Dalton

According to a friend of the pilot, the pilot was taking the airplane to have an annual inspection completed. The friend assisted the pilot before departure and watched as the airplane departed. He did not notice any anomalies with the airplane during the takeoff or the climbout. According to a witness in the vicinity of the accident site, he heard the airplane coming toward him, and it was flying very low. He looked up and saw the airplane approximately 200 feet over his house and descending toward the trees. As he watched the airplane, he noticed that the right propeller was not turning, and the right engine was not running. He stated that the left engine sounded as if it was running at full power. The airplane pitched up to avoid a power line and rolled to the right, descending below the tree line. A plume of smoke and an explosion followed. Examination of the right propeller assembly revealed evidence of significant frontal impact. The blades were bent but did not have indications of rotational scoring; thus they likely were not rotating at impact. One preload plate impact mark indicated that the blades were at an approximate 23-degree angle; blades that are feathered are about 86 degrees. Due to fire and impact damage of the right engine and related system components, the reason for the loss of power could not be determined. An examination of the airframe and left engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. A review of the airplane maintenance logbooks revealed that the annual inspection was 12 days overdue. According to Lycoming Service Instruction No. 1009AS, the recommended time between engine overhaul is 1,200 hours or 12 years, whichever occurs first. A review of the right engine maintenance logbook revealed that the engine had accumulated 1,435 hours since major overhaul and that neither engine had been overhauled within the preceding 12 years. Although the propeller manufacturer recommends that the propeller be feathered before the engine rpm drops below 1,000 rpm, a review of the latest revision of the pilot operating handbook (POH) revealed that the feathering procedure for engine failure did not specify this. It is likely that the pilot did not feather the right propeller before the engine reached the critical 1,000 rpm, which prevented the propeller from engaging in the feathered position

The pilot was cleared for a localizer approach by Atlanta Center and told to maintain 5,000 feet until crossing the final approach fix (FAF). Normal altitude at the FAF was 2,700 feet. The pilot was unable to land from this approach and performed a missed approach. He was handed off to Chattanooga Approach, then was cleared to cross the FAF at 3,000 feet and perform another localizer approach. About one mile from the FAF, the pilot was told to change to the airport advisory frequency. The pilot acknowledged, then there was no further communication with the aircraft. A short time later, witnesses heard the aircraft crash near the approach end of the runway. Examination of the crash site showed the aircraft had touched down in a grass area about 1,100 feet from the end of the runway, while on the localizer. Propeller slash marks showed both engines were operating at approach power and the aircraft was at approach speed. No evidence of precrash mechanical failure or malfunction of the aircraft structure, flight controls, systems, engines, or propellers was found. The 0621 weather was in part: 300 feet overcast and 1/2 mile visibility with fog. Minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the localizer approach was 1,180 feet msl; airport elevation was 710 feet. The pilot had flown 8 flight hours, was on duty for 13.6 hours the day before the accident, was off duty for about 6 hrs, and had about 4 hours of sleep before the accident flight.