Kansas

The airplane had recently undergone an annual inspection, and the pilot planned to fly the airplane back to his home base. After receiving clearance from air traffic control, the pilot proceeded to take off. The airplane accelerated and reached a peak groundspeed of 81 kts about 2,075 ft down the 4,097-ft runway. Once airborne, the airplane drifted slightly to the right and the pilot radioed an urgent need to return to the airport. The controller cleared the airplane to land and no further transmissions were received from the accident airplane. The airplane’s flight path showed that it slowed before turning back toward the left and the airplane’s speed continued to decrease throughout the remainder of the data. The final data point recorded the airplane at a groundspeed of 45 kts. The groundspeed would equate to 60 kts airspeed when considering the 15-kt headwind. The stall speed chart for the airplane listed the minimum stall speed for any configuration as 64 kts. Postaccident examinations of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. External and internal engine damage indicated that the engine was producing power at the time of impact, but the amount of power output could not be determined. Based on the available information, the pilot perceived an urgent need to return the airplane to the airport; however, due to the amount of damage from the impact and postimpact fire, the reason that the pilot was returning to the airport could not be determined. Stall speed information for the airplane, the recorded winds, and flight track data, indicated that the airplane encountered an aerodynamic stall before impacting the ground near the departure end of the runway. Since the airplane stalled and impacted the ground before reaching the perimeter of the airport, the pilot may not have had sufficient altitude to execute a forced landing to the empty field off the departure end of the runway.

The pilot was conducting a cross-country flight when, about 8 miles north of his intended destination, he reduced engine power, pitched for level flight, and waited for indicated airspeed to drop below 174 kts to add 20° of flaps. As soon as the drag was introduced, the airplane began to “buck back and forward,” and the two engines were “throttling up and down on their own.” He noted that the right engine seemed to be “sputtering and popping” more than the left engine, so he decided to raise the flaps and to shut down and feather the right engine. He declared an emergency to air traffic control. The pilot then noticed that the left engine was “slowly spooling down” and the airplane was not able to maintain airspeed and altitude. The pilot performed a forced landing to a flat, muddy wheat field about 4 nautical miles from the airport. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and to both wings. A Federal Aviation Administration inspector traveled to the accident site to examine the airplane. Flight control and engine control continuity were confirmed. The master switch was turned on and the fuel gauges showed a zero indication. There was no evidence of fuel at the accident site or in the airplane. During the recovery of the airplane from the field, no fuel was found in the three intact fuel tanks, nor in any of the engine fuel lines. The pilot later stated that he ran the airplane out of fuel during the accident flight. The pilot reported that, during the preflight checks and twice during the accident flight, he activated the low fuel warning light, and no anomalies were noted. Postaccident testing of the low fuel warning light in an exemplar Piper Aerostar 602P revealed no anomalies.

The pilot was conducting a Part 135 on-demand cargo flight in instrument meteorological conditions. After executing a second missed approach, he informed air traffic control (ATC) of his intentions to divert to an airport located about 36 miles to the southeast. About 7 minutes after executing the second missed approach, the pilot began making unintelligible radio communications that ATC characterized as very garbled and difficult to understand, “almost hypoxic.” ATC then instructed the pilot to utilize oxygen. About 19 minutes after the second missed approach, ATC informed the pilot that the airplane had descended 1,600 ft, not following assigned course vectors or instructions and asked if everything was alright, to which no response was received. After attempting to relay communications through other airplanes in the area, an unintelligible response was received from the accident airplane. ATC then made numerous transmissions to the accident pilot urging him to utilize oxygen and open a window. No further communications were received from the accident airplane. A witness reported that he saw the airplane descend out of a low overcast cloud layer at a high rate of descent. The airplane then abruptly transitioned into a steep climb before re-entering the clouds. A few seconds later, he heard the airplane impact terrain and responded to the accident site. The sudden change in communications from the pilot indicates a possible impairment. When combined with the ATC data, the witness account, and the lack of any mechanical irregularities or malfunctions with the airplane, it is likely the pilot experienced difficulty controlling the airplane due to impairment. While the pilot was at an increased risk for an acute cardiovascular event, the extremely limited available medical evidence leaves no way to quantify that risk and no evidence regarding whether such an event occurred. As a result, whether the pilot was incapacitated by an acute medical event cannot be determined from the available medical information.

According to the flight instructor, he and the pilot rated student receiving instruction were operating under instrument flight rules in instrument meteorological conditions. He reported that throughout the flight the airplane accumulated light rime ice. He recalled that after holding at a Very High Frequency Omni-Directional Range (VOR), they completed a VOR approach, executed the missed approach procedure, set the power to climb at the airspeed of 130 knots indicated airspeed and began to climb to 5000 feet. He reported that as they climbed they encountered freezing rain, the airspeed began to deteriorate and the degree of ice accumulation increased from light to moderate. He reported that all of the airplane's de-ice systems were functioning yet he was not able to maintain altitude. He determined that landing at the destination airport was not an option and executed a forced landing in an open field. He affirmed that during the landing the airplane bounced several times before coming to a stop. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the firewall, forward pressure bulkhead and puncture holes in the airplane skin. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical failures or anomalies prior to or during the flight that would have prevented normal flight operation.

The airline transport pilot was departing for a repositioning flight. During the initial climb, the pilot declared an emergency and stated that the airplane "lost the left engine." The airplane climbed to about 120 ft above ground level, and witnesses reported seeing it in a left turn with the landing gear extended. The airplane continued turning left and descended into a building on the airfield. A postimpact fired ensued and consumed a majority of the airplane. Postaccident examinations of the airplane, engines, and propellers did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Neither propeller was feathered before impact. Both engines exhibited multiple internal damage signatures consistent with engine operation at impact. Engine performance calculations using the preimpact propeller blade angles (derived from witness marks on the preload plates) and sound spectrum analysis revealed that the left engine was likely producing low to moderate power and that the right engine was likely producing moderate to high power when the airplane struck the building. A sudden, uncommanded engine power loss without flameout can result from a fuel control unit failure or a loose compressor discharge pressure (P3) line; thermal damage prevented a full assessment of the fuel control units and P3 lines. Although the left engine was producing some power at the time of the accident, the investigation could not rule out the possibility that a sudden left engine power loss, consistent with the pilot's report, occurred. A sideslip thrust and rudder study determined that, during the last second of the flight, the airplane had a nose-left sideslip angle of 29°. It is likely that the pilot applied substantial left rudder input at the end of the flight. Because the airplane's rudder boost system was destroyed, the investigation could not determine if the system was on or working properly during the accident flight. Based on the available evidence, it is likely that the pilot failed to maintain lateral control of the airplane after he reported a problem with the left engine. The evidence also indicates that the pilot did not follow the emergency procedures for an engine failure during takeoff, which included retracting the landing gear and feathering the propeller. Although the pilot had a history of anxiety and depression, which he was treating with medication that he had not reported to the Federal Aviation Administration, analysis of the pilot's autopsy and medical records found no evidence suggesting that either his medical conditions or the drugs he was taking to treat them contributed to his inability to safely control the airplane in an emergency situation.

After climbing to and leveling at 15,000 feet, the airplane departed controlled flight, descended rapidly in a nose-down vertical dive, and impacted terrain; an explosion and postaccident fire occurred. Evidence at the accident site revealed that most of the wreckage was located in or near a single impact crater; however, the outer portion of the left wing impacted the ground about 1/2 mile from the main wreckage. Following the previous flight, the pilot reported to a maintenance person in another state that he had several malfunctioning flight instruments, including the autopilot, the horizontal situation indicator, and the artificial horizon gyros. The pilot, who was not a mechanic, had maintenance personnel replace the right side artificial horizon gyro but did not have any other maintenance performed at that time. The pilot was approved under an FAA exemption to operate the airplane as a single pilot; however, the exemption required that all equipment must be operational, including a fully functioning autopilot, flight director, and gyroscopic flight instruments. Despite the malfunctioning instruments, the pilot chose to take off and fly in instrument meteorological conditions. At the time of the loss of control, the airplane had just entered an area with supercooled large water droplets and severe icing, which would have affected the airplane's flying characteristics. At the same time, the air traffic controller provided the pilot with a radio frequency change, a change in assigned altitude, and a slight routing change. It is likely that these instructions increased the pilot's workload as the airplane began to rapidly accumulate structural icing. Because of the malfunctioning instruments, it is likely that the pilot became disoriented while attempting to maneuver and maintain control of the airplane as the ice accumulated, which led to a loss of control.

The aircraft was substantially damaged when it collided with a hedgerow during a forced landing following a loss of engine power near Wichita, Kansas. The loss of engine power occurred about 4-1/2 minutes after departing Wichita Mid-Continent Airport (ICT), Wichita, Kansas. The commercial pilot, who was the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The airplane was registered to the Federal Express Corporation and operated by Baron Aviation Services Incorporated, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 while on an instrument flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the cargo flight that had the intended destination of Garden City Regional Airport (GCK), Garden City, Kansas. According to air traffic control transmissions, at 0734:35 (hhmm:ss), the pilot requested an instrument flight rules clearance from ICT to GCK. Radar track data indicated that the airplane departed runway 19R approximately 0737:45. At 0738:18, the tower controller told the pilot to change to the departure control frequency. The departure controller then cleared the flight to proceed direct to GCK and to climb to 8,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The airplane continued to climb on a westerly heading until 0742:02, at which time the airplane began a left 180-degree turn back toward the departure airport. According to radar data, the airplane had reached 4,700 ft msl when it began the left turn. At 0742:13, the pilot transmitted that his airplane had experienced a loss of engine power and that he was attempting to return to the departure airport. At 0742:31, the pilot asked if there were any nearby airports because he was unable to reach ICT. The departure controller provided vectors toward an airstrip that was approximately 2.5 miles southeast of the airplane's position. At 0743:46, the pilot advised that he could not see the airstrip because the airplane's windshield was contaminated with oil. At 0744:57, the pilot's final transmission was that he was landing in a grass field. The airplane was located about 2.2 miles south of ICT at 1,600 feet msl, about 300 feet above ground level (agl) at the time of the last transmission. The radar data continued northeast another 1/2 mile before radar contact was lost at 0745:15. A witness to the accident reported that he was outside his residence when he observed the accident airplane overfly his position. He recalled that the airplane's propeller was not rotating and that he did not hear the sound of the engine operating. He stated that the airplane landed in a nearby agricultural field on a northeast heading. He reported that during the landing rollout the airplane impacted a hedgerow located at the northern edge of the field. The witness indicated that the pilot was unresponsive when he arrived at the accident site and that there was a small grass fire located 8 to 10 feet in front of the main wreckage.

While en route to the destination airport, the pilot turned on the cabin heater and, afterward, an unusual smell was detected by the occupants and the ambient air temperature increased. When the pilot turned the heater off, dark smoke entered the cabin and obscured the occupants' vision. The smoke likely interfered with the pilot’s ability to identify a safe landing site. During the subsequent emergency landing attempt to a field, the airplane’s wing contacted the ground and the airplane cartwheeled. Examination of the airplane found several leaks around weld points on the combustion chamber of the heater unit. A review of logbook entries revealed that the heater was documented as inoperative during the most recent annual inspection. Although a work order indicated that maintenance work was completed at a later date, there was no logbook entry that returned the heater to service. There were no entries in the maintenance logbooks that documented any testing of the heater or tracking of the heater's hours of operation. A flight instructor who flew with the pilot previously stated that the pilot used the heater on the accident airplane at least once before the accident flight. The heater’s overheat warning light activated during that flight, and the heater shut down without incident. The flight instructor showed the pilot how to reset the overheat circuit breaker but did not follow up on its status during their instruction. There is no evidence that a mechanic examined the airplane before the accident flight. Regarding the overheat warning light, the airplane flight manual states that the heater “should be thoroughly checked to determine the reason for the malfunction” before the overheat switch is reset. The pilot’s use of the heater on the accident flight suggests that he did not understand its status and risk of its continued use without verifying that it had been thoroughly checked as outlined in the airplane flight manual. A review of applicable airworthiness directives found that, in comparison with similar combustion heater units, there is no calendar time limit that would require periodic inspection of the accident unit. In addition, there is no guidance or instruction to disable the heater such that it could no longer be activated in the airplane if the heater was not airworthy.

The airline's chief pilot was giving a newly-hired pilot a required competency/proficiency check. Memory data from the airplane's global positioning system showed the airplane made
steep 360-degree turns to the left and right before continuing towards a practice area at gradually decreasing airspeed and altitude. A low cloud ceiling prevailed. Witnesses said they
heard both engines "sputter, then quit," and saw the airplane clear a grove of trees, stall, and strike the ground. The landing gear was down and the flaps were in the approach setting. Both propellers were in the low pitch/high rpm setting, and bore little rotational signatures. Both engine fuel supply lines contained only residual fuel. Those familiar with the chief pilot's flying practices stated that he always followed a certain routine when giving a check ride. The routine consisted of the following: After performing steep 360-degree turns, he would ask the trainee to configure the airplane for landing and demonstrate minimum control maneuvers. Prior to executing steep turns, he would turn the boost pumps on. At the completion of the maneuver, the pumps would be turned off. The investigation revealed that there are unguarded fuel shutoff switches next to the boost pumps, and the circumstances of the accident are consistent with the these fuel shutoff switches being inadvertently placed in the off position, instead of the fuel boost pumps.

According to witnesses, the airplane departed runway 35 and was observed flying in and out of the clouds. Several of the witnesses observed the airplane initiate a turn to the west. One witnesses commented that it was dark but he could still see the silhouette of the airplane. He observed the airplane descend below the trees. All of the witnesses reported flames and "fireballs." On scene evidence was consistent with the airplane impacting trees in a left turn. The airplane was destroyed. An examination of the airplane, flight controls, engines, and remaining systems revealed no anomalies. Weather observations and radar data depicted low clouds, and restricted visibility due to rain and mist, in the vicinity of the airport. Toxicological examination revealed cetirizine, an antihistamine, consistent with use within the previous 12 hours. Most studies have not found any significant impairment from the medication, though it is reported to cause substantial sedation in some individuals.