Upland

The commercial pilot was entering the airport traffic pattern for landing during a familiarization flight. He reported that he turned on the carburetor heat, switched the fuel tank selector to the right fuel tank, and shortly thereafter, the engine experienced a total loss of power. The pilot attempted numerous times to restart the engine but was unsuccessful. After realizing that he would not be able to reach the runway, he decided to make a forced landing to a small field. During the landing approach, the airplane contacted a power line, nosed over, and came to rest inverted, resulting in substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. During the postaccident examination of the airplane, about 16 ounces of water were removed from the fuel system. Water was present in the lower gascolator, the fine fuel filter (upper gascolator), and subsequent fuel line to the carburetor inlet. A brass screen at the carburetor inlet and 2 carburetor fuel bowl thumb screens also contained corrosion, water, and rust. The approved aircraft inspection checklist called for washing the carburetor and main fuel filter every 50 hours and cleaning and/or replacing the fine fuel filter every 100 hours. The fine fuel filter is not easily accessible and not able to be drained during a preflight inspection. The mechanic who completed the most recent inspection stated that he did not drain or check the fine fuel filter. The last logbook entry that specifically stated the fuel filters were cleaned was about 4 years before the accident.

The airplane touched down at night about 1,400 feet down the 3,864-foot runway and overran the runway surface, coming to rest about 851 feet beyond the departure end. The pilot was operating the airplane using a single-pilot waiver that he obtained two months prior to the accident. The airplane was certified by the Federal Aviation Administration with a flight crew of two. The pilot was returning from a personal event with his family, and landing at his home airport when the accident occurred. Witnesses stated that the pilot’s approach into the airport was not consistent with previous approaches in which the airplane would touch down directly on the runway numbers. They also stated that they heard the thrust reversers deploy, and then return to the stowed position. The airplane flight manual states that once the thrust reversers have been deployed, a pilot should not attempt to restow the thrust reversers and take off. Two sink rate warnings were issued during the approach to landing which should have alerted the pilot of the unstabilized approach. Performance calculations showed that the airplane would have required an additional 765 to 2,217 feet of runway for a full stop landing.

The airplane impacted a residence during a missed approach. After completing the en route portion of the instrument flight, a controller cleared the pilot to proceed direct to the initial approach fix for the global positioning satellite (GPS) approach to the airport. After being cleared for the approach, the airplane continued on a course to the east and at altitudes consistent with flying the GPS published approach procedure. Radar data indicated that at the missed approach point at the minimum descent altitude of 2,000 feet msl, the airplane made a turn to the left, changing course in a northerly direction toward rapidly rising mountainous terrain. The published missed approach specified a climbing right turn to 4,000 feet, and noted that circling north of the airport was not allowed. Remaining in a slight left turn, the airplane climbed to 3,300 feet msl over the duration of 1 minute 9 seconds. The controller advised the pilot that he was flying off course toward mountainous terrain and instructed him to make an immediate left turn heading in a southbound direction. The airplane descended to 3,200 feet msl and made a left turn in a southerly direction. The airplane continued to descend to 2,100 feet msl and the pilot read back the instructions that the controller gave him. The airplane then climbed to 3,300 feet, with an indicated ground speed of 35 knots, and began a sharp left turn. It then descended to impact with a house. At no time during the approach did the pilot indicate that he was experiencing difficulty navigating or request assistance. An examination of the airplane revealed no evidence a mechanical malfunction or failures prior to impact; however, both the cockpit and instrument panel sustained severe thermal damage, precluding any detailed examinations.

During a nighttime takeoff initial climb, the airplane collided with terrain near the airport. Witnesses reported watching the airplane accelerate on runway 12, rotate, and climb to 200 to 300 feet above ground level. The climb rate decreased and the airplane appeared to initiate a left turn, with the roll continuing to a wings vertical attitude. At this point the airplane descended into the terrain. One witness north of the accident site described the landing lights going from horizontal to vertical followed by a decrease in engine sound just before impact. According to the airplane owner, the pilot had never flown the accident airplane before the first leg to the accident location to drop off the owner and another passenger. Examination of the pilot records failed to locate any previous flight time in Cessna 300 or 400 series airplanes. In the last 30 days he had given instruction in a smaller light twin engine airplane. Post accident examination of the wreckage revealed the landing gear to be in the down position at the time of impact. The retractable landing lights were extended and the nose gear taxi light was destroyed. Both propellers exhibited symmetrical power signatures. No preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures were identified. The impact site was east of the airport about 0.68 nautical miles. The departure direction is towards a mountain range with sparse population and few ground reference lights. The moon's disk was 25 degrees above the southeastern horizon and was 89 percent illuminated. The FAA AC61-23C Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge addresses the environmental factors and potential in-flight visual illusions, which could affect pilot performance. The reference material describes Somatogravic Illusion as, "a rapid acceleration during takeoff can create the illusion of being in a nose up attitude. The disoriented pilot will push the airplane into a nose low, or dive attitude. A rapid deceleration by a quick reduction of the throttles can have the opposite effect, with the disoriented pilot pulling the airplane into a nose up, or stall attitude."

Upon arriving at his destination the pilot began a visual, night descent to his destination airport. As the aircraft descended the pilot reduced the airspeed and deployed flaps. As the aircraft neared the airport the pilot increased the flap angle and adjusted the propellers to the landing rpm and the airspeed decreased. The pilot stated that at this time he heard a noise that sounded like a flutter which he thought was emanating from the right engine. Full throttle was applied, but the airspeed continued to decrease and the pilot elected to land on a freeway. The aircraft collided with a motor vehicle on touchdown and slid to a stop. Post crash exam revealed the rpm control levers and bellranks to be in the high rpm settings. The left prop was found in the feathered position.

After takeoff from Upland-Cable Airport in marginal weather conditions, the pilot reported problems with gyro when cruising at low in low ceiling, the airplane crashed into an airport complex. Four employees of the complex were injured while all five occupants of the airplane were killed.

Few minutes after takeoff from Norton AFB, in San Bernardino, while cruising in poor weather conditions, the aircraft hit the west slope of Mt Baldy at a height of 10,064 feet. The wreckage was found a day later and all four occupants have been killed. At the time of the accident, visibility was poor due to low clouds and precipitations.