Landing (descent or approach)

The RAF Hercules was on a routine operational flight providing support to the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) at Lashkar Gar, Afghanistan at the time of the accident. The LKG Tactical Landing Zone (TLZ) is 6,800 feet long by 150 feet wide with a surface of compacted sand and gravel located on the south side of LKG town. The TLZ is used by UK forces and other agencies including the UN and Red Cross. The aircraft took off at 08:50 UTC from Kabul International Airport (KBL) to fly a routine logistics sortie to deliver cargo and personnel to LKG TLZ. After an uneventful medium level transit the aircraft landed at LKG at 10:20 UTC. Using a standard tactical landing technique the aircraft touched down some 500ft in from the runway threshold, reverse thrust was selected and speed reduced without the need for wheel braking. After 3 seconds, as the speed was nearing 70 kts there was a loud bang from the port side of the aircraft in the vicinity of the port main landing gear, the force of which was felt throughout the aircraft. At the same time the flight deck crew saw tyre debris flying up in front of the aircraft and then became aware of structural damage to the number 2 engine. The captain ordered the Emergency Engine Shutdown Drill (EESD) on the number 2 engine. He maintained directional control with nosewheel steering. Immediately after the shutdown of number 2 engine crew members observed a large amount of fuel leaking from the port wing area in the vicinity of the external tank pylon and that there was a fire in the vicinity of No.1 engine. The captain ordered the shut down of the No.1 engine using the EESD. Whilst this drill was carried out crew members observed that the fire was spreading across the whole wing. Realising the severity of the situation the captain brought the aircraft to a halt near the northern end of the landing zone some 6,400 feet from the touchdown point. He ordered the passengers and crew to immediately carry out the Emergency Evacuation Drill. Once all personnel had evacuated the aircraft, fire rapidly destroyed the aircraft and cargo.

At 0444Z On May 24 2006, Miami Centre (George Town Sector) informed Nassau ATC That Lifeguard Flight N475AT, a Westwind Jet (WW-1124), en-route from San Juan, Puerto Rico to Norfolk, Virginia reported that it had developed generator problems and the aircraft was looking to land at the nearest airport to its position. Miami Air Traffic Center vectored the aircraft to Exuma International Airport at Great Exuma, Bahamas, as that was the nearest airport. Attempts were made by Nassau ATC to contact the authorities at Exuma International Airport to have the runway lights turned on. At 0454Z, Miami ATC reported loss of contact with the aircraft; therefore, N475AT proceeded with an emergency landing, before Miami ATC could give further instructions. The uncontrolled aircraft came to rest approximately 800 feet beyond the end of runway 30 and approximately 300 feet right of the extended centre line of the runway. The aircraft landing gears were sheered off when the aircraft exited the runway, hence traveling into the clearing and then eventually into the bushes on the right side of the runway. The right wing of the aircraft collided with a mound of dirt, causing it to spin uncontrollably, resulting in it coming to rest on an easterly heading at an approximate 30 degree incline. The occupants were evacuated from the wreckage and received minor injuries while making their way thru the thick brush and shrubbery while being led to safety. All Crew members were ATP rated and both proficiency checks found to be were valid and current neither of the pilots was available for an interview at the time of the field investigation at Exuma International Airport.

On final approach to Nueva Antioquia Airport, the single engine aircraft went out of control and crashed, killing all three occupants, two pilots and one passenger.

The twin engine aircraft departed Santo Antonio Airport on a local training flight, carrying four pilots. While on approach to runway 29, the aircraft went out of control and crashed in the sea few km offshore. All four occupants were killed.

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Greensboro, NC, the aircraft made a wheels-up landing on runway 18 at Myrtle Beach Airport, SC. The aircraft slid on its belly for few dozen metres before coming to rest on the main runway. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The commercial certificated pilot was positioning the multi-engine, retractable landing gear airplane for a corporate passenger flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91, when the accident occurred. Upon landing at the destination, the pilot aborted the landing, and after climbing to about 100 feet agl descended, impacting in a canal. A witness who was not looking towards the runway, reported hearing the sound of a twin engine airplane approaching with the engines at reduced power, and then heard a scraping noise similar to the recent gear-up landing he had witnessed. Looking toward the runway, he said the airplane was midfield, left of the runway centerline, about 20 feet in the air with the landing gear retracted, and that he saw a cloud of dust, and heard what he thought was full engine power being applied. He said the airplane climbed to about 100 feet agl, and disappeared from view. Another witness with a portable VHF radio tuned to the unicom frequency, reported hearing the pilot say he was "doing an emergency go-around." The airplane descended striking utility poles, and impacted in a saltwater canal. An examination of the airport runway revealed a set of parallel propeller strike marks. The left and right sets of marks were 109 and 113 feet long, and the mark's center-to-center measurement is consistent with the engine centerline-to-centerline measurement for the accident airplane. No landing gear marks were observed. The airplane's six propeller blades had extensive torsional twisting and bending, as-well-as extensive chord wise scratching and abrasion. Several of the blades had fractured or missing tips. An examination of the cockpit showed the landing gear retraction/extension handle was in the up/retracted position, and the landing gear extension warning horn circuit breaker was in the pulled/tripped position. The landing gear emergency extension handle was in the stowed position. The nose landing gear was damaged during final impact, and was not functional. During the postimpact examination, both the left and right main landing gear were stowed in the up and locked/retracted position. The landing gear were released/unlocked and operated appropriately using the emergency extension handle. An examination of the left and right main landing gear showed no damage to the wheel doors, leg doors, wheels, or tires. All linkages and locking devices were undamaged, and appeared to function normally.

The twin engine aircraft departed Recife-Guararapes Airport at 0609LT on a flight to Natal, carrying one passenger, one pilot and a load consisting of bags containing bank documents. On approach to Natal-Augusto Severo Airport runway 16L, the left engine failed. Shortly later, at a height of about 600 feet, the right engine failed as well. Aware that he will not be able to reach the airport, the pilot attempted an emergency landing in an open field. On touchdown, the undercarriage collapsed and the aircraft slid for about 200 metres before coming to rest in a muddy field. Both occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On 2 May 2006 the Armavia A320, registered EK-32009, was undertaking passenger flight RNV 967 from Zvartnots (Yerevan, Armenia) to Adler (Sochi, Russia). Preliminary preparation of the crew was conducted on 23-24 May 2006 under the guidance of the airline’s Flight Director, in accordance with the requirements of ROLRGA RA-2000, Section 7.2.1. Pre-flight briefing of the crew was conducted on the day of departure, under the guidance of the Captain, in accordance with the requirements of ROLRGA RA-2000, Section 8.2.1 On 2 May 2006 at 19.30 the crew passed the pre-flight medical examination. The crew’s pre-flight rest period exceeded 24 hours. In accordance with ROLRGA RA-2000 and Work-Rest Norms for civil aircraft crews from the Republic of Armenia, each crew member is individually responsible for adherence to the pre-flight rest regime. It should be noted that it was difficult for the crew to take adequate rest during the day before the night flight, due to impairment of bio-rhythms. That is most likely why, in their cockpit conversations the crew members mentioned that they had not got enough sleep. In order to make their decision for departure, the crew obtained the observed weather data and the weather forecast for the takeoff, landing and alternate aerodromes that met the requirements for IFR flights. According to the documents submitted, the airplane takeoff weight and the centre of gravity were 62,712 kg and 29.9% mean aerodynamic chord, i.e. within the A320 FCOM limitations. There were 113 occupants on board: 105 passengers (including 5 children and 1 baby), 2 pilots, 5 flight attendants and 1 engineer. The airplane took off from Zvartnots airport at 20:47. Takeoff, climb and cruise were uneventful. The first communication between the Sochi approach controller and the crew took place at 21:10:20. At that moment the airplane was beyond the coverage area of Sochi aerodrome radar. Up until 21:17 the approach controller and the crew discussed the observed and forecast weather, and as a result the crew decided to return to Yerevan. At 21:26:37, after the decision had already been made, the crew asked the controller about the latest observed weather. At 21:30:49 the controller informed the crew that visibility was 3,600 m and the cloud ceiling 170 m. At 21.31.14 the crew decided to continue the flight to Sochi airport. The next communication with the approach controller was at 22:00:45. At that moment the airplane was descending to an altitude of 3,600 m heading to GUKIN point and was being tracked by the Sochi radar. The approach controller cleared the airplane for descent to 1,800 m and reported the observed weather at Sochi, as at 22:00, for runway 06, which was above the aerodrome minimum. Then the crew was handed over to the holding and tower controllers, and was cleared for descent to 600 m, as per aerodrome pressure QNH 1016 hPa, before entering the turn to final. While performing the turn to final, the runway extended centreline was overshot. Having eliminated the deviation, the airplane started descending along the glide slope, following the approach pattern. At 22:10:45 the crew reported extension of the landing gear and their readiness for landing. In response they were advised of the distance of 10 km and weather 4000 x 190, and were cleared for landing. However, about 30 seconds later, the controller advised the crew of the observed cloud ceiling at 100 m and instructed them to stop their descent and carry out a right turn and climb up to 600 m and also to get in touch with the holding controller. The last communication with the crew was at 22:12:35. After that the crew did not respond to any of the controller’s calls. At 22:13:03 the airplane struck the water, was destroyed and sank.

The aircraft departed Goma at 0930LT on a cargo flight to Amisi, carrying five passengers, three crew members and a load consisting of telecommunication equipments. On approach to Amisi Airport, the aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances, killing all eight occupants.

The aircraft was dispatched in Afghanistan on behalf of the US Department of State, carrying members of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. Following an uneventful flight from Kandahar, the crew landed at Lashkar Gah Airport. After touchdown, a truck crossed the active runway so the pilot-in-command initiated a turn to avoid the collision. Doing so, the aircraft veered off runway and collided with nearby houses. Both pilots as well as three people on the ground were killed. All other occupants were injured, some seriously.