Landing (descent or approach)

After takeoff from Libreville-Léon M'Ba Airport, while in initial climb, the crew reported an engine failure and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. On final approach, the aircraft stalled and crashed onto several houses located in a district few km short of runway threshold. The aircraft and several houses were destroyed but there were no casualties on the ground. Nevertheless, both pilots were killed.

While approaching Tegucigalpa-Toncontin Airport runway 01 in IMC conditions, the aircraft descended too low and crashed 10 km short of runway at an altitude of 5,325 feet. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were killed. The minimum altitude for the approach at the crash site is 6,700 feet. After crossing the 5 DME fix, a flight can descend to 5,200 feet.

Thai Airways International flight 261, an Airbus A310, left Bangkok-Don Mueang International Airport, Thailand at 17:54 hours local time for a domestic flight to Surat Thani. At 18:26 hours, the copilot first established contact with the Surat Thani approach controller while the aircraft was 70 nautical miles away from Surat Thani Airport. The controller radioed that the crew could expect a VOR/DME instrument approach to runway 22. At that time surface wind was calm with a visibility of 1500 meters, light rain and a cloud base of 1800 feet. At 18:39 hours the copilot contacted Surat Thani aerodrome controller and reported over the Intermediate Fix (IF). The controller informed him that the precision approach path indicators (PAPI) on the right side of runway 22 were unserviceable while the left lights were in use. At 18:41 hours, the copilot reported passing final approach fix (FAF). The controller informed the pilot that the aircraft was not in sight but it was cleared to land on runway 22. The surface wind was blowing from 310 degrees at a velocity of 5 knots so the pilots should be careful or the slippery runway. At 18:42 hours, the copilot reported that the runway was in sight and later on the controller also had the aircraft in sight. The pilot decided to go-around. The controller asked the pilot about the distance where the runway could be seen. The copilot reported that it could be seen at 3 nautical miles and requested for the second approach. The controller requested to report over FAF . When the copilot reported that the flight was over the FAF again, the controller cleared the flight to land although he again could not see the runway. When the flight crew failed to observe the runway lights, the captain decided to go around again. Again the controller instructed the flight to report over the FAF and reported that visibility had decreased to 1,000 meters in light rain. At 19:05, after reporting over the FAF, the flight was cleared to land on runway 22. The flight maintained the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) but the crew were unable to see the runway. The autopilot was disconnected and a little later the captain decided to go around. The pitch attitude increased continuously. The pitch attitude reached approximately 40°, when the pilot applied the elevator decreasing the pitch attitude to 32-33°. When he discontinued applying elevator the pitch increased to 47-48°. Consequently the speed decreased to 100 knots. The captain was not aware of the attitude due to stress and the expectation that the go around was flown exactly like the first two go-arounds. The airplane lost altitude until it impacted terrain to the left of the runway. 45 people survived and 101 others were killed, including 11 crew members.

The flight departed Fort Lauderdale's Executive Airport (FXE) at about 1833 on a northwesterly heading for the co-located Pahokee VOR/airport (PHK) on the second training session of the day for the 2 front seat occupants. This particular flight had a dual purpose, in that the left seat occupant/new-hire was getting a 'pre-check ride' by the right seat occupant/instructor/PIC, and the instructor was being observed by the air taxi's director of operations in anticipation of an endorsement for an FAA designation as a company check airman. The flight was not in contact with any ATC facility and was squawking a transponder code consistent with non-controlled, VMC flight. At 1902, the Miami ARTCC lost radar contact at the 334 degree radial/12 nmi from the PHK VOR at 1,300 feet agl. Eight days later, the wreckage with its 3 occupants still inside, was located and recovered from the lake bottom. The location roughly corresponds with the radial of the PHK VOR that would have to be tracked while performing the VOR Runway 17 approach. The wreckage was intact except for 2 nacelle doors, the nose cone, and the left propeller, and revealed no engine, airframe, or component failure or malfunction. There was no evidence of a bird strike. Evidence revealed that both engines were developing power and the airplane was wings level in the approach configuration and attitude at water contact.

After takeoff from Istanbul-Atatürk Airport, on a positioning flight to Antalya, the crew reported technical problems and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. After touchdown, the twin engine aircraft went out of control, veered off runway and eventually collided with containers stored by the apron, bursting into flames. Both pilots were killed.

The airplane collided with the tops of trees during an ILS approach near the middle marke. Witnesses heard the airplane strike the trees and a '...whop, whop, whop sound...' it made as it continued its flight. Other witnesses observed the airplane flying a curved, descending, flight path until the aircraft impacted the ground. Visibility was reported as 1/2 mile at the airport. The on-scene examination revealed no airframe or engine anomalies that would prevent flight. A section of the right propeller and other pieces of airframe were found along the approach path after initial impact with trees. The trees along the flight path were about 30 to 60 feet high. The tops of the taller trees were broken or had fresh cut marks on their limbs. The pilot's blood alcohol level was 216 (mg/dL, mg/hg).

A witness observed the airplane circle to land at the completion of an NDB approach. The nighttime meteorological conditions were an 800 feet ceiling, 1 mile visibility in blowing snow, and 26 knot winds. The surrounding terrain was essentially flat, snow covered, and featureless. The witness saw the airplane on final approach misaligned for the runway, and then disappear below an 18 feet msl bluff. He transmitted on the radio to 'get out of there,' and heard no response. About 10 minutes later the accident pilot walked up to the witness' airplane. The pilot told the investigator-in-charge that he was 'beat around by the winds, ...it was snowing pretty hard, I always had the lights, and I was concentrating on the runway. The next thing I knew I was on the ground short of the runway.' The pilot's previous experience to this airport was during daytime, and during visual conditions. The airport, which was being transferred from the Air Force to the North Slope Borough, has medium intensity runway lights (MIRL), and runway end identifier lights (REILS). It does not have visual approach slope indicator (VASI) lights.

During the landing roll, the nose gear settled onto the runway, and the aircraft veered hard to the right. Application of the left brake had no effect. The airplane skidded, exited the runway, struck a runway marker, and collapsed the nose landing gear. The steering actuator had failed, the hydraulic fluid was lost from the steering actuator, and the fuselage received structural damage. The steering actuator assembly, p/n 1501-4, had accumulated 5,938.0 hours since new and had not been repaired or overhauled. Examination of the nose gear steering actuator cylinder by the metallurgist revealed that the cylinder fracture was the result of fatigue cracking initiated by an abrupt machining transition from the 45 degree thread ring chamfer to the straight wall of the cylinder. The engineering drawings appear to depict the radius at the fatigue origin as a continuation of the 0.03 inch to 0.06 inch radius adjacent to the fracture. However, the drawing is not clear on the specific intent of the transition between the nearby radius and the internal threads for the nut.

A float-equipped Cessna Caravan, 5N-PAN, departed Lagos (LOS) on a chartered flight to Warri with a scheduled stop-over at Lekki. The aircraft was airborne at 07:34 hours UTC and was cleared to 1,000 feet by Lagos Tower and landed at Lekki at 07:42 hours UTC. At 08:20 hours UTC, the aircraft departed Lekki and called Lagos Approach which cleared it to 3,500 feet with further instructions for the aircraft to report at TMA. The aircraft reported at TMA and continued its normal flight at 3,500 feet. On contact with Escravos Tower, it requested for a descent from 3,500 feet to 700 feet in order to overfly the Chevron facility at Opuekaba for an aerial inspection. After the inspection, the aircraft was cleared to 2,500 feet to resume its normal flight to Warri. The pilot made an outbound turn to line up for the final approach to runway 03. At about five nm DME from Warri the pilot chose to reduce speed to 120 knots and he selected gear down with flap 15°. At three nautical miles out, the aircraft was about 900 feet high above the approach path, and cleared to land. The aircraft was now configured for landing with flap at 30° and the pilot reduced the speed to between 85 and 90 knots. At about 1.5 miles out, the aircraft was between 350 - 400 feet high, gliding with 400 lb of torque, the pilot felt a small shudder from the engine which was instantaneously followed by a need for power input, so he advanced the throttle but there was no response from the engine. He quickly retracted the flaps and feathered the propeller. Then the pilot re-selected flap 30° and also unfeathered the propeller which restored the engine to full torque. The pilot decided to abandon the approach mainly because of the a building structure ahead, close to the runway threshold. The pilot chose to veer the airplane to the left of the approach path centerline and ditched into the swampy terrain, cutting through some scattered trees and shrubbery.

After takeoff from Lago Argentino Airport, a red warning light came on in the cockpit panel, informing the crew about the incomplete retraction of the left main gear. The crew proceeded to a visual inspection and after confirmation that the left main gear was properly secured in its wheel well, the crew decided to continue to Río Gallegos. On approach, the left main gear did not deploy. After the crew failed to extend it manually, he raised the other landing gear and completed a belly landing. On short final, just prior to flare, both engines were shut down and their propellers were feathered. The aircraft landed on its belly, slid for few dozen metres and came to rest. All seven occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.