Cargo

The pilot was completing a cargo flight from Goma with a load of food on board. While approaching Walikale, weather conditions deteriorated. The pilot attempted three times to land but eventually initiated a go-around when the disappeared few minutes later. SAR operations were suspended after few days as no trace of the aircraft nor the pilot was found.

Prior to the flight, the pilot obtained a weather briefing which included an AIRMET for IFR conditions and an AIRMET for icing that was "just off to the north." According to air traffic control (ATC) information, the en route portion of the flight was uneventful. ATC cleared the pilot for an ILS approach to runway 35, and the pilot acknowledged the approach clearance. When the airplane reached the outer marker ATC approved the pilot for a frequency change to the common traffic advisory frequency. The pilot acknowledged the frequency change, and no further communications were received from the pilot by ATC. Witnesses observed the airplane approximately 200 feet above ground level (agl) on a northwesterly heading, west of runway 35. The airplane then entered a climbing left turn to the south and disappeared into the overcast cloud layer. Shortly thereafter, the witness observed the airplane in a "20 degree nose down, wings level attitude" on a southeasterly heading. The witness then lost sight of the airplane due to hangars obstructing his view. At the time of the accident, the witness stated that the ceiling was approximately 500 foot overcast with mist. The published missed approach procedure instructed the pilot to initiate a climbing left turn to a fix and hold. Examination of the accident site revealed the airplane impacted the terrain in a right wing, nose-low attitude. No ground impact marks were noted except in the immediate vicinity of the wing leading edges, engines, and propeller assemblies. The flaps and landing gear were in the extended position. The leading edge surfaces of the vertical and horizontal stabilizers revealed 1/4 to 1/2 inches of clear ice. The upper fuselage antenna displayed 1/4 to 1/2 inches of clear ice. Local authorities reported observing a "layer of ice" on the leading edges of both wings when they arrived to the accident site. Examination of the airframe and engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operations.

The pilot was dispatched on a nonscheduled cargo flight to an airport other than his usual destination because it had a precision instrument approach, while his usual destination airport did not. The pilot elected to fly to his usual airport, and attempted a non precision instrument approach. The airport had both a VOR and an NDB approach. The NDB approach was noted as being out of service, although there was still a radio signal coming from the navigation aid. The pilot was cleared for the VOR approach, although instrumentation inside the cockpit was found set for the NDB approach, and radar track data disclosed that the flight path was consistent with the NDB approach path, not the VOR's. The airport's reported weather was 1.25 miles visibility, with a 200-foot overcast in mist. The airport's minimum NDB approach altitude is 652 feet above touchdown height. The airplane did not reach the runway, and collided with a pole and a building. Inspection of the airplane disclosed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions.

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Medellín-José María Córdova (Rionegro) Airport, the crew completed the approach and landing on runway 09R at Miami-Intl Airport. After touchdown, following a course of 100-120 metres, the crew activated the thrust reverser systems when the right main gear collapsed. The aircraft veered to the right and came to rest near the taxiway U. All three crew members evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

A Beech 99 and a Cessna 402 were substantially damaged in a ground collision that occurred during night taxi operations at General Mitchell International Airport (MKE), Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Both pilots followed each of the controller's instructions to proceed to the same cargo ramp using intersecting taxiways after having landed. Neither controller had advised either pilot that other aircraft would be approaching the same taxiway intersection. Neither pilot reported seeing the other airplane approaching the taxiway intersection. The Cessna 402 landed on runway 25R and was instructed to taxi to the cargo ramp via Golf, Bravo, and Alpha taxiways. The Beech 99 landed on runway 25L. The taxi instructions given to the Beech 99 pilot were to turn right at taxiway A2 (high-speed taxiway), monitor ground on frequency 121.8, and taxi to the cargo ramp. The local controller reported he scanned taxiway A, the runway, and saw the Beech 99 clear of the runway. As the Beech 99 prepared to turn off taxiway A2 onto taxiway A, the Cessna 402 approached the taxiway A and taxiway A2 intersection. The Beech 99's right propeller impacted the Cessna 402's left wing tip fuel tank. The impact of the two airplanes resulted in a fire. Both of the pilots involved in the ground collision evacuated their respective airplanes. The FAA Order 7110.65, "Air Traffic Control," states that the absence of holding instructions authorizes an aircraft to cross all taxiways and runways that intersect the taxi route. FAA Order 7110.65, "Air Traffic Control," states that it is the procedure for controllers to instruct aircraft where to turn off the runway after landing and advise the aircraft to hold short of a runway or taxiway if required for traffic. Neither aircraft was issued hold short instructions. The Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDEX), provided images of each airplane's movement leading up to the time of the ground collision. The ASDE-X replay showed the Beech 99 taxiing at 20 knots on taxiway A2 approaching the taxiway A intersection. The Cessna 402 was shown taxiing at 20 knots just short of the taxiway A and taxiway A2 intersection. Both pilots reported that they did not see the other airplane approaching the same intersection while taxiing. Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 states that vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to "see and avoid" other aircraft.

The flight crew was delivering a cargo of fuel in the four-engine airplane under Title 14, CFR Part 125, when the airplane lost power in the number 2 engine. The captain elected to shut the engine down and return to the airport. He said during the shutdown procedure, the engine caught fire, and that the fire extinguishing system was activated. The crew thought the fire was out, but it erupted again, and the captain elected to land the airplane gear-up on the snow covered tundra. Once on the ground, the left wing was consumed by fire. An inspection by company maintenance personnel revealed that an overhauled engine cylinder had failed at its base, resulting in a fire. The airplane was not examined by the NTSB due to its remote location.

Following an uneventful mail flight from Kuala Lumpur, the crew initiated a night approach to Kuching Airport. After touchdown on a wet runway due to recent heavy rain falls, the aircraft deviated to the left and veered off runway. While contacting soft ground, both main gears collapsed, the left engine was torn off and the aircraft came to rest 1,500 metres past the runway threshold. All four crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airplane was substantially damaged during an in-flight recovery after the captain attempted an intentional aileron roll maneuver during cruise flight and lost control. The cargo flight was being operated at night under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 135 at the time of the accident. The captain reported the airplane was "functioning normally" prior to the intentional aileron roll maneuver. The captain stated that the "intentional roll maneuver got out of control" while descending through flight level 200. The captain reported that the airplane "over sped" and experienced "excessive G-loads" during the subsequent recovery. The copilot
reported that the roll maneuver initiated by the captain resulted in a "nose-down unusual attitude" and a "high speed dive." Inspection of the airplane showed substantial damage to the left wing and elevator assembly.

On January 9, 2007, at 2323 central standard time, a Gates Learjet model 24F airplane, N444TW, serial number 348, was destroyed upon impact with terrain, about 18.8 nautical miles east of Guadalajara, State of Jalisco, in the Republic of Mexico. The airline transport-rated pilot and the commercial pilot functioning as first officer were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to the Sierra American Corporation of Wilmington, Delaware, and was being operated by Ameristar Jet Charter, Inc., of Addison, Texas, as Ameristar flight 878, a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 on-demand cargo flight. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the flight from Laredo, Texas. The cargo flight had originated in Laredo, Texas, at about 2210, with the Don Miguel Hidalgo International Airport (MMGL) near Guadalajara, Mexico, as its intended destination. Mexican Air Traffic Control personnel reported that the flight had approached MMGL from the north. At 2313, Guadalajara Approach Control cleared the flight to descend to 12,000 feet, provided an altimeter setting of 30.28, and told the flight to expect radar vectors for the ILS runway 28 approach to MMGL. After being provided a vector of 190 to intercept the localizer for the ILS runway 28 approach, there were communications between the flight and the controller to clarify which runway was active, and at 2318:00, the flight was given a right turn to a heading of 200 degrees. At 2318:56 the flight was cleared to descend to 10,000 feet, and at 2320:38, the flight was cleared to descend to 9,000 feet. The airplane was last observed on radar descending through 9,200 feet, while crossing the GDL VOR 085 degree radial.

The commercial certificated pilot prepared for a VFR cross-country nonscheduled cargo flight under Title 14, CFR Part 135, by preflighting the wheel-equipped airplane and starting the engine. The airplane had been parked on the airport ramp overnight, with an electric engine heater and an engine cover on. A portion of the flight was over ocean waters to a remote village. After engine start, the pilot contacted the company owner and reported that the engine oil pressure appeared to be low, but within the operating range. The owner and the pilot discussed the possible reasons, such as cold ambient temperatures, which was about -20 degrees F. The pilot then departed, and reported to his company that the engine pressure was good. About 10 minutes later, he declared an emergency and stated he was ditching in the water, about 18 miles west of the departure airport. Retrieved track data from the pilot's GPS showed the airplane's maximum altitude was 1,439 feet msl, while crossing the ocean in an area that was about 22 miles wide. A review of the manufacturer's maximum glide distance chart revealed that from an altitude of about 1,500 feet, the airplane could glide about 2.1 nautical miles. The airplane was located about two hours after the accident, floating nose down next to a segment of pan ice, about 8.8 miles from the initial accident location. The pilot was not recovered with the airplane, and subsequent searches did not locate him. Following recovery of the airplane, examination of the engine revealed a 8 X 5 inch hole in the top of the case, adjacent to the number 2 cylinder. The number 2 connecting rod was broken from its crankshaft journal, and broken from the bottom of the piston. The number 1 connecting rod bearing was missing from its normal position on the crankshaft journal and the rod had evidence of high heat. Evidence of oil starvation and high heat signatures to several crankshaft and connecting rod bearings was found throughout the engine, along with a large amount of fragmented bearing material. The pilot was not wearing any personal flotation equipment, and the expected survival time in the 29 degree F ocean water was about 30 minutes. The company's operations manual does not contain a written policy requiring pilot's to maintain sufficient altitude to reach shore when crossing ocean waters.