Landing (descent or approach)

The investigation determines that the probable causes of this accident to be the following;
• Substandard maintenance that was performed. (Due to the improper flange on the hydraulic line, the hydraulic line came loose from its housing and depleted the fluid from the hydraulic
reservoir).
• Failure of the back up emergency blow down bottle system. It has been determined from inspection that the cable that connects the emergency blow down bottle system in the nose well of the aircraft to the T-handle in the cockpit, exhibited excessive play. Therefore even though the cable was pulled all the way to its fullest extent, it did not allow movement of the pin that would have provided activation of the system. Annual inspection report completed in December 2005 revealed that the portion of the Annual Inspection that required inspection of the emergency blow down bottle was not signed off by the mechanic as having been accomplished. However, the aircraft was returned to service with this discrepancy outstanding.
• Pilot’s lack of qualification and unfamiliarity with this aircraft, its systems and emergency procedures. ( Evidence of falsification of qualification and time requirement exists in pilot’s logbook).
• Pilot’s poor decision making and impaired judgement. (Possibility of impaired judgement due to pilot fatigue).
• Pilot’s failure in assessing the severity of his situation.
• Pilot’s failure to notify ATC of his problem. (Problem was discovered 20 miles prior to the accident).
• Pilot’s failure to properly assess the conditions for landing and maintain vigilant situational awareness while manoeuvring the aircraft after landing. (From post accident inspection, it was noted that the flaps were not extended for the landing. Had it been extended the aircraft glide path as well as the distance required for roll out after landing may have been greatly decreased).
• Pilot’s failure to take immediate action once he realized his predicament. (Pilot stated that after the propeller made contact with the ground, he decided to apply power and go around, but it was too late. Failure to act also can be attributed to possible pilot fatigue as (pilot was out all day shopping and then decided to leave at such a late hour) well as pilot’s unfamiliarity with aircraft systems and performance capabilities).
• Pilot’s failure to request Emergency Service Assistance. Had this service been requested in a timely manner, preparations could have been made to prevent the fire from spreading to the degree in which it did.

Wrong approach configuration on part of the captain who decided to landed while the aircraft was too high on the glide. Failure of the captain to initiate a go-around procedure after the copilot warned him three times about that.

The loss of engine power in both engines for an unknown reason.

Controlled flight into terrain after the crew continued the approach at an unsafe altitude in marginal weather conditions.

Based on clear and convincing evidence, the Board President determined the primary cause of the mishap was the pilots' and flight engineers' failure to use the number three, fully operational, engine; the instructor's and primary flight engineer's failure to brief, and the pilots' failure to consider or utilize a 62.5 or 40% flap setting (instead of a 100% flap setting); and the pilots' attempt at a visual approach to runway 32, descending well below a normal glidepath for an instrument-aided approach or the normal VFR pattern altitude of 1,800 ft. There is substantial evidence that a contributing factor to this mishap was MP1's failure to give a complete approach briefing, in that, nonstandard factors, configuration, landing distance, and missed approach intentions were not addressed.

The accident occurred as a result of erroneous actions by the flight engineer during operations to turn on the engine reverse when landing the plane, expressed in shifting the reverse buckets to direct thrust and putting the 1st and 4th engines to take-off mode after landing. The Commission concluded that the flight engineer’s erroneous actions were facilitated by:
- A low level of technological discipline in the crew due to the weak role of the captain as a leader in the crew, which was manifested in the crew members not fully fulfilling the "Instructions for the interaction and technology of the crew members of the IL-62M aircraft" and Aircraft Flight Manual during descent, approach and landing,
- Emotional relaxation of the crew at the end of a business trip and return to base,
- Lack of effective control, including according to the data of flight recorders over flight operations with LIBAVIA,
- In the "Instructions for the interaction and technology of the crew of the IL-62M aircraft" there are no control functions on the part of other crew members for the actions of the flight engineer at the stage of aircraft landing and the status of the reverse on/off alarm,
- The absence in the training programs of the simulator of exercises for practicing the actions of crew members in case of erroneous actions by the flight engineer when the reverse is turned on,
- Lack of equipment for the flight engineer’s workplace with a radio headset, lack of procedures in the "Instructions for Interaction and the Work Technology of the Crew Members of the Il-62M Aircraft" for the use of a radio headset for flight personnel in flights with a reduced crew,
- Excessive volume of the SSU speakers broadcasting external radio communications, which created additional difficulties when listening to the commands given by the captain,
- Fuzziness (illegibility) of the commands given by the PIC and the lack of response of the PIC to the non-confirmation of the commands given by him to the flight engineer.

The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed to avoid a stall during the final approach to land. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's impairment due to the use of a sedating antihistamine.