Charlotte Amalie-Cyril E. King (ex Harry S. Truman)

The aircraft was flying from St Thomas in the US Virgin Islands to Virgin Gorda (VIJ) in the British Virgin Islands. There were eight passengers on board, together with the pilot. It was the pilot’s eleventh flight of the day, and his fourth flight to Virgin Gorda. All these flights were short, with the longest flight being about 40 minutes duration and the shortest just a few minutes. The flight from St Thomas to Virgin Gorda took 35 minutes. The weather in Virgin Gorda was excellent with a light easterly wind and little cloud. The pilot commenced his approach to Virgin Gorda using his usual turning and configuration points. The aircraft touched down normally on runway 03 and the pilot retracted the flaps before applying the brakes. The brakes responded, although the pilot commented that the right brake did not seem to respond as positively as he expected. The pilot reapplied the brakes but the left brake pedal “flopped to the floor”. Judging he had insufficient room to abort the landing, the pilot continued to pump the brakes which he did not consider to be responding. He shut down the engines before the aircraft left the paved surface, struck signage and then a low wall before coming to rest on a bank. The pilot vacated the aircraft through the side window and then opened the main door to allow the passengers to exit the aircraft. None of the occupants was injured. The aircraft was extensively damaged.

During taxi to a runway, the instrument panel and cockpit floor erupted in flames. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the majority of the wires contained inside the main junction box had very little damage except for two wires that had insulation missing. The damage appeared to be associated with the routing of the two wires. Both wires were connected to the battery relay and ran through wires in and around the exposed terminal studs. Heat damage was noted on the insulation of wires and other components that were in contact with the exposed wires. The wires ran from the battery relay to the forward section of the cockpit, where the fire started. Due to the fire damage that consumed the cockpit, the examination was unable to determine what system the wires were associated with. Further examination revealed that the fuel pressure was a direct indicating system. Fuel traveled directly to the instruments in the cockpit via rigid aluminum lines routed on the right lower side of the fuselage, where more severe fire damage was noted. Review of maintenance records did not reveal any evidence of the fuel pressure indicating system lines and hoses having ever been replaced; however, they were only required to be replaced on an as-needed basis. The electrical system, instrument lines, and hoses through the nose compartment were required to be inspected on a Phase D inspection; the airplane's last Phase D inspection was completed about 9 months prior to the accident and the airplane had accrued 313.1 hours of operation since that inspection.

The captain stated that the accident flight was a return flight to San Juan, Puerto Rico, after delivering U.S. Mail. The airplane was empty of cargo at the time of the accident. The first officer was flying the airplane. The takeoff roll and rotation at 84 knots was uneventful until about 100 feet above the ground when the gear was called out to be retracted. At that time, the left engine's rpm dropped from 2,700 to 1,000. He communicated to the first officer that he would be assuming control of the airplane. He then proceeded with verifying that the left engine had failed. Once confirmed, he proceeded with the failed engine check list and feathering the propeller. They advised air traffic control (ATC) of the situation and informed them that they were returning to land. The airplane would not maintain altitude and the airspeed dropped to about 75 knots. The captain stated that he knew the airplane would not make it back to the airport. Instructions were given to the two passengers to don their life vests and prepared for a ditching. The captain elected to perform a controlled flight into the water. All onboard managed to exit the airplane through the cockpit overhead escape hatch onto the life raft as the airplane remained afloat. About ten minutes later the airplane sank nose first straight down. The airplane came to rest at the bottom of the ocean, in about 100 feet of water. The airplane was not recovered. Underwater photos provided by the operator showed the nose and cockpit area caved in, the left engine's propeller was in the feathered position, and the right engine's propeller was in a low pitch position.

The airplane was making a public use flight between two islands for the purpose of transporting residents of a correctional facility to court hearings. During descent to the destination airport, at an altitude of approximately 1,400 feet, both engines started surging. The pilot's attempts to restore normal engine power were unsuccessful, and he ditched the airplane in ocean water with both engines still surging. The airplane stayed afloat as he and the passengers exited, and then it sank. The airplane was not recovered from the ocean, precluding its examination and determination of the reason for the dual loss of engine power.

On May 11, 1998, about 1349 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 421B, N17BN, registered to Quinn Industries, Inc., operating as a 14 CFR 91 personal flight, crashed into Lake Killarney, New Providence Island, Bahamas, while on approach for landing to Nassau International Airport. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The airplane received unknown damage, the pilot suffered serious injuries, and two passengers suffered minor injuries. The flight originated about 26 minutes before the accident. According to initial reports, the flight originated earlier that day from St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, with a stop at Governor's Harbour, Eleuthera, for refueling. Upon landing at Governor's Harbour, the pilot was advised no fuel was available and elected to proceed to Nassau for refueling. Some time during the straight-in approach the pilot transmitted he was "low on fuel", and N17BN crashed about 400 yards short of the runway into a swamp.

The pilot stated that during cruise flight, the flight crew noticed that the left engine had high temperature and that its oil pressure started to fluctuate. A precautionary engine shutdown was performed. A short time later, the right engine started to fail, and the airplane would not maintain altitude. The left engine was restarted, but the flight crew could not maintain altitude. A forced landing was made on a beach; however, the airplane came to rest in 5 feet of water in the Atlantic Ocean. Examination of the left engine revealed a failure of the front master rod bearing. Examination of the right engine revealed a failure of the aft master rod.

As the flight made a visual approach to the airport from the south over the sea, at night, the pilot changed his navigation radio from the VOR to the ILS system for runway 10 and lost DME reading from the VOR located on a hill north of the localizer course. The localizer showed the flight was south of the localizer course, and without DME from the VOR the pilot believed he was much closer to the island and the airport than the aircraft actually was. As the pilot attempted to make visual contact with the airport and maintain clearance from the hills he allowed the aircraft to descend and crash into the sea about 3 miles southwest of the airport. The pilot had not filed a FAA flight plan for the scheduled commuter flight. The pilot had been flying the route for 5 days and had no previous experience in the area. The pilot reported he had no mechanical malfunctions with the aircraft systems, flight controls, or engines. No FAA Operations inspectors had conducted surveillance on the company's flight operations in the Caribbean since service had begun in December 1996.

On August 5, 1996, about 1335 Atlantic standard time, a Cessna 402B, N403N, registered to Virgin Air, Inc. dba Air St. Thomas, as flight 105, 14 CFR Part 135 scheduled international passenger service, from St. Barthelemy Island to St. Thomas, overran the runway during an aborted takeoff at St. Barthelemy Island. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight plan was filed. The aircraft received substantial damage and the airline transport-rated pilot and 6 passengers were not injured. One passenger received minor injuries. The flight was originating at the time of the accident. The pilot stated the elevator control jammed during the takeoff roll. He aborted the takeoff, but could not stop prior to over running the runway. The aircraft came to rest in about 3 feet of water.

The pilots lost aileron control shortly after takeoff while in a left turn. The left turning tendencies of the aircraft could not be corrected and the aircraft crash landed in the Caribbean Sea. Post crash inspection of the aircraft revealed the left aileron control cable was trapped within a bundle of electrical wires and cables. This occurred when an electrical cable from a reverse current relay in the right wing to the main junction box in the left cabin area at the center wing was changed and secured. The aileron cable chafed through the protective cover of the large electrical cable. When contact was made with the metal electrical cable the aileron cable arched at several points and separated at two different points causing a loss of aileron control. A passenger was killed while 14 other occupants were rescued.

While executing a night visual approach to runway 09 in visual meteorological conditions the aircraft was allowed to descend; crashing into water 2 miles short of the runway. The pilot was not familiar with the airport and failed to make use of a full instrument landing system and visual approach slope indicating system which were operational for runway 09 at the time of the accident. The pilot stated there were no mechanical malfunctions with the aircraft which attributed to the accident. The aircraft was equipped with a radar altimeter system which also was not used by the pilot. The pilot performed two missed approaches because the airport was not in sight. The accident occurred during the 3rd attempt. Neither the pilot-in-command nor the copilot were properly certificated for the flight.