Kansas

According to the flight crew, they exited the clouds approximately 250 feet above ground level, slightly left of the runway centerline. The pilot not flying took control of the airplane and adjusted the course to the right. The airplane rolled hard to the right and when the pilot corrected to the left, the airplane rolled hard to the left. The airplane impacted the ground in a right wing low attitude, resulting in substantial damage. Further examination and testing revealed anomalies with the yaw damper and spoileron computer. According to the manufacturer, these anomalies would not have prevented control of the airplane. Greater control wheel displacement and force to achieve a desired roll rate when compared with an operative spoileron system would be required. The result would be a slightly higher workload for the pilot, particularly in turbulence or crosswind conditions. An examination of the remaining systems revealed no anomalies.

Prior to the flight, the pilot obtained a weather briefing which included an AIRMET for IFR conditions and an AIRMET for icing that was "just off to the north." According to air traffic control (ATC) information, the en route portion of the flight was uneventful. ATC cleared the pilot for an ILS approach to runway 35, and the pilot acknowledged the approach clearance. When the airplane reached the outer marker ATC approved the pilot for a frequency change to the common traffic advisory frequency. The pilot acknowledged the frequency change, and no further communications were received from the pilot by ATC. Witnesses observed the airplane approximately 200 feet above ground level (agl) on a northwesterly heading, west of runway 35. The airplane then entered a climbing left turn to the south and disappeared into the overcast cloud layer. Shortly thereafter, the witness observed the airplane in a "20 degree nose down, wings level attitude" on a southeasterly heading. The witness then lost sight of the airplane due to hangars obstructing his view. At the time of the accident, the witness stated that the ceiling was approximately 500 foot overcast with mist. The published missed approach procedure instructed the pilot to initiate a climbing left turn to a fix and hold. Examination of the accident site revealed the airplane impacted the terrain in a right wing, nose-low attitude. No ground impact marks were noted except in the immediate vicinity of the wing leading edges, engines, and propeller assemblies. The flaps and landing gear were in the extended position. The leading edge surfaces of the vertical and horizontal stabilizers revealed 1/4 to 1/2 inches of clear ice. The upper fuselage antenna displayed 1/4 to 1/2 inches of clear ice. Local authorities reported observing a "layer of ice" on the leading edges of both wings when they arrived to the accident site. Examination of the airframe and engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operations.

The airplane received substantial damage on impact with trees, terrain, and a residence about one mile from the departure airport during instrument meteorological conditions. The airport elevation was 1,096 feet mean sea level. The personal flight was operating on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan with a filed equipment suffix designating that the airplane was equipped with a Global Positioning System. Airplane records indicate that the airplane was equipped with a GPS but was not approved for IFR navigation. The pilot was issued a departure clearance to 3,000 feet and heading of 130 degrees. Radar data indicates that the airplane leveled off at an altitude approximately 2,000 feet during a 32 second period while executing a right turn to the assigned heading. Witnesses reported that the airplane impacted terrain in a right wing nose low attitude. Wreckage distribution and ground scarring was indicative of a high-speed impact with terrain. No anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane were noted. The calculated airplane weight was approximately 597 lbs above the maximum gross weight of the airplane.

The emergency medical services (EMS) airplane was destroyed by terrain impact and post impact fire about 7 nautical miles (nm) west of its destination airport, Dodge City Regional Airport (DDC), Dodge City, Kansas. The 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 positioning flight departed the Wichita Mid-Continental Airport (ICT), Wichita, Kansas, about 0215 central standard time and was en route to DDC. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed when the accident occurred about 0257 central standard time. The flight had been on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan, but the pilot cancelled the IFR flight plan about 34 nm east of DDC and initiated a descent under visual flight rules. Radar track data indicated that the airplane maintained a magnetic course of about 265 degrees during the flight from ICT to DDC. The rate of descent was about 850 to 950 feet per minute. During the descent, the airplane flew past the airport on a 270 degree course. Witnesses in the area reported hearing the engine noise of a low-flying airplane followed by the sound of impact. One of the witnesses described the engine noise as sounding like the engines were at "full throttle." The on-site inspection revealed that the airplane impacted the terrain in a gear-up, wings-level attitude. The inspection of the airplane revealed no anomalies to the airframe or engines. A review of the pilot's 72-hour history before the accident revealed that it had been 14 hours and 32 minutes from the time the pilot reported for duty about 1225 central standard time until the time of the accident. It had been 20 hours 57 minutes from the time the pilot awoke (0600) on the morning before the accident until the time of the accident. No evidence of pilot impairment due to carbon monoxide, drugs, or medical incapacitation was found. The accident occurred during a time of day that was well past the pilot's normal bedtime and also at a time of day when the physiological need to sleep is especially strong. The findings from a Safety Board's human performance analysis indicates that the pilot was likely fatigued. A review of 14 CFR 135.267 indicated that the pilot had adhered to the flight time limitations and rest requirements specified in the regulation.

The airplane was destroyed during an attempted forced landing following an in-flight fire in cruise flight. The pilot was reported to be flying the airplane to an airport in order to have maintenance work performed on the right engine due to a boost problem. It was reported that the pilot had another mechanic at another airport look at the airplane. A work order for a transient airplane was found that indicated work performed on the right engine turbocharger system about 1 month before the accident. The work order shows that the wastegate oil filter was found clogged and collapsed and that it was cleaned, straightened and reinstalled. The pilot operated the airplane with a right engine boost problem. The boost problem with the right engine is evidenced by the previous work order, the excessive amount of runway used during takeoff, the reported smoke from the right engine after takeoff, and the airplane not climbing as expected after takeoff. Due to the reduced power from the right engine, the pilot was required to apply left brake in order to maintain directional control during takeoff, as evidenced by the blued left brake disk with metal transfer into the relief holes and slots. As a result of the pilot using left brake during takeoff, a fire erupted in the left wheel well, which spread to the aft fuselage. This is evidenced by the sooting, fire, and heat damage to the wheel well, the carpet above the wheel well, and aft fuselage. The fuselage immediately behind the baggage compartment had extensive fire damage. The damage in this area included blistered paint on the upper surface, and a two foot square section of the left fuselage skin that was burned away. The area that was burned away was in the vicinity of the hydraulic fluid reservoir. The aluminum hydraulic fluid reservoir was not found, only the steel filler neck, mounting screws, and cap were found. No evidence of fire was found within the right main landing gear wheel well or in the engine compartments. A witness reported seeing the airplane flying south and trailing smoke then banking to the left making a complete circle before descending and ultimately impacting the ground.

Impact forces and fire destroyed the airplane when it impacted the terrain after a loss of control during cruise flight. The pilot received a weather brief by AFSS prior to departure concerning the IFR conditions along the route of flight, which included, rain, freezing rain, icing, turbulence, and snow. The cloud tops were forecast to be 25,000 feet. The pilot filed a flight plan with a cruise flight level of 28,000 feet. About 32 minutes after takeoff, at 1345:58, the pilot reported he had an attitude gyro problem and that he was hand flying the airplane. The airplane's altitude remained at about 28,000 feet for the next seven minutes. At 1352:46, the pilot stated he had an emergency, but at 1352:53, the pilot stated, "Uh it came back on never mind." At 1353:26, the pilot stated, "I need to get to uh anywhere I can get a visual." At 1353:56, the airplane was cleared to climb to 31,000 feet, and radar data indicated the airplane was currently at 27,000 feet. The radar data indicated the airplane went into a series of steep descents and climbs over the next 4.5 minutes until radar contact was lost at 2,500 feet. The pilot of a commercial airline who was flying in the same sector as the accident airplane reported that he heard the accident pilot state that he was in a spin. The commercial airline pilot stated they were flying at 33,000 feet and were "barely above the tops" of the clouds. The airplane impacted the terrain in a steep nose down attitude and burst into flames. The engines, flight controls, and flight instruments did not exhibit any pre-existing anomalies. A witness reported that two days prior to the accident, the pilot had advised him that the airplane's attitude gyro was having problems. There was no record that the pilot had the attitude gyro inspected prior to the accident. A witness reported the pilot routinely flew with the autopilot engaged soon after takeoff. He reported that he had never observed the pilot hand-fly the airplane in instrument conditions.

The pilot said that the copilot was flying a visual approach to runway 15 at the Lawrence Municipal Airport, Lawrence, Kansas. The pilot said, "With gear down and full flaps at approximately 15 to 20 feet above the runway and 115 KTS, the nose abruptly dropped and there was no elevator effectiveness with the yoke pulled back to the mechanical stop." The pilot said, "After landing, I noticed that the stabilizer trim indicated full nose down in the cockpit and, upon exterior inspection, the stab was in that position." The copilot said, "I made my turn to base and proceeded to make my turn to final. No problems with the controllability were noted at this time. The turn to final was made and the airplane was lined up with the runway on final approach with normal glide path. My altitude was dropping normally and my airspeed was approximately 140 knots." The copilot said, "When it got time to pull the power back to idle for landing our airspeed was approximately 110 knots and power was reduced. At that point in time the nose of the aircraft seemed to pitch over towards the runway and increase speed. I pulled back on the yoke to raise the nose and at that same instance the pilot recognized the pitch over and pulled back on the yoke at the same time. The yoke did not seem to pull all of the way to its full extent of travel and felt to mechanically stop at about 3/4 the way travel. Even with both pilot's pulling on the yoke it seemed unresponsive and failed to raise the nose back to a proper landing attitude. The aircraft hit the runway very hard and came to a stop on the runway." A preliminary inspection of the airplane showed the stabilizer positioned at 4 degrees nose down. An examination of the airplane's systems revealed no anomalies.

During a test flight, the airplane encountered an elevator system oscillation while in a high speed dive outside the normal operating envelope. The 17 second oscillation was recorded on the cockpit voice recorder and had an average frequency of 28 Hz. The aft elevator sector clevis (p/n 2331510-32) fractured due to reverse bending fatigue caused by vibration, resulting in a complete loss of elevator control. The flight crew reported that pitch control was established by using horizontal stabilizer pitch trim. The flightcrew stated that during final approach to runway 17 (13,337 feet by 200 feet, dry/asphalt) the aircraft's nose began to drop and that the flying pilot was unable to raise the nose using a combination of horizontal stabilizer trim and engine power. The aircraft landed short of the runway, striking an airport perimeter fence and a berm. The surface winds were from the south at 23 knots, gusting to 32 knots.

On October 10, 2000, at 1452 central daylight time, a Canadair Challenger CL-600-2B16 (CL604) (Canadian registration C-FTBZ and operated by Bombardier Incorporated) was destroyed on impact with terrain and postimpact fire during initial climb from runway 19R at Wichita Mid-Continent Airport (ICT), Wichita, Kansas. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as an experimental test flight. The pilot and flight test engineer were killed. The copilot was seriously injured and died 36 days later.