Landing (descent or approach)

The approach was completed in low visibility due to poor weather conditions. The crew continued the approach and landed too far down the runway, reducing the landing distance available. After touchdown, th aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overrun and crashed in the Sobat River. Three crew and 24 passengers were killed while 30 other occupants were injured. Flight ZY001 was performed from Khartoum to Nasir with an intermediate stop in Malakal on behalf of the Sudanese Government. Several officials were on board, among them the Vice President, General Al Zubair Mohammed Saleh who was killed in the accident.

The three engine aircraft was completing a charter flight from Dübendorf to Samedan, carrying 17 passengers and three crew members. After touchdown on runway 03 at Samedan Airport, the aircraft deviated to the left. The crew elected to regain control but at a speed of 110 km/h, the aircraft struck a snow wall on a distance of 250 metres, causing severe damages to the left wing, left engine and left main gear. All 20 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

This final sector was flown at FL 50, with the aircraft in IMC conditions. The crew noted no indication of ice at this level and the use of the aircraft de-icing equipment was not required. Prior to their approach to Stornoway, the crew contacted ATC and noted the following information: Runway 36 in use, surface wind 260°/ 08 kt, visibility 15 km in light drizzle, cloud few at 800 feet and broken at 1,400 feet agl, temperature plus 7°C and QNH 1002 mb. The commander then briefed for a NDB/DME approach for Runway 36. With G-BLGB still at FL 50, the crew completed the 'Descent' checks and then, when cleared for the procedure completed the 'Approach' checks 'to the line'. The initial approach was normal and the crew were VMC at a range of approximately 8 nm from the airfield. At this stage the commander was certain of his geographical position and, with the agreement of his first officer, decided to continue visually. Although they were in sight of the surface, there appeared to be some patchy cloud in the direction of the airfield and neither pilot could see the runway. The crew completed the rest of the 'Approach' checks and then did the 'Final' checks down to 'Flaps'; Flap 15 had been selected. By now, the commander was level at his minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 430 feet amsl. Shortly afterwards, the crew acquired visual contact with the runway; the aircraft was to the right of the extended centreline and the crew could see the Precision Approach Path Indicators (PAPI) which were indicating 'four whites'; the commander estimated his range from the runway as one mile. He subsequently recalled that, at the time he considered 'going around' but, considering the length of Stornoway runway, decided to land. The commander called for "Full flap" and for "Props to max", and manoeuvred G-BLGB to the runway extended centreline. His subsequent approach was based on runway perspective with the intention of touching down beside the PAPIs. During this final approach, the first officer was monitoring the airspeed and initially called out "Plus 10"; this signified a speed of 113 kt based on a VAT of 103 kt. Thereafter, he called "Plus 5", "VAT" and then "Minus 5" before calling for "Power" on several occasions just before touchdown. Neither pilot could remember the PAPI lights during this final part of the approach and the commander did not think that he exceeded 1,000 feet per minute rate of descent. He was certain that the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) had not activated during the final approach. The commander remembers pulling back on the control wheel just before touchdown but that this had no effect on the rate of descent; he also advanced the power levers but the aircraft had landed before any increase in power was apparent. Touchdown was 'Firm' and beside the PAPIs. On landing, there was a 'bang' and the left side of the aircraft went down. G-BLGB slewed to the left and the commander used full right rudder and brake in an attempt to counter this movement. The aircraft came to rest at the left edge of the runway. With the aircraft stopped, the first officer shut both engines down and the commander switched off the 'Electrics'. The commander then opened the door to the cabin and, saw that the rear emergency door at the rear right side was open and the evacuation was in progress; the flight crew followed the passengers out of the door. Immediately following the landing, the first officer declared a 'problem' to ATC. The controller had been monitoring the approach and noted the apparent lack of a normal flare; following the call from the crew, he immediately activated the 'Crash Alarm'. Within 30 seconds, the AFS had manned their vehicles and had checked in with the controller; the AFS were cleared direct to the aircraft and arrived there within a minute of the initial call. There was no indication of fire but, with fluid leaking from the right gear, the AFS sprayed the area with foam.

On February 9, 1998, about 0954 central standard time (CST), a Boeing 727-223 (727), N845AA, operated by American Airlines as flight 1340, impacted the ground short of the runway 14R threshold at Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD) while conducting a Category II (CAT II) instrument landing system (ILS) coupled approach. Twenty-two passengers and one flight attendant received minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane, being operated by American Airlines as a scheduled domestic passenger flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121, with 116 passengers, 3 flight crewmembers, and 3 flight attendants on board, was destined for Chicago, Illinois, from Kansas City International Airport (MCI), Kansas City, Missouri. Daylight instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

After landing at Navegantes-Itajaí Airport, the crew encountered unknown difficulties. The aircraft overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest in a grassy area. All 25 occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft departed Geneva-Cointrin Airport at 1220LT with three crew members and two passengers on a short flight to Chambéry where additional passengers should embark before a flight to Riyadh. After being cleared for an ILS approach to runway 18, the crew continued the descent in relative good weather conditions. On final approach, the aircraft descended below the glide until it struck the water surface of Lake of Bourget and crashed one km short of runway. All five occupants evacuated the cabin and jumped in a 4° C water. The aircraft lost its tail and sank by a depth of 33 metres. The stewardess suffered a broken arm.

On February 3, 1998 at about 1200 eastern standard time, a Douglas DC3C, N200MF, registered to Missionary Flights International, as a 14 CFR Part 91 passenger flight experienced a total loss of engine power on both engines and made a forced landing 1 mile from the Greater Exuma Airport, Moss Town, Bahamas. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an IFR flight plan was filed. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The airline transport pilot-in-command (PIC), commercial pilot first officer, and 24 passengers reported no injuries. The flight originated from Moss Town about 1 hour 52 minutes before the accident.

SAIL King Air F90 aircraft VT-ELZ was involved in an accident near Bhilai Airfield on 02-02-98 during private flight from I.G.I. Airport, New Delhi to Bhilai Airfield. The pilot while on direct track to Bhilai at 76 DME from Raipur and FL070 insisted for further descent reporting bad weather. ATC Raipur cleared him for descend to 2,700 feet on QNH of Raipur i.e. below MORA and MSA. On descending the navigation and communication guidance became intermittent and unreliable. Due to severe weather activities the aircraft diverted 40 NMs right of the track. The pilot while steering in the Easterly direction i.e. towards the destination in the darkness on the evening hours flew into rising terrain and collided with a hill resulting into fatal injuries to all the occupants
and post accident fire. Aircraft was completely destroyed. Crash occurred 10 minutes to ETA.

The pilot departed in visual meteorological conditions of three to four miles visibility with high ceilings. He stated the airplane encountered freezing rain about five miles south of the airport while in cruise flight at 1,200 feet msl, and rapidly accumulated ice on the airframe, wings, and windshield. The pilot said he initially changed altitude in an attempt to exit the icing conditions. Ice accumulation continued, so he elected to return. While maneuvering to land at the airport, the airplane was unable to maintain altitude at full engine power. He said that any angle of bank resulted in the onset of pre stall buffet, so he decided to land on a frozen lake south of the airport. He said that the airplane did not reach the lake, 'mushed into the ground,' and during the flare/touchdown, the left wing stalled. The pilot did not have access to the official weather prior to departure. The National Weather Service contracted observer, made his observation from a location about five miles south of the official weather station at the airport. The FAA AWOS-3 was inoperative. Examination of the airplane after the accident revealed a 1/2 inch layer of clear ice covering all the upper and lower airfoil surfaces of the airplane, from leading edges to between 1/3 and 1/2 of the chords. All antennas were coated with approximately 1/2 inch of clear ice. The airplane was not equipped with ice protection equipment except for pitot heat and windshield heat.

According to the pilot, upon landing in heavy rain, the airplane began hydroplaning. He said the airplane departed the left side of the runway, striking trees, which damaged both wings and collapsed the landing gear. A witness stated the airplane touched down in moderate rain.