Cargo

Whilst on a cargo flight from Braunschweig, Germany, to Oxford, England, when approximately 30 nm from the English coast, the right engine started to run roughly. On checking the fuel gauges, the pilot observed that they were indicating in the ‘red sector’. The right engine subsequently stopped, shortly followed by the left engine. The aircraft then glided from FL100 towards the Suffolk coast and ditched in the sea approximately 9.5 nm southeast of Aldeburgh. The pilot was able to abandon the aircraft, which sank quickly. He was rescued from the sea some 18 minutes later by a Royal Air Force Search and Rescue helicopter and taken to hospital, where he was found to have suffered a fractured a vertebra. The investigation determined that the aircraft had run out of fuel, due to insufficient fuel for the intended journey being on-board the aircraft at the start of the flight.

On the day of the accident, Flight DV110 routing was Abidjan – Accra - Lagos. It departed Abidjan at 1015 hrs for Lagos via Accra. The aircraft finally departed Accra for Lagos at 1145 hrs with a total declared cargo weight of 50014 lbs (22733 kgs). The aircraft contacted Lagos Area Control at 1242 hrs, while maintaining FL 210 (21, 000ft) and was given an in-bound clearance to Lagos VOR (LAG) for ILS approach on runway 18L. At 1252 hrs, Lagos Approach cleared it to FL050 (5,000 feet) and at 12 NM, it was further cleared down to 3500ft on QNH 1013 hpa, and finally to 2,200 feet and to report established on the ILS. At 4 NM to the runway, the aircraft reported fully established on the ILS and was handed over to Control Tower for landing instructions. At 1303 hrs and 2 NM to the runway, the aircraft was cleared to land on runway 18L but to exercise caution, as the runway surface was wet. The cloud was low; the Captain said in his statement that the cloud base was about 100 feet above minimum. Speci weather was also available to the crew. The pilot was advised to exercise caution due to the rain and the weather at that time. In spite of all the warnings the copilot was still allowed to proceed with the landing. At the point of touch down the captain observed that it was impossible to stop on the runway and he called for a go-around. The procedure was not properly executed and thus the aircraft overshot the runway 400m into the grass area. There was no fire outbreak and no injury was sustained by any of the crew members. There was serious damage to the aircraft.

A first attempt to take off from El Obeid Airport failed. During the second attempt, an engine caught fire and the aircraft crashed. There were no casualties but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

While taxiing at Bogotá-El Dorado Airport, ready for a cargo flight to Barranquilla, the aircraft suffered a technical problem with the right main gear that collapsed. All three crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The four engine aircraft departed Algiers-Houari Boumédiène Airport at 1705LT on a cargo flight to Frankfurt with a crew of three on board. While cruising at an altitude of 25,000 feet over north Italy, the copilot informed ATC about the failure of the automatic pilot system. Less than a minute later, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent during which the overspeed alarm sounded in the cockpit. In a nose down angle of 45-50° and at a speed of 850/900 km/h, the aircraft crashed in an open field located southwest of Piacenza. The aircraft totally disintegrated on impact and all three crew members were killed. A large crater was found at the point of impact and debris were found till 800 metres around.

The approach and landing were stabilized and within specified limits. Recorded data indicates that the loads experienced by the landing gear at touchdown were within the certification limits for an intact landing gear without any pre-existing cracks or flaws. The weather and runway conditions did not affect the landing. The application of braking by the accident crew, and the overall effect of the carbon brake modification did not initiate or contribute to the landing gear fracture. Post-accident modifications to the MD-10 carbon brake system were implemented due to investigative findings for the purposes of braking effectiveness and reliability. Post accident emergency response by the flight crew and ARFF was timely and correct. The left main landing gear (LMLG) outer cylinder on the accident airplane had been operated about 8 ½ years since its last overhaul where stray nickel plating likely was introduced in the air filler valve hole. Nickel plating is a permissible procedure for maintaining the tolerances of the inner diameter of the outer gear cylinder, however the plating is not allowed in the air filler valve bore hole. Literature and test research revealed that a nickel plating thickness of 0.008" results in a stress factor increase of 35%. At some point in the life of the LMLG, there was a load event that compressively yielded the material in the vicinity of the air filler valve hole causing a residual tension stress. During normal operations the stress levels in the air filler valve hole were likely within the design envelope, but the addition of the residual stress and the stress intensity factor due to the nickel increased these to a level high enough to initiate and grow a fatigue crack on each side of the air filler valve hole. The stresses at the air filler valve hole were examined via development of a Finite Element Model (FEM) which was validated with data gathered from an instrumented in-service FedEx MD-10 airplane. The in-service data and FEM showed that for all of the conditions, the stress in the air filler valve hole was much higher than anticipated in the design of the outer cylinder. Fatigue analysis of the in service findings and using the nickel plating factor resulted in a significantly reduced fatigue life of the gear cylinder compared with the certification limits. During the accident landing the spring back loads on the LMLG were sufficient to produce a stress level in the air filler valve hole that exceeded the residual strength of the material with the fatigue cracks present.

While cruising en route in VFR conditions, the aircraft lost power on both engines. The pilot attempted an emergency forced landing at a nearby unpaved State airport, but after encountering a 20 mph tailwind on downwind and a 20 mph headwind on final, the aircraft impacted a tall conifer tree while about one-half mile from the approach end of the runway. The reason for the dual engine power loss was not determined.

Few minutes after takeoff from Goma Airport, en route to Kisangani, the crew informed ATC about engine problem and was cleared to return to Goma for an emergency landing. Shortly later, the aircraft lost height, hit trees and crashed in hilly terrain located near Sake, about 20 km northwest of Goma. The aircraft was destroyed and all 6 occupants were killed.

Following a hard landing on runway 05 at Mexico City-Benito Juárez Airport, the tyre on the left main gear burst. The fuel tank was punctured by debris and a fire erupted. The aircraft was stopped on the main runway and while both pilots escaped uninjured, the aircraft was partially destroyed by fire.

In unknown circumstances, the aircraft caught fire shortly after landing at Bagram AFB. It came to rest on the runway and the crew was able to evacuate safely. The aircraft was destroyed by fire.