Landing (descent or approach)

The airplane touched down at night about 1,400 feet down the 3,864-foot runway and overran the runway surface, coming to rest about 851 feet beyond the departure end. The pilot was operating the airplane using a single-pilot waiver that he obtained two months prior to the accident. The airplane was certified by the Federal Aviation Administration with a flight crew of two. The pilot was returning from a personal event with his family, and landing at his home airport when the accident occurred. Witnesses stated that the pilot’s approach into the airport was not consistent with previous approaches in which the airplane would touch down directly on the runway numbers. They also stated that they heard the thrust reversers deploy, and then return to the stowed position. The airplane flight manual states that once the thrust reversers have been deployed, a pilot should not attempt to restow the thrust reversers and take off. Two sink rate warnings were issued during the approach to landing which should have alerted the pilot of the unstabilized approach. Performance calculations showed that the airplane would have required an additional 765 to 2,217 feet of runway for a full stop landing.

The twin engine aircraft departed Nepālganj Airport on a domestic service to Jumla with an intermediate stop in Surkhet, carrying six passengers, three crew members and a load consisting of bags containing grains for a total of 941 kilos. While approaching Jumla Airport, the crew was informed that runway 27 was in use with a wind from 240 at 4 knots. For unknown reasons, the captain started the approach to runway 09 at 1201LT. At an excessive speed, he missed the runway, initiated a go-around procedure and passed to the right of the tower. Then, he started a steep turn to the left when the aircraft lost height and speed and crashed in a field located 500 meters east of the airport, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 9 occupants were killed.

On a scheduled cargo flight from Liège Airport to London Stansted Airport the crew diverted to Nottingham East Midlands Airport due to unexpectedly poor weather conditions at Stansted. The weather conditions at EMA required a CAT IIIA approach and landing. On approach, at approximately 500 feet agl, the crew were passed a message by ATC advising them of a company request to divert to Liverpool Airport. The commander inadvertently disconnected both autopilots whilst attempting to reply to ATC. He then attempted to re-engage the autopilot in order to continue the approach. The aircraft diverged to the left of the runway centreline and developed a high rate of descent. The commander commenced a go-around but was too late to prevent the aircraft contacting the grass some 90 m to the left of the runway centreline. The aircraft became airborne again but, during contact with the ground, the right main landing gear had broken off. The crew subsequently made an emergency landing at Birmingham Airport (BHX).

The first officer reported that during cruise flight, both propeller secondary low pitch stop (SLPS) lights illuminated, indicating the SLPS system prevented both propellers from going below the low pitch hydraulic mechanical stop. The right occurred first, then the left approximately 1 minute later. Emergency procedures to correct the condition were ineffective. The right propeller feathered at some point during the flight, and the first officer reported that while operating single engine, they experienced a problem with the propeller governor. The flight proceeded direct to an airport with short runways approximately 3.2 nautical miles (nm) northwest of their present position, rather than to an air carrier airport located 8.5 nm away. The captain entered a close-in right base to runway 35 (2,688 feet long runway), while flying at 155 knots (51 knots above single engine reference speed). He turned onto final approach with the landing gear and flaps retracted, but overshot the runway. The airplane contacted a taxiway near the departure end of intended runway, and then collided with several obstacles before coming to rest at a house located past the departure end of runway 35. A post crash fire consumed the cockpit, cabin, and sections of both wings. Post accident examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. No determination was made as to the reason for the annunciation of both SLPS lights.

In unknown circumstances, the aircraft crashed upon landing at Abéché Airport and came to rest about 200 metres past the runway end, bursting into flames. At least five passengers were killed and several others were injured. The aircraft was destroyed. The accident occurred 30 minutes after the airport closing time at 1800LT.

After landing on wet runway 10/28 at Banda Neira Airport, the aircraft slid then veered off runway to the right. While contacting soft ground, the undercarriage collapsed and the aircraft came to rest, broken in two. All 18 occupants escaped with minor injuries. The accident occurred in heavy rain falls.

The aircraft departed Miami-Intl Airport on a night cargo flight to Managua, carrying three crew members and a load consisting of 50 tons of chemical and toxic products. After touchdown on runway 09 which is 2,450 metres long, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, went through a fence, lost its nose gear and came to rest 350 metres further in trees. All three crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew briefed the Instrument Landing System approach, including the missed approach procedures. Weather at the time included a 100-foot broken cloud layer, and at the airport, 2 miles visibility. The approach was flown over water, and at the accident location, there was dense fog. Two smaller airplanes had successfully completed the approach prior to the accident airplane. The captain flew the approach and the first officer made 100-foot callouts during the final descent, until 200 feet above the decision height. At that point, the captain asked the first officer if he saw anything. The first officer reported "ground contact," then noted "decision height." The captain immediately reported "I got the lights" which the first officer confirmed. The captain reduced the power to flight idle. Approximately 4 seconds later, the captain attempted to increase power. However, the engines did not have time to respond before the airplane descended into the water and impacted a series of approach light stanchions, commencing about 2,000 feet from the runway. Neither crew member continued to call out altitudes after seeing the approach lights, and the captain descended the airplane below the decision height before having the requisite descent criteria. The absence of ground references could have been conducive to a featureless terrain illusion in which the captain would have believed that the airplane was at a higher altitude than it actually was. There were
no mechanical anomalies which would have precluded normal airplane operation.

Following an uneventful flight from Panama City, the crew completed the approach and landing at Bocas del Toro Airport. After touchdown on a wet runway following heavy rain falls, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest in bushes. All occupants were rescued, among them few were slightly injures. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The single engine aircraft departed Toussus-le-Noble Airport in the early morning on a private flight to Fairoaks with two people on board. About 40 minutes into the flight, at an altitude of 18,000 feet, the manifold pressure dropped from 30 to 28 inches of mercury. The pilot increased the engine power when the manifold pressure boosted to 33 inches of mercury then dropped again. Suddenly, a burning smell pervades the cabin. The pilot declared an emergency and elected to divert to Abbeville Airport which was at a distance of 15 NM from his position. While descending, he lowered the landing gear and reduced the engine power. Shortly before reaching FL100, the oil pressure warning light came on, the engine started to vibrate then stopped. At this time, the aircraft was 10 NM from Abbeville Airport, descending in IMC conditions. On short final, at a height of 300 feet, the pilot established a visual contact with the runway but his trajectory was too short. The aircraft crash landed in a field and came to rest 200 metres short of runway 20. Both occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.