Takeoff (climb)

The commercial pilot was distracted by the nose cargo door popping open during takeoff; the airplane stalled and collided with trees off the end of the runway. The pilot said there were no mechanical problems with the airplane or engines and that he was fixated on the cargo door and lost control of the airplane. He also said that due to stress, he was not mentally prepared to handle the emergency situation.

In the afternoon, the crew departed Annino AFB (Gorelovo) to complete a local training mission consisting of touch-and-go maneuvers. After two circuits, the aircraft landed normally and the crew took off and started the rotation without informing ATC. After liftoff, at a height of about 10-15 metres, the aircraft rolled to the right to an angle of 70° then stalled and crashed in a kindergarten located one km from the airport, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.

This was a commercial non scheduled flight which was being operated for air transport for local flights. The operator is based in Mombasa and mostly executes passenger flights to the Masai Mara and other game parks and reserves within the Republic of Kenya. On 22nd Aug 2012, the aircraft was scheduled to carry out a flight to the Masai Mara, do several sectors to pick and drop passengers and return to Moi international Airport via Ukunda Airport. The call sign was 5Y-UVP. The last point of departure was Ngerende Airstrip in the Masai Mara at 0917 with intention of onward flight to Mara North airstrip in the Masai Mara. The flight had earlier left Amboseli Airstrip with two crew, and 17 passengers for Ngerende Airstrip. 6 passengers had disembarked at Ngerende and the remaining 11 passengers were continuing to other destinations. No additional passengers or cargo was picked up from Ngerende airstrip. No refueling was done at the airstrip. The airfield is an unmanned airfield, with crew executing unmanned airfield communication procedures to execute approach and landings and also during takeoff. There is however a ground time keeper and a fueling bay at the airfield. Due to terrain and prevailing winds at the time of the flight, Runway 28 was in use. The crew was using unmanned airfield procedures and after the drop-off of 6 passengers, the aircraft lined up runway 28 and proceeded with the take off run. Ground staff at the airstrip reported a normal takeoff run and rotation. During the initial climb, the ground staff still had the aircraft in sight and reported to have seen the aircraft veer sharply to the left and then disappear behind terrain. Shortly afterwards, a loud sound was heard followed by dust in the air. Emergency SAR was initiated with the airport and hotel staff rushing to the accident site. The location of the accident was about 310 meters from the threshold of Runway 10, offset 30° to the left of the extended center line Runway 28. GPS coordinates (figure 1.2) 01.084189° S, 35.1781127° E, Ngerende airstrip. The accident occurred at 0917 UTC on 22nd Aug 2012, during daytime.

Shortly after a night takeoff from Jacarepaguá Airport, the single engine aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the sea. Few debris were found several days later. The pilot's body was found on September 4 on a beach in Barra de Tijuca. The wreckage and the copilot's body were never found. It was reported that the crew did not activate the transponder after takeoff and did not contact ATC for unknown reasons.

Several witnesses observed the airplane before and during its takeoff roll on the morning of the accident. One witness observed the airplane for the entire event and stated that the run-up of the engines sounded normal. During the takeoff roll, the acceleration of the airplane appeared a little slower but the engines continued to sound normal. Directional control was maintained, and at midfield, the airplane had still not rotated. As the airplane continued down the 5,132-foot-long runway, it did not appear to be accelerating, and, about 100 yards from the end of the runway, it appeared that it was not going to stop. The airplane maintained contact with the runway and turned slightly right before it overran the end of the runway. The airplane was subsequently destroyed by impact forces and a postaccident fire. The wreckage was located at the bottom of a deep gully off the end of the runway. Postaccident examination of the area at the end of the runway revealed two distinct tire tracks, both of which crossed the asphalt and dirt overrun of 175 feet. A review of the airplane's weight and balance and performance data revealed that it was within its maximum gross takeoff weight and center of gravity limits. At the time of the accident, the density altitude was calculated to be 7,100 feet; the airport's elevation is 4,830 feet. For the weight of the airplane and density altitude at the time of the accident, it should have lifted off 2,805 feet down the runway; the distance to accelerate to takeoff speed and then to safely abort the takeoff and stop the airplane was calculated to be 4,900 feet. It is unknown whether the pilot completed performance calculations accounting for the density altitude. All flight control components were accounted for at the accident site. Although three witnesses indicated that the engines did not sound right at some point during the runup or takeoff, examination of the engine and airframe revealed no evidence of any preexisting mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Propeller signatures were consistent with rotational forces being applied at the time of impact. No conclusive evidence was found to explain why the airplane did not rotate or why the pilot did not abort the takeoff once reaching the point to safely stop the airplane.

The twin engine aircraft was engaged in a special flight to the Tasiast Airstrip deserving the Gold Mine of Tasiast on behalf of the Kinross Gold Corporation. Shortly after take off from Nouakchott, while in initial climb, the aircraft stalled and crashed in a desert area located past the runway end, bursting into flames. All seven occupants were killed and aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. Both pilots were Mauritanian Customs Officers while among the passengers were three Security Officers of the Kinross Gold Corporation who were in charge to transfer a load of gold back to Nouakchott.

The aircraft started taking off from runway 27 threshold. Upon reaching a speed deemed proper by the pilot for rotation, the pilot noticed that the aircraft was not taking off, so he decided to abort the takeoff. While trying to stop the aircraft, it exited via the left side of the runway near the end, breaking through the fence that surrounds the aerodrome before coming to rest in trees. While all ten occupants were uninjured, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair with both wings sheared off.

According to a friend of the pilot, the pilot was taking the airplane to have an annual inspection completed. The friend assisted the pilot before departure and watched as the airplane departed. He did not notice any anomalies with the airplane during the takeoff or the climbout. According to a witness in the vicinity of the accident site, he heard the airplane coming toward him, and it was flying very low. He looked up and saw the airplane approximately 200 feet over his house and descending toward the trees. As he watched the airplane, he noticed that the right propeller was not turning, and the right engine was not running. He stated that the left engine sounded as if it was running at full power. The airplane pitched up to avoid a power line and rolled to the right, descending below the tree line. A plume of smoke and an explosion followed. Examination of the right propeller assembly revealed evidence of significant frontal impact. The blades were bent but did not have indications of rotational scoring; thus they likely were not rotating at impact. One preload plate impact mark indicated that the blades were at an approximate 23-degree angle; blades that are feathered are about 86 degrees. Due to fire and impact damage of the right engine and related system components, the reason for the loss of power could not be determined. An examination of the airframe and left engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. A review of the airplane maintenance logbooks revealed that the annual inspection was 12 days overdue. According to Lycoming Service Instruction No. 1009AS, the recommended time between engine overhaul is 1,200 hours or 12 years, whichever occurs first. A review of the right engine maintenance logbook revealed that the engine had accumulated 1,435 hours since major overhaul and that neither engine had been overhauled within the preceding 12 years. Although the propeller manufacturer recommends that the propeller be feathered before the engine rpm drops below 1,000 rpm, a review of the latest revision of the pilot operating handbook (POH) revealed that the feathering procedure for engine failure did not specify this. It is likely that the pilot did not feather the right propeller before the engine reached the critical 1,000 rpm, which prevented the propeller from engaging in the feathered position

The single engine aircraft was engaged in skydiving flights at Clinceni Airport. Shortly after takeoff, while climbing to a height of about 200 feet, the engine failed. The pilot attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crash landed in a field located 300 meters past the runway end. A skydiver was slightly injured while three other occupants were unhurt. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew was performing a cargo flight from Montevideo to Buenos Aires on behalf of DHL. The aircraft departed runway 24 at Montevideo-Carrasco Airport at 1945LT and the crew was cleared to climb to FL080. While reaching a height of 4,500 feet, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the sea at a speed of 570 knots which caused its disintegration off Flores Island. Few debris were found the following day floating on water but the main wreckage was localized two weeks later about one NM south of Flores Island. The CVR was found on 02AUG2012 but was unreadable as the content was concerning the last 30 minutes of the precedent flight. On 11FEB2013, fishermen found the cargo door in their fishnet. No trace of the cargo nor the crew was ever found.