Landing (descent or approach)

Regency Express Air Operations Flight 434, a Cessna 208 Caravan (serial number 208B0061), was en route from Vancouver International Airport to Victoria International Airport, British Columbia, on a night visual flight rules (VFR) flight when it collided with trees on Saltspring Island, about five nautical miles (nm) north of the Victoria International Airport. The aircraft broke apart on impact and a post-crash fire occurred. The two pilots, who were the sole occupants of the aircraft, sustained fatal injuries, and the aircraft was destroyed. The accident occurred at 0030 Pacific standard time (PST).

The pilot, sole on board, departed Kathmandu-Tribhuvan Airport on a positioning flight to Namche Bazar to pick up passengers. During the pre-flight briefing, he was informed about the good weather conditions along the route and at destination. But en route, these conditions deteriorated and upon arrival, clouds were present up to 3,600 metres. He made several circuits expecting weather improvement. Few minutes later, he saw a hole in the clouds and initiated a descent when the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Kongri Himal located 3 km north of the airfield. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was killed.

The single engine airplane was completing a charter flight with seven passengers and two pilots on board. While approaching Koror Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with limited visibility due to heavy rain falls. The crew decided to abandon the approach and made a go-around procedure. Few minutes later, a second attempt to land was also abandoned, as well as a third and a fourth attempt. During the fifth approach, the aircraft crashed few km from the airport, killing all nine occupants. It was reported that the crew was trying to land under VFR mode in IMC conditions.

The aircraft departed Ostend Airport at 0328LT on a cargo flight to Lagos, carrying five crew members and a load of 35 tons of electronics. About 20 minutes into the flight, while cruising at an altitude of 24,000 feet over the border between Brussels and Paris ARTCC, the crew informed ATC about severe turbulences. Few seconds later, he reported the loss of the engine n°3 that separated and elected to return to Ostend. After being cleared, the crew started a circuit and while descending to Ostend Airport, the hydraulic systems failed. The crew completed a holding pattern to burn fuel and was later cleared to land on runway 26. After touchdown, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran, lost its undercarriage, slid for few dozen metres and eventually came to rest near the localizer antenna. All five crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The twin engine aircraft was approaching Giebelstadt AFB when it crashed in the Sommerhausen zoo located about 8 km northeast of the airfield. Both pilots were killed.

The first officer of AirTran Airways flight 890, which preceded AirTran flight 867 in the accident airplane, identified and reported a leak from the right engine of the Boeing 737-200 during a postflight inspection at William B. Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport (ATL), Georgia. AirTran mechanics at ATL identified the source of the leak as a chafed hydraulic pressure line to the right thrust reverser. They found the part in the illustrated parts catalog (IPC), which was not designed as a troubleshooting document and does not contain sufficient detail for such use. One of the mechanics telephoned an AirTran maintenance controller in Orlando, Florida, for further instructions. The mechanics who initially identified the source of the leak had little experience working on the Boeing 737 because they had worked for ValuJet Airlines, which flew DC-9s only, until ValuJet and AirTran merged in September 1997. On the basis of the information provided by the mechanic, and without questioning his description of the line or verifying the part number that he had provided against the IPC or some other appropriate maintenance document, the maintenance controller instructed the mechanic to cap the leaking line and deactivate the right thrust reverser in accordance with AirTran's Minimum Equipment List procedures. However, instead of capping the hydraulic pressure line, the mechanics capped the right engine hydraulic pump case drain return line. The mechanics performed a leak check by starting the auxiliary power unit and turning on the electric hydraulic pumps to pressurize the airplane's hydraulic systems; no leaks were detected. Although the mechanics were not required by company procedures to test their repair by running the engines, this test would have alerted the mechanics that they had incorrectly capped the hydraulic pump case drain line, which would have overpressurized the hydraulic pump and caused the hydraulic pump case seal to rupture. However, because the mechanics did not perform this test, the overpressure and rupture occurred during the airplane's climb out, allowing depletion of system A hydraulic fluid. Depletion of system A hydraulic fluid activated the hydraulic low-pressure lights in the cockpit, which alerted the flight crew that the airplane had a hydraulic problem. The crew notified air traffic control that the airplane would be returning to ATL and subsequently declared an emergency. The flight crew's initial approach to the airport was high and fast because of the workload associated with performing AirTran's procedures for the loss of hydraulic system A and the limited amount of time available to perform the procedures. Nevertheless, the crew was able to configure and stabilize the airplane for landing. However, depletion of system A hydraulic fluid disabled the nosewheel steering, inboard flight spoilers, ground spoilers, and left and right inboard brakes. The flight crew was able to land the airplane using the left thrust reverser (the right thrust reverser was fully functional but intentionally deactivated by the mechanics), outboard brakes (powered by hydraulic system B), and rudder. The flight crew used the left thrust reverser and rudder in an attempt to control the direction of the airplane down the runway, but use of the rudder pedals in this manner had depleted the system A accumulator pressure, which would have allowed three emergency brake applications. The use of the right outboard brake without the right inboard brake at a higher-than-normal speed (Vref for 15-degree flaps is faster than Vref for normal landing flaps) and with heavy gross weight (the airplane had consumed only 4,650 pounds of the 28,500 pounds of fuel on board at takeoff) used up the remaining friction material on the right outboard brake, causing it to fail. (The left outboard brake was still functional at this point.) The lack of brake friction material on the right outboard brake caused one of the right outboard brake pistons to overtravel and unport its o-ring, allowing system B hydraulic fluid to leak out; as a result, the left outboard brake also failed. Loss of the left and right inboard and outboard brakes, loss of nosewheel steering, and use of asymmetric thrust reverse caused the flight crew to lose control of the airplane, which departed the left side of the runway and came to rest in a ditch.

The aircraft was completing a humanitarian flight from Playa Grande to Quetzaltenango on behalf of the Living Water Teaching Ministries owned by Jim and Marion Zirkle. On board were 16 passengers and two pilots, among them doctors and a load of medicines and first aid kits for the victims of hurricane Mitch. The approach was completed in poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls and thick fog when the aircraft struck the ground few km from the airport. Seven people were rescued while 11 others were killed, among them Jim Zirkle and his son.

Following an uneventful flight from Rio de Janeiro-Santos Dumont Airport, the pilot started the descent to Joinville Airport by night and marginal weather conditions. He was informed about the visibility at destination being 2 km with ceiling at 650 feet. At 2032LT, he initiated the approach and reported to ATC that if it was raining, he would divert to Curitiba. Four minutes later, on final approach, the twin engine aircraft struck trees and crashed about 15 km southeast of runway 33 threshold. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all three occupants were killed.

The Part 135 cargo flight was approaching its destination on an IFR flight plan. The pilot had requested the ILS-DME approach to runway 10, but 2 minutes later, he changed his request to the VOR-B approach to runway 28. ARTCC cleared him for the approach to the non-towered airport. The pilot contacted the airport's Unicom, and requested that the ramp personnel be standing by with fuel and oxygen. The airplane was found 5.8 nm from the approach end of runway 28, at 7,900 feet. The approach minimums for the VOR-B was 7,900 feet, which the pilot could descend to at 8.7 nm. The VOR was located 285 degrees at 13.6 nm from the accident site, and the ILS-DME transmitter was located 285 degrees at 5.6 nm from the accident site. The airplane was equipped with a single DME display head, and it had a Nav 1/Nav 2 selector switch.

The Learjet was participating in water ingestion tests, which required multiple landing rolls through a diked pool on the runway. On one of the landing rolls, the airplane's left main landing gear and nose landing gear tracked through the pool, while the right main landing gear tracked outside the pool. The airplane veered to the left, departed the left side of the runway, and struck a pickup truck parked adjacent to the runway. The airplane came to rest inverted and on fire. Formal hazard identification and risk management procedures were not employed and no alignment cues were in place on the runway to facilitate pool entry alignment. Further, the accident truck, other vehicles, heavy equipment, and personnel were placed hundreds of feet inside the FAA recommended runway-safe and object-free areas during the test.