Crash of a Swearingen SA227AC Metro III in Terrace: 7 killed

Date & Time: Sep 26, 1989 at 0828 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
C-GSLB
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Prince Rupert - Terrace
MSN:
AC-481
YOM:
1981
Flight number:
SLK070
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Aircraft flight hours:
11177
Circumstances:
A Swearingen SA227-AC Metro III passenger plane, operating as Skylink Flight 070 was destroyed in accident at Terrace Airport, BC (YXT), Canada. All five passengers and two crew members were killed. Flight 070 took off from Vancouver, BC (YVR) at 06:51 on a scheduled domestic flight to Terrace, BC. At 08:20 Flight 070 was cleared for an approach at Terrace. At 08:27, at an altitude of 1,200 feet asl and just prior to reaching the published missed approach point (MAP), the captain stated "OK, I got the button here." Fourteen seconds after this, the captain saw the button of runway 27. At approximately this same time, the aircraft was observed on what corresponded to a downwind leg for runway 15 at about 500 feet above ground level (agl), flying straight and level over the threshold of runway 27, with the landing gear down. The aircraft crossed the localizer transmitter at an altitude of 1,100 feet asl and at an airspeed of 140 knots. Approximately 30 seconds after crossing the localizer transmitter, the aircraft commenced a descent out of 1,100 feet, and the flaps were lowered to the full position. The aircraft then levelled at an altitude of approximately 900 feet. At or about this same time, the aircraft was observed on base leg for runway 15 at a low altitude, close to the east/west ridge located about 1.5 miles north of the airport. Twenty-six seconds after full flap was selected, a missed approach was initiated, and the landing gear and flaps were selected up. Within five seconds of the initiation of the missed approach, the aircraft began to accelerate and a rate of climb of approximately 1,200 feet per minute was established. This rate of climb quickly diminished to zero, followed by the start of a descent which quickly increased to 3,000 feet per minute. As the aircraft descended, the co-pilot called "descending" twice. A few seconds later, the aircraft struck trees on the west side of runway 15 just inside the airport perimeter. A second and final impact with the ground occurred just outside the airport perimeter approximately 800 feet from the initial tree strike. A fire erupted following the ground impact.
Probable cause:
The crew continued with the approach beyond the missed approach point without establishing the required visual references. The evidence indicates that, while subsequently carrying out a missed approach in IFR conditions, the aircraft was flown into the ground in a manner consistent with disorientation. Contributing to the occurrence were the inadequacy of the company's operating procedures, the reduced operating standards, and the inadequate definition of the visual references required for a circling approach.

Crash of a Dornier DO228-201 near Indapur: 11 killed

Date & Time: Sep 23, 1989 at 1953 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VT-EJF
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Pune - Hyderabad
MSN:
8052
YOM:
1985
Flight number:
PF624
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
11
Captain / Total flying hours:
4459
Circumstances:
The aircraft took off from Pune at 1928 hrs. The flight was uneventful up to 1943 hrs. Soon thereafter, the aircraft started losing height rapidly with increasing speed. The pilot attempted recover the aircraft from the dive but the aircraft continued to lose height till it impacted the backwaters Ujjaini Dam near Indapur village, 129 ms east-southeast of Pune. The aircraft disintegrated into multiple pieces, killing all persons on board the aircraft. The accident occurred during night conditions.
Probable cause:
Entry of the aircraft into severe turbulent conditions while passing through clouds, leading to rapid loss of height of the aircraft because of inappropriate action by the pilots. As a result, the aircraft entered a spiral. This was not recognised by the pilots, resulting in initiation of incorrect recovery action by pulling back on the control column instead of first levelling the wings. The possibility of jamming of the elevator of the aircraft cannot be ruled out as one of the probable cause of the accident. Disorientation; unpreparedness of the pilots and their failure to recognise in time, a serious situation and take appropriate corrective action; long breaks in night flying in the case of the captain and temporary malfunction or sluggishness of ADI are the contributory causes.

Ground accident of a Fairchild F27A in Toulon

Date & Time: Sep 22, 1989 at 1950 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
F-GFHZ
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Toulon - Bastia
MSN:
79
YOM:
1960
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
37
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Boarding was done and the crew was preparing the aircraft when the gear were mistakenly retracted for unknown reasons. All 40 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Piper PA-31T-1040 Cheyenne III in Sachs Harbour: 5 killed

Date & Time: Sep 22, 1989
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GBDH
Survivors:
No
MSN:
31-8375003
YOM:
1983
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
On final approach to Sachs Harbour Airport, the pilot encountered limited visibility due to fog when the aircraft crashed in a lake located 600 meters short of runway. All five occupants were killed.

Crash of a Boeing 737-401 in New York: 2 killed

Date & Time: Sep 20, 1989 at 2321 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N416US
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
New York - Charlotte
MSN:
23884
YOM:
1988
Flight number:
US5050
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
57
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
5525
Captain / Total hours on type:
140.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3287
Copilot / Total hours on type:
8
Aircraft flight hours:
2235
Aircraft flight cycles:
1730
Circumstances:
A USAir Boeing 737-401, registration N416US, was scheduled to depart from Baltimore/Washington (BWI) as flight 1846 at 15:10, but air traffic inbound to New York-LaGuardia (LGA) delayed the takeoff until 19:35. Holding on the taxiway at BWI for 1.5 hours required the flight to return to the terminal area for fuel. The Boeing 737-400 left BWI uneventfully and arrived at LGA's Gate 15 at 20:40. Weather and air traffic in the LGA terminal area had caused cancellations and delayed most flights for several hours. The USAir dispatcher decided to cancel the Norfolk leg of Flight 1846, unload the passengers, and send the flight to Charlotte (CLT) without passengers. Several minutes later, the dispatcher told the captain that his airplane would not be flown empty but would carry passengers to Charlotte as USAir flight 5050. This seemed to upset the captain. He expressed concern for the passengers because more delays would cause him and the first officer to exceed crew duty time limitations before the end of the trip. While passengers were boarding, the captain visited USAir's ground movement control tower to ask about how decisions were made about flights and passengers. The captain returned to the cockpit as the last of the passengers were boarding, and the entry door was closed. After the jetway was retracted, the passenger service representative told the captain through the open cockpit window that he wanted to open the door again to board more passengers. The captain refused, and flight 5050 left Gate 15 at 22:52. The 737 taxied out to runway 31. Two minutes after push-back, the ground controller told the crew to hold short of taxiway Golf Golf. However, the captain failed to hold short of that taxiway and received modified taxi instructions from the ground controller at 22:56. The captain then briefed takeoff speeds as V1: 125 knots, VR: 128 knots, and V2: 139 knots. The first officer was to be the flying pilot. He was conducting his first non supervised line takeoff in a Boeing 737. About 2 minutes later, the first officer announced "stabilizer and trim" as part of the before-takeoff checklist. The captain responded with "set" and then corrected himself by saying: "Stabilizer trim, I forgot the answer. Set for takeoff." Flight 5050 was cleared into position to hold at the end of the runway at 23:18:26 and received takeoff clearance at 23:20:05. The first officer pressed the autothrottle disengage and then pressed the TO/GA button, but noted no throttle movement. He then advanced the throttles manually to a "rough" takeoff-power setting. The captain then said: "Okay, that's the wrong button pushed" and 9 seconds later said: "All right, I'll set your power." During the takeoff roll the airplane began tracking to the left. The captain initially used the nosewheel steering tiller to maintain directional control. About 18 seconds after beginning the roll a "bang" was heard followed shortly by a loud rumble, which was due to the cocked nosewheel as a result of using the nosewheel steering during the takeoff roll. At 23:20:53, the captain said "got the steering." The captain later testified that he had said, "You've got the steering." The first officer testified that he thought the captain had said: "I've got the steering." When the first officer heard the captain, he said "Watch it then" and began releasing force on the right rudder pedal but kept his hands on the yoke in anticipation of the V1 and rotation callouts. At 23:20:58.1, the captain said: "Let's take it back then" which he later testified meant that he was aborting the takeoff. According to the captain, he rejected the takeoff because of the continuing left drift and the rumbling noise. He used differential braking and nose wheel steering to return toward the centerline and stop. The throttle levers were brought back to their idle stops at 23:20:58.4. The indicated airspeed at that time was 130 knots. Increasing engine sound indicating employment of reverse thrust was heard on the CVR almost 9 seconds after the abort maneuver began. The airplane did not stop on the runway but crossed the end of the runway at 34 knots ground speed. The aircraft dropped onto the wooden approach light pier, which collapsed causing the aircraft break in three and drop into 7-12 m deep East River. The accident was not survivable for the occupants of seats 21A and 21B because of the massive upward crush of the cabin floor.
Probable cause:
The captain's failure to exercise his command authority in a timely manner to reject the take-off or take sufficient control to continue the take-off, which was initiated with a mistrimmed rudder. Also causal was the captain's failure to detect the mistrimmed rudder before the take-off was attempted. Board member Jim Burnett filed the following concurring and dissenting statement: "Although I concur with the probable cause as adopted as far as it goes, I would have added the following as a contributing factor: Contributing to the cause of the accident was the failure of USAir to provide an adequately experienced and seasoned flight crew.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-10-30 in Niger: 170 killed

Date & Time: Sep 19, 1989 at 1359 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N54629
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Brazzaville – N’Djamena – Paris
MSN:
46852
YOM:
1973
Flight number:
UT772
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
14
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
156
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
170
Captain / Total flying hours:
11039
Captain / Total hours on type:
2723.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
8357
Copilot / Total hours on type:
754
Aircraft flight hours:
60267
Aircraft flight cycles:
14777
Circumstances:
The DC-10 departed N'Djamena Airport at 1313LT bound for Paris-Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport. Forty-six minutes later, while cruising at an altitude of 35,000 feet over Niger, the aircraft disappeared from radar screens and the crew did not send any distress call. It was quickly understood that the aircraft exploded in mid-air and crashed somewhere in the desert. SAR operations were initiated and the wreckage was found a day later in the Ténéré Desert, about 650 km north of N'Djamena, northeast from the Termit Mountain Range. Debris scattered on 100 km2 and none of the 170 occupants survived the crash.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the accident was the aircraft was destroyed by an explosion. The following findings were reported:
- The destruction was due to an explosive charge placed in a container located in position 13R in the forward cargo hold.
- The bomb was formed of pentrite, namely an explosive composed with a powerful and very sensitive crystalline nitric ester.
- The Investigation Commission assert that the most plausible hypothesis is that the explosive charge was inside baggage loaded at Brazzaville Airport.
- Observations made shortly after the accident on Brazzaville Airport made it clear that, at that time, the airport security measures in force were not in accordance with the ICAO standards and recommended practices (Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and Civil Aviation Security Manual (DOC 8973)).
Final Report:

Crash of a Yakovlev Yak-40 in Jalal-Abad

Date & Time: Sep 15, 1989
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-87391
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bishkek - Jalal-Abad
MSN:
9 41 03 33
YOM:
1974
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
27
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Following a wrong approach configuration, the crew completed the landing at an excessive speed in a nose-down attitude. Upon touchdown, the aircraft bounced three times then veered off runway and came to rest. All 30 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Wrong approach configuration on part of the flying crew.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 in Bintuni: 22 killed

Date & Time: Sep 15, 1989
Operator:
Registration:
PK-NUE
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Manokwari - Bintuni
MSN:
345
YOM:
1972
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
19
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
22
Circumstances:
While approaching Bintuni Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions when the aircraft struck a mountain located few km from the airfield. All 22 occupants were killed.

Crash of a Let L-410M in Vodochody

Date & Time: Sep 13, 1989
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
OK-FDC
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
75 04 08
YOM:
1975
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
For unknown reasons, the twin engine aircraft landed hard and was damaged beyond repair. There were no casualties.

Crash of a BAc 111-320AZ in Port Harcourt

Date & Time: Sep 7, 1989 at 1905 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5N-AOT
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Lagos - Port Harcourt
MSN:
133
YOM:
1968
Flight number:
OKJ307
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
88
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
42575
Circumstances:
Okada Air Flight OKJ307 originated from Lagos (LOS), at about 17:10 hours UTC en-route to Port-Harcourt (PHC). By 17:40 hours, at FL250, the crew established contact with Port Harcourt Tower and was cleared to the "PR" Radio Beacon. The 1700 hours weather report was passed onto the crew with the assurance not to expect any delay for an ILS approach to runway 21. At 75 nm from Port Harcourt, the aircraft was cleared down to FL90 and the crew reviewed their approach briefings. The First Officer was still flying when the airplane was further cleared to 2000 feet with the instructions to report when established on the localizer. At 700 feet, the Commander had the field-in-sight but the flying pilot had not. Then the Commander took over control from the First Officer. The captain requested the tower to increase approach lights intensity because of drizzling rain. The BAC 111 passed an area of heavy downpour. It entered a high sink rate and made a hard landing. The airplane bounced and made the second touchdown on its nose-wheel. The right nose wheel shattered instantaneously while the second nose wheel fractured at the hub. It rolled for about 90 metres and crumbled under the weight of the aircraft. When both wheels of the nose gear had broken away, the wheel axle made contact with runway to cut grooves onto the runway surface for about 25 metres before the nose strut finally gave way. The aircraft now scooped forward on the nose fuselage section and continued off the runway on to the left shoulder. On the shoulder, the aircraft ran into the wide trench which was covered up with loose soil and the impact severed off the right main gear from the attachment point. The aircraft eventually came to a stop 735 meters after touchdown.
Probable cause:
The probable cause of this accident is the poor handling of the controls at the critical movement of final approach and landing phases, probably due to the sudden loss of azimuth in the heavy downpour of rain. The contributory factor to the accident is the excavation and improper refilling of the outrageous trenches of wide dimensions along the length of runway 03/21.