the right fuel selector was likely positioned to the on position. (The as-found positions of the fuel selector knobs were unreliable due to postaccident damage.) The starting engines checklist indicates that the pilot is to move both fuel selectors from the on position to the crossfeed position, and back to the on position while listening for valve actuation/movement. The before takeoff checklist indicates that the pilot is to verify that the selectors are in the on position. Although the left engine servo fuel injector did not meet flow tests during the postaccident investigation, this was attributed to postaccident heat damage. Calculations to determine engine rpm based on ground scars revealed that the left engine was operating just above idle, and the right engine was operating about 1,315 rpm, which is consistent with a left engine loss of power and the pilot reducing power on the right engine during the in-flight loss of control. Examination of both propellers determined that neither was feathered at impact. Although the as-found position of the left fuel selector knob could be considered unreliable because of impact damage during the accident sequence, given that right wing fuel tank had no usable fuel, it is unlikely that the experienced pilot would have moved the left fuel selector to the crossfeed position in response to the engine power loss. It is more likely that the pilot failed to return the left fuel selector to the on position during the starting engines checklist and also failed to verify its position during the before takeoff checklist; thus, the left engine was being fed only from the right fuel tank, which had very little fuel. There was likely enough fuel in the right tank and lines for the pilot to taxi and takeoff before the left engine failed, causing the airplane to turn to the left, from which the pilot did not recover.