Landing (descent or approach)

At 1700 MST, Alberta Citylink flight 933, C-FBIE, a British Aerospace Jetstream 31, serial number 815, took off from Calgary, on a scheduled flight to Lloydminster, Alberta. The aircraft carried a two-pilot crew, 13 passengers, and 250 pounds of freight and baggage. A non-precision automatic direction finder (ADF) approach was conducted to runway 25. The first officer was flying the approach, and when the runway environment became visual, the captain took control, requested 35 degrees of flap, and commenced the final descent to the runway. On touchdown, the left main landing gear collapsed and both propellers struck the runway surface. The aircraft slid along the runway on the belly pod for about 1 800 feet, and when the left wing contacted snow on the edge of the runway, the aircraft turned about 160 degrees. The passengers and crew evacuated through the over-wing exit. There was no fire and no injuries. The Board determined that an unstabilized approach resulted in a heavy landing because the captain changed the configuration of the aircraft, and the high rate of descent was not arrested before contact was made with the runway surface. Contributing to the high rate of descent were the reduction of engine power to flight idle, airframe ice, and the time available for the final descent. Contributing to the damage on landing was the left-to-right movement of the aircraft.

The encountered high winds on approach and landing at Alghero Airport. Upon touchdown on runway 03, the aircraft encountered unfavorable winds and floated before landing 750 metres past the runway 03 threshold. The aircraft landed hard, nose gear first. The aircraft bounced and landed firmly 1,300 metres further, to the right of the runway. It lost its undercarriage and came to rest after a distance of 400 metres. All 25 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, crosswinds were gusting up to 42 knots.

The aircraft was transferred from Gomel to Kunovice for maintenance purposes. On approach to Kunovice, the crew encountered poor weather conditions and decided to divert to Brno-Tuřany Airport where the conditions were poor as well. Two approaches were abandoned. During the third attempt to land, in a gear up/flaps up configuration, the aircraft crashed 3,5 km from the runway threshold and was destroyed upon impact. Both pilots were killed. At the time of the accident, the visibility was reduced to 50 metres due to thick fog.

The flight crew was positioning the airplane in preparation for a revenue flight when it crashed 2 nautical miles (nm) short of the runway during a second instrument landing system approach in instrument meteorological conditions. Except for the final 48 seconds of the 25- minute flight, the captain was the flying pilot, and the first officer was the nonflying pilot. When the airplane was about 0.5 nm inside the outer marker on the first approach, the compass warning flag on the captain's course deviation indicator appeared, indicating that the heading display was unreliable. The airplane deviated from the localizer centerline to the left but continued to descend. After about 1 minute, during which time the airplane's track continued to diverge from the localizer centerline, the flight crew executed a missed approach. The flight crew then unsuccessfully attempted to clear the compass flag by resetting circuit breakers. The captain directed the first officer to request a second approach. Contrary to company crew coordination procedures, the flight crew did not conduct an approach briefing or make altitude callouts for either approach. Although accurate heading information was available to the captain on his radio magnetic indicator, he experienced difficulty tracking the localizer course as the airplane proceeded past the outer marker on the second approach. The captain transferred control to the first officer when the airplane was 1.9 nm inside the outer marker. The airplane then began to deviate below the glideslope. The descent continued through the published decision height of 200 feet above ground level, and the airplane struck 80-foot-tall trees. Post accident testing revealed that the first officer's instruments were displaying a false full fly-down glideslope indication because of a failed amplifier in the navigation receiver. The glideslope deficiency was discovered 2 months before the accident by another flight crew. An FAA repair station attempted to resolve the problem and misdiagnosed it as "sticking" needles in the cockpit instruments. The operator was immediately advised of the problem. The operator's minimum equipment list for the airplane required that the problem be repaired within 10 days, but the operator improperly deferred maintenance on it for 60 days and allowed the unairworthy airplane to be flown by the accident flight crew. The airplane was not equipped with, nor was it required to be equipped with, a ground proximity warning system, which would have sounded 40 seconds before impact.

On approach to runway 21, the crew encountered poor weather conditions and limited visibility. unable to establish a visual contact with the runway, the captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure. While on a second approach to runway 03 which is 1,620 metres long, the aircraft was too high on the glide and landed about half way down the runway. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, it overran, lost its undercarriage and collided with an earth mound located 67 metres past the runway end. All 74 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

After departing on an IFR flight in VFR conditions, the flight had been cleared to climb from 3,000 to 4,000 feet, when the right engine lost power. The pilots diverted toward an uncontrolled airport, secured the right engine, & cancelled their IFR clearance. They made an approach to land on runway 15, then attempted a single engine go-around. During the go-around, the airplane yawed/rolled to the right in what the passenger believed was a VMC roll. It then struck power lines & crashed in a right wing low attitude. Investigation revealed that both pilots held multi-engine ratings. The owner said the pilot (PIC) had flown the airplane for a short time on 12/21/98; however, no other record was found to verify that either the pilot or copilot had flight experience in this make/model of airplane. Examination of the wreckage revealed evidence that the flaps were retracted, the landing gear was in transit, the left propeller was operating with power, & the right propeller was feathered. The airplane had a history of fuel flow fluctuations in the right engine. The diaphragm (P/N 364446) in the right engine distributor valve assembly was found ruptured. It was an old style diaphragm, which was colored black. Bendix Service Bulletin RS-76, issued 11/15/80, called for replacement of the black diaphragm with a red fluorosilicone diaphragm (P/N 245088) at overhaul. The engine was overhauled in June 1992. During maintenance in December 1997, both fuel system injectors & nozzles were tested; however, the distributor valve assembles were not tested. Calculations showed the airplane was loaded 116.3 lbs over the maximum allowable gross weight & 1.3 inches forward of the allowable CG range.

The aircraft landed a little too far down the runway and bounced twice. Out of control, it skidded and overran the runway before coming to rest in a ditch. All eight occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot initiated an ILS approach with rain and fog. Approach flaps were maintained until the runway was sighted, and then landing flaps were set. The airplane landed long, overran the runway, struck the ILS localizer antenna on the departure end of the runway, and came to rest at the edge of a mobile home park. The airplane and two mobile homes were destroyed by fire. Vref had been computed at 110 Kts. The PIC reported a speed on final of 130 Kts, while the SIC said it was 140 Kts. Radar data revealed a 160 knots ground speed from the outer marker until 1.8 miles from touchdown. The airplane passed the control tower, airborne, with 2,500 feet of runway remaining on the 6,500 foot long runway. Performance data revealed that the airplane would require about 2,509 feet on a dry runway, and 5,520 feet on a wet runway. The airplane was not equipped with thrust reversers or anti-skid brakes. The PIC was the company president, and the SIC was a recent hire who had flown with the PIC three previous times. The PIC was qualified for single-pilot operations in the airplane, and had been trained to fly stabilized approaches.

While descending to Tehran-Mehrabad Airport, the crew was informed about the poor weather conditions at destination with snow falls, low visibility and a 20 knots tailwind. The crew decided to divert to Isfahan-Shahid Beheshti Airport. On approach, the crew encountered limited visibility due to foggy conditions. The aircraft struck the ground, lost its undercarriage and slid for almost one km before coming to rest in a desert area located 8 km short of runway 26. All 113 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On approach to Tampico-General Francisco Javier Mina Airport, the crew established on the ILS. The aircraft descended below the glide and MDA until it struck the ground and crashed in a lagoon located 12,8 km short of runway. A pilot and two passengers were killed while five other occupants were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.