Great Bend

The instrument-rated private pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight in the multiengine airplane under instrument flight rules (IFR). As the flight neared its destination, the controller issued clearance for a GPS approach, and, shortly thereafter, the pilot informed the controller that he needed to review the approach procedure before continuing the approach. The controller acknowledged, and, after the pilot reported that he was ready to proceed with the approach, the controller again issued clearance for the GPS approach. Radar data showed that, during the approach, the airplane tracked a course that was offset about 0.5 miles right of the final approach course until it was about 1 mile from the runway threshold. The airplane then turned left towards the threshold and descended to an altitude of about 145 ft above ground level over the runway threshold before the pilot performed a missed approach. It is likely that the pilot performed the missed approach because he was unable to align the airplane with the runway before it crossed the threshold. The controller provided radar vectors for the airplane to return to the approach course and cleared the airplane a third time for the GPS approach to the runway. Radar data showed that the airplane was established on the final approach course as it passed the initial approach fix; however, before it reached the final approach fix, its airspeed slowed to about 111 knots, and it began a left turn with a 25 degree bank angle. About 18 seconds later, while still in the turn, the airplane slowed to 108 knots and began descending rapidly. The airplane's rate of descent exceeded 10,000 feet per minute, and it impacted the ground about 9 miles from the destination airport. Examination of the accident site showed that the airplane was severely fragmented and fire damaged with debris scattered for about 450 feet. Postaccident examination of the wreckage did not reveal evidence of any preimpact failures; however, damage to the left engine indicated that it was not producing power at the time of the accident. The severity of impact and fire damage to the airplane and engine precluded determination of the reason for the loss of left engine power. Weather conditions present at the time of the accident were conducive to super cooled liquid water droplets, and the airplane likely encountered moderate or greater icing conditions. Several pilot reports (PIREPs) for moderate, light, trace, and negative icing were reported to air traffic control but were not distributed publicly into the national airspace system, and there was no airmen's meteorological information (AIRMET) issued for icing. However, the pilot received standard and abbreviated weather briefings for the flight, and his most recent weather briefing included three PIREPs for icing conditions in the area of the accident site. Given the weather information provided, the pilot should have known icing conditions were possible. Even so, the public distribution of additional PIREPs would have likely increased the weather situational awareness by the pilot, weather forecasters, and air traffic controllers. The airplane was equipped with deicing and anti-icing systems that included wing and empennage deice boots and engine inlet heaters. Due to impact damage to the cockpit, the positions of the switches for the ice protection systems at the time of the accident could not be determined. Although the airplane's airspeed of 108 knots when the steep descent began was above its published stall speed of 77 knots, both bank angle and ice accretion would have increased the stall speed. In addition, the published minimum control airspeed was 93 knots. It is likely that, after the airplane passed the initial approach fix, the left engine lost power, the airplane's airspeed began to decay, and the asymmetric thrust resulted in a left turn. As the airspeed continued to decay, it decreased below either stall speed or minimum control airspeed, and the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent.

Prior to the flight, the pilot obtained a weather briefing which included an AIRMET for IFR conditions and an AIRMET for icing that was "just off to the north." According to air traffic control (ATC) information, the en route portion of the flight was uneventful. ATC cleared the pilot for an ILS approach to runway 35, and the pilot acknowledged the approach clearance. When the airplane reached the outer marker ATC approved the pilot for a frequency change to the common traffic advisory frequency. The pilot acknowledged the frequency change, and no further communications were received from the pilot by ATC. Witnesses observed the airplane approximately 200 feet above ground level (agl) on a northwesterly heading, west of runway 35. The airplane then entered a climbing left turn to the south and disappeared into the overcast cloud layer. Shortly thereafter, the witness observed the airplane in a "20 degree nose down, wings level attitude" on a southeasterly heading. The witness then lost sight of the airplane due to hangars obstructing his view. At the time of the accident, the witness stated that the ceiling was approximately 500 foot overcast with mist. The published missed approach procedure instructed the pilot to initiate a climbing left turn to a fix and hold. Examination of the accident site revealed the airplane impacted the terrain in a right wing, nose-low attitude. No ground impact marks were noted except in the immediate vicinity of the wing leading edges, engines, and propeller assemblies. The flaps and landing gear were in the extended position. The leading edge surfaces of the vertical and horizontal stabilizers revealed 1/4 to 1/2 inches of clear ice. The upper fuselage antenna displayed 1/4 to 1/2 inches of clear ice. Local authorities reported observing a "layer of ice" on the leading edges of both wings when they arrived to the accident site. Examination of the airframe and engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operations.

Both aircraft departed Wichita on IFR flight plan in VFR weather conditions. They flew northwest toward their respective destinations, and cancelled IFR about 20 minutes before the accident. ATC observed the airplanes on radar, and stated they were 'dogfighting back and forth' prior to the collision. One pilot's roommate reported the two pilots, who were close friends as well as co-workers, often cancelled IFR and flew in formation if the weather was VFR. He reported the pilots often videotaped each other, and he had watched some of the tapes. He stated 'it was hard to tell from the videotape how close they were because they could use the zoom feature, etc. You could read the N numbers.' Investigation revealed brown paint transfer on the bottom of the right wing of the blue and white airplane, which had separated and was located 1.5 miles from the main wreckage. There were light colored scuff marks on the top of the left engine nacelle of the brown and white airplane. Both aircraft and both pilots were killed.