Tamworth

Two company pilots were undergoing first officer Metro III type-conversion flying training. Both had completed Metro III ground school training during the week before the accident. A company check-and-training pilot was to conduct the type conversions. This was his first duty period after 2 weeks leave. Before commencing leave, he had discussed the training with the chief pilot. This discussion concerned the general requirements for a co-pilot conversion course compared to a command pilot course but did not address specific sequences or techniques. The three pilots met at the airport at about 1530 EST on 16 September 1995. During the next 2 hours and 30 minutes approximately, the check-and-training pilot instructed the trainees in daily and pre-flight inspections, emergency equipment and procedures, and cockpit procedures and drills (including the actions to be completed in the event of an engine failure), as they related to the aircraft type. The briefing did not include detailed discussion of aircraft handling following engine failure on takeoff. The group began a meal break at 1800 and returned to the aircraft at about 1830 to begin the flying exercise. The check-and-training pilot was pilot in command for the flight and occupied the left cockpit seat. One trainee occupied the right (co-pilot) cockpit seat while the other probably occupied the front row passenger seat on the left side. This person had the use of a set of head-phones to listen to cockpit talk and radio calls. The aircraft departed Tamworth at 1852, some 40 minutes after last light. Witnesses described the night as very dark, with no moon. Under these conditions, the Tamworth city lighting, which extended to the east from about 2 km beyond the end of runway 12, was the only significant visual feature in the area. The co-pilot performed the takeoff, his first in the Metro III. For about the next 30 minutes, he completed various aircraft handling exercises including climbing, descending, turning (including steep turns), and engine handling. No asymmetric flight exercises were conducted. The check-and-training pilot then talked the co-pilot through an ILS approach to runway 30R with an overshoot and landing on runway 12L. The landing time was 1940. The aircraft had functioned normally throughout the flight. After clearing the runway, the aircraft held on a taxiway for 6 minutes, with engines running. During this period, the crew discussed the next flight which was to be flown by the same co-pilot. The check-and-training pilot stated that he was going to give the co-pilot a V1 cut. The co-pilot objected and then questioned the legality of night V1 cuts. The check-and-training pilot replied that the procedure was now legal because the company operations manual had been changed. The co-pilot made a further objection. The check-and-training pilot then said that they would continue for a Tamworth runway 30R VOR/DME approach and asked the co-pilot to brief him on this approach. The crew discussed the approach and the check-and-training pilot then requested taxi clearance. The aircraft was subsequently cleared to operate within a 15-NM radius of Tamworth below 5,000 ft. The crew then briefed for the runway 12L VOR/DME approach. The plan was to reconfigure the aircraft for normal two-engine operations after the V1 cut and then complete the approach. The crew completed the after-start checks, the taxi checks, and then the pre-take-off checks. The checks included the co-pilot calling for one-quarter flap and the check-and-training pilot responding that one-quarter flap had been selected. The crew briefed the take-off speeds as V1 = 100 kts, VR = 102 kts, V2 = 109 kts, and Vyse = 125 kts for the aircraft weight of 5,600 kg. Take-off torque was calculated as 88% and watermethanol injection was not required. The aircraft commenced the take-off roll at 1957.05. About 25 seconds after brakes release, the check-and-training pilot called 'V1', and less than 1 second later, 'rotate'. The aircraft became airborne at 1957.32. One second later, the check-and-training pilot reminded the co-pilot that the aircraft attitude should be 'just 10 degrees nose up'. After a further 3 seconds, the check-and-training pilot retarded the left engine power lever to the flight-idle position. Over the next 4 seconds, the recorded magnetic heading of the aircraft changed from 119 degrees to 129 degrees. The co-pilot and then the check-and-training pilot called that a positive rate of climb was indicated and the landing gear was selected up 15 seconds after the aircraft became airborne. The landing gear warning horn began to sound at approximately the same time. After 19 seconds airborne, and again after 30 seconds, the check-and-training pilot reminded the co-pilot to hold V2. Three seconds later, the check-and-training pilot said that the aircraft was descending. The landing gear warning horn ceased about 1 second later. By this time, the aircraft had gradually yawed left from heading 129 degrees, through the runway heading of 121 degrees, to 107 degrees. After being airborne for 35 seconds, the aircraft struck a tree approximately 350 m beyond, and 210 m left of, the upwind end of runway 12L. It then rolled rapidly left, severed power lines and struck other trees before colliding with the ground in an inverted attitude and sliding about 70 m. From the control tower, the aerodrome controller saw the aircraft become airborne. As it passed abeam the tower, the controller directed his attention away from the runway. A short time later, all lighting in the tower and on the airport failed and the controller noticed flames from an area to the north-east of the runway 30 threshold. Within about 30 seconds, when the emergency power supply had come on line, the controller attempted to establish radio contact with the aircraft. When no response was received, he initiated call-out of the emergency services.

VH-SWP was operating on a standard company flight plan for the route Bankstown-Tamworth-Armidale-Glen Innes-Inverell and return, and the flight plan indicated the flight would be conducted in accordance with IFR procedures. The classification of the flight was shown as non-scheduled commercial air transport although the aircraft was operating to a company schedule, and departure and flight times for each route segment were indicated on the flight plan. The aircraft departed Bankstown at about 0640 and proceeded as planned to Inverell where the pilot rested until his departure that afternoon for the return journey. The schedule required an Armidale departure at 1721. At 1723 the pilot reported to Sydney Flight Service that he was departing Armidale for Tamworth. The planned time for the flight was 17 minutes. Although the flight-planned altitude for this sector was 6,000 ft, the pilot was unable to climb immediately because a slower aircraft, which had departed Armidale for Tamworth two minutes earlier, was climbing to that altitude. In addition, there was opposite direction traffic at 7,000 ft. The next most suitable altitude was 8,000 ft, but separation from the other two aircraft, which were also IFR, had to be established by the pilot before further climb was possible. The published IFR lowest safe altitude for the route was 5,400 ft. The pilot subsequently elected to remain at 4,500 ft in visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and at 1727 requested an airways clearance from Tamworth Tower. A clearance was issued by ATC to the pilot to track direct to Tamworth at 4,500 ft visually. At about 1732 the pilot requested a descent clearance. He was cleared to make a visual approach with a clearance limit of 5 NM by distance measuring equipment (DME) from Tamworth, and was requested to report at 8 DME from Tamworth. The pilot acknowledged the instructions and reported leaving 4,500 ft on descent. Transmissions from ATC to the pilot less than two minutes later were not answered. The aircraft was not being monitored on radar by ATC, nor was this a requirement. At about 1740, reports were received by the police and ATC of an explosion and possible aircraft accident near the mountain range 8 NM north-east of Tamworth Airport. The aircraft wreckage was discovered at about 2115 by searchers on the mountain range.Soon after the aircraft was reported missing, a search aircraft pilot, who had extensive local flying experience, reported to ATC that the top of the range (where the accident occurred) was obscured by cloud, and that there was very low cloud in the valley nearby.

VH-NYG had departed Tamworth three days before the accident on an extended passenger charter through Sydney, Moree, Emerald, Brisbane, Moree, and Tamworth. On the day of the accident, the pilot had submitted a flight plan nominating a charter category, single pilot, Instrument Flight Rules flight from Brisbane to Moree, then Tamworth. The flight plan indicated that the aircraft carried 1400 Ib (635 kg) of fuel and had an endurance of 211 min. The aircraft, with four passengers on board, departed Brisbane at 0902 hours and landed at Moree at 1010 after an uneventful flight. All four passengers left the flight at Moree. The pilot reported taxiing at Moree to Dubbo Flight Service at 1047 and called airborne at 1050. At 1117 hours the aircraft was given a clearance to enter the Tamworth Control Zone on descent from 10000 ft. The pilot was told to expect a right downwind leg for runway 30. At 1125 the pilot requested a change of runway to runway 18, stating that there was a fuel flow problem with the left engine. The aerodrome controller (ADC) issued a change of runway (runway 18) to the aircraft, asking the pilot whether emergency conditions existed. The pilot answered in the negative and about 30 sec later informed the ADC that he was conducting one left orbit. The orbit was commenced at about 300 ft above ground level (agl) and approximately above the threshold of runway 18. The orbit was flown with an angle of bank of about 60°. The aircraft developed a high rate of descent during the orbit and rolled wings level in a pronounced nose-down attitude after turning through almost 360°. The aircraft then struck the ground in a grassed paddock about 350 m short of the threshold of runway 18 and in line with the right edge of the flight strip. The aircraft, largely intact, slid in the direction of the runway for 53 m before coming to rest. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Shortly after takeoff, while in initial climb, the right engine failed. The aircraft stalled and crashed near the runway end. All seven passengers were able to vacate the cabin while the pilot was seriously injured. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces.

The airplane departed Tamworth for a local flight. The pilot was completing aerobatics when the propeller detached. He lost control of the airplane that crashed near the airfield. Both occupants were killed.