Columbus-Rickenbacker (Lockbourne AFB)

The accident flight was the first flight following maintenance that included flight control cable rigging. The flight was also intended to provide cockpit familiarization for the first officer and the pilot observer, and as a training flight for the first officer. About one minute after takeoff, the first officer contacted the tower and stated that they needed to return to land. The airplane impacted a cornfield about one mile southwest of the approach end of the runway, and 2 minutes 40 seconds after the initiation of the takeoff roll. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) indicated that, during the flight, neither the captain nor the first officer called for the landing gear to be raised, the flaps to be retracted, or the power levers to be reduced from full power. From the time the first officer called "rotate" until the impact, the captain repeated the word "pull" about 27 times. When the observer pilot asked, "Come back on the trim?" the captain responded, "There's nothing anymore on the trim." The inspection of the airplane revealed that the elevator trim cables were rigged improperly, which resulted in the trim cables being reversed. As a result, when the pilot applied nose-up trim, the elevator trim system actually applied nose-down trim. The flight crew was briefed on the maintenance work that had been performed on the airplane; therefore, when the captain’s nose-up trim inputs were affecting his ability to control the airplane, at a minimum, he should have stopped making additional inputs and returned the airplane to the configuration it was in before the problem worsened. An examination of the maintenance instruction cards used to conduct the last inspection revealed that the inspector's block on numerous checks were not signed off by the Required Inspection Item (RII) inspector. The RII inspector did not sign the item that stated: "Connect elevator servo trim tab cables and rig in accordance with Allison Convair [maintenance manual]...” The item had been signed off by the mechanic, but not by the RII inspector. The card also contained a NOTE, which stated in bold type, "A complete inspection of all elevator controls must be accomplished and signed off by an RII qualified inspector and a logbook entry made to this effect." The RII inspector block was not signed off.

The cargo flight was departing on its fourth flight leg of a five-leg flight in night instrument conditions, which included a surface observation of light snow and a broken ceiling at 500 feet above ground level (agl). One pilot who departed just prior to the accident flight indicated that moderate snow was falling and that he entered the clouds about 200 feet agl. The accident airplane's wings and tail were de-iced prior to departure. Radar track data indicated the accident flight was about 45 seconds in duration. An aircraft performance radar study indicated that the airplane reached an altitude of about 1,130 feet mean sea level (msl), or about 400 feet above ground level, about 114 knots with a left bank angle of about 29 degrees. The airplane descended and impacted the terrain at an airspeed of about 155 knots, a pitch angle of -16 degrees, a left roll angle of 22 degrees, and a descent rate of 4,600 feet per minute. The study indicated that the engine power produced by the airplane approximately matched the engine power values represented in the pilot's operating handbook. The study indicated that the required elevator deflections were within the available elevator deflection range, and that the center-of-gravity (CG) position did not adversely affect the controllability of the airplane. The study indicated that the load factor vectors, the forces felt by the pilot, could have produced the illusion of a climb, even when the airplane was in a descent. The inspection of the airframe and engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

The airplane was substantially damaged during an in-flight recovery after the captain attempted an intentional aileron roll maneuver during cruise flight and lost control. The cargo flight was being operated at night under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 135 at the time of the accident. The captain reported the airplane was "functioning normally" prior to the intentional aileron roll maneuver. The captain stated that the "intentional roll maneuver got out of control" while descending through flight level 200. The captain reported that the airplane "over sped" and experienced "excessive G-loads" during the subsequent recovery. The copilot
reported that the roll maneuver initiated by the captain resulted in a "nose-down unusual attitude" and a "high speed dive." Inspection of the airplane showed substantial damage to the left wing and elevator assembly.

Shortly after takeoff from Fort Sill AFB, the aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances. All five crew members were killed. They were en route to Columbus-Rickenbacker (Lockbourne AFB), Ohio.
Crew:
Cpt George Freeland Jr.,
Maj Thomas Brady,
Lt Col Donald Griffith,
T/Sgt Michael Snodgrass,
Sr Amn Robert Hass.

The aircraft was engaged in a training mission and was taxing from an unlit ramp towards the runway when it collided with a second USAF KC-135 registered 63-7980. The airplane continued for about 200 yards before coming to rest in flames on a grassy area. Three crew members were injured while two others were killed. The aircraft was partially destroyed by fire.

The flight departed from Newark, New Jersey, at 1733 May 16, 1948, for Chicago, Illinois, Denver, Colorado, Burbank, and San Francisco, California. In addition to a crew consisting of Captain William R. McCauley and Copilot Jack R. Foote, the flight carried 5,280 pounds of fuel, and 10,263 pounds of cargo. According to the hourly weather reports available to the crew in Newark prior to departure, thunderstorm activity which existed over the vicinity of Goshen and Fort Wayne, Indiana, was moving eastward. Chicago Municipal Airport was reported to have a ceiling of 2,000 feet. The flight plan specified a cruising altitude of 4,000 feet to Chicago, the first intended point of landing. South Bend, Indiana, was designated as the alternate airport. No unusual incident was reported for approximately the first two hours of the trip, then, at 1931 the flight reported over Cleveland, Ohio, at 4,000 feet, stating that there was extreme turbulence approximately five miles east of the Cleveland Airport. At this time the flight acknowledged receipt of a weather report from Toledo, Ohio, to the effect that light thunderstorms with cloud to cloud lightning were moving northeasterly from Toledo. At 2013 the flight reported at 4,000 feet over Mansfield, Ohio, 58 miles south southwest of Cleveland. The crew stated that they had changed course to the south to avoid thunderstorms, and intended to proceed to Columbus, Ohio, in accordance with visual flight rules. A special weather observation taken at Cleveland at 2003 which reported a ceiling of 2,000 feet, visibility 10 miles, light rain, wind from the northwest at 30 miles per hour with strong gusts, and cloud to cloud and cloud to ground lightning was transmitted to the flight Cleveland Radio also transmitted a weather observation taken at Columbus at 1930 which reported an unlimited ceiling, visibility of 15 miles, and wind from the south at 14 miles per hour. After acknowledging receipt of this weather information, the flight stated "For your information advise no one to go through the turbulence we just went through." The next position report was received at 2032 at which time the flight reported being five miles north of Columbus. Following this report it was cleared by Columbus Tower for landing. In reply the flight stated to the tower, "We are declaring an emergency. Our rudder is locked, and I don’t think we will have any directional control on the ground." A landing approach was made for runway twenty-three, 4,490 feet long. Information concerning wind direction and velocity was transmitted repeatedly by the tower to the flight throughout the course of the approach. Although the first touchdown on runway 23 appeared normal, power was immediately applied and the aircraft took off. The crew then informed the tower that they wished to land directly into the wind, which at that time was from the south at five to ten miles per hour. They were accordingly cleared to land on runway eighteen, 3,580 feet long. The second approach appeared normal, and a touchdown was made on the runway without any apparent difficulty, but power was again applied and the flight took off again. When the flight reached a point 2 1/2 miles east of the field in its left circle of the field, it was observed to spin to the ground. Flames were observed immediately after the crash.