Landing (descent or approach)

The airline transport pilot was departing to the north from a narrow stream in a float-equipped airplane with lodge guests aboard, on a Title 14, CFR Part 91 flight. Northerly winds between 25 and 35 knots, were reported at the time of the accident. The accident pilot reported that after departure, he turned left, and a strong downdraft "threw the airplane to the ground." The passengers said that the airplane started its takeoff run directly into the strong winds, but shortly after becoming airborne, the pilot made a steep turn to the left, about 150 feet above the ground. The passengers indicated that as the airplane continued to turn left, it began to shudder and buffet, then abruptly descended nose low into the marsh-covered terrain. During the impact, the right wing folded, and the airplane's fuselage came to rest on its right side. One of the occupants, seated next to the right main cabin door, was partially ejected during the impact sequence, and was pinned under the fuselage and covered by water. Rescue efforts by the pilot and passengers were unsuccessful. In the pilot's written statement to the NTSB, he reported that there were no pre accident mechanical anomalies with the airplane, and during the on-site examination of the wreckage by the NTSB investigator-in-charge, no pre accident mechanical anomalies were discovered.

The twin engine aircraft departed Abuja on a flight to Obudu, carrying 15 passengers and a crew of three. The pilots started the descent in poor weather conditions when the aircraft impacted hilly terrain near Vande Ikya, about 29 km northwest of Obudu. Five occupants were injured while 13 others were killed, among them several high ranking officers who were flying to Obudu to proceed to an inspection of the military equipments. At the time of the accident, the visibility was poor due to low ceiling.

The single engine aircraft departed Monterrey-Del Norte Airport at 0827LT on a private flight to Acapulco, carrying six passengers and one pilot. About three hours and a half into the flight, while in cruising altitude, the pilot contacted ATC, declared an emergency and was cleared to divert to Toluca Airport. On final approach, the engine failed. The aircraft stalled, collided with a fence and eventually crashed in a deconstruction site located 1,600 metres short of runway 15. Two passengers were seriously injured while five other occupants escaped with minor injuries. The aircraft was destroyed. Few hours later, one of the survivor, the Mexican actor Pablo Santos aged 19, died from his injuries, and a second survivor passed away a day later. It was later reported by the authorities that Pablo Santos was seating on the floor and was not strapped.

On the day of the accident, Flight DV110 routing was Abidjan – Accra - Lagos. It departed Abidjan at 1015 hrs for Lagos via Accra. The aircraft finally departed Accra for Lagos at 1145 hrs with a total declared cargo weight of 50014 lbs (22733 kgs). The aircraft contacted Lagos Area Control at 1242 hrs, while maintaining FL 210 (21, 000ft) and was given an in-bound clearance to Lagos VOR (LAG) for ILS approach on runway 18L. At 1252 hrs, Lagos Approach cleared it to FL050 (5,000 feet) and at 12 NM, it was further cleared down to 3500ft on QNH 1013 hpa, and finally to 2,200 feet and to report established on the ILS. At 4 NM to the runway, the aircraft reported fully established on the ILS and was handed over to Control Tower for landing instructions. At 1303 hrs and 2 NM to the runway, the aircraft was cleared to land on runway 18L but to exercise caution, as the runway surface was wet. The cloud was low; the Captain said in his statement that the cloud base was about 100 feet above minimum. Speci weather was also available to the crew. The pilot was advised to exercise caution due to the rain and the weather at that time. In spite of all the warnings the copilot was still allowed to proceed with the landing. At the point of touch down the captain observed that it was impossible to stop on the runway and he called for a go-around. The procedure was not properly executed and thus the aircraft overshot the runway 400m into the grass area. There was no fire outbreak and no injury was sustained by any of the crew members. There was serious damage to the aircraft.

After landing on runway 14L at Mashhad Airport, a nose gear tyre burst. The crew lost control of the airplane that veered off runway and came to rest, bursting into flames. 28 passengers were killed while 54 were seriously injured and 66 escaped unhurt. The aircraft was destroyed.

Prior to the accident flight, the pilot obtained a preflight weather briefing and filed an instrument flight rules flight plan. The briefer noted no adverse weather conditions along the route. The airplane departed the airport at 0853, and climbed to FL190. The first two hours of the flight was uneventful, and the aircraft was handed off to Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZJX ARTCC) at 1053. The pilot contacted ZJX Crestview sector at 1054:45 with the airplane level at FL190. At 1102, the Crestview controller broadcasted an alert for Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMET) 32E, which pertained to thunderstorms in portions of Florida southwest of the pilot's route. At 1103, the controller cleared to the airplane to descend to 11,000 feet and the pilot again acknowledged. At 1110:21, the pilot was instructed to contact Tyndall Approach. The pilot checked in with the Tyndall RAPCON North Approach controller at 1110:39. The pilot was told to expect a visual approach. Shortly thereafter, the pilot transmitted, "...we're at 11,000, like to get down lower so we can get underneath this stuff." The controller told the pilot to stand by and expect lower [altitude] in 3 miles. About 15 seconds later, the controller cleared to pilot to descend to 6,000 feet, and the pilot acknowledged. At 1112:27, the pilot was instructed to contact Tyndall Approach on another frequency. The airplane's position at that time was just northwest of REBBA intersection. The Panama sector controller cleared the pilot to descend to 3,000 feet at his discretion, and the pilot acknowledged. There was no further contact with the airplane. The controller attempted to advise the pilot that radar contact was lost, but repeated attempts to establish communications and locate the airplane were unsuccessful. A witness, located approximately 1 mile south of the accident site, reported he heard a "loud bang," looked up and observed the airplane in a nose down spiral. The witness reported there were parts separating from the airplane during the descent. The witness stated it was raining and there was lightning and thunder in the area. Local authorities reported that the weather "was raining real good with lightning and the thunderstorm materialized very quickly." The main wreckage came to rest near the edge of a swamp in tree covered and high grassy terrain. The left wing, left engine, and the left wing tip tank were located in a wooded area approximately 0.6 miles northwest of the main wreckage. The left wing separated from the airplane inboard of the left engine and nacelle. Examination of the fracture surfaces indicated that both the front and rear spars failed from "catastrophic static up-bending overstress..." The airplane flew through an intense to extreme weather radar echo containing a thunderstorm. Although the controllers denied that there was any weather displayed ahead of the airplane, recorded radar and display data indicated that moderate to extreme precipitation was depicted on and near the route of flight. During the flight, the pilot was given no real-time information on the weather ahead. The airplane was equipped with a weather radar system and the system provided continuous en route weather information relative to cloud formation, rainfall rate, thunderstorms, icing conditions, and storm detection up to a distance of 240 miles. No anomalies were noted with the airframe and engines.

The twin engine aircraft departed Asunción on a charter flight to Salta with intermediate stops in Resistencia and Joaquín Víctor González, carrying 10 passengers and two pilots. On approach to Salta-Martín Miguel de Güemes Airport, both engines failed. The crew attempted an emergency landing but the aircraft struck trees and crashed in an open field located 3 km short of runway. All 12 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The Hawker and the glider collided in flight at an altitude of about 16,000 feet above mean sea level about 42 nautical miles south-southeast of the Reno/Tahoe International Airport (RNO), Reno, Nevada, which was the Hawker's destination. The collision occurred in visual meteorological conditions in an area that is frequently traversed by air carrier and other turbojet airplanes inbound to RNO and that is also popular for glider operations because of the thermal and mountain wave gliding opportunities there. Before the collision, the Hawker had been descending toward RNO on a stable northwest heading for several miles, and the glider was in a 30-degree, left-banked, spiraling climb. According to statements from the Hawker's captain and the glider pilot, they each saw the other aircraft only about 1 second or less before the collision and were unable to maneuver to avoid the collision in time. Damage sustained by the Hawker disabled one engine and other systems; however, the flight crew was able to land the airplane. The damaged glider was uncontrollable, and the glider pilot bailed out and parachuted to the ground. Because of the lack of radar data for the glider's flight, it was not possible to determine at which points each aircraft may have been within the other's available field of view. Although Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) require all pilots to maintain vigilance to see and avoid other aircraft (this includes pilots of flights operated under instrument flight rules, when visibility permits), a number of factors that can diminish the effectiveness of the see-and-avoid principle were evident in this accident. For example, the high closure rate of the Hawker as it approached the glider would have given the glider pilot only limited time to see and avoid the jet. Likewise, the closure rate would have limited the time that the Hawker crew had to detect the glider, and the slim design of the glider would have made it difficult for the Hawker crew to see it. Although the demands of cockpit tasks, such as preparing for an approach, have been shown to adversely affect scan vigilance, both the Hawker captain, who was the flying pilot, and the first officer reported that they were looking out the window before the collision. However, the captain saw the glider only a moment before it filled the windshield, and the first officer never saw it at all.

The airplane departed on a long cross country flight, with thunderstorms and rain squalls along the general route. Approaching the destination airport, the airplane entered a rain squall, stalled, and impacted the ground in an almost vertical descent. Other than the onboard weather radar being previously removed for maintenance, there were no mechanical anomalies noted with the airplane. The pilot, whose logbook was not recovered, was not instrument qualified. Although he was recently observed flying four to five times weekly, when the pilot applied for a multi-engine rating about 3 1/2 months earlier, he indicated 107 hours of total flight experience.

The airplane impacted a fence and terrain on short final during a visual approach to runway 27. The airplane was operated as a cargo airplane with two flight crewmembers by a commercial operator certificated under 14 CFR Part 135. The flightcrew worked approximately 18.75 hours within a 24-hour period leading up to the accident performing flights listed by the operator as either 14 CFR Part 91 or 14 CFR Part 135, all of which were in the conduct of company business. Of this total, 5.9 hours involved flying conducted under 14 CFR Part 135. The flight to the accident airport was for the purposes of picking up repair parts for another company airplane that received minor damage in which the flight crew was previously piloting in the 24- hour period. They were then going to fly back to the operator's home base on the same day, which would have had an estimated flying time of 2:45 hours. The captain said he was tired and that he and the first officer had not slept at any of the stops made during the period. The captain said that the company likes for the airplanes to return to their home base. The captain said that the company prefers an option for pilots to stay overnight if tired and he has stayed overnight on previous trips but only due to maintenance related reasons. The Aeronautical Information Manual states that acute fatigue affects timing and perceptional field performance.