Scheduled Revenue Flight

The approach and landing at Istanbul-Atatürk was completed in marginal weather conditions with sleet, strong winds and turbulences. The copilot was the pilot-in-command. Upon touchdown on runway 36, the aircraft landed hard and bounced. On the second impact, the nose gear collapsed. The aircraft went out of control, veered off runway to the right at a speed of 60 knots and came to rest. All 81 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The wind was gusting up to 29 knots at the time of the accident with a visibility limited to 4 km.

After takeoff from Novy Bor Airfield, while climbing to a height of about 10 metres, the aircraft nosed up. The pilot reduced the engine power when the aircraft stalled and crashed on the runway about 150 metres from its end. All 14 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It was reported that the CofG was well beyond the aft limit.

Upon landing, the aircraft flipped over and came to rest. There were no casualties.

While approaching Bundi Airport on a flight from Madang, the pilot decided to divert to Begesin Airport for unknown reason. On final approach to Begesin Airstrip, he extended the approach and landed too far down the runway. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and crashed in a ravine. The pilot and a passenger were killed.

Following an uneventful flight from Trabzon, the crew started the descent to Krasnodar Airport by night. Upon landing, the aircraft bounced five times and a positive acceleration of 3,3 g was recorded. After the fifth bounce, the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All 44 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It was reported that the crew failed to prepare the flight according to published procedure and at the time of the accident, the CofG was too far aft, causing the aircraft to be unstable.

At about 18:34 EST, American Airlines Flight 965 took off from Miami for a flight to Cali. At 21:34, while descending to FL200, the crew contacted Cali Approach. The aircraft was 63 nm out of Cali VOR (which is 8nm South of the airport) at the time. Cali cleared the flight for a direct Cali VOR approach and report at Tulua VOR. Followed one minute later by a clearance for a straight in VOR DME approach to runway 19 (the Rozo 1 arrival). The crew then tried to select the Rozo NDB (Non Directional Beacon) on the Flight Management Computer (FMC). Because their Jeppesen approach plates showed 'R' as the code for Rozo, the crew selected this option. But 'R' in the FMC database meant Romeo. Romeo is a navaid 150nm from Rozo, but has the same frequency. The aircraft had just passed Tulua VOR when it started a turn to the left (towards Romeo). This turn caused some confusion in the cockpit since Rozo 1 was to be a straight in approach. 87 Seconds after commencing the turn, the crew activated Heading Select (HDG SEL), which disengaged LNAV and started a right turn. The left turn brought the B757 over mountainous terrain, so a Ground Proximity (GPWS) warning sounded. With increased engine power and nose-up the crew tried to climb. The spoilers were still activated however. The stick shaker then activated and the aircraft crashed into a mountain at about 8900 feet (Cali field elevation being 3153 feet).

The captain initiated a takeoff on runway 04L, which was covered with patches of ice and snow. The wind was from 330 degrees at 11 knots. Before receiving an 80-knot call from the 1st officer, the airplane began to veer to the left. Subsequently, it went off the left side of the runway and collided with signs and an electric transformer. Investigation revealed evidence that the captain had overcontrolled the nosewheel steering through the tiller, then applied insufficient or untimely right rudder inputs to effect a recovery. The captain abandoned an attempt to reject the takeoff, at least temporarily, by restoring forward thrust before the airplane departed the runway. The current Boeing 747 operating procedures provide inadequate guidance to flightcrews regarding the potential for loss of directional control at low speeds on slippery runways with the use of the tiller. Current Boeing 747 flight manual guidance was inadequate about when a pilot should reject a takeoff following some indication of a lack of directional control response. Improvements in the slippery runway handling fidelity of flight simulators used for Boeing 747 pilot training were considered to be both needed and feasible.

En route from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk to Khabarovsk, while cruising at the assigned altitude of 10,600 metres, about 35 minutes after takeoff, the aircraft rolled to the right, entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a mountainous and isolated area located in the Sikhot-Alin Mountain Range. SAR operations were initiated but suspended a day later due to the deterioration of the weather conditions and started again four days later. The wreckage was found 11 days later about 50 km west of Grossevichi. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 98 occupants were killed.

For unknown reasons, the aircraft belly landed and was damaged beyond repair. There were no casualties.

During initial climb, at a height of about 60 metres and at a speed of 317 km/h, the left engine failed. The copilot counteracted the left bank and five seconds later, the flight engineer informed the crew that the right engine also failed. The captain took over control and the aircraft climbed to the height of 197 metres when the speed dropped to 290 km/h. The captain elected to make an emergency landing but was forced to make a sharp turn to the right to avoid a building. The aircraft rolled to the right to an angle of 37° and adopted a rate of descent of 1,960 feet per minute before crashing in an open field located 3,850 metres from the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact. Thirty occupants were rescued while 52 others, among them two crew members, were killed.