Istanbul-Atatürk

On November 21, 2019, a regular THY2UT flight en-route Istanbul – Odesa at B737-800 aircraft, nationality and registration mark TC-JGZ of the Turkish Airlines, was performed by the aircraft crew consisting of the Pilot-in-Command (PIC), co-pilot and four flight attendants of the aircraft. In fact, the departure from Istanbul Airport was performed at 17:33. The actual aircraft landing took place at 18:55. According to the flight plan, the alternate aerodromes were Istanbul and Chișinău. There were 136 passengers and 2793 kg of luggage on board the aircraft. The PIC was a Pilot Flying, and the co-pilot was a Pilot Monitoring of the aircraft. The pre-flight briefing of the crew, according to its explanations, was carried out before departure from the Istanbul Airport, after which the PIC took the decision to perform the flight. The climb and level flight were performed in the normal mode. The landing approach was performed to the Runway16 with ILS system at a significant crosswind component of variable directions. At the final stage of approaching with ILS to Runway 16, the ATC controller of the aerodrome control tower (ATC Tower) gave the aircraft crew a clearance for landing. The aircraft crew confirmed the controller’s clearance and continued the landing approach. Subsequently, from a height of about 50 meters, the aircraft performed a go-around due to the aircraft non-stabilization before landing. Following the go-around, the aircraft headed to the holding area to wait for favorable values of wind force and direction. At 18:45, the PIC took the decision to carry out a repeated landing approach, reported of that to the ATC controller, who provided ATS in the Odesa Terminal Maneuvering Area (TMA.) At 18:51, the crew re-contacted the Tower controller and received the clearance to land. At 18:55, after touchdown, during the runway run, the aircraft began to deviate to the left and veered off of the runway to the left onto the cleared and graded area. After 550 m run on the soil, the aircraft returned to the runway with its right main landing gear and nose part (while moving on the soil, the nose landing gear collapsed) and came to rest at the distance of 1612 m from the runway entrance threshold. The crew performed an emergency evacuation of passengers from the aircraft. As a result of the accident, the aircraft suffered a significant damage to the nose part of the fuselage and left engine. None of the passengers or crew members was injured.

A Turkish Challenger 604 corporate jet impacted a mountain near Shahr-e Kurd in Iran, killing all 11 on board. The aircraft departed Sharjah, UAE at 13:11 UTC on a flight to Istanbul, Turkey. The aircraft entered Tehran FIR fifteen minutes later and the Tehran ACC controller cleared the flight to climb to FL360 according to its flight plan. About 14:32, the pilot requested FL380, which was approved. Before reaching that altitude, the left and right airspeeds began to diverge by more than 10 knots. The left (captain's) airspeed indicator showed an increase while the right hand (copilot's) airspeed indicator showed a decrease. A caution aural alert notified the flight crew of the difference. Remarks by the flight crew suggested that an 'EFIS COMP MON' caution message appeared on the EICAS. As the aircraft was climbing, the crew reduced thrust to idle. Approximately 63 seconds later, while approaching FL380, the overspeed aural warning (clacker) began to sound, indicating that the indicated Mach had exceeded M 0.85. Based on the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) of the aircraft, the pilot flying should validate the IAS based on the aircraft flight manual and define the reliable Air Data Computer (ADC) and select the reliable Air Data source. The pilot did not follow this procedure and directly reduced engine power to decrease the IAS after hearing the clacker. The actual airspeed thus reached a stall condition. The copilot tried to begin reading of the 'EFIS COMP MON' abnormal procedure for three times but due to pilot interruption, she could not complete it. Due to decreasing speed, the stall aural warning began to sound, in addition to stick shaker and stick pusher activating repeatedly. The crew then should have referred to another emergency procedure to recover from the stall condition. While the stick pusher acted to pitch down the aircraft to prevent a stall condition, the captain was mistakenly assumed an overspeed situation due to the previous erroneous overspeed warning and pulled on the control column. The aircraft entered a series of pitch and roll oscillations. The autopilot was disengaged by the crew before stall warning, which ended the oscillations. Engine power began to decrease on both sides until both engines flamed out in a stall condition. From that point on FDR data was lost because the electric bus did not continue to receive power from the engine generators. The CVR recording continued for a further approximately 1 minute and 20 seconds on emergency battery power. Stall warnings, stick shaker and stick pusher activations continued until the end of the recording. The aircraft then impacted mountainous terrain. Unstable weather conditions were present along the flight route over Iran, which included moderate up to severe turbulence and icing conditions up to 45000ft. These conditions could have caused ice crystals to block the left-hand pitot tube. It was also reported that the aircraft was parked at Sharjah Airport for three days in dusty weather condition. Initially the pitot covers had not been applied. The formation of dust inside the pitot tube was considered another possibility.

The aircraft departed Atatürk Airport in Istanbul at 2105LT bound for Ercan with a crew of three and one passenger on board. Shortly after takeoff, an unexpected situation forced the crew to return for an emergency landing. After touchdown on runway 35L, the twin engine aircraft went out of control, veered off runway, struck a concrete drainage ditch and came to rest, broken in two and bursting into flames. All four occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

The aircraft departed Milan-Malpensa Airport at 0700LT and proceeded to the east. Following an uneventful flight, the crew initiated the approach to Istanbul-Atatürk Airport Runway 05. At a height of 100 feet above the runway, the aircraft banked to the right, stalled and struck the runway surface. On impact, the right main gear was severely damaged and punctured the right wing. In such condition, the captain decided to abandon the landing manoeuvre and initiated a go-around procedure. The aircraft climbed to an assigned altitude of 3,800 feet then the crew declared an emergency and confirmed that the right engine was out of service. Few minutes later, the right engine caught fire. The crew followed a 20-minutes holding circuit over the bay of Marmara before a second approach to runway 35L. After touchdown, the right main gear collapsed, the aircraft slid for few dozen metres then veered off runway to the right, completed a 180 turn before coming to rest in a grassy area. All 97 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. According to the operator, the loss of control during the last segment was caused by turbulences from a preceding Boeing 787 that landed on the same runway 05.

The aircraft departed Istanbul at 1818LT on March 3 on a scheduled flight to Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA), Kathmandu with 11 crew members and 224 passengers .The aircraft started contacting Kathmandu Control from 00:02 hrs to 00:11hrs while the aircraft was under control of Varanasi and descending to FL 250 but there was no response because Kathmandu Control was not yet in operation. The airport opened at its scheduled time of 00:15hrs. The aircraft established its first contact with Kathmandu Approach at 00:17 hrs and reported holding over Parsa at FL 270. Kathmandu Approach reported visibility 100 meters and airport status as closed. At 00:22 hrs the aircraft requested to proceed to Simara due to moderate turbulence. The Kathmandu Approach instructed the aircraft to descend to FL 210 and proceed to Simara and hold. At 01:05 hrs when Kathmandu Approach provided an updated visibility of 1000 meters and asked the flight crew of their intentions, the flight crew reported ready for RNAV (RNP) APCH for runway 02. The aircraft was given clearance to make an RNP AR APCH. At 01:23 hrs when the aircraft reported Dovan, Kathmandu Approach instructed the flight crew to contact Kathmandu Tower. Kathmandu Tower issued a landing clearance at 01:24 hrs and provided wind information of 100° at 03 knots. At 01:27 hrs the aircraft carried out a missed approach due to lack of visual reference. The aircraft was given clearance to proceed to RATAN hold via MANRI climbing to 10500 feet as per the missed approach procedure. During the missed approach the aircraft was instructed to contact Kathmandu Approach. At 01:43 hrs the aircraft requested the latest visibility to which Kathmandu Approach provided visibility 3000 m and Kathmandu Tower observation of 1000 meters towards the south east and few clouds at 1000 ft, SCT 2000 ft and BKN 10,000 feet. When the flight crew reported their intention to continue approach at 01:44 hrs, Kathmandu Approach cleared the aircraft for RNAV RNP APCH runway 02 and instructed to report RATAN. The aircraft reported crossing 6700 ft at 01:55 hrs to Kathmandu Tower. Kathmandu Tower cleared the aircraft to land and provided wind information of 160° at 04 kts. At 01:57 hrs Kathmandu Tower asked the aircraft if the runway was insight. The aircraft responded that they were not able to see the runway but were continuing the approach. The aircraft was at 880 ft AGL at that time. At 783 ft AGL the aircraft asked Kathmandu Tower if the approach lights were on. Kathmandu Tower informed the aircraft that the approach lights were on at full intensity. The auto-pilots remained coupled to the aircraft until 14 ft AGL, when it was disconnected, a flare was attempted. The maximum vertical acceleration recorded on the flight data recorder was approximately 2.7 G. The aircraft pitch at touchdown was 1.8 degree nose up up which is lower than a normal flare attitude for other landings. From physical evidence recorded on the runway and the GPS latitude and longitude coordinate data the aircraft touched down to the left of the runway centerline with the left hand main gear off the paved runway surface. The aircraft crossed taxiways E and D and came to a stop on the grass area between taxiway D and C with the heading of the aircraft on rest position being 345 degrees (North North West) and the position of the aircraft on rest position was at N 27° 41' 46", E 85° 21'29" At 02:00 hrs Kathmandu Tower asked if the aircraft had landed. The aircraft requested medical and fire assistance reporting its position at the end of the runway. At 02:03 hrs the aircraft requested for bridge and stairs to open the door and vacate passengers instead of evacuation. The fire and rescue team opened the left cabin door and requested the cabin attendant as well as to pilot through Kathmandu Tower to deploy the evacuation slides. At 02:10 hrs evacuation signal was given to disembark the passengers. All passengers were evacuated safely and later, the aircraft was declared as damaged beyond repair.

Turkish Airlines Flight 1951, a Boeing 737-800, departed Istanbul-Atatürk International Airport (IST) for a flight to Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS), The Netherlands. The flight crew consisted of three pilots: a line training captain who occupied the left seat, a first officer under line training in the right seat and an additional first officer who occupied the flight deck jump seat. The first officer under line training was the pilot flying. The en route part of the flight was uneventful. The flight was descending for Schiphol and passed overhead Flevoland at about 8500 ft. At that time the aural landing gear warning sounded. The aircraft continued and was then directed by Air Traffic Control towards runway 18R for an ILS approach and landing. The standard procedure for runway 18R prescribes that the aircraft is lined up at least 8 NM from the runway threshold at an altitude of 2000 feet. The glidepath is then approached and intercepted from below. Lining up at a distance between 5 and 8 NM is allowed when permitted by ATC. Flight 1951 was vectored for a line up at approximately 6 NM at an altitude of 2000 feet. The glide slope was now approached from above. The crew performed the approach with one of the two autopilot and autothrottle engaged. The landing gear was selected down and flaps 15 were set. While descending through 1950 feet, the radio altimeter value suddenly changed to -8 feet. And again the aural landing gear warning sounded. This could be seen on the captain’s (left-hand) primary flight display. The first officer’s (right-hand) primary flight display, by contrast, indicated the correct height, as provided by the right-hand system. The left hand radio altimeter system, however, categorised the erroneous altitude reading as a correct one, and did not record any error. In turn, this meant that it was the erroneous altitude reading that was used by various aircraft systems, including the autothrottle. The crew were unaware of this, and could not have known about it. The manuals for use during the flight did not contain any procedures for errors in the radio altimeter system. In addition, the training that the pilots had undergone did not include any detailed system information that would have allowed them to understand the significance of the problem. When the aircraft started to follow the glidepath because of the incorrect altitude reading, the autothrottle moved into the ‘retard flare’ mode. This mode is normally only activated in the final phase of the landing, below 27 feet. This was possible because the other preconditions had also been met, including flaps at (minimum) position 15. The thrust from both engines was accordingly reduced to a minimum value (approach idle). This mode was shown on the primary flight displays as ‘RETARD’. However, the right-hand autopilot, which was activated, was receiving the correct altitude from the right-hand radio altimeter system. Thus the autopilot attempted to keep the aircraft flying on the glide path for as long as possible. This meant that the aircraft’s nose continued to rise, creating an increasing angle of attack of the wings. This was necessary in order to maintain the same lift as the airspeed reduced. In the first instance, the pilots’ only indication that the autothrottle would no longer maintain the pre-selected speed of 144 knots was the RETARD display. When the speed fell below this value at a height of 750 feet, they would have been able to see this on the airspeed indicator on the primary flight displays. When subsequently, the airspeed reached 126 knots, the frame of the airspeed indicator also changed colour and started to flash. The artificial horizon also showed that the nose attitude of the aircraft was becoming far too high. The cockpit crew did not respond to these indications and warnings. The reduction in speed and excessively high pitch attitude of the aircraft were not recognised until the approach to stall warning (stick shaker) went off at an altitude of 460 feet. The first officer responded immediately to the stick shaker by pushing the control column forward and also pushing the throttle levers forward. The captain however, also responded to the stick shaker commencing by taking over control. Assumingly the result of this was that the first officer’s selection of thrust was interrupted. The result of this was that the autothrottle, which was not yet switched off, immediately pulled the throttle levers back again to the position where the engines were not providing any significant thrust. Once the captain had taken over control, the autothrottle was disconnected, but no thrust was selected at that point. Nine seconds after the commencement of the first approach to stall warning, the throttle levers were pushed fully forward, but at that point the aircraft had already stalled and the height remaining, of about 350 feet, was insufficient for a recovery. According to the last recorded data of the digital flight data recorder the aircraft was in a 22° ANU and 10° Left Wing Down (LWD) position at the moment of impact. The airplane impacted farmland. The horizontal stabilizer and both main landing gear legs were separated from the aircraft and located near the initial impact point. The left and right engines had detached from the aircraft. The aft fuselage, with vertical stabilizer, was broken circumferentially forward of the aft passenger doors and had sustained significant damage. The fuselage had ruptured at the right side forward of the wings. The forward fuselage section, which contained the cockpit and seat rows 1 to 7, had been significantly disrupted. The rear fuselage section was broken circumferentially around row 28.

The aircraft departed Istanbul-Atatürk Airport at 0051LT on a schedule service to Isparta, carrying 50 passengers and 7 crew members. After being cleared to proceed to a VOR/DME approach to Isparta Airport runway 05, the crew was supposed to fly over IPT VOR then to follow a 223° heading. But the crew failed to input the arrival procedures in the FMS and started the approach by night over rising terrain. As the EGPWS failed to activate, the crew did not realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft collided with trees and crashed in a mountainous area located near Çukurören, about 12 km west of Isparta Airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all 57 occupants were killed.

En route from Hurghada to Warsaw, while cruising over Turkey, the crew contacted ATC and reported electrical and hydraulic problems. The crew was cleared to divert to Istanbul-Atatürk Airport for an emergency landing. After touchdown, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and came to rest near the ILS antenna after both main gears collapsed. All 163 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew departed Istanbul-Atatürk Airport in the afternoon on a fire fighting mission. While completing a scooping manoeuver in Lake Duru located about 50 km northwest of Istanbul, the aircraft crashed and burned. All three occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed. It was leased from Società Richerche Esperienze Meteorologiche (SOREM) to the Municipality of Istanbul (Istanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi).

After landing on runway 24 at Istanbul-Atatürk Airport, the aircraft was unable to stop on a wet runway, overran and came to rest 30 metres further. All 50 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was later declared as damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, the runway surface was wet due to rain falls.