Takeoff (climb)

The twin engine aircraft was completing a flight from La Carlota to the El Libertador AFB in Maracay on behalf of the National Institute for Cooperation and Education. Shortly after takeoff from La Carlota-General Francisco de Miranda AFB, while climbing, the aircraft rolled to the right, lost height and crashed, bursting into flames. All seven occupants were killed.

The twin engine aircraft departed Bogotá-El Dorado Airport at 0638LT. While climbing, the crew reported technical problems with the right engine and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. While completing a left turn, the crew lost control of the airplane that crashed near Empresa Triturados del Tolima, about 5 km north of the airport, some 7 minutes after takeoff. The aircraft was destroyed and all five occupants were killed.

After takeoff from Ponta Delgada-Nordela Airport, the aircraft encountered difficulties to gain height. It collided with power lines, stalled and crashed in the sea few dozen metres offshore. All seven crew members were killed.

The aircraft was dispatched out from Elmendorf AFB on an AWACS survey mission under call sign Yukla 27, carrying 20 passengers and four crew members. Shortly after takeoff from runway 05, while in initial climb, the aircraft collided with a flock of Canada geese that struck both left engines n°1 and 2. The aircraft climbed to a maximum height of about 250 feet when the engine n°1 failed and the engine n°2 exploded. The aircraft entered an uncontrolled left roll, causing the left wing to struck trees. Out of control, it crashed in a huge explosion in a wooded area located about a mile from the runway end. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 24 occupants were killed. Numerous dead geese were found at the crash site.

The pilot obtained a preflight briefing and indicated that he would obtain an IFR clearance after becoming airborne; however, he took off and did not activate a flight plan. Witnesses observed the airplane flying north (away from the destination) about 200 to 300 feet above the ground below a low overcast sky condition. One witness said the airplane was flying very slow; he said he was almost able to keep up with it in his vehicle. The witnesses said they saw the airplane roll rapidly to the right and descend toward the ground. It collided with the ground in an approximate 50 degree pitch down attitude. An on-scene examination did not reveal any airframe or control anomaly that would have resulted in the accident. The engines and propellers were disassembled for inspection. Examination of the engines revealed they were capable of producing power. Examination of the propellers revealed both were operating at low pitch settings. About 25 miles north-northwest at Battle Creek, MI, the 1145 edt weather was, in part: 500 feet overcast, visibility 2 miles with fog, wind from 050 degrees at 10 knots.

A witness stated he observed the airplane on climbout from runway 32. The airplane started a right turn estimated at about 30 to 45° angle of bank. The airplane stopped climbing and began descending. Subsequently, it collided with a tree line, while in a right bank, and then it impacted the ground. Weather conditions at the time of accident were described by the witness as very dark, with no ambient light or visible horizon. Examination of the airframe, flight control system, engine assembly, and propeller assembly revealed no evidence of a precrash failure or malfunction. The autopilot was found in the off position, and the autopilot circuit breakers were not tripped. The pilot and passenger were seriously injured and had no memory of the flight. A radio transcript revealed that after taking off, the flight had made one radio transmission to request an ifr clearance.

Two company pilots were undergoing first officer Metro III type-conversion flying training. Both had completed Metro III ground school training during the week before the accident. A company check-and-training pilot was to conduct the type conversions. This was his first duty period after 2 weeks leave. Before commencing leave, he had discussed the training with the chief pilot. This discussion concerned the general requirements for a co-pilot conversion course compared to a command pilot course but did not address specific sequences or techniques. The three pilots met at the airport at about 1530 EST on 16 September 1995. During the next 2 hours and 30 minutes approximately, the check-and-training pilot instructed the trainees in daily and pre-flight inspections, emergency equipment and procedures, and cockpit procedures and drills (including the actions to be completed in the event of an engine failure), as they related to the aircraft type. The briefing did not include detailed discussion of aircraft handling following engine failure on takeoff. The group began a meal break at 1800 and returned to the aircraft at about 1830 to begin the flying exercise. The check-and-training pilot was pilot in command for the flight and occupied the left cockpit seat. One trainee occupied the right (co-pilot) cockpit seat while the other probably occupied the front row passenger seat on the left side. This person had the use of a set of head-phones to listen to cockpit talk and radio calls. The aircraft departed Tamworth at 1852, some 40 minutes after last light. Witnesses described the night as very dark, with no moon. Under these conditions, the Tamworth city lighting, which extended to the east from about 2 km beyond the end of runway 12, was the only significant visual feature in the area. The co-pilot performed the takeoff, his first in the Metro III. For about the next 30 minutes, he completed various aircraft handling exercises including climbing, descending, turning (including steep turns), and engine handling. No asymmetric flight exercises were conducted. The check-and-training pilot then talked the co-pilot through an ILS approach to runway 30R with an overshoot and landing on runway 12L. The landing time was 1940. The aircraft had functioned normally throughout the flight. After clearing the runway, the aircraft held on a taxiway for 6 minutes, with engines running. During this period, the crew discussed the next flight which was to be flown by the same co-pilot. The check-and-training pilot stated that he was going to give the co-pilot a V1 cut. The co-pilot objected and then questioned the legality of night V1 cuts. The check-and-training pilot replied that the procedure was now legal because the company operations manual had been changed. The co-pilot made a further objection. The check-and-training pilot then said that they would continue for a Tamworth runway 30R VOR/DME approach and asked the co-pilot to brief him on this approach. The crew discussed the approach and the check-and-training pilot then requested taxi clearance. The aircraft was subsequently cleared to operate within a 15-NM radius of Tamworth below 5,000 ft. The crew then briefed for the runway 12L VOR/DME approach. The plan was to reconfigure the aircraft for normal two-engine operations after the V1 cut and then complete the approach. The crew completed the after-start checks, the taxi checks, and then the pre-take-off checks. The checks included the co-pilot calling for one-quarter flap and the check-and-training pilot responding that one-quarter flap had been selected. The crew briefed the take-off speeds as V1 = 100 kts, VR = 102 kts, V2 = 109 kts, and Vyse = 125 kts for the aircraft weight of 5,600 kg. Take-off torque was calculated as 88% and watermethanol injection was not required. The aircraft commenced the take-off roll at 1957.05. About 25 seconds after brakes release, the check-and-training pilot called 'V1', and less than 1 second later, 'rotate'. The aircraft became airborne at 1957.32. One second later, the check-and-training pilot reminded the co-pilot that the aircraft attitude should be 'just 10 degrees nose up'. After a further 3 seconds, the check-and-training pilot retarded the left engine power lever to the flight-idle position. Over the next 4 seconds, the recorded magnetic heading of the aircraft changed from 119 degrees to 129 degrees. The co-pilot and then the check-and-training pilot called that a positive rate of climb was indicated and the landing gear was selected up 15 seconds after the aircraft became airborne. The landing gear warning horn began to sound at approximately the same time. After 19 seconds airborne, and again after 30 seconds, the check-and-training pilot reminded the co-pilot to hold V2. Three seconds later, the check-and-training pilot said that the aircraft was descending. The landing gear warning horn ceased about 1 second later. By this time, the aircraft had gradually yawed left from heading 129 degrees, through the runway heading of 121 degrees, to 107 degrees. After being airborne for 35 seconds, the aircraft struck a tree approximately 350 m beyond, and 210 m left of, the upwind end of runway 12L. It then rolled rapidly left, severed power lines and struck other trees before colliding with the ground in an inverted attitude and sliding about 70 m. From the control tower, the aerodrome controller saw the aircraft become airborne. As it passed abeam the tower, the controller directed his attention away from the runway. A short time later, all lighting in the tower and on the airport failed and the controller noticed flames from an area to the north-east of the runway 30 threshold. Within about 30 seconds, when the emergency power supply had come on line, the controller attempted to establish radio contact with the aircraft. When no response was received, he initiated call-out of the emergency services.

The airplane was loaded with 10 sport parachutists and one pilot. Later, investigators calculated that the maximum gross weight was exceeded by 149.6 pounds, and the center of gravity was 2.87 inches aft of the aft limit. The cabin door had been removed for parachuting operations; however, an altered Flight Manual Supplement had been used as authority for the door removal. The airplane was not on the FAA-approved eligible list for such removal. The airplane needed to be refueled before flight, but the quantity of fuel in the airport's underground storage tank was below the electric cutoff level. Fuel was pumped manually from the storage tank into plastic jugs, which were used to refuel the airplane. Before takeoff, samples of fuel were reported to have been drained from the airplane's fuel tanks (sumps). According to witnesses, they heard an engine misfiring during takeoff. They observed the airplane level off during the initial climb and start a shallow right turn. The bank angle gradually increased from shallow to steep as the nose dropped and the airplane descended. Other witnesses observed the airplane in a steep dive just before it crashed in the rear of a residence. One person in the residence was killed. A postaccident fire destroyed the accessory sections of both engines. Examination of the airplane disclosed evidence that the right engine had been shut down and the right propeller had been feathered; however, no preimpact mechanical failure was found. A sample of excess fuel was obtained from the tank that was used to refuel the airplane, but no observable quantity of water or contamination was found.

The DC-3 aircraft, with the captain, first officer, and an apprentice aircraft maintenance engineer on board, was to be ferried from Vancouver, British Columbia, to Whitehorse, Yukon. Just after take-off from runway 08, as the first officer was setting the engine power, the right propeller began to over-speed. The captain told the first officer to shut down and feather the right engine. The first officer did as instructed, and advised the Vancouver tower controller of the engine problem and that they would return to the airport to land on runway 08. The captain turned the aircraft to the right, onto downwind for runway 08; however, because the aircraft's altitude and airspeed were decreasing, the first officer advised the tower controller that they would land on runway 30. The aircraft continued to lose height, narrowly avoiding buildings in its path, and crashed to the ground, one mile short of runway 30. The three occupants were seriously injured during the impact and the post-crash fire; the captain died of his injuries eight days after the accident.

During the takeoff roll on runway 34, at a speed of 65 mph, the pilot pulled up on the control column to rotate. The nose gear lifted off briefly before touching down again. In such conditions, the pilot decided to abort the takeoff and initiated an emergency braking manoeuvre. Unable to stop within the remaining distance (the aircraft already rolled for 2/3 of the runway), the aircraft overran and came to rest in a rocky and bushy area. All 11 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.